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State v. Griffin
| 114895 | Guilty plea; waiver of nonjurisdictional issues; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; separately assigned error; waive argument; hybrid sentence; no-contact order; community-control sanction; plain error; prejudice; invited error. Because appellant pled guilty, he waived any arguments related to the probable-cause finding by the juvenile court. Under App.R. 12(A) and 16(A), the court declined to consider appellant’s argument regarding the validity of his plea because he did not separately assign this argument as error. Further, while the trial court improperly imposed hybrid sentences of a prison sentence and a no-contact order, which is a community-control sanction, appellant invited any error by accepting a plea agreement that included hybrid sentences. Moreover, appellant failed to demonstrate how he suffered any prejudice and therefore could not demonstrate plain error. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-925 |
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State ex rel. Boggs v. Cleveland
| 112111 | Motion for summary judgment; writ of mandamus; taking; appropriation; eminent domain; standing; redressability; municipality; outside municipal corporate limits; Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution; Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution; R.C. 719.02; R.C. 719.01. Relators lacked standing to obtain a writ of mandamus against Cleveland to compel it to begin appropriation proceedings of their property, which is located outside of its municipal corporate limits. Section 19, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution, as limited by Section 3, Article XVIII, does not provide Cleveland with the power of eminent domain beyond its geographical limits. Nor is the appropriation of Relators’ property within the statutory authority conferred by R.C. 719.02, which allows municipalities to acquire property outside of its limits, when reasonably necessary, for the specific purposes set forth in R.C. 719.01. Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that Relators’ claim is not redressable by a writ of mandamus and concluded that Relators lacked standing to bring the action. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in Cleveland’s favor. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1450 |
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Stewart v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Inc.
| 115049 | Class action; breach of contract; automobile insurance; actual cash value; appraisal provision; binding; moot. - Trial court’s decision granting class certification is reversed because the plaintiff’s individual claims became moot prior to class certification. The trial court ordered the parties to undergo a contractually mandated appraisal process. The subsequent appraisal award was contractually binding on both parties, and the insurance company tendered payment to plaintiff, leaving no live controversy between the parties. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1451 |
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Gringo v. Hanak
| 115341 | Defamation; defamation per se; online review; vexatious litigator; presumed damages; presumed malice; summary judgment; Crim.R. 56; improper Crim.R. 56 material; affidavit; privileged statements; motion to quash; abuse of discretion; damages hearing; compensatory damages; punitive damages; plain error. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the appellee, a doctor, in his defamation lawsuit against a former patient who published a Yelp review accusing the doctor of multiple crimes, including rape. The statements amounted to defamation per se and were not privileged. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a witness’ motion to quash and in excluding the testimony of one of appellant’s friends because neither had personal knowledge of appellee’s damages. The court did not commit plain error in awarding compensatory and punitive damages to appellee because there was ample evidence to support the award. The defamatory statements were made with hatred, ill will, a spirit of revenge, or with disregard to the doctor’s rights and safety. The parties concede that appellant had already been declared a vexatious litigator at the time the order in this case was entered. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1452 |
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State v. Riley
| 115512 | R.C. 2953.74; postconviction DNA testing; biological material; parent sample. Affirmed. The trial court’s decision denying the offender’s application for postconviction DNA testing under R.C. 2953.71-2953.81 was not in error; it cannot be determined that a scientifically sufficient amount of material is held by the State from which a test sample could be extracted under R.C. 2953.74(C)(2) because the offender concedes that no parent sample exists under R.C. 2953.74(C)(1) for further testing. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1453 |
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State v. Centers
| 115518 | Merger; allied offenses of similar import; limited record; guilty plea; R.C. 2941.25; abuse of a corpse; tampering with evidence. It was not plain error to sentence defendant separately for the offenses of abuse of a corpse and tampering with evidence where the limited record did not support his assertion that the offenses were committed by the same conduct. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1454 |
