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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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Tolani v. Med. Mut. of Ohio
| 114356 | Civ.R. 56, motion for summary judgment, dispute of material fact, breach of contract, bad faith, 45 CFR 155.305, intent to reside, lawful presence, B-2 visa. Ajit Tolani (“Ajit”) and Shruti Tolani sued Medical Mutual of Ohio (“MMO”) for breach of contract and bad faith following recission of their health-insurance coverage. A dispute of material fact existed regarding whether Ajit intentionally misrepresented information to MMO when applying for health insurance, as the policy required for MMO to rescind. Despite MMO’s assertions that Ajit’s temporary-visa status prevented him from intending to reside in the service area or reasonably expecting to be lawfully present in the service area under the Affordable Care Act, MMO submitted no evidence regarding what information Ajit provided it when he applied for the policy. As such, the court erred in granting summary judgment. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
12/18/2025
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12/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5624 |
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State v. Day
| 114582 | Weight of the evidence; sufficiency of the evidence; self-defense; defense of others; jury instructions; admission of evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel; invited error. The conviction for having weapons while under disability was supported by sufficient evidence where the appellant claimed self-defense thus admitting the elements of the offense and the State established that appellant did not act in self-defense. Furthermore, all of the convictions were supported by the greater weight of the evidence, where the State established that appellant did not have a reasonable belief that he was in danger of death or great bodily harm and that he used unreasonable force based on the circumstances. The trial court did not err when it denied a request for an instruction on the lesser included offense of reckless homicide where the evidence did not establish that the appellant was not guilty of the greater offense but guilty of the lesser offense. The trial court did not err when it refused to give an instruction on defense of others, where the evidence failed to establish that appellant had a reasonable and/or an honest belief that he was in immediate or imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. Where the parties submitted agreed jury instructions, the appellant cannot benefit from an error he invited by challenging those same instructions on appeal. The trial court did not err when it failed to include a limiting instruction on evidence of prior convictions where the defense did not object to the instructions and the evidence did not reflect that the jury impermissibly used the evidence to determine the verdicts. Furthermore, appellant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by admission. Appellant failed to sufficiently brief or argue how the jury was prejudiced by the trial court’s decision not to permit evidence that was presented to the jury at trial to be submitted to the jury during deliberations. Finally, appellant failed to establish he received ineffective assistance of counsel where he failed to establish that his lawyer’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that he was prejudiced by that conduct. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
12/18/2025
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12/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5625 |
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State v. Foster
| 114642 | Motion to suppress; investigatory traffic stop; reasonable suspicion that vehicle was used in murder; ineffective assistance of counsel; failure to object. Denial of multiple motions to suppress affirmed. Surveillance camera footage and eyewitness testimony established that a vehicle was used in a fatal shooting. A subsequent investigatory stop of the vehicle was justified under the Fourth Amendment because the police had reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was involved in a completed felony. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the admission of evidence that the court previously ruled was admissible after a suppression hearing. There is no need to re-object to evidence admitted after a ruled-upon suppression motion. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
12/18/2025
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12/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5626 |
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Baraona v. SMS Fin., L.L.C.
