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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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State v. Morris
| 113777 | Crim.R. 8; joinder; Crim.R. 14; prejudicial joinder; denial of motion for relief from prejudicial joinder; no prejudice; abuse of discretion; ineffective assistance of counsel; preindictment delay; no prejudice. In appellant’s first assignment of error, he appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for relief from prejudicial joinder pursuant to Crim.R. 14. On review, we find that appellant was unable to establish prejudice from the joinder so the assignment of error is overruled. In appellant’s second assignment of error, he alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to motion the court regarding the six-year preindictment delay. On review, we find appellant failed to establish prejudice as the evidence he alleged was missing was speculative and unlikely to minimize the State’s evidence or bolster his defense. His second assignment of error was also overruled. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3273 |
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1900 Capital Trust II, by US Bank Trust Natl. Assn. v. House-Redd
| 114293 | Foreclosures; motion to dismiss; subject-matter jurisdiction; standing; summary judgment; note; mortgage; loan modification; lost-note affidavit; assignor; assignee; holder; a person or entity entitled to enforce the mortgage note; genuine issue of material fact; nonholder; possession; chain of assignments; gap assignment. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in a foreclosure action where genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether plaintiff was the entity entitled to enforce the mortgage note in light of internal inconsistencies in a lost-note affidavit submitted in support of summary judgment. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the foreclosure complaint on the grounds that plaintiff lacked standing to sue. Whether the plaintiff has standing to sue is dependent on whether it can show it is entitled to enforce the mortgage note, an issue to be determined on remand. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3274 |
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D.C. v. J.C.
| 114330 | Divorce; pro se; counsel; parenting agreement; divorce decree; parenting time; residential parent; void; motion; R.C. 3109.051(A); Civ.R. 7(B)(1); reunification counselor; GAL. In a divorce action, the trial court’s adoption of the parenting agreement and issuance of the divorce decree were upheld. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s request for a continuance to obtain new counsel, because he had three months to do so but made no effort until one week before trial. Father offered no evidence of a lack of mutual agreement regarding the parenting agreement, which he had signed and affirmed on the record. Thus, there was no basis to invalidate the agreement. The court properly incorporated the agreement’s terms into the decree, including reunification counseling as a condition of Father’s parenting time and allowing the counselor to determine parenting time. The court also acted within its discretion in limiting Father’s testimony to the unresolved issues at trial. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3275 |
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State v. Riley
| 114449 | Consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C); R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c); juvenile record. Judgment affirmed. The defendant challenges the trial court’s finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c), claiming that his juvenile criminal history does not provide support for the imposition of a discretionary consecutive sentence. However, a defendant’s juvenile record may be considered as part of an offender’s criminal conduct under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) for the purposes of determining whether to impose consecutive sentences. Based on the record before us, we cannot clearly and convincingly conclude that the record does not support the trial court’s R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c) finding. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3276 |
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Westlake v. Knowles
| 114517, 114518 | R.C. 2919.22(A); child endangerment; motion to continue; motion for new counsel; abuse of discretion; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; substantial risk of harm. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant-appellant’s untimely request for new counsel and corresponding request for a continuance of trial. Defendant-appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Flagg Lanzinger | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3277 |
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Cambridge Health Leasing, L.L.C. v. Embassy Cambridge, L.L.C.
| 114523 | Breach of contract; operating agreement; unjust enrichment; conversion; civil conspiracy; motion for summary judgment. The trial court properly granted summary judgment as to appellant’s breach of contract claims and unjust enrichment. The trial court erred in awarding conversion for the same monies subject to the contract and therefore the conversion claim was denied as a matter of law. Subsequently, the trial court’s award of punitive damages and attorney’s fees pursuant to the conversion award was also an error and said awards were vacated. Similarly, the appellant’s civil conspiracy claim failed as a matter of law because the conversion finding was the basis of the unlawful independent act. As such, the trial court erred when it denied appellee’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the civil conspiracy claim. The jury verdict’s award and the trial court’s judgment concerning the civil conspiracy claim are vacated. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3278 |
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Parma VTA, L.L.C. v. Parma GE 7400, L.L.C.
