|
| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
|
Cuyahoga Cty. Treasurer v. LaRossa Property Affiliates, Ltd.
| 114183 | Tax foreclosure; magistrate’s decision; magistrate objections; magistrate procedure; Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d); independent review; foreclosure procedure; delinquent land certificate; R.C. 5721.18(A). - Judgment affirmed. Appellants contested the trial court’s decision to adopt the magistrate’s decision, which granted the foreclosure in favor of the appellee. Appellants argue that (1) the trial court did not perform an independent review of the magistrate’s decision; (2) the tax hearing procedure is improper and violative of due process; and (3) the delinquent land certificate attached to the complaint was not certified and thus improperly considered. We find no merit to any of appellants’ arguments. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
8/7/2025
|
8/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2768 |
|
State v. Lynch
| 114304 | Competency, sufficient indicia of incompetency; waiver of counsel; competency of a witness; ineffective assistance of counsel; plain error; sufficiency of the evidence; weapons while under disability; child endangering; recklessly; gross abuse of a corpse; manifest weight of the evidence; R.C. 2945.37(A); R.C. 2945.37(G); R.C. 2945.37(B); Crim.R. 52(B); Evid.R. 601; R.C. 2317.01; Crim.R. 29; R.C. 2923.13(A)(2); R.C. 2919.22(A); R.C. 2901.22(C); R.C. 2927.01(B); R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for two counts of murder, two counts of felonious assault, two counts of having weapons while under disability, endangering children, and gross abuse of a corpse. Appellant argued that the trial court erred when it did not hold a competency hearing on the record, when it did not rule on his motion to waive his right to counsel, by admitting the testimony of an eight-year-old witness whose competency to testify was not established, when it denied his Crim.R. 29 motion, when it failed to calculate and award him jail-time credit, and when it imposed a consecutive sentence for firearm specifications attendant to Counts 2 and 3 because those counts merged as allied offenses. Appellant also argued that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. None of the arguments had merit, except that the trial court erred by failing to award jail-time credit. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
8/7/2025
|
8/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2769 |
|
State v. Johnson
| 114389 | Rape; gross sexual imposition; corroboration; physical evidence; sexually violent predator specification; R.C. 2971.02; confirming sexual abuse; Evid.R. 803(8)(b); witness letter; jury instruction misstatement. - Appellant’s convictions for rape and gross sexual imposition upheld where the jury was presented with physical evidence and testimony by two medical professionals testifying about whether the physical evidence supported allegations of sexual activity. Lack of corroboration by household members does not render a conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence. Trial court complied with R.C. 2971.02 when the appellant elected to have the trial court consider the sexually violent predator specification; execution of a jury waiver is not required. Trial court should not have permitted the sexual assault nurse examiner to testify that the victim’s medical records “confirmed sexual abuse” because it infringed on the jury’s factfinding function. Nevertheless, the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights because the defendant’s expert refuted the nurse’s opinion. Witness’s letter to police is inadmissible under Evid.R. 803(8)(b) because it was not words of law enforcement personnel. Trial court’s misstatement giving the jury its instructions was harmless when the written instructions provided to the jury contained the correct definition. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
8/7/2025
|
8/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2770 |
|
State v. Silver
| 114499 | Aggravated murder; felonious assault; Confrontation Clause; personal knowledge; hearsay; limiting instructions; Evid.R. 105; gruesome photographs; sufficient evidence; aggravated burglary; manifest weight of the evidence. Affirmed. The appellant’s evidentiary arguments are without merit because the trial court provided a limiting instruction to focus the jury’s attention on the admissible aspects of testimony presented at trial; the appellant failed to demonstrate that the post-mortem photos of the victims were unduly prejudicial based on the “gruesome” depictions; and the convictions were not against the weight of the evidence or based on insufficient evidence. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