| 114718 | Summary judgment; res judicata limits in garnishment; R.C. 2716.13(C); laches waived as unpled; corporate dissolution; R.C. 1701.88; chain of title; lis pendens; remand. Claim preclusion arising from a prior garnishment does not bar later challenges to judgment ownership or enforceability because garnishment is a limited statutory proceeding that precludes objections to the judgment. Laches was forfeited where not pleaded as an affirmative defense. Genuine issues of material fact remain regarding chain of title and whether post-dissolution actions fell within R.C. 1701.88’s winding-up authority, rendering summary judgment improper on those issues and on tort claims dependent on ownership. Lis pendens renders mid-litigation transfers subject to the case outcome rather than void. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
12/18/2025
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12/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5627 |
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Miles v. Cleveland Clinic Health Sys. E. Region
| 114769 | Removal of juror for cause; R.C. 2313.17; fair, impartial, and unbiased juror; voir dire; conflicting statements; defer to trial court; Batson challenge; exclusion of expert medical testimony; motion in limine; proffer; preserve for review on appeal; irrelevant evidence; inadmissible; unfairly prejudicial. Where the record shows the defendants-appellees established the existence of facts showing a potential juror’s inability to serve as a fair, impartial, and unbiased juror, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted defense counsel’s motion to excuse the juror for cause. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff-appellant’s motion to excuse potential jurors for cause because the jurors indicated they could be fair, impartial, and unbiased. This court defers to the trial court’s assessment of any contradictory statements by the jurors, relying on the prospective jurors’ demeanor and nonverbal characteristics observed during voir dire. The plaintiff-appellant did not demonstrate the removal of African-American jurors satisfied the requirements of Batson and, thus, the trial court’s rejection of the Batson challenge was not clearly erroneous. Following the trial court’s grant of a motion in limine in favor of defendants-appellees, plaintiff-appellant’s proffer of evidence at trial addressed only one issue raised in the motion and, accordingly, only that one issue was preserved for review on appeal. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the introduction of irrelevant evidence. And where the introduction of evidence about bed bugs was not unfairly prejudicial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the introduction of the evidence. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
12/18/2025
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12/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5628 |
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State v. Jemison
| 114844 | Admission of evidence; expert testimony; Crim.R. 16; expert report; witnesses; sufficiency of the evidence; domestic violence; knowingly; child endangering; substantial risk; furthermore clause; prior convictions; R.C. 2945.75(B)(1); manifest weight of the evidence; jury instructions; plain error. Appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of the expert witness, the police officers, or the victim. Appellant did not demonstrate plain error with regard to the jury instructions regarding his prior convictions. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
12/18/2025
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12/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5629 |
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Mikra, L.L.C. v. Taylor
| 114936 | Forcible entry and detainer; damages; motion for relief from judgment; motion to stay; magistrate’s decision; adoption of magistrate’s decision; abuse of discretion; affidavit; transcript; objections to magistrate’s decision; eviction; restitution. The trial court did not err in overruling the objections to the magistrate’s decision and did not abuse its discretion in adopting the magistrate’s decision in a forcible-entry-and-detainer action, where the objecting party failed to file a transcript of proceedings or an affidavit of evidence as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii). | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
12/18/2025
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12/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5630 |
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Fauvel v. Pacific E. Coventry, Inc.
| 114968 | Civ.R. 12(C); judgment on the pleadings; de novo; blended analysis; foreign-natural test; reasonable-expectation test; Berkheimer v. REKM, L.L.C. Judgment on the pleadings was error where the court was required to conduct a fact-specific analysis in food-based negligence case. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
12/18/2025
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12/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5631 |
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State v. Akins
| 114971 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; merger of offenses; Brady violation; consecutive sentences. Judgment affirmed. The record demonstrates that appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in refusing to merge his failure-to-comply convictions because the offenses were dissimilar in import or significance. The trial court also did not err in denying appellant’s motion for a mistrial based on an alleged Brady violation because the lost evidence was not material evidence within the meaning of Brady. The trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences for appellant’s two aggravated-vehicular-assault convictions was proper because this court could not clearly and convincingly find that the record did not support the trial court’s findings. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
12/18/2025
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12/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5632 |
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State v. Anderson
| 114979 | Felonious assault; R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); domestic violence; R.C. 2919.25(A); self-defense; manifest weight; mistrial; Evid.R. 902(11). Defendant’s convictions were affirmed. The State met its burden of disproving that the defendant acted in self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court did not err when it denied the defendant's request for a mistrial because the victim’s reference at trial that she had to get him out of jail was fleeting and the trial court immediately gave the jury a curative instruction. And the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the victim’s medical records because the State sent the records to the defendant five months before trial. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
12/18/2025
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12/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5633 |
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Lakewood v. M.T.S.