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State v. Jones
| 115535 | Postconviction relief; successive petition; untimely petition; motion for leave to file motion for new trial; unavoidably prevented; Brady violation; Brady v. Maryland; suppression; suppressed evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel; work product; newly discovered evidence; res judicata; R.C. 2953.21; R.C. 2953.21(A); R.C. 2953.21(A)(1); R.C. 2953.21(A)(2); R.C. 2953.23; Crim.R. 33; Crim.R. 33(B). Judgment affirmed. The trial court properly denied appellant’s untimely and successive petition for postconviction relief and his motion for leave to file an untimely motion for new trial because he failed to show that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence on which he relied. Appellant offered no affidavits from persons with firsthand knowledge establishing that an assistant prosecutor’s interoffice memorandum had been suppressed or explaining when and how it was obtained. The memorandum did not refer to evidence and any contention that the assistant prosecutor’s impressions were based on suppressed evidence was speculation. The memorandum was work product, not evidence that the State was required to disclose. Furthermore, appellant could not circumvent the “unavoidably prevented” requirement by arguing in the alternative that if his trial counsel possessed the memorandum, counsel was ineffective in not using it. Arguments that could have been made on direct appeal or in his previous petition for postconviction relief were barred by res judicata. Appellant likewise failed to show that Larissa Taylor’s affidavit could not have been obtained earlier, and her proffered account of the conflict did not undermine confidence in the verdict because it conflicted with the trial evidence and appellant’s own statement to police. Any hearing on appellant’s Crim.R. 33(B) motion for leave to file a motion for new trial would be an exercise in futility because the same “unavoidably prevented” requirement applicable to an untimely, successive petition for postconviction relief applies to a Crim.R. 33(B) motion. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1455 |
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State v. Becks
| 115653 | Crim.R. 32.1; ineffective assistance of counsel; hearing; pressure; defective performance. - Appellant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel during her presentence motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Appellant failed to demonstrate that a conflict existed between her and counsel, and the record does not support that appellant was pressured by her counsel to plead guilty. Counsel strongly advocated for appellant’s plea to be withdrawn, and thus counsel’s representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonable representation. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1456 |
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In re C.F.
| 115689 | Permanent custody; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iv); plain error; best interest of child; R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); clear and convincing evidence; plain error; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; engagement with case-plan services. Where Mother failed to challenge factual findings in her objections to magistrate’s decision, she waived all but plain error with respect to those findings. Juvenile court’s determination that permanent custody was in the best interest of the child was supported by clear and convincing evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mother’s initial progress with case-plan services did not preclude a grant of permanent custody to the agency where progress did not continue as the case progressed. Mother had not substantially remedied the conditions that caused child’s removal, and there was no indication she would do so at any reasonable time in the future. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1457 |
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State ex rel. Lundeen v. Miday
| 115697 | Mandamus; Civ.R. 12(C); motion for judgment on the pleadings; jurisdiction; adequate remedy; counterclaim dismissal. When a specific action is within a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction renders the court’s judgment voidable, not void. Any extraordinary relief, such as through an original action, is not available to attack a voidable judgment. When a court possesses basic subject-matter jurisdiction to act, and an appeal is available, a writ will not issue. Thus, we find that the relators have failed to establish a right to have the dismissal of their counterclaim vacated, failed to establish that respondent-judge is required to vacate the judgment that dismissed their counterclaim, and failed to establish that an appeal does not constitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1458 |
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Hunter v. Dahdouh
| 115847 | Denial of motion to continue; Unger test; abuse of discretion. Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to continue the trial filed the day before trial was scheduled. We find that the trial court applied the proper test and weighed the factors in Unger and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to continue. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1459 |
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Citywide RX, L.L.C. v. Providence Healthcare Mgt., Inc.