8/7/2025
|
8/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2771 |
|
State v. Mitchell
| 114545 | Right to confrontation; joinder; allied offenses of similar import; weight and sufficiency of the evidence; admissibility of medical records; R.C. 2317.422; Evid.R. 803(6); Evid.R. 902(10). Trial court did not err when it admitted medical records that complied with R.C. 2317.422, Evid.R. 803(6), and Evid.R. 902(10) without the testimony of patient. The records were kept in the ordinary course of business and self-authenticating and did not require extrinsic testimony for admissibility. Further, the admission of the records did not violate the appellant’s right to confrontation under the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions where there was no allegation that the records contained hearsay statements from the patient that were inadmissible without her testimony on the witness stand. The trial court did not err when it granted the State’s motion to join the indictments of the two cases. Appellant failed to preserve the issue when he failed to object to the alleged prejudicial joinder at the close of testimony and he failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the joinder when the evidence was simple and direct and unlikely to cause the jury to consider propensity evidence. Appellant’s conviction for vandalism was not supported by sufficient evidence where the State was required to establish knowing conduct and appellant’s conduct was merely reckless. Appellant’s other sufficiency arguments lacked merit since there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions for failure to comply, trafficking, and receiving stolen property. The appellate court declined to address the sufficiency of the criminal tools conviction due to appellant’s failure to comply with appellate rules. Appellant’s convictions were supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The State introduced direct and circumstantial evidence that identified the appellant as the perpetrator. Additionally, the State introduced evidence that established appellant acted knowingly when committing the crime of felonious assault. The trial court did not commit plain error when it failed to merge three counts of failure to comply, where each count was of dissimilar import and caused separate and distinct harm. The trial court did err when it failed to merge having-weapons-while-under-disability conviction in each case where the sole allegation in each case was that the appellant was in possession of a gun at the time of each crime. Finally, with respect to aggravated-vehicular-assault convictions involving two victims, the trial court erred when it failed to merge the convictions into two counts, one for each victim, where the appellant’s conduct against each victim did not cause distinct harm, was not committed separately, and were not committed with separate animus or motivation. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
8/7/2025
|
8/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2772 |
|
In re V.W.
| 114567, 114590, 114591, 114593, 114594 & 114595 | Juvenile sex offender; register; R.C. 2152.83(D); nature of the offense; remorse; abuse of discretion. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in classifying the juvenile offender as a Tier I juvenile sex offender pursuant to R.C. 2152.83(B) given the young age of the victim; the serious nature of the offense, including the filming and subsequent dissemination of the video without the victim’s knowledge; and V.W.’s complete lack of remorse with respect to his actions. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
8/7/2025
|
8/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2773 |
|
State v. Harris
| 114569 | Self-defense; cumulative error; structural error; abuse of discretion; mistrial. The trial court did not err when it did not give the jury an instruction on self-defense because the evidence was not sufficient to support the instruction. Appellant used more force than was necessary to defend himself and violated his duty to retreat. The court also did not err in denying Appellant’s motion for a mistrial. Appellant could not show that he was materially prejudiced when the court did not allow repeated showing of the disturbing surveillance video. The court did not commit structural error; the court was not biased against Appellant. The court did not penalize Appellant for going to trial; the court never stated that it would have agreed to a certain sentence had Appellant accepted the State’s plea deal. There was no cumulative error. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
8/7/2025
|
8/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2774 |
|
Cleveland v. 8009 Lake, L.L.C.