| 114988 | Motion to seal the case; ex parte protection order; R.C. 2903.214(G)(2); R.C. 2953.32. Affirmed. Appellant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to seal the case containing his conviction for violating an ex parte protection order. Appellant asserted that R.C. 2903.214(G)(2) required sealing of the case after the denial of a protection order. On appeal, the court found that R.C. 2903.214(G)(2) was only applicable to the common pleas court where the civil stalking protection order was filed, not to the municipal court where the violation of the ex parte protection order was prosecuted. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
12/18/2025
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12/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5634 |
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State v. Gerhardt
| 115010 | Ineffective assistance of counsel; deficient performance; prejudice; speculation. Judgment affirmed. Appellant failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that appellant was prejudiced by counsel’s representation. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
12/18/2025
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12/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5635 |
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State v. Kilton
| 115048 | Impact statements; detective; R.C. 2929.19(A); plain error. - The trial court did not commit plain error in allowing the investigating detective to offer statements at sentencing about his investigation and the defendant’s conduct. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
12/18/2025
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12/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5636 |
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State v. Murray
| 115076 | Mandatory fine; indigent; unable to pay; ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial court properly imposed a mandatory fine where defendant, who may have been indigent, was able to pay the fine while in prison. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file affidavit of indigency in order to avoid mandatory fine because the defendant was able to pay the fine in prison and establishing indigency would not have changed that fact. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
12/18/2025
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12/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5637 |
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Eastlake Milford, L.L.C. v. Jones
| 115082 | Accelerated appeal; conversion; civil theft; R.C. 2913.02(A); R.C. 2307.61(A); treble damages; punitive damages; R.C. 2315.21(C); summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); unopposed; requests for admission; Civ.R. 36; service; Civ.R. 4.6(D); due process; personally liable; App.R. 16(A)(7); pro se. On an accelerated appeal, the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment against appellant on claims for conversion and civil theft was affirmed. Requests for admission were deemed admitted pursuant to Civ.R. 36, service was properly made pursuant to Civ.R. 4.6(D), no violation of due process occurred, and the evidence supported appellees’ claims. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
12/18/2025
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12/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5638 |
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In re G.V.W.
| 115130 | Personal jurisdiction; long-arm jurisdiction; R.C. 3111.06(B); R.C. 2307.382; paternity action; Civ.R. 4.3; transacting business in Ohio; waiver of lack-of-jurisdiction defense; Civ.R. 12(H)(1); default hearing; juvenile court, sua sponte, raises defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. The juvenile court did not err when it found it lacked personal jurisdiction over the alleged father in a paternity action because the plaintiff-appellant did not demonstrate the alleged father’s acts constituted business transactions as required under R.C. 2307.382(A)(1), Ohio’s long-arm jurisdiction statute. The alleged father’s failure to enter an appearance in a paternity action did not constitute a waiver of his defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. And where the alleged father did not waive his defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, the juvenile court could raise the defense sua sponte. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
12/18/2025
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12/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5639 |
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R.C. v. R.A.C.
| 115293 | Accelerated appeal; App.R. 11.1; Cuyahoga C.P., Domestic Relations Loc.R. 15(B); due process. Judgment reversed and remanded. The trial court abused its discretion by granting defendant-appellee’s motion prior to the 14-day deadline established by Cuyahoga C.P., Domestic Relations Loc.R. 15(B), depriving plaintiff-appellant of the opportunity to respond. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
12/18/2025
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12/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5640 |
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State v. Fields
| 109664 | Application to reopen appeal; App.R. 26(B); untimely application; good cause; genuine issue of a colorable claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. Application to reopen appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B) denied. Application was filed beyond the 90-day period for filing a timely application under App.R. 26(B)(1) and (2)(b). Applicant failed to show good cause for the untimely filing of the application. Further, applicant failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of a colorable claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel based on appellate counsel’s failure to advance assignments of error related to sentencing on multiple firearm specifications and an alleged multiplicitous indictment. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
12/17/2025
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12/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5623 |
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State v. Morgan