| 115352 | Attorney fees; reasonableness; breach of contract; Civ.R. 56(C); summary judgment; de novo review; new arguments; waived; App. 16(A)(7); App. 12(A)(2); locale; evidence. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of appellee on a request for attorney fees. Appellee set forth sufficient Civ.R. 56(C) evidence to establish that the rates and hours charged were reasonable. Appellant failed to set forth any Civ.R. 56(C) evidence to establish that a genuine issue of material fact remained to be litigated on the reasonableness of attorney fees charged by appellee. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1377 |
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State v. Stafford
| 115414 | Plain error; waiver; constitutionality; R.C. 2923.13(A)(2); ineffective assistance. Appellant waived argument regarding the constitutionality of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) based on this court’s ruling in State v. Philpotts, 2025-Ohio-1179 (8th Dist.), when he failed to raise it with the trial court. Nevertheless, the record reflects that the trial court did not plainly err, where the Ohio Supreme Court stayed execution of the Philpotts case pending appeal. Appellant did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on allegations that his counsel did not consider or advise him of the Philpotts decision before entering his plea, where the record did not reflect counsel’s failure. To the extent appellant argued events that happened off the record, his remedy was in postconviction-relief proceedings and not direct appeal. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1378 |
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Islam v. Razzak
| 115438 | Domestic relations; post-decree motion hearing; motion for continuance; abuse of discretion; Sup.R. 41(B); ineffective assistance of counsel; right to counsel; ex parte; cumulative-error doctrine; App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16(A)(7). Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff-appellant’s motion for continuance. In light of the discovery delays created by plaintiff-appellant, the trial court’s clear directives regarding continuances based on counsel’s unavailability, plaintiff-appellant’s eleventh-hour motion for continuance, and plaintiff-appellant’s complete failure to appear for the post-decree motion hearing, we cannot say that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in denying the motion. Moreover, Sup.R. 41(B) did not require the granting of plaintiff-appellant’s motion for continuance in this case. Next, we find no grounds for reversal based on plaintiff-appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Plaintiff-appellant did not have a constitutional right to counsel at this domestic-relations hearing, and the trial court was within its right to proceed with the hearing in plaintiff-appellant’s and his counsel’s absence. Finally, since plaintiff-appellant did not provide any legal authority to suggest that (1) any error — let alone multiple — occurred and (2) application of the cumulative-error doctrine is appropriate in this case, we decline to find that the doctrine mandates reversal. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1379 |
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Frederico v. 1795 Spino Dr., L.L.C.
| 115468 | Civ.R. 12(B)(6); motion to dismiss; political subdivision tort immunity, R.C. 2744.02(B)(3). Judgment reversed. The trial court erred by denying the city’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss on immunity grounds. Plaintiff did not allege facts in his complaint to demonstrate that the tree was an obstruction on the roadway that blocked or clogged the roadway. Thus, the plaintiff failed to allege facts that an exception under R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) to the city’s general grant of immunity applied. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1380 |
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State v. Sampson
| 115478 | Sixth Amendment; right to counsel of choice; motion to continue; abuse of discretion; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; felony sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G); contrary to law; judicial bias; presumed unbiased and unprejudiced; fair proceeding. Judgment affirmed. The record is clear that appellant’s last-minute request for a continuance to hire an attorney was a delay tactic, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion. The record establishes that the trial court considered the R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 factors when sentencing the appellant and the sentence was not contrary to law. Finally, there is no compelling evidence that the trial court was biased against appellant. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1381 |
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State v. Lewis
| 115526 | Motion to suppress; traffic stop; probable cause; odor; burnt marijuana; vehicle search; automobile exception; R.C. 3780.36; R.C. 3780.99; smoking marijuana while in vehicle. The trial court did not err in determining that the police officer lacked probable cause to search appellant’s vehicle. The odor of burnt marijuana combined with appellant’s admission that he had smoked marijuana in the vehicle earlier that day supported a potential violation of former R.C. 3780.36(D)(2), which prohibits smoking marijuana in a vehicle. However, pursuant to former R.C. 3780.99, this provision only applies to passengers in a vehicle, not the operator of the vehicle. Accordingly, probable cause that a criminal offense had been committed did not exist, and the search of appellant’s vehicle was improper. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1382 |
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In re L.N.