| 114576 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; notice of condemnation; cost of demolition; Cleveland Cod.Ord. 3103.09. Affirmed. The appellant failed to demonstrate any error with the judgment against him and in favor of the City of Cleveland for the cost incurred in demolishing a condemned structure. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
8/7/2025
|
8/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2775 |
|
State v. Cook
| 114609 | Agreed-upon sentence; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2953.08(D)(1); subject to review; Crim.R. 32(C); App.R. 16(A)(7); Reagan Tokes notifications; R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c); invited error; postrelease control notifications; constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the parties entered into an agreed-upon sentencing range. The trial court imposed a sentence that fell within the agreed-upon range. As such, the sentence is not subject to review pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(1). Appellant claims the trial court’s sentencing entry was insufficient since it failed to note that certain firearm specifications were dismissed as a result of the plea agreement. He presents no authority in support of his premise that the sentencing entry must include details of the plea agreement as required by App.R. (16)(A)(7). We decline to address his assignment of error. Even if we were to address his assignment of error, it would not be successful. Crim.R. 32(C) no longer requires the sentencing entry to include the manner of conviction. The trial court failed to advise the defendant of the Reagan Tokes notifications at the sentencing hearing as required under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). However, the trial court did fully advise the defendant of these provisions at the plea hearing. Defense counsel advised the trial court that the notifications at the plea hearing were sufficient and did not need to be repeated at the sentencing hearing. As such, the trial court’s failure to repeat these notifications at the sentencing hearing, if error, was invited. When notifying the defendant of postrelease control at sentencing, the trial court failed to notify the defendant of the consequences he may face if he violated postrelease control. As a result, the trial court’s notice of postrelease control is insufficient and the case is remanded back to the trial court for a limited resentencing hearing to properly notify the defendant of postrelease control. The defendant concedes that in State v. Hacker, 2023-Ohio-2535, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law on the same grounds raised by the defendant. As such, defendant’s constitutional challenges to the Reagan Tokes Law are overruled. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
8/7/2025
|
8/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2776 |
|
Rojas v. Rucker
| 114630 | Motion; attorney fees; sanctions; R.C. 2323.51; Civ.R. 11; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. Nothing in the limited record before this court establishes that appellees or their counsel’s conduct was sanctionable under R.C. 2323.51’s objective egregious-conduct standard or Civ.R. 11’s subjective willfulness standard. The appellants fail to cite any authority in support of their contention that the standards set forth in R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11 apply to appellees and their counsel’s conduct or are otherwise satisfied by this set of facts. Under these circumstances and in lieu of any authority supporting sanctions in this instance, we decline to find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the appellants’ R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R 11 motion. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
8/7/2025
|
8/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2777 |
|
State v. Farraj
| 114669 | R.C. 2911.12; burglary; ineffective assistance of counsel; Strickland v. Washington; deficient performance; prejudice. Defendant-appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel made references to his conduct in the case because defendant-appellant was not prejudiced by these references considering the overwhelming evidence against him. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
8/7/2025
|
8/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2778 |
|
Clay v. Galita, Chief Med. Examiner
| 114679 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; R.C. 313.19; coroner’s verdict; cause of death; mode of death; manner of death; competent, credible evidence. Judgment affirmed. Appellant was convicted of felony murder in connection with the death of his infant daughter. He filed suit attempting to have the coroner’s verdict changed to “accident” or “undetermined.” After careful review of the record, we find that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated regarding the cause, manner, and mode of death of appellant’s infant daughter. Appellant’s theories are not evidence and do not create a genuine issue of material fact. Summary judgment in favor of the appellee was proper. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
8/7/2025
|
8/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2779 |
|
In re N.B.