| 114601 | Arbitration Award; tenancy-in-common agreement (“TIC Agreement”); cash call; mortgage payoff; vacate arbitration award; de novo; R.C. 2711.10(D); arbitrators exceeded their powers; draws from essence of the contract; rational nexus; narrow scope of judicial review; statute of frauds; double recovery. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3279 |
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State v. Sopko
| 114604 | Sufficiency of evidence; identity; prior calculation and design; manifest weight of the evidence; firearm toolmark evidence; cell phone location evidence; abuse of discretion; cumulative-error doctrine. Judgment affirmed. The State presented sufficient evidence of appellant’s identity as the shooter, as identity can be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. The State also presented sufficient evidence of prior calculation and design in this execution-style murder. The weight of the evidence supported the conviction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing firearm toolmark and cell phone location testimony. Because the trial court did not commit multiple errors, the cumulative-error doctrine is inapplicable. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3280 |
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State v. Howard
| 114623 | Evidence; Crim.R. 16; discovery violation; felony murder; “proximate cause theory”; manifest weight; sufficiency; circumstantial evidence; stacking inferences; silence; lack of remorse; Fifth Amendment; sentencing; recidivism factors; consecutive sentences. Trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting newly discovered evidence not produced in discovery in violation of Crim.R. 16 because there was no indication that the evidence prejudiced the defense. Direct and circumstantial evidence were sufficient to establish the defendant’s criminal liability without impermissibly stacking inferences. Appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although the trial court impermissibly considered the defendant’s silence as a lack of remorse for sentencing purposes, the defendant’s consecutive sentence was affirmed because other factors supported the consecutive sentence and the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for the trial court’s consideration of his silence, the sentence would have been different. Trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3281 |
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Grimm v. Caesar's Holdings, Inc.
| 114631 | Sanctions; attorney fees; expenses; R.C. 2323.51; Civ.R. 11; discretion; abuse of discretion; discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant-appellant’s motion for attorney fees and other expenses under Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51 where plaintiff-appellee continued litigation long enough to obtain certain discovery items needed to determine the continuing viability of his claims against defendant-appellant. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3282 |
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Goldfarb v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Pub. Works
| 114721 | Political-subdivision immunity; R.C. Ch. 2744; governmental or proprietary function; negligence; duty; breach of duty; evidence; self-serving affidavit. The trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment. Appellee was unable to establish a prima facie case of negligence and therefore could not establish that one of the exceptions to political-subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B). | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3283 |
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Rasheed v. Robinson
| 114757 | Pro se litigants; res judicata. Pro se appellant’s third successive motion for relief from judgment is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3284 |
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Bykova v. Cleveland
| 114791 | Civ.R. 12(B)(6); political subdivision immunity; res judicata; R.C. 2744.02. The trial court erred in granting the city’s motion to dismiss based on res judicata. Res judicata is not a proper basis for dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). However, the motion to dismiss was properly granted on the alternative ground of immunity. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3285 |
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In re R.W.
| 114806 | Permanent custody; sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence; R.C. 2151.414(B), (D) and (E); best interest of the child; clear and convincing evidence. The juvenile court’s grant of permanent custody of the child to the agency is supported by clear and convincing evidence and by the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3286 |
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State v. McFarland
| 114930 | Felony sentencing; postrelease control; court costs. The court did not err in imposing a sentence that included a one-to-three-year period of postrelease control. R.C. 2967.28 does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine, and the statute requires a “period” of postrelease control rather than a “definite term” of postrelease control. The court did not err in imposing court costs as part of the defendant’s felony sentence, despite the defendant’s indigency. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3287 |
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State ex rel. Dabernig v. Earley
| 115319 | Procedendo, mandamus, App.R. 9(C) statement, issue ruling on pending motion, moot. The complaint for a writ of procedendo and mandamus, to compel the trial court judge to comply with App.R. 9(C), is moot. The trial court judge has complied with App.R. 9(C). | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/5/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3288 |
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Boutros v. MetroHealth Sys. Bd. of Trustees
| 114446 | Open Meetings Act; R.C. 121.22; App.R. 16; App.R. 12; public meeting; executive session; summary judgment; presumption of regularity; executive session. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the appellees. The appellant did not show a genuine issue of material fact that the appellees violated Ohio’s Open Meetings Act. Appellant could not overcome the presumption of regularity that the appellees properly performed their duties. Appellant failed to present evidence that the Board discussed any improper subjects in executive session, failed to keep adequate meeting minutes, or failed to follow the proper procedure to enter executive session. Appellant did not show that the appellees improperly retained counsel, and there was no evidence that appellees ever formed a special committee to investigate him. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
9/4/2025
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9/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3142 |
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State v. J.B.