| 115709 | R.C. 2151.353(A)(4); permanent custody; termination of parental rights; R.C. 2151.414(E)(11); best interest of the child; R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); clear and convincing evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; legal custody; temporary custody. - Juvenile court did not err in granting permanent custody of children to agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(4). The record supported juvenile court’s finding that mother, who had her parental rights terminated as to two of her other children, failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she could provide a legally secure placement for the children under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). The juvenile court’s findings that (1) the children could not be placed with one of the children’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent and (2) permanent custody was in the children’s best interest were supported by clear and convincing evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Given the juvenile court’s determination that permanent custody to the agency was in the children’s best interest, granting legal custody to a relative or temporary custody to the agency necessarily was not in their best interest. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
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4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1383 |
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State v. Humphries
| 115756 | Conceded error; statute of limitations; motion to dismiss; ineffective assistance of counsel. - State concede that appellant was deprived of effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to raise a statute-of-limitations argument in the motion to dismiss. A reasonable probability existed that the five-year-old misdemeanor offense would have been dismissed and thus he would not have been subsequently convicted. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
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4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1384 |
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State v. Frazier
| 115203 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; murder; having a weapon while under disability; aiding and abetting; ineffective assistance of counsel; jury instructions; abuse of discretion. Convictions affirmed. There was sufficient evidence to support appellant’s convictions for murder and having a weapon while under disability. Appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where both circumstantial and direct evidence linked appellant to the crimes. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on a complicity theory of aiding and abetting, nor did its discretion in instructing the jury that it may compare a picture of the suspect at the scene of the crime to appellant’s in-court appearance as a defendant at trial. Lastly, trial counsel was not ineffective where trial counsel’s actions were a matter of trial strategy. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
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4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1275 |
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Hrina v. KLS Martin, L.P.
| 115222 | Motion to dismiss; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); Civ.R. 10(D)(2); Civ.R. 15(C); affidavit of merit. Trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss where plaintiffs failed to timely file an affidavit of merit as required by Civ.R. 10(D)(2). | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1276 |
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State v. Kijanski
| 115281 | Consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); multiple victims; proportionality; criminal history; mitigation evidence, mitigation report; presentence-investigation report; allocution; weapons under disability; felonious assault; discharge of firearm on or near prohibited premises; tampering with evidence. Judgment affirmed. The record supported the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences after appellant pleaded guilty to discharge of firearm on or near prohibited premises, two counts of felonious assault involving two separate teenage victims, tampering with evidence, and having weapons while under disability. Review of a trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) is highly deferential. Here the trial court made the required R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings, and the record supported those findings. Appellant shot two random victims, and the existence of multiple victims reasonably supported consecutive terms on the felonious-assault counts. In addition, his repeated weapons-related conduct, including both juvenile and adult criminal history, supported the finding that consecutive service was necessary to protect the public. The trial court did not err in rejecting appellant’s reliance on mitigation evidence and arguments about consistency with similarly situated offenders. Such arguments are more appropriately raised with respect to findings under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 rather than consecutive-sentence findings. Moreover, the trial court expressly considered the presentence-investigation report, the mitigation report, victim-impact statements, appellant’s statements in allocution, and the arguments of counsel at the sentencing hearing but remained skeptical of his claimed blackout, remorse, and explanation for the shooting. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1277 |
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State v. Fluker
| 115355 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; burglary; force; menacing by stalking; intimidation; unlawful threat of harm; ineffective assistance of counsel; joinder; Crim.R. 8(A); jury instructions; curative instructions; hearsay; state-of-mind exceptions; Evid.R. 803(3); constitutional speedy trial; statutory speedy trial; mistrial. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support appellant’s convictions for burglary, menacing by stalking, and intimidation. Appellant’s convictions for burglary, menacing by stalking, and intimidation were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in joining appellant’s cases together for the purposes of trial because the evidence supporting appellant’s convictions would have been admitted in each trial if tried separately. The error in the jury instructions concerning the date of appellant’s prior convictions was corrected by the court, and the jury was advised of the correct date; therefore, there was no prejudice. The trial court did err in instructing the jury to determine whether appellant used a deadly weapon in a manner calculated to destroy life since there was nothing in the record to support this instruction, but the error was harmless. The trial court did not err in admitting jail calls made by the appellant while incarcerated because they were permitted to demonstrate consciousness of guilt. The trial court did err in allowing an officer to testify as to why the victim in this case was scared of appellant, but that error was harmless since the victim testified at trial and appellant had an opportunity to cross-examine her. Appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel was not required to file a motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds when speedy trial had not yet run. Counsel was also not ineffective for choosing not to move for a mistrial. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1278 |
|
SPM Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Italian Restaurant Group, L.L.C.