| 114732 | Parental rights; permanent custody; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; R.C. 2151.414; constitutional challenge. Judgment affirmed. Despite the appellant-father’s efforts to engage in services, remedy some conditions that caused two children to be removed from his custody, visit with children, and attend many of his autistic child’s appointments, the juvenile court’s permanent custody awards are supported by sufficient evidence within the record and are not contrary to that evidence’s manifest weight. Moreover, we decline to review Father’s constitutional challenges to R.C. 2151.414 since they were not raised before the trial court. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
8/7/2025
|
8/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2780 |
|
State v. Nagy
| 90400 | Reopening; appellate judgment; untimely filing; deadline; sentence; judgment of conviction; ineffective assistance claim; sexually oriented; Megan's Law; classification; manifest weight. App.R. 26(B) is inapplicable to the appeal that the applicant is attempting to reopen. App.R. 26(B) applies only to an appeal that concerned the judgment of conviction and sentence. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
8/5/2025
|
8/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2767 |
|
Johnson v. O'Donnell
| 115397 | Prohibition, R.C. 1901.21, minor misdemeanor, basic statutory jurisdiction, municipal court, and failure to rule on motions. The court denied an application for a writ of prohibition, because the municipal court had basic statutory jurisdiction to hear a minor misdemeanor pursuant to R.C. 1901.21. The failure to rule on motions by the eve of trial does not deprive the court of jurisdiction and such error, if any, is remediable on appeal. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
8/5/2025
|
8/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2782 |
|
Manning v. Gallagher
| 115192 | Writ of procedendo; motion to dismiss; moot. Respondent’s motion to dismiss granted; writ dismissed. Relator was not entitled to a writ of procedendo ordering trial judge to “close out pending issues” so she could proceed with appeal. Procedendo claim became moot when trial judge issued order clarifying judgment. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
8/1/2025
|
8/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2781 |
|
State v. Smiley
| 114178 | Ineffective assistance of counsel; preindictment delay; due process; actual prejudice; failure to object; Confrontation Clause; Sixth Amendment; investigation; cross-examination; Smith v. Arizona; testing analyst; testifying analyst; statements; hearsay; testimonial; harmless error; plain error; Evid.R. 803(4); social worker testimony; manifest weight. Affirmed. Appellant’s counsel was not ineffective because (1) a motion for preindictment delay would have been futile; (2) the failure to object to hearsay evidence was harmless error; and (3) counsel’s cross-examination falls within the realm of trial strategy. Appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
7/31/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2674 |
|
State v. Bradley
| 114281 | Motion to withdraw guilty plea; Reagan Tokes Law; reopen appeal; R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c); notifications; advisements; sentencing hearing; vacate; hearing; presentence motion to withdraw; postsentence motion to withdraw; manifest injustice. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea without first holding a hearing because the defendant’s sentence had been vacated on appeal and, therefore, the motion should have been treated as a presentence motion to withdraw. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
7/31/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2675 |
|
First Rehab Funding, L.L.C. v. Milton
| 114370 | Landlord; tenant; breach of contract; real party in interest; first time on appeal; service of process. The defendant raised real-party-in-interest issues on appeal that were not raised at the trial-court level. We decline to address these arguments for the first time on appeal. The defendant also raises issues concerning the sufficiency of service with respect to the complaint. Since this issue was also not raised below, it is waived. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
7/31/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2677 |
|
Klarfeld v. Vestige Group, L.L.C.
| 114486 | Forum-selection clause, commercial contract, fraud or overreaching, unreasonable and unjust enforcement. Plaintiff filed suit in Ohio, individually and on behalf of an Ohio business he owns and operates, against a North Carolina company. Parties had entered service agreements that included a forum-selection clause requiring disputes to be adjudicated in North Carolina. Forum-selection clauses in commercial contracts are ordinarily enforceable. Service agreements were commercial contracts because it was in furtherance of both parties’ business activities, even where plaintiff also used some of business's assets personally. Enforcement of forum-selection clause was adequate basis for dismissal where plaintiff did not allege fraud or overreaching in formation of the provision. Enforcement of the clause was also not unreasonable and unjust where, among other factors, plaintiff provided no information to substantiate his claim that he had a medical condition that made litigating in North Carolina unduly burdensome. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
7/31/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2678 |
|
State v. Sykes
| 114512 | Crim.R. 29; motion for acquittal; sufficiency of the evidence; circumstantial evidence; probative value; manifest weight of the evidence; inconsistencies in witnesses’ testimony. Even though the evidence against appellant was entirely circumstantial, his conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/31/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2679 |
|
Tvergyak v. Rak
| 114513 | Summary judgment. The trial court did not err by granting the appellee’s motion for summary judgment because there were no genuine issues of material fact. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
7/31/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2680 |
|
Kirksey v. Cornerstone Innovations, Inc.