| 114501 | Expungement; drug test; trial court’s authority; R.C. 2953.32; statutory construction; de novo review. The defendant applied to the trial court to have his criminal convictions expunged. At the hearing on the defendant’s application, the trial court ordered the defendant to submit to a drug test. The trial court ultimately denied the defendant’s application because of the results of the test. The expungement and sealing statutes do not authorize a trial court to order a person applying to have their records of convictions expunged to submit to drug test. As such, the trial court’s order denying the application for expungement was vacated and the case remanded. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
9/4/2025
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9/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3143 |
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State v. Bringht
| 114548; 114879 | Crim.R. 11; complete admission of guilt; plea colloquy; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); R.C. 2929.144(B)(2); indefinite sentences. Affirmed. The trial court did not err when it failed to inform appellant that his guilty plea was a complete admission of guilt. The trial court appropriately calculated appellant’s indefinite prison terms in separate cases. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
9/4/2025
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9/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3144 |
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Allan v. Tallan, L.L.C.
| 114618 | Sanctions; frivolous conduct; R.C. 2323.51; objective standard; Civ.R. 11; subjective bad faith; res judicata; promissory note; lack of consideration; successor liability; bench trial; affirmative defenses; Civ.R. 8(C); motion to amend answer. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant-appellant Raida Allan’s motion for sanctions against plaintiff-appellee Qais Allan without a hearing. Although Raida argued that Qais’s lawsuit to enforce a promissory note was frivolous, the record supported the trial court’s denial of the motion for sanctions because the suit, while unsuccessful, was not wholly unwarranted under existing law. The bench trial involved complex factual and legal issues, including whether Raida had assumed the liabilities of Tallan, L.L.C. or fraudulently transferred its sole asset, whether consideration supported the note given that payment was made by entities Qais controlled, which were guarantors of a separate, purportedly related loan, and whether the suit was barred by res judicata. In addition, the trial court permitted amendment of the answer at trial to assert the affirmative defenses of lack of consideration and fraud and based its decision, in part, on those defenses, further complicating the sanctions issue. Prevailing on the merits does not establish frivolous conduct, and the trial court had sufficient familiarity with the parties and issues to rule without a hearing. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
9/4/2025
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9/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3145 |
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Johnston, Exr. v. Munger
| 114638 | Motion to enforce settlement agreement; jurisdiction; Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Judgment affirmed. The trial court’s language in its dismissal entry — “pursuant to the stipulation filed by the parties” — was sufficient to reserve the court’s jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement because the stipulation expressly provided for that reservation. Filing a Civ.R. 60(B) motion was not the only means by which the court could vacate its dismissal entry. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
9/4/2025
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9/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3146 |
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Berman v. Minnesota Lawyers Mut. Ins. Co.
| 114676 | Motion to dismiss; Civ.R. 12; Civ.R. 41; Civ.R. 15. The trial court did not err in granting appellee’s motion to dismiss. Appellant did not file an amended complaint; therefore, the court did not err in failing to consider a pleading that was never filed. Appellee moved to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(2) and (B)(6). There is no evidence the court dismissed the case pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1); therefore, the notice requirement was not triggered. The court was not required to state its reasons when it granted the motion to dismiss. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
9/4/2025
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9/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3147 |
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State v. Rashed
| 114723 | Restitution; hearing on restitution; dispute; ineffective assistance of counsel; R.C. 2929.18(A)(1). Judgment affirmed. Appellant has not demonstrated that there was a dispute as to the amount of restitution, thus triggering the trial court to hold a mandatory hearing pursuant to R.C. 2929.18(A)(1). Appellant also has not demonstrated how he was prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged deficient conduct relating to requesting a hearing. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
9/4/2025
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9/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3148 |
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In re D.T.
