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Shelly Co. v. N.E.S. Corp.
| 115409; 115668 | Hearsay; business records; habit; Evid.R. 801(C); Evid.R. 802; Evid.R. 803; Evid.R. 803(6); Evid.R. 804; Evid.R. 805; breach of contract; mutual assent; contract modification; integration clause; FOB; R.C. 1302.32(A)(1); unjust enrichment; harmless error; Civ.R. 15(B); amendment to conform to the evidence; veil piercing; fraud; fraudulent conveyance; R.C. 1336.04(A); R.C. 1336.05; Civ.R. 9(B); payment bond; notice of furnishing; R.C. 153.56(C); personal guaranty; manifest weight; attorney fees; Civ.R. 7(B)(1); Civ.R. 6(C); Civ.R. 59; Civ.R. 60(B)(1); Civ.R. 60(B)(5); App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The trial court properly imposed contractual liability on Perk, guaranty liability on Cifani, and bond liability on Hudson for the Union Avenue and U.S. 322 projects. Shelly’s direct contractual privity with Perk eliminated the need for notices of furnishing as to those projects. The Auburn contract judgment is reversed because inadmissible hearsay did not establish Perk’s assent to replace itself for N.E.S. as purchaser. The matter is remanded to determine whether an Auburn unjust-enrichment theory was tried by consent. The residual $643,674.56 unjust-enrichment award against Perk is vacated because Shelly did not connect the underlying N.E.S. residual debt to any benefit retained by Perk. The veil-piercing judgment against Cifani is vacated because the trial court improperly permitted amendment under Civ.R. 15(B) to add unpleaded fraud and fraudulent-conveyance theories without a fair opportunity to defend. On remand, Shelly may seek leave to amend, followed by discovery and motion practice if the trial court permits amendment. The trial court’s attorney-fee procedure was not an abuse of discretion, but the fee award is vacated for recalculation, rendering the Civ.R. 60(B) issue moot. The judgment against nonappealing party N.E.S. remains undisturbed. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
8/6/2026
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8/6/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3019 |
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State v. Genao
| 115679 | Evid.R. 404(B); Evid.R. 403; R.C. 2907.322(A)(3); R.C. 2907.322(A)(5); jury instructions; parental discipline; weight of the evidence; sufficiency of the evidence; knowledge; lesser included offense. The trial court did not err when it concluded that evidence of other acts was admissible where the State’s reasoning established that it was introducing the evidence to show the appellant’s preparation and plan and where it limited the evidence to a particular time frame ensuring that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any potential prejudicial effect. The trial court properly denied the appellant’s request for a parental discipline instruction where the evidence at trial established that the appellant admitted “whipping” the minor child “too much” and there was evidence she sustained physical injuries as a result. Appellant’s conviction for gross sexual imposition was supported by the greater weight of the evidence, where although there were discrepancies in the minor child’s testimony, she consistently maintained that appellant had touched her inappropriately and the jury was free to believe all, some, or none of her testimony. The trial court erred in finding that R.C. 2907.322(A)(5) was a lesser included offense of R.C 2907.322(A)(3). However, the trial court did not err in finding appellant guilty under R.C. 2907.322(A)(5) where 2907.322(A)(5) was an inferior offense to R.C. 2907.322(A)(3) and the State presented sufficient evidence to support the conviction. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
8/6/2026
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8/6/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3020 |
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J.P.C. v. S.T.C.
| 115734 | Mootness; collateral legal consequences; domestic-violence civil-protection order (“DVCPO”); R.C. 3113.31; Evid.R. 901(A); authentication; Civ.R. 61; harmless error; motion for continuance. Appeal from expired DVCPO was not moot where appellant demonstrated collateral legal consequences, that is, that the court considered the DVCPO in a related case. Court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a one-year DVCPO that did not cover the petitioner’s children. Petitioner testified that appellant had engaged in prior acts that put her or her children in danger. Petitioner also testified that appellant stopped his motorcycle in traffic, pounded on her car window, and screamed obscenities at her. Court did not err by admitting evidence of prior domestic violence. Court committed harmless error by prohibiting appellant from attempting to lay a foundation for the authentication of digital evidence related to his location on the date of petitioner’s allegations. Court did not err in granting petitioner’s motion for one-week continuance, allowing her time to retain counsel. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
8/6/2026
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8/6/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3021 |
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Woods v. Lukan
| 115776 | Separation agreement; contempt; failure to file transcript; objections; magistrate’s decision; Civ.R. 53; abuse of discretion; review limited to legal conclusions. Judgment affirmed. Appellant failed to file a transcript or affidavit by which the trial court could review the magistrate’s findings of fact. When an objecting party fails to timely file a transcript or affidavit, a trial court must accept the magistrate’s findings of fact and limit its review to the magistrate’s legal conclusions. On appeal, our review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in accepting and adopting the magistrate’s decision. The domestic relations court did not abuse its discretion in this case. There is no obligation in the separation agreement requiring appellee to pay appellant a certain sum to equalize the marital portion of the bank/financial accounts — a fact that both parties acknowledged at trial. As a result, the court properly concluded that appellee could not be found in contempt for failing to pay appellant 50 percent of the marital portion of the funds in the bank/financial accounts. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
8/6/2026
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8/6/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3022 |
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State v. Simoneau
| 115836 | Plea; mandatory prison; ineligible; community control; stand-in counsel; Crim.R. 11; nonconstitutional rights; prejudice; Reagan Tokes; maximum sentence; postrelease control. - Appellant failed to demonstrate that he did not enter a knowing, intelligent, and involuntary plea for this court to invalidate the plea. Appellant failed to demonstrate how the trial court’s boilerplate, conditional language affected his decision to plead guilty or that he was prejudiced by the court’s statements. He also failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by stand-in counsel in counsel’s failure to correct the court, such that his plea was not voluntarily made because of this failure. Trial court’s imposition of a maximum sentence was not contrary to law, but the court’s lacks of advisement regarding Reagan Tokes and misadvisement about postrelease control warrants a limited resentencing. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
8/6/2026
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8/6/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3023 |
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