| 114575 | Workers’ compensation; appeal; loss of use; extent of disability; R.C. 4123.512(A); R.C. 4123.57(B); mandamus; lack of jurisdiction; dismissed. Affirmed the trial court’s decision dismissing case for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1). The trial court lacked jurisdiction over an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission of Ohio that denied appellant’s motion for a total loss of use of his right foot. Authority from the Supreme Court of Ohio establishes that the decision concerned the injured worker’s “extent of disability,” which is not appealable under R.C. 4123.512(A), and that the decision is properly challenged in mandamus. The trial court did not err in declining to address appellant’s constitutional challenges, and those challenges were not considered on appeal. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/31/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2681 |
|
State v. Hadley
| 114578 | Manifest weight of the evidence; disrupting public services. Judgment affirmed. We cannot say that the jury lost its way in finding the appellant guilty of disrupting public services when the appellant’s own testimony acknowledged that he took the victim’s phone and threw it to the side to prevent her from calling for assistance. Moreover, appellant concedes, in his appellate brief, that he took the phone intending to prevent the police from responding to the scene. His actions delayed the response of police arriving to the scene and allowed him to leave before the police arrived. Therefore, we find that the prosecution has met its burden of persuasion and this is not the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
7/31/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2682 |
|
State v. Mendenhall
| 114621 | Consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). The trial court did not err when it sentenced the appellant to consecutive sentences because the trial court fully complied with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). The trial court failed to comply with the advisements under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) and must provide appellant with the notifications required by law. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
7/31/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2683 |
|
State v. Miller
| 114629 | R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); consecutive sentence; protect the public from future crime; course of conduct; purposes of felony sentencing. The trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences was not contrary to law where the court made the necessary R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings, the court’s corresponding judgment entry reflected those statements, and this court did not find clearly and convincingly that the record did not support the trial court’s findings. Additionally, the trial court’s imposition of the maximum sentence was consistent with the purposes of felony sentencing. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
7/31/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2684 |
|
In re S.B.
| 114693 | Parental rights; Anders v. California; motion to withdraw; frivolous; clear and convincing evidence. Counsel satisfied the requirements of Anders v. California. Because an appeal would be wholly frivolous, the case is dismissed and counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
7/31/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2685 |
|
Tentacles of Cuyahoga Cty. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Prosecutor's Office
| 114761 | Public Records Act; R.C. 149.43; R.C. 2743.75; exemption; waiver. Affirmed. The Court of Claims properly dismissed appellant’s complaint alleging a denial of access to public records because the records in question were exempt under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(b) as records pertaining to probation or community-control sanctions. Moreover, contrary to appellant’s assertion, the record does not establish the appellee waived the exemption by releasing the records to the public. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
7/31/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2686 |
|
Cleveland v. J.T.
| 114797 | Conceded error; Loc.App.R. 16(B); motion to seal record; expungement; hearing. Judgment is reversed and remanded. A review of the record reveals that the defendant’s motion to seal her record was denied by the court without first holding a hearing. The court’s basis to deny the defendant’s motion was that the defendant had passed away although the defendant is alive. The City concedes the error. Therefore, we reverse the municipal court’s judgment denying the defendant’s motion to expunge and seal her record and remand to the court to set a hearing date and hold a hearing on the motion. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
7/31/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2687 |
|
Franciscan Communities, Inc. v. Rice
| 114886 | Charging lien; judgment lien; creditor’s bill; attorney fees; counterclaim; setoff; supersedeas bond; priority. Trial court abused its discretion in denying attorney’s motion to enforce a charging lien where the law firm timely produced a copy of the attorney-client fee agreement, the law firm obtained a money judgment for its client, and the law firm provided timely notice of its intent to assert the lien. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/31/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2688 |
|
In re N.M.