| 114745 & 114747 | Juv.R. 40; independent review; timely objections to magistrate’s decision, and request for transcript. Judgment reversed and case remanded. The juvenile court abused its discretion by rendering its judgment overruling the appellant’s objections to the magistrate’s decision without review of the subject transcript because the appellant timely filed the objections and request for the transcript. The record demonstrates that the juvenile court did not conduct an independent review of the matter as required under Juv.R. 40. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
9/4/2025
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9/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3149 |
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Lavar v. Accel Schools Ohio
| 114804 | Civ.R. 12(B)(1); subject-matter jurisdiction; R.C. 2743.03; R.C. 2743.75. Trial court erred when it denied appellant's motion for dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The legislature’s grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to hear public-records-access cases expanded the court’s already limited jurisdiction to political subdivisions. The plain language of the statute does not establish an intent to expand the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction to private entities. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
9/4/2025
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9/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3150 |
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State v. Hughes-Davis
| 114695 | Children; rape; gross sexual imposition; letter; hearsay; bench trial; harmless error; manifest weight of the evidence; credibility; delayed disclosure. Child-victim’s letter written to mother was improperly admitted into evidence, but because the letter contained similar information that the child-victim testified about, it was harmless error. Convictions for rape and gross sexual imposition upheld because the trial judge, as the trier of fact, considered the testimony of the victims and the evidence presented. The fact this was a delayed disclosure with no physical evidence does not render the conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
9/4/2025
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9/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3151 |
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State v. Hughey
| 114712 | Denial of presentence motion to withdraw plea; abuse of discretion; package plea deal; actual innocence claim; coercion. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw his plea. The record reflects that the appellant was (1) represented by highly competent counsel at the time of his plea; (2) afforded a full Crim.R. 11 hearing where it was determined that he understood the nature of the charges and possible penalties before entering his plea; (3) given a complete and impartial hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea; and (4) given full and fair consideration of his plea-withdrawal request. The record further indicates that, although the appellant timely made his request to withdraw his plea, the State would have been prejudiced by a withdrawal of the plea. The appellant’s new actual innocence claim was contradicted by his prior statements and admission of guilt and was insufficient to vacate his knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered plea. The appellant was not denied due process because his plea was a package deal with his codefendant; he was represented by competent counsel and was capable of intelligently and voluntarily entering his plea. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
9/4/2025
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9/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3152 |
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U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Butts
| 115003 | Magistrate’s decision, summary judgment, Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv). The trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate’s decision granting summary judgment in foreclosure where appellant failed to timely object to the magistrate’s decision. | Flagg Lanzinger | Cuyahoga |
9/4/2025
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9/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3154 |
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State ex rel. Hero Homes JV2, L.L.C. v. Scott
| 114975 | Prohibition; mandamus; personal jurisdiction; added party; municipal housing court; housing offenses; Cleveland Cod.Ord. 367.131; community control; conditions of community control; appeal; adequate remedy at law; stay order; mootness; county fiscal officer; discretion to issue mandamus. When a company pled no contest to owning properties without registering with the Ohio Secretary of State, Cleveland Cod.Ord. 367.131, the Cleveland Municipal Housing Court imposed community-control sanctions on the company and added a sister company to the case. One of the conditions of community control was not to sell, transfer, or gift any of the companies’ properties without court approval. The company appealed, and the court of appeals issued a stay. The municipal housing court ruled that the company had violated community control and imposed more restrictive sanctions, one of which was to file the order with the county fiscal officer to prevent further transfers of property. The company appealed that order and obtained another stay. The municipal housing court judge held another community-control-status conference after the stay but adjourned the hearing to discern the scope of the stay. The court took no further actions after that. The companies brought prohibition and mandamus actions to prohibit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the sister company, to “claw back” the order to county fiscal officer, and to prohibit the judge from violating the stay orders. This court denied the writ of prohibition for lack of personal jurisdiction because appeal was an adequate remedy at law and because, for prohibition to issue for lack of personal jurisdiction, there must be a failure to comply with the minimum contacts requirement for constitutional due process. Because the clerk had filed an affidavit of fact declaring the filing with the fiscal officer null and void, the “claw-back” claim was moot. The court of appeals declined to issue a mandamus to comply with the stay order because the respondent judge had abided by the stay order for four months. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
9/3/2025
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9/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3153 |
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Cleveland v. King
| 114464 | Jury instructions; essential element; sufficiency; manifest weight; ineffective assistance of counsel; plain error. Defendant’s convictions for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest are affirmed. Although the trial court failed to instruct the jury on an essential element of disorderly conduct, the defendant did not object to the jury instructions and the error did not affect the outcome of the trial. Because any error in the trial court’s jury instructions regarding disorderly conduct did not affect the outcome of trial, defendant’s argument that her counsel was ineffective is without merit. The trial court did not err when instructing the jury on resisting arrest. And defendant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
8/28/2025
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8/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3067 |
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State v. Hicks