| 115382 | Summary judgment; breach of contract; motion to disqualify attorney; mitigation of damages; abrogation of duty to mitigate damages. A review of the contracts at issue shows that the landlord had a duty to mitigate its damages in the event the tenant defaulted and landlord retook possession of the property. Furthermore, there was a factual issue for the jury regarding whether the landlord did mitigate its damages. The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord. Because summary judgment was improper, the trial court also erred by rendering moot the motion to disqualify one of the landlord’s attorneys based on conflict of interest. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1279 |
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Marcinkevicius v. Galloway
| 115391 | Probate; appointment of successor trustee; trustee rejects trustee appointment; trust instrument; courts of equity; Ohio Trust Code; priority of trustee appointment; R.C. 5807.04(C). - Judgment affirmed. The court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a successor trustee where there was a vacancy and then an attempted appointment pursuant to the terms of the trust. The court’s jurisdiction was properly invoked and as a court of equity, it was enabled to make the successor appointment when it found that the person named in the trust to make an appointment did not follow the wishes of the settlor. The court’s appointment comported with the order of priority in R.C. 5807.04(C) and aligned with the settlor’s wishes. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1280 |
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M.H. v. B.S.
| 115470 | Domestic violence civil protection order; motion for continuance; abuse of discretion; R.C. 3113.31; Civ.R. 65.1; child abuse; sufficient evidence in the record. The domestic relations court did not abuse its discretion by granting one continuance of the full hearing on a domestic violence civil protection order, because the respondent had not been served with the petition or the ex parte order, and the petitioner’s attorney could not attend the originally scheduled full hearing. The domestic relations court did not err in granting the domestic violence civil protection order, because sufficient evidence in the record showed that the respondent committed child abuse against the victim, which is enough to issue a protection order under R.C. 3113.31 and Civ.R. 65.1. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1281 |
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State v. R.T.
| 115475 | Seal record of federal conviction; R.C. 2953.32. Reversed, vacated, and remanded. The trial court’s order sealing the record of a federal conviction contains requirements exceeding the state court’s limited authority to seal any state-retained record of the federal conviction not used or maintained pursuant to federal law. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1282 |
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R.S. v. G.S.
| 115476 | Domestic-violence civil-protection order (“DVCPO”); domestic violence; R.C. 3113.31; sufficient, credible evidence. Judgment vacated and remanded. The trial court erred in granting a DVCPO because the petitioner did not present sufficient, credible evidence that she was in danger of domestic violence. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1283 |
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State v. Moore
| 115503 | Domestic violence; manifest weight of the evidence; bench trial; credibility; victim testimony; delayed medical treatment; physical harm; attempt to cause physical harm; visible injury not required; Crim.R. 29; R.C. 2919.25(A). Judgment affirmed. Following a bench trial, appellant was convicted of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a felony of the third degree, for assaulting his mother in their shared home by shoving her into a freezer door after she refused to buy him cigarettes. In arguing that the conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence, he claimed that the victim was not credible because she wanted him removed from the home, delayed going to the hospital, and allegedly could have deliberately injured herself after police told her the day before that appellant could not be removed from the home unless he put his hands on her. The trial court, as factfinder in a bench trial, was entitled to credit the victim’s testimony over the appellant’s denial, especially where photographs and medical records supported the victim’s account. Visible injury is not required for a domestic-violence conviction because the statute also prohibits an attempt to cause physical harm. This was not the exceptional case in which the factfinder clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1284 |
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State v. Wright
| 115514 | Effective assistance of counsel; deficient performance; plea bargain; sexual battery; sexual activity; sexual conduct; U.S. Const. amend VI; Ohio Const. art. I, § 10; R.C. 2907.03; R.C. 2907.02; R.C. 2907.01; Crim.R. 11(C)(2). Affirmed. Appellant did not show that defense counsel’s assistance was deficient or that appellant’s defense was prejudiced where defense counsel did not interject after the trial court did not state the elements of an amended charge during the plea colloquy and defense counsel did not move to withdraw the appellant’s guilty plea after appellant made statements at sentencing minimizing his actions. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1285 |