| 114650 | R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c), substantial-impairment rape, prejudicial joinder, motion to sever, simple and direct, Crim.R. 14, sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant appealed his conviction for rape. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to sever rape allegations involving separate women on separate dates where the State’s presentation of evidence was simple and direct. There was no overlap between the witnesses to each allegation. The court also did not abuse its discretion by not holding a hearing on the motion to sever or ordering the State to provide defendant’s own audio statements that only concerned one of the rape allegations, of which he was found not guilty. Sufficient evidence supported appellant’s conviction where his DNA was found in victim’s vagina, they had previously been drinking alcohol together, and appellant observed victim struggling to stand on her own. Use of the word “survivor” was not an error where witness used the word generically and the court granted objection to single use of the word to describe a specific victim. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5510 |
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Phillips v. Independence
| 114685 | R.C. 2744.02; political-subdivision immunity; negligence; proprietary function; governmental function; summary judgment; genuine issue of material fact. Summary judgment in favor of the city was appropriate where none of the claimed exceptions to political-subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744.02 applied. The accident did not involve a proprietary function, a physical defect on the building or grounds of the city, or a negligent failure to keep roads in good repair. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5511 |
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State v. Smith
| 114842 | Grand Jury; proceedings; transcript; evidence; particularized need; secrecy; disclosure; speculation; cost; burden; Crim.R. 6(E); R.C. 2939.11. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s petition for disclosure of grand-jury proceedings because the appellant failed to demonstrate a particularized need. The appellant’s speculation that the transcripts might be useful to impeach witnesses in a separate civil case, and that obtaining the information independently would be burdensome, was insufficient to warrant disclosure. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5512 |
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State v. Johnson
| 114874 | Plea; knowing; voluntary; intelligent; Crim.R. 11; colloquy; burden of proof; beyond a reasonable doubt; presumption of innocence; presumed innocent; Alford plea. Although the trial court did not directly answer the defendant’s question regarding the meaning of the presumption of innocence, it did not err in accepting the appellant’s guilty pleas. The record reflects that the court fully complied with Crim.R. 11 by advising the appellant of the constitutional rights he was waiving, including the State’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant affirmed his understanding of this right and raised no further questions. Moreover, the court did not err by accepting the guilty plea without conducting an additional inquiry into the factual basis for the plea as would be required for an Alford plea. An Alford plea was not entered because the defendant did not assert his innocence at the time of the plea. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5513 |
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State v. Orr
| 114878 | Crim.R. 33; motion for leave to file motion for new trial; affidavit requirements; unsworn statements are not evidence; petition for postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21(A)(2); successive petition; lack of jurisdiction; R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a); not unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts; Brady violation; no suppression; vexatious litigator declaration; Loc.App.R. 3(A). Appellant’s motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial and petition for postconviction relief were both properly denied by the trial court. Appellant’s motion for leave was based on alleged “new evidence,” but the motion only contained handwritten letters that did not contain the proper requirements to be an affidavit and were therefore merely unsworn statements which are not evidence. As such, appellant was unable to prove there was any “new evidence” to support his motion and it was properly denied. Similarly, his successive petition, which alleged suppressed evidence and that the trial court failed to consider the new evidence from a potential witness was unsupported. Appellant failed to present any evidence that there was suppressed evidence at trial. Further, appellant did not attach the alleged affidavits of the new potential witness or provide any other evidence to support his allegation that there was a new witness the trial court did not consider. Wherefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for leave and successive petition. Because of Orr’s repeated frivolous filings, this court sua sponte declares him a vexatious litigator pursuant to Loc.App.R. 3(A). | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5514 |
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State v. Moses
| 114937 | Ineffective assistance of counsel; R.C. 2903.13; assault; jury nullification; self-defense; entrapment. Affirmed. Defendant’s conviction for assaulting two law enforcement officers while they restrained her from striking at another officer is affirmed because trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to raise an insanity, self-defense, or entrapment defense, none of which is applicable. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5515 |
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Garrett v. Jackson
| 114939 | New arguments on appeal; law-of-the-case doctrine; Civ.R. 38(D); the mandate rule; pro se litigants. Affirmed. The trial court’s award of damages to appellee is affirmed because appellant raised new arguments on appeal, a jury demand issue was determined in a previous appeal, and the trial court followed the appellate court’s mandate on remand. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5516 |
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Parma v. Gardner