| 114532 | Motion to disqualify counsel; guilty plea; admission of guilt; waiver of right to appeal. Defendant-appellant’s guilty plea waived his right to appeal nonjurisdictional defects except the constitutionality of the plea itself. Thus, defendant-appellant’s assigned error that addressed the trial court’s denial of a motion to discharge counsel, and not the constitutionality of the plea hearing, was waived when he entered a guilty plea. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
8/28/2025
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8/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3068 |
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State v. Xi
| 114540 | Sentencing discretion; due-process; plain error; unsubstantiated allegations; psychological harm; victim-impact statements; seriousness of the offense; R.C. 2929.12(B)(2); emotional trauma; sentencing hearing; trial court findings; appellate review; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); relationship with the victim; credibility of evidence; statutory sentencing factors; felony sentencing; mitigating and aggravating factors; judicial discretion; record support; consecutive sentencings. The trial court did not violate the defendant’s due-process rights by considering the victim’s statements regarding psychological harm and fear for her family’s safety during sentencing. Although the victim referenced alleged threats from the defendant’s wife or associates, the trial court did not make an evidentiary finding by attributing those threats to the defendant. Instead, the court permissibly considered the ongoing psychological impact of the offenses under R.C. 2929.12(B)(2). Because the record supports the trial court’s findings and the sentence was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law, the appellate court affirmed. (R.C. 2929.12(B)(2); R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).) Consecutive sentences upheld. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
8/28/2025
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8/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3069 |
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State v. Steele
| 114574 | Aggravated robbery, R.C. 2911.01(A)(1); one-year firearm specification, R.C. 2941.141(A); three-year firearm specification, R.C. 2941.145(A). The trial court’s imposition of a firearm specification enhancement on the appellant as an accomplice who never possessed or used the weapon in the underlying offense was not contrary to Ohio law. The trial court’s decision to impose a three-year firearm specification enhancement under R.C. 2941.145(A) instead of a one-year enhancement under R.C. 2941.141(A) was not contrary to Ohio law. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
8/28/2025
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8/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3070 |
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State v. Smith
| 114637 | Sufficiency of the evidence; ballistic evidence; eyewitness evidence; video recording; manifest weight of the evidence. After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of felonious assault and having weapons while under disability proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, the record does not show that the trial court clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the defendant-appellant’s convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thus, defendant-appellant’s claims of insufficient evidence to support the convictions and convictions that are against the manifest weight of the evidence are without merit and are overruled. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
8/28/2025
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8/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3071 |
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State v. Halasz
| 114645 | Attempted murder, sentencing hearing, prison term, aggravating factors, R.C. 2929.12(B), mitigating factors, R.C. 2929.12(C) principles of felony sentencing, R.C. 2929.11, jail-time credit award, R.C. 2967.191(A), date of confinement. Criminal defendant convicted of attempted murder appeals his 11-year prison sentence, the statutory maximum. Defendant stabbed an advanced nurse practitioner that was treating him for schizoaffective disorder. Defendant asserts that the record did not support his sentence because the court failed to consider that he committed the acts underlying his conviction while suffering from serious mental illness. Prison sentence was affirmed because it was within the appropriate statutory range of years and because the sentencing hearing transcript showed the court considered mitigating factors under R.C. 2929.12(C), aggravating factors under R.C. 2929.12(B), and the overriding principles of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11. However, the trial court miscalculated defendant's jail-time credit award. Defendant was confined for 216 days between his arrest for attempted murder and his sentence; the trial court mistakenly awarded him only 208 days of jail-time credit. Case remanded to trial court to correct jail-time credit award. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
8/28/2025
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8/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3072 |
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State v. Chicharro
| 114678 | Child pornography; motion to suppress; search warrant; citizen informant; probable cause; cache files. Denial of motion to suppress upheld. Based on information provided by citizen informant, the detective’s affidavit in support of the search warrant afforded the issuing judge a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to search appellant’s residence. Appellant’s convictions for offenses related to child pornography were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the testimony and evidence presented demonstrated that Chicharro either knew or should have known that he possessed the images or was reckless when downloading certain images. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
8/28/2025
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8/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3073 |
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State v. Tyson
| 114691 | Plea; postrelease control; sex-offender classification; presentence motion to withdraw plea. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s presentence motion to withdraw his plea. Although the trial court did not fully comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) with respect to postrelease control and the sex-offender classification, defendant did not establish that he was prejudiced by the incomplete notifications. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
8/28/2025
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8/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3074 |
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State v. Wilder
| 114716 | Guilty plea; Crim.R. 32.1; presentence; actual innocence; change of heart; misunderstanding. Trial court’s decision to deny appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea is upheld where appellant’s claim of actual innocence was not asserted until after pleading guilty and no facts or defenses were set forth supporting his claim. Appellant’s contention that he misunderstood the potential sentence was not supported by the record. The record reflected a change of heart. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
8/28/2025
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8/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3075 |
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State v. L.M.