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State v. Clark
| 115520 | Sentencing hearing, presumption of incarceration, sexual battery, R.C. 2907.03, plain error, Crim.R. 52(B), purposes of felony sentencing, R.C. 2929.11, seriousness and recidivism factors, R.C. 2929.12. Appellant’s sentence for sexual battery affirmed. During sentencing hearing, court mistakenly stated that sexual battery under R.C. 2907.03 carries a presumption of incarceration. However, appellant did not demonstrate that this affected the outcome of the proceeding or amounted to a manifest miscarriage of justice. Court made explicit finding that community-control sanction would not have been appropriate in this case, where appellant’s victim was under the age of 12, was a family member, and where appellant had a significant criminal history, including for prior violent offenses. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1286 |
|
State v. Green
| 115598 | Effective assistance of counsel; knowing and voluntary plea; plea colloquy; mental-health-court docket; postsentence motion to withdraw guilty plea; manifest injustice; Crim.R. 11(C); Cuyahoga C.P., Gen.Div., Loc.R. 30.1; Crim.R. 32.1. Affirmed. The trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea because appellant did not establish a manifest injustice. Defense counsel’s assistance was not ineffective when defense counsel did not request a transfer to the mental-health-court docket because appellant did not establish that he qualified for the specialized docket, that the trial court would have applied for a transfer, or that the administrative judge would have granted a request for a transfer. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1287 |
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State ex rel. Scott v. Costello
| 116037 | Prohibition; mandamus; community-control sanctions; probation-violation hearings; adequate notice; jurisdiction; adequate remedy at law; clerk of court; indigency; mootness; discretion of court; recusal; and rejection of filings. The failure to give notice of a probation-violation hearing does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the hearing; appeal is an adequate remedy at law. The termination of probation rendered the notice issues moot. Mandamus does not lie to compel a judge to recuse or reassign a case. Given the procedural posture of the underlying case, a delayed appeal presented an adequate remedy at law precluding mandamus to address filing issues and any other irregularities. Mandamus does not lie to compel the law generally or for anticipation of the nonperformance of duty. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1385 |
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State ex rel. JTC Solutions, L.L.C. v. Kelley
| 116096 | Writ of mandamus; arbitration; motion to dismiss; mandate; disobey; clear legal right; remedy at law; legal duty; law of the case; appeal; adequate remedy. -The equities of the situation demand that a writ of mandamus issue directing respondent to adhere to the court’s prior mandate. Relator established a clear legal right to the requested relief and a clear legal duty on the part of respondent, and an appeal was an inadequate remedy at law. | Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/8/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1288 |
|
State ex rel. Otis v. Clancy
| 116317 | Mandamus, jail-time credit; discretion of court; appeal with a motion for stay is an adequate remedy at law. Relator sought mandamus to compel the trial court judge to grant him 13 days of jail-time credit. This court dismissed the mandamus action sua sponte because a judge has discretion in deciding a motion of jail-time credit and mandamus does not control judicial discretion even if it is grossly abused. Moreover, appeal with a motion for stay is an adequate remedy at law precluding mandamus. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/7/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1290 |
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Richards v. Cuyahoga Cty. Corr. Ctr. Warden Shemo
| 116238 | Petition for writ of habeas corpus; not cognizable in habeas corpus; R.C. 2725.04(D); commitment papers; improper respondent; R.C. 2969.25(C)(1); sua sponte dismissal. -Habeas corpus petition dismissed, sua sponte. Claims of false charges, police misconduct, due-process violations, double jeopardy, prosecutorial misconduct, and judicial bias and misconduct alleged in petition were not cognizable in habeas corpus; petition lacked commitment papers as required by R.C. 2725.04(D); and petitioner did not provide an inmate account statement certified by the institutional cashier as required by R.C. 2969.25(C)(1). Because habeas corpus claims can be maintained only against the jailer or warden who presently has legal custody of the individual, trial judge was an improper respondent. | Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/6/2026
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4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1289 |
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Allan v. Allan