| 114945 | Venue; circumstantial evidence; sufficiency; resisting arrest; law enforcement officer; peace officer; continuance; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. Venue may be established by circumstantial evidence. Here, there was sufficient evidence that venue was established. In addition, there was sufficient evidence that the witness was a police officer. Finally, the trial court’s decision to deny appellant’s request for continuance on the day of trial was not an abuse of discretion. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5517 |
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Hill v. Kiernan
| 114964 | R.C. Ch. 2744; R.C. 2744.02; R.C. 2744.03(A)(6); political-subdivision immunity; political-subdivision employee immunity; willful, wanton or reckless conduct; summary judgment. Judgment affirmed, and case remanded. The trial court properly denied summary judgment under Civ.R. 56(C) because genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute regarding the cause of the subject motor vehicle accident and whether appellant Kiernan’s actions constitute willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. Appellants are not entitled to immunity under R.C. Ch. 2744 as a matter of law. Therefore, summary judgment is improper. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5518 |
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JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Yoo
| 114993 | Pro se; sovereign citizen; subject-matter jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction; motions; credit card; motion to dismiss; counterclaim; motion for summary judgment, Civ.R. 56(C); App.R. 3; App.R. 4; res judicata; bootstrapping. The trial court had jurisdiction over the case and appellant’s person. This court has routinely rejected sovereign citizen claims. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee. The evidence presented showed that appellant took out a credit card, stopped paying on the credit card, and owed money on the credit card. Appellant failed to show any material issues of fact; therefore, he was not entitled to a jury trial. Motions not ruled upon are deemed denied after a final judgment has been entered. Appellant did not timely appeal the trial court’s granting of appellee’s motion to dismiss his counterclaim. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5519 |
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State v. Terry
| 115016 | Finalized judgment of conviction; criminal sentence; final order; increased sentence; harsher sentence; due-process rights; defendant present at criminal proceedings; record affirmatively indicates defendant’s absence; defense counsel’s opportunity to object. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence on the defendant-appellant, remanded the defendant-appellant, and after a recess, unexpectedly resumed the hearing and increased the sentence on one conviction by one year. The initial sentence — a proclamation in open court — was not a final order because it had not been journalized. Defense counsel conceded the new sentence complied with the statutory requirements and the new sentence was supported by the facts. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court’s subsequent change in the defendant-appellant’s felonious-assault sentence was clearly and convincingly not supported by the record. Additionally, the defendant-appellant’s due-process rights were not violated because the record did not affirmatively indicate he was absent when the trial court imposed the harsher sentence, and defense counsel was present and objected to the increased sentence. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5520 |
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State v. Beard
| 115019 | Sufficiency of the evidence; failure to comply; substantial risk of physical harm; manifest weight of the evidence; having weapons while under disability; credibility of witnesses. Defendant was convicted of failure to comply with the felony-enhancement provision, finding that while committing the offense, he operated a motor vehicle in a way that caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm. The court found that the felony-enhancement finding was supported by sufficient evidence and that that finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The offender was parked in a parking lot when officers pulled behind him, activated their lights, approached his vehicle, and asked him turn off his car. Defendant refused and took off. The testimony of an officer on scene, along with the officer’s body-camera footage showed defendant’s vehicle pull out of the parking spot into another spot, fail to stop before entering the aisle of the parking lot, and fail to make a full stop at a stop sign. Police attempted to follow, but defendant was gone by the time officers returned to their vehicles and exited the parking lot. This evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant operated his vehicle in a way that caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm. Defendant also alleges that because of inconsistencies and contradictions of some of the State’s witnesses, his conviction for having weapons while under disability was against the manifest weight of the evidence because these witnesses’ testimony was the only evidence demonstrating that defendant possessed a firearm that night. The court ruled that the jury was in the best position to weigh the credibility of the witness testimony. As such, the defendant failed to demonstrate that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5521 |
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State v. H.M.
| 115043 | Expungement; sealing; restitution; final discharge; cognovit note; eligible offender; rehabilitation. The judgment granting the defendant’s motion to seal or expunge is vacated. Although the Ohio Supreme Court Client Security Fund paid the victim the amount of restitution the trial court ordered the defendant to pay, the defendant has not fully reimbursed the Fund as ordered. The defendant signed a cognovit note for the amount of his remaining balance owed to the victim, but a cognovit note is not payment in full sufficient to constitute final discharge for the purpose of sealing or expunging a conviction. Further, the defendant failed to present testimony or evidence that the other statutory requirements for sealing or expungement were met. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5522 |
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Schmidt v. Lincoln Elec. Co.