| 114889 | Parental rights; termination of parental rights; permanent custody; substance abuse; case plan; reasonable efforts; best interests of the child; cannot or should not be placed finding; R.C. 2151.419; R.C. 2151.414; manifest weight of the evidence; clear and convincing evidence. - Judgment affirmed. The record supports the juvenile court’s determination, pursuant to R.C. 2151.419, that the agency made reasonable efforts to prevent removal or to return the child safely home. Additionally, the juvenile court’s decision granting permanent custody to the agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 is supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
7/31/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2689 |
|
Chrzanowski v. Chrzanowski
| 114932 & 114933 | Pro se litigant; divorce; App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16(A)(2); App.R. 16(A)(7); failure to cite legal authority. Appellant is representing herself pro se in this appeal in a divorce case. She failed to cite any legal authority at all in her brief. Pursuant to the appellate rules, we disregard her assignments of error. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/31/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2690 |
|
State v. Johnson
| 114962 | Motion for relief from duty to register as violent offender; R.C. 2903.42; violent offender database; jurisdiction; motion must be filed in court that sentenced offender; sentencing court; Crim.R. 48; dismissal; nullity. The trial court did not err in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider appellant’s motion for relief from duty to register as a violent offender. Appellant’s motion was filed in the incorrect case number, and at the point he sought to rectify the error, the statutory time for filing the motion had passed. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/31/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2691 |
|
Rossi Personalty Revocable Living Trust v. Keehan
| 114291 | Motion for sanctions; Civ.R. 11; R.C. 2323.51; abuse of discretion; motion to substitute. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants’ second motion for sanctions where the conduct at issue did not appear to be sanctionable under the standards of Civ.R. 11 or R.C. 2323.51. Because the trial court’s denial of the motion for sanctions was not an abuse of discretion, the argument challenging the trial court’s resolution of the motion to substitute is moot. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
7/31/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2694 |
|
State v. Brown
| 113879 | Application to reopen appeal; App.R. 26(B); genuine issue of a colorable claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel; restitution; consecutive-sentence findings; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); jail-time credit. Application to reopen appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B) is granted in part and denied in part. Applicant failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of a colorable claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel based on appellate counsel’s failure to advance assignments of error related to alleged improper conviction of allied offenses of similar import and amount of restitution awarded. Appeal reinstated to docket; judgment reversed in part to the extent it fails to include a calculation of jail-time credit; remanded to trial court for the issuance of nunc pro tunc order setting forth consecutive-sentence findings made at sentencing hearing and calculation of jail-time credit. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
7/30/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2672 |
|
State v. Foster
| 114148 | Application to reopen appeal; App.R. 26(B); genuine issue of a colorable claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel; conviction; sentence; resentencing; res judicata; record. Application to reopen appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B) denied. Applicant fail | Groves | Cuyahoga |
7/29/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2673 |
|
State v. Maxey
| 112981 | App.R. 26(B) ineffective assistance of counsel; untimeliness; good cause; courier’s delay; and successive applications. The court denied an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen as untimely courier’s delay or failure to file timely do not state good cause. Successive App.R. 26(B) applications are disallowed. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
7/25/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2671 |
|
State v. Stewart
| 114361 & 114362 | Application to reopen appeal; App.R. 26(B); genuine issue of a colorable claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. Application to reopen appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B) denied. Applicant failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of a colorable claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel based on appellate counsel’s failure to advance assignments of error related to trial court’s alleged failure to make consecutive-sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), the alleged invalidity of defendant’s guilty pleas, trial court’s alleged imposition of an illegal blanket sentence, and alleged unspecified violations by trial counsel of defendant’s due process rights. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
7/25/2025
|
7/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2676 |
|
A.M.F. v. E.C.K.F.