| 114193 | Judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”); JNOV; fraudulent transfer; statute of limitations; Civ.R. 50(B); R.C. 1336.09; R.C. 1336.06; reasonably could have discovered; discovery rule; manifest weight of the evidence; perfection; accrual; domestic relations; divorce. In a fraudulent-transfer case, the trial court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of defendants on statute-of-limitations grounds. The jury was entitled to weigh the competing evidence on whether and when the transfers occurred and whether the plaintiff reasonably could have discovered the transfers. The trial court exceeded its authority under Civ.R. 50(B) by substituting its own judgment for that of the jury’s by improperly applying a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard rather than a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard. The evidence that the jury considered in determining the accrual date of the action for statute-of-limitations purposes was sufficient to support its ruling. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1187 |
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Bradley v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., L.L.C.
| 115092 | Pro se; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; Civ.R. 56; summary judgment; negligence; duty; foreseeable. The trial court did not err in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant was unable to show a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The appellant did not comply with appellate rules in his assignments of error by failing to point to places in the record to support his claims. A claim of judicial bias or misconduct is not properly before this court. There was no cumulative error. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1188 |
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State v. Franklin
| 115200 | Motion to suppress; traffic stop; protective sweep; search; reasonable belief that suspect was dangerous; totality of the circumstances. The protective sweep of appellant’s vehicle was proper when there were specific and articulable facts demonstrating a reasonable belief that appellant was dangerous and that he would gain access to a weapon upon his return to the vehicle. The presence of a loaded magazine and the officers’ experience that a loaded magazine often meant the presence of a firearm, combined with appellant’s prohibition from owning a firearm and his admission that he owned one at his home was sufficient to meet the test set forth in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). The traffic stop was not significantly prolonged for the exterior sniff by the canine. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as the result of the protective sweep of the vehicle. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1189 |
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State v. Slaughter
| 115252 | Strangulation; domestic violence; lay opinion testimony; testimony about another case; manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the investigating detective to testify as a lay witness regarding domestic violence and strangulation. The detective was a veteran law-enforcement official who had over two decades of experience investigating domestic-violence cases. The detective also had specialized training and education on strangulation. His testimony was based on his training and experience, and it assisted the jury. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the victim to testify that, in the hours leading up to the within incident, a case against the appellant, in which she was also the named victim, had been dismissed. The testimony about the dismissed case was not offered to show that appellant had a propensity to commit a crime or that he acted in conformity with bad character. Rather, it was offered because it was inextricably intertwined with this case and was necessary to give context to what occurred in this case. The strangulation and domestic-violence convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The jury was in the best position to make credibility determinations, and there is nothing exceptional about its determinations in this case. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1190 |
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In re I.J.
| 115279 | Parental rights and responsibilities; modification; change in circumstances; R.C. 3109.04(E); best interests; R.C. 3109.051(D); witness list; exhibit list; Guardian ad litem (“GAL”); fees; local rules; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the parties’ parental rights and responsibilities agreement and declining to find a change in circumstances. The juvenile court exercised sound discretion when allowing the child’s half-brother to testify and allowing certain exhibits from Father even though Mother’s witness list and Father’s supplemental exhibit list were untimely. Father failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances under R.C. 3109.04(E) to warrant a change in Mother’s status as residential parent and legal custodian. Additionally, the modifications by the court to the agreement were in the child’s best interest under R.C. 3109.051(D). Lastly, the court did not err when it denied in part Father’s motion to exclude the GAL report. The court remedied any error by striking the improper legal conclusions by the GAL regarding change in circumstances and