| 115084 | Workers’ compensation; spinal stenosis; expert opinions; manifest weight; high-dose steroids. The trial court’s judgment finding that plaintiff was entitled to additional workers’ compensation benefits was not against the manifest weight of the evidence even though there were conflicting expert opinions where there was evidence corroborating the plaintiff’s expert opinion and there was no evidence corroborating the employer’s expert opinion. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5523 |
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Howard Hanna v. Ford
| 115086 | Standing; jurisdiction; subject-matter jurisdiction; money damages; R.C. 1923.081; Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 2012-Ohio-5017; Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275; defense; timely preserved; capacity to sue; real party in interest; Civ.R. 9(A); Civ.R. 17(A); Civ.R. 8(C). Judgment affirmed. We decline to adopt the defendant-appellant’s broad conclusion that lack of standing always presents a nonwaivable-jurisdictional issue that can be raised at any point in a proceeding. Instead, we find that certain standing-related objections, especially those inconsequential to a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, can be waived if they are not timely preserved. Here, the defendant-appellant’s lack-of-standing argument does not present a nonwaivable-jurisdictional question; rather, the defendant-appellant challenges the plaintiff-appellee’s capacity to sue and questions whether plaintiff-appellee is the real party in interest — both of which are waivable defenses. Defendant-appellant’s answer did not include lack-of-capacity-to-sue or real-party-in-interest defenses. Nor did defendant-appellant seek to amend her answer to preserve those defenses. Therefore, defendant-appellant waived any lack-of-capacity or real-party-in-interest defenses and cannot subsequently raise them, even under the guise of standing. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5524 |
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State v. Conley
| 115106 | Consecutive sentences; failure to comply; mandatory consecutive term; operation of law; R.C. 2921.331(B); R.C. 2921.331(D); R.C. 2929.331(C)(3); R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); contrary to law. Judgment affirmed. The trial court properly ordered appellant’s 18-month prison term for fourth-degree failure to comply to run consecutively to his concurrent six-month prison terms for breaking and entering and attempted theft. R.C. 2921.331(D) mandates that any prison term imposed for a violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) be served consecutively to any other prison term, removing the trial court’s discretion and eliminating any need for consecutive-sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). The sentence was therefore not contrary to law under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). The record indicated that the trial court understood and applied the statutory mandate, advising appellant at the plea hearing that any prison term for failure to comply “must be consecutive” and stating at the sentencing hearing that the sentence was “consecutive pursuant to law.” Finally, because the R.C. 2921.331(D) mandate extends to prison terms imposed in different cases, the aggregate 24-month sentence was valid. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5525 |
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State v. Jones
| 115113 | Consecutive sentences; findings; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); clearly and convincingly; findings supported by the record. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences. Appellant failed to demonstrate that the record clearly and convincingly did not support the imposition of consecutive sentences. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5526 |
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State v. Shelton
| 115171 | Felony sentencing; maximum sentence; contrary to law; drive-by shooting; seriousness of offense; remorse; risk of recidivism; concurrent sentence; firearm specification; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Judgment affirmed. After appellant pled guilty to felonious assault with a one-year firearm specification, improper discharge of a firearm into a habitation, and attempted having a weapon while under disability, the trial court imposed concurrent terms of eight years on each second-degree felony and 18 months on the attempted weapon-under-disability count, plus a consecutive one-year firearm specification. The aggregate maximum state sentence was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) where the sentencing entries stated that the trial court had considered all required factors of law and found prison consistent with R.C. 2929.11. In addition, the sentencing transcript reflected the trial court’s consideration of the seriousness of the drive-by shooting, appellant’s lack of genuine remorse, and his risk of recidivism under R.C. 2929.12. An appellate tribunal lacks the authority to reweigh those factors or substitute its judgment for the trial court’s assessments. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5527 |
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In re F.B.