| 114425 | Record on appeal; App.R. 9; magistrate’s decision; objections; Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii); post-decree modification of parental rights; abuse of discretion; R.C. 3109.04; transcript; presume regularity; pro se. Judgment affirmed. Without trial transcripts or an acceptable substitute under App.R. 9 (C) or (D) this court must presume regularity and accept the facts as presented by the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision and overrule appellant’s assignments of error. Appellant’s failures to comply with App.R. 9 and fulfill his duty of filing the necessary transcripts to enable this court to evaluate the trial court’s judgment cannot be excused on the basis that he is acting pro se. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
7/24/2025
|
7/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2594 |
|
State v. Booker
| 114521 | Having a weapon while under disability; improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed. When viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found that appellant knew of the gun and had constructive possession of the gun, which was found in her glove compartment. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to support her convictions for having a weapon while under disability and improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle. Furthermore, appellant’s convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant’s own testimony confirmed that she knew the gun was in the glove compartment. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
7/24/2025
|
7/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2595 |
|
In re Z.H.
| 114568 | Permanent custody; best interest of the child; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.414(E) factors; reasonable efforts; clear and convincing evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; sufficiency; Evid.R. 612; refreshing recollection. Affirmed. The juvenile court’s decision granting permanent custody to the agency and terminating appellant’s parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant failed to remedy the issues that caused the child’s removal and demonstrated a lack of commitment towards the child. Finally, it was in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
7/24/2025
|
7/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2596 |
|
In re J.P.
| 114632 | Pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor; age not established; expungement. Judgment affirmed. By the State’s own concession, the age of the victims was not definitively established. Thus, the record did not demonstrate that the defendant was ineligible to have his record expunged because the victims were less than 13 years old. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the defendant expressed remorse for his crimes and had been rehabilitated. Thus, the trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion for expungement. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
7/24/2025
|
7/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2597 |
|
State v. Streets
| 114683 | App.R. 4(A)(1); condition of community control; direct appeal; bootstrapping. Dismissed. Appellant’s appeal of his motion to modify a condition of his community control is dismissed because it should have been raised in a direct appeal after the imposition of the condition. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
7/24/2025
|
7/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2598 |
|
State v. Vance
| 114717 | Conceded error. The appellee concedes reversible error occurred because the trial court erred in entering convictions of fourth-degree felonies on the charges of aggravated theft and vandalism; and the trial court erred by failing to merge the offenses of vandalism and theft. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
7/24/2025
|
7/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2599 |
|
State v. McGrath
| 114758 | Falsification; insurance fraud; attempted grand theft; theft offense; deception; R.C. 2921.13(A)(9); R.C. 2913.47(B)(1); R.C. 2923.02; R.C. 2913.02(A)(3); Crim.R. 29; bench trial; GPS evidence; sufficiency; manifest weight. Judgment affirmed. After a bench trial, the trial court convicted defendant-appellant of falsification in violation of R.C. 2921.13(A)(9) and attempted grand theft in violation of R.C. 2923.02 / 2913.02(A)(3) for filing a false stolen-vehicle report and seeking nearly $50,000 in insurance proceeds. The State presented sufficient evidence to support the convictions, including body-camera footage of interviews with appellant, his own written statement alleging the theft of his truck and equipment, witness testimony, and GPS data indicating appellant had visited the location where the vehicle was recovered approximately an hour before filing his theft report. In addition, the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. A review of the entire record did not suggest that this was the exceptional case where the trial court clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
7/24/2025
|
7/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2600 |
|
State ex rel. Ramirez v. Cuyahoga Cty. Domestic Relations Court