| 115024 | Expungement; eligibility; abuse of discretion; de novo review; pending criminal case; outstanding warrant; third-degree felonies; fourth-degree felonies; fifth-degree felonies; R.C. 2953.32; R.C. 2953.32(D)(1)(b); R.C. 2953.32(D)(2); R.C. 2953.32(A)(1); R.C. 2913.02; R.C. 2913.31. Judgment affirmed. Because appellant had a pending larceny case and an outstanding warrant, she was statutorily ineligible for expungement pursuant to R.C. 2953.32(D)(1)(b) and (D)(2), and the trial court’s denial of her motion for expungement was therefore proper. Having resolved the appeal on that basis, we decline to opine on the parties’ shared view that R.C. 2953.32(A)(1) permits expungement of lower-level felonies even when third-degree felonies remain on a movant’s record. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
8/28/2025
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8/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3076 |
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State ex rel. Jenkins v. Byrd
| 115114 | Public records, mandamus; R.C. 149.43(B)(8); Superintendence Rules 44 – 47; and indictment. Pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B)(8), the respondent in a public records mandamus action had no clear legal duty to provide a convicted defendant from a 1981 murder case with the indictment from that case, because the convicted defendant had not obtained judicial approval for the record. Sup.R. 44 – 47 apply only to case documents from cases commenced after July 1, 2009. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
8/26/2025
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8/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3077 |
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S.M. v. A.P.
| 113909 | Domestic relations; R.C. 3105.171; marital property; separate property; nonprofit corporation; Schwab account; Social Security benefits; derivative payment; 42 U.S.C. 407(a); spousal support; imputed income; trust account; retirement accounts; attorney fees; financial misconduct; distributive award; equitable division; abuse of discretion. The trial court properly classified and divided most marital and separate property, including the marital residence, Schwab account, and retirement accounts. The court erred in classifying a nonprofit corporation organized under R.C. Ch. 1702 as marital property. The denial of spousal support, division of lump-sum Social Security derivative payment, imputation of income, attorney fee rulings, and rejection of financial misconduct claims were upheld. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
8/21/2025
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8/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2985 |
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Cleveland v. Snyder
| 114465 | Traffic stop; commercial vehicle; uncovered load; rock salt; municipal ordinance; Cleveland Codified Ordinances ("C.C.O.") 439.11(A); sufficiency of evidence; manifest weight; police testimony; vehicle enforcement; tarp requirement; misdemeanor; Cleveland Municipal Court; jury verdict; judgment entry; subsection distinction; conviction affirmed; C.C.O. 439.09; seatbelt violation; C.C.O. 437.27(B)(1). Appellant was convicted for violations of Cleveland Codified Ordinances 439.11(A), 439.09, and 437.27(B)(1) after police observed him operating a commercial dump truck carrying an uncovered load of rock salt. There was sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s finding that the truck was not loaded or covered to prevent material from escaping, as required by C.C.O. 439.11(A). The court declined to review the citation under C.C.O. 439.11(B), because the trial court’s journal entry did not reflect a conviction on that subsection. The manifest weight and sufficiency challenge regarding the seat-belt violation also failed. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
8/21/2025
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8/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2986 |
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Estate of Clemons v. Ocejo
| 114491 | Interpleader; unjust enrichment; quantum meruit; charging lien; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); standing to appeal; nonparty; Civ.R. 24. Dismissed. As a result of the appellant’s failure to abide by the procedural requirements of Civ.R. 24, he is not a party to the underlying action, and as a nonparty he lacks standing to perfect an appeal in this case as a matter of law. Because the appellant cannot establish standing to properly invoke the jurisdiction of this court as a matter of law, the appeal is dismissed. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
8/21/2025
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8/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2987 |
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Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Cleveland
| 114531 | R.C. 2744.01; political-subdivision immunity; summary judgment; R.C. 2744.03(A)(5). The trial court did not err in denying the appellant’s motion for summary judgment based on immunity under R.C. Ch. 2744. No defense applied to reinstate immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5). | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
8/21/2025
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8/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2988 |
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State v. Browning
| 114556 | Guilty plea; nunc pro tunc; unlawful restraint; R.C. 2905.03(A); R.C. 2905.03(B). | Keough | Cuyahoga |
8/21/2025