| 115271 | Parental rights; permanent custody; clear and convincing evidence; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); best interests of the children; manifest weight of the evidence; sufficiency of the evidence; reasonable efforts. It was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the juvenile court granted permanent custody of the children to the agency. The juvenile court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(D)(1) were supported by sufficient evidence. Mother was unable to remedy the conditions that caused the children to be placed outside the children’s home, which included substance-abuse concerns, along with a number of other concerns that caused the removal of the children from the home. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5528 |
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State v. Baker
| 115298 | Conceded error; postrelease control; jail-time credit; R.C. 2967.191(A); “arising out of the offense.” The trial court erred where it awarded defendant-appellee jail-time credit for days served on a prior, unrelated offense. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5529 |
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State v. Silver
| 114499 | App.R. 26(B); ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, R.C. 2929.04(A), capital specifications, and authentic assignments of error. This court denied the defendant’s App.R. 26(B) application to reopen. He did not list assignments of error as required by App.R. 26(B)(2)(c). He argued that he was not provided with the safeguards of a capital case, but he was not tried in a capital case pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A). | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
12/9/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5509 |
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State v. Richards
| 115849 | Habeas corpus, excessive bond, deprivation of justice, R.C. 2725.04, commitment papers, verification, proper respondent, R.C. 2969.25, prior lawsuit affidavit, and proper poverty affidavit. This court sua sponte dismissed a petition for habeas corpus for excessive bond and deprivation of justice because the petition had multiple fatal pleading defects pursuant to R.C. 2725.04 and 2969.25: failure to attach commitment papers, failure to verify, failure to attach prior lawsuit affidavit, failure to attach proper poverty affidavit, and failure to name a proper respondent. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
12/9/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5531 |
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Johnson v. Torres-Lugo
| 115375 | Mandamus; Civ.R. 10(A); R.C. 2731.04; moot. It is well settled that the failure to properly caption a mandamus action is sufficient grounds for denying the writ. In addition, R.C. 2731.04 provides that an application for a writ of mandamus must be brought in the name of the state on the relation of the person applying. Finally, relief is unwarranted because the request for a writ of mandamus is moot. This court will not compel the performance of a duty that has already been performed. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
12/5/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5530 |
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N. Star Med. Research, L.L.C. v. Kozlovich
| 114598 | Small claims court; motion for continuance; discretion of the court; ruling on discovery matters; subject-matter jurisdiction; R.C. 1925.02; small-claims complaint; R.C. 1925.04; unauthorized practice of law; R.C. 1925.17; inadmissible evidence; Evid.R. 101(C)(8); indispensable party; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; fraud upon the court. The municipal court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant-appellant’s third motion to continue the hearing or when the court ruled on all properly filed motions on the hearing date. The municipal court’s small claims division had jurisdiction over plaintiff-appellee’s complaint pursuant to R.C. 1925.02, and the complaint sufficiently identified the amount and nature of the claim thereby meeting the statutory requirements of R.C. 1925.04. The plaintiff-appellee’s chief operating officer prepared and filed a complaint with a small claims court and presented the contract case on behalf of her corporation. Where the chief operating officer acted within the parameters of R.C. 1925.17 and did not engage in cross-examination, argument, or other acts of advocacy, she did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law. The municipal court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the introduction of specific evidence allegedly in contravention to the Ohio Rules of Evidence because Evid.R. 101(D)(8) states those rules do not apply in small claims court. This court may disregard an assigned error where the defendant-appellant failed to cite any legal authority in support of his argument. The defendant-appellant did not present meritorious arguments in support of his fraud-upon-the-court claim. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
12/4/2025
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12/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5410 |
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State v. Nicholson
| 114659 | R.C. 2929.19; R.C. 2967.271(F); R.C. 2929.13(F); mandatory service; Reagan Tokes Law advisements. Vacated and remanded. The trial court erred by imposing the four- to six-year non-life indefinite term as a mandatory prison sentence that cannot be reduced under the Earned Reduction of Minimum Prison Term ("ERMPT") credit and by failing to provide the R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) sentencing advisements. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
12/4/2025
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12/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5411 |
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State v. Davis
| 114872 | Jury instructions; abuse of discretion; flight instruction; consciousness of guilt; manifest weight; self-defense; reasonable belief; imminent danger of death or great bodily harm; objective and subjective belief; bona fide belief; Crim.R. 12.2; Crim.R. 29; Crim.R. 52(A); R.C. 2903.01(A); R.C. 2903.01(B); R.C. 2923.162(A)(3); R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); R.C. 2903.11(A)(2); R.C. 2921.12(A)(1); R.C. 2921.31(A); R.C. 2921.04(B)(2); R.C. 2941.141(A); R.C. 2941.145(A). Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving a flight instruction because the evidence showed more than “mere departure” from the scene of the shooting. Appellant remained hidden near the scene while police arrived but did not approach despite the safety afforded by police presence. He stayed at a hotel following the shooting, changed his Instagram handle, attempted to delete Instagram direct messages, and disassembled and discarded the firearm used in the shooting, all conduct supporting a jury instruction on consciousness of guilt. In any event, the instruction’s limiting language left weight and motive to the jury, defeating any claim of prejudice. Appellant’s conviction was not against the manifest weight as to self-defense. Video and audio established that only appellant fired. He never claimed anyone brandished a weapon or threatened him, and his recorded statement described immediately “letting off shots” when the victim exited the car. The jury could reasonably find the State disproved a bona fide, objectively reasonable belief of imminent death or great bodily harm and that appellant’s use of deadly force was disproportionate to any perceived threat. This was not the exceptional case where the jury lost its way. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
12/4/2025
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12/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5412 |
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State v. Robinson
| 114912 | Having weapons while under disability; R.C. 2923.13(A)(2); carrying a concealed weapon; R.C. 2923.12(A)(2); improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle; R.C. 2923.16(B); motion to suppress; criminal trespass; search and seizure; Terry stop; Fourth Amendment; plain view; reasonable suspicion; probable cause. The trial court did not err in granting the motion to suppress when the evidence at the hearing showed that appellant entered and exited a gas station with a firearm in his pocket. The gas station had a sign posted stating that weapons were prohibited on the premises. The evidence also showed that appellant got into his car after exiting the gas station and based on this the agents had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry investigative stop. The agents then saw a firearm in plain view in the car and found out that appellant could not lawfully possess a firearm, giving agents probable cause to arrest appellant. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
12/4/2025
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12/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5413 |
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In re K.C.