| 114935 | Mandamus, procedendo, moot. The writ of mandamus and the writ of procedendo generally serve a similar purpose and the Ohio Supreme Court has treated them both as available remedies. Although mandamus will lie in cases of a court’s undue delay in entering judgment, procedendo is more appropriate, since an inferior’s refusal or failure to timely dispose of a pending action is the ill a writ of procedendo is designed to remedy. In order to obtain a writ of procedendo, the relator must establish the possession of a clear legal duty to require proceed, that a judicial officer possess a clear legal duty to proceed, and there exists no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. When a court refuses to render a judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment, procedendo is the appropriate remedy. It must also be noted that procedendo cannot be employed to compel the performance of a duty that has already been performed. Herein, rulings have been rendered with regard to outstanding motions and the request for procedendo is moot. In addition, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that setting a matter for hearing renders a complaint for procedendo moot. Finally, neither procedendo nor mandamus may be employed to supervise a judicial officer via a claim of bias or ex parte communications. This court may only direct a respondent to proceed to judgment. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
7/23/2025
|
7/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2601 |
|
State v. Crawford
| 110986 | App.R. 26(B) application to reopen, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, 90-day limitation period, untimely application, reliance on counsel, failure to obtain necessary records, and manifest injustice. The court denied an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen as untimely. The failure of counsel to timely inform the applicant of the court’s decision does not state good cause for untimely filing. Similarly, difficulties in obtaining necessary records, either from appellate counsel or the clerk, do not state good cause. Claims on manifest injustice do not state good cause. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
7/21/2025
|
7/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2591 |
|
State ex rel. Marbuery-Davis v. Cuyahoga Cty. Common Pleas Court
| 115125 | Writ of prohibition; subject-matter jurisdiction; ordinary course of law; criminal; adequate remedy; unauthorized; patent; unambiguous; arraignment; res judicata; dismiss. The respondent judge had subject-matter jurisdiction over the relator’s criminal case, and relator had an adequate remedy of law by way of direct appeal. The respondents are entitled to dismissal. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
7/21/2025
|
7/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2602 |
|
State v. Frett
| 97538 | Reopening; good cause; untimely filing; appellate judgment; deadline; indefinite period of time; conviction and sentence; appellate counsel; ineffective assistance of counsel. Application to reopen appeal under App.R. 26(B) denied. Application was filed beyond the 90-day period for filing a timely application under App.R. 26(B)(1) and (2)(b). Applicant failed to show good cause for the untimely filing of the application. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/18/2025
|
7/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2590 |
|
COD Properties Ohio, L.L.C. v. Black Tie Title, L.L.C.
| 113730 | Breach of fiduciary duty; conversion; civil theft; treble damages; attorney fees; final appealable order; summary judgment; trial; jury verdict; punitive damages; judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV"); compensatory damages; court costs; Civ.R. 60(A); foreclosure; sheriff’s sale; real property; civil theft of real property; sufficiency of the evidence; R.C. 2315.21; R.C. 2307.61; R.C. 2913.02. The trial court properly denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part with respect to the plaintiff’s claims for civil theft, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. These claims arose from an agreement in which the defendants undertook to act on the plaintiff’s behalf at a sheriff’s sale in a foreclosure action, with the intent to acquire real property. The defendants’ subsequent actions resulted in the property deed being improperly titled in one of the defendants’ names. The denial of summary judgment on these claims was appropriate because it was not based on a pure question of law, but rather on the existence of genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the defendants’ conduct constituted civil theft, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court also did not err in denying the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the plaintiff’s claims for civil theft and breach of fiduciary duty. Real property can be the subject of a civil-theft claim, and the evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of breach of fiduciary duty. Furthermore, the trial court correctly denied the defendants’ motion for JNOV as to the jury’s award of punitive damages. Punitive damages are permissible as part of the compensatory-damage award when a breach of fiduciary duty has been established. However, the trial court erred in denying the defendants’ motion for JNOV on the plaintiff’s conversion claim, because real property cannot, as a matter of law, be the subject of a conversion claim. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to the plaintiff, because the defendants were the losing party and punitive damages had been awarded on the fiduciary-duty claim. Nonetheless, the trial court did abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiff’s motion under Civ.R. 60(A) to “correct” the record by introducing an additional exhibit related to attorney fees that had not been submitted at the attorney-fee hearing and, was therefore, not subject to cross-examination. Apart from the portion of the attorney-fee award based on that improperly admitted exhibit, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its overall determination of the appropriate attorney fees owed by the defendants. Lastly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the defendants to pay all litigation costs, rather than apportioning them between the parties. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
7/17/2025
|
7/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2519 |
|