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8/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2989 |
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Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision
| 114680 | Real property valuation; R.C. 5715.05; independent determination of property value; rubber stamp; appraisal evidence; comparable properties reflect current market value. Judgment affirmed. The trial court satisfied its statutory obligation to independently determine property value under R.C. 5715.05 and did not impermissibly rubber stamp the board of revision decision. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting the value of the real property at issue. Specifically, the trial court has broad discretion in determining which party’s appraisal offers the best evidence of value and questions regarding the credibility and probative value of the parties’ appraisals are factual questions within the province of the trial court as the factfinder in this matter. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
8/21/2025
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8/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2990 |
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Anton v. Petras
| 113858 & 113859 | Motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; genuine issues of material fact; judgment as a matter of law; de novo review; declaratory judgment; breach of contract; fraud; breach of fiduciary duty; civil conspiracy; operating agreement; limited-liability company; derivative lawsuit; indemnification. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees on plaintiff-appellant’s claims of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy because no genuine issues of material facts existed supporting the claims and defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees on plaintiff-appellant’s request for a declaratory judgment because the court was unable to declare that plaintiff-appellant be reinstated as Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of the limited-liability company where no provision in the law or operating agreement permitted such relief. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees on plaintiff-appellant’s breach-of-contract action pertaining to his removal as CEO and request for backpay because no genuine issues of material fact existed supporting such claims and defendants-appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court did err however in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees on plaintiff-appellant’s claim for breach of contract for failure to indemnify him with respect to attorneys’ fees associated with defending against the derivative suit. Genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the fees were actually and reasonably incurred such that defendants-appellees had a duty to indemnify. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
8/14/2025
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8/14/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2861 |
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Zirafi v. Green Mile Ents., L.L.C.
| 114423 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); Civ.R. 56(C) evidence; successor liability; lack of evidence. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees where appellees affirmatively demonstrated that appellants did not have any evidence supporting their claims and as such, there is no genuine issue of material fact relating to any of the causes of action in the complaint. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
8/14/2025
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8/14/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2862 |
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State v. Davis
| 114461 | Consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Affirmed. The record clearly and convincingly supports the trial court sentencing appellant to 17 consecutive sentences for nonviolent theft offenses where there were 17 individuals and businesses impacted by his two-month crime spree. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
8/14/2025
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8/14/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2863 |
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Cerny v. Andrews
| 114529 | Liquidated damages; penalty; cognovit note; settlement agreement; breach of contract; remand. The parties entered into a settlement agreement in which Appellants would pay Appellees $215,000. Appellants breached the agreement. A provision of the agreement provided that upon a breach of the agreement by Appellants, Appellees had the ability to enforce a cognovit note that was executed pursuant to the settlement agreement in the amount of $465,000 against Appellants. The trial court issued an order enforcing the note against Appellants. The trial court’s judgment was reversed. The provision of the settlement agreement creating the cognovit note is a liquidated-damages clause. While there are generally limited defenses to be raised against the holder of a cognovit note, a cognovit note may not be used to enforce a provision in a settlement agreement in violation of public policy. The trial court did not address this aspect of Appellants’ argument. As such, the case is remanded to the trial court to make that determination in the first instance. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
8/14/2025
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8/14/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2864 |
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