| 114999 | File a transcript; presume the regularity of the proceedings; identification of error in the record; App.R. 4(A)(1); App.R. 9(B)(1); App.R. 16(A)(7). Affirmed. Father’s appeals of the juvenile court’s April 10 and May 23, 2025 entries are overruled because the notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days of the date of the entry as required by App.R. 4(A)(1). The juvenile court’s March 26 and March 27, 2025 entries are affirmed because Father failed to file a transcript. Without a record, the appellate court presumes the regularity of the proceedings in the trial court. In addition, Father did not identify the error in the record and did not provide supportive legal arguments. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
12/4/2025
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12/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5414 |
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State v. J.D.B.
| 115065 | R.C. 2953.32; application to seal record of conviction; abuse of discretion; legitimate reasons; burden; evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an application to seal a record of conviction where the applicant did not testify or present any evidence at the hearing demonstrating legitimate reasons for sealing the record and therefore does not satisfy their statutory burden. Likewise, while a trial court is generally required to place its findings on the record when denying an application to seal, the absence of any evidence or testimony supporting the application negates this requirement. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
12/4/2025
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12/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5415 |
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State ex rel. Shepherd v. Gall
| 115826 | Mandamus; Crim.R. 32(B); notification of appellate rights; revision of sentencing entry; clear legal duty; and adequate remedy at law through motion and appeal. The court dismissed sua sponte a mandamus action seeking to compel revision of a sentencing entry to include notification of appellate rights pursuant to Crim.R. 32(B) because there is no duty to include such notification. The relator also has an adequate remedy at law through a motion to revise and an appeal, if necessary. Moreover, the relator is pursuing those remedies. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
12/3/2025
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12/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5416 |
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State v. Coates
| 114534 | Murder; attempted murder; self-defense; castle doctrine; rebuttable presumption of self-defense; reasonable force; jury instructions; lesser-included offenses; expert testimony; post-traumatic stress disorder. Defendant’s convictions for murder, attempted murder and felonious assault, all with firearm specifications, are affirmed. Defendant admitted to shooting and killing his roommate but argued that he did so in self-defense. The victim was coming home and attempting to enter the house through the front door, with her seven-month-old child in her arms, when the defendant fired 14 shots from an assault rifle through the closed door while he was inside the house. The defendant argued he acted in self-defense because he has post-traumatic stress disorder and he thought someone was trying to unlawfully enter the house. He failed to look at the doorbell camera video of the front door before firing his gun. The court did not err in instructing the jury regarding self-defense and the castle doctrine. The court did not err in not instructing the jury regarding lesser-included offenses, because the defendant acted knowingly and/or purposefully when he fired the assault rifle. The court did not err in allowing defendant’s expert witness to testify about post-traumatic stress disorder but limiting what the expert said about the defendant’s state of mind. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5340 |
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State v. Vega-Medina
| 114792 | Postrelease control; R.C. 2929.19(B); R.C. 2967.28; interpreter. Judgment affirmed. The trial court accurately informed the appellant regarding postrelease control. A Spanish interpreter was appointed and present for appellant’s sentencing. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5341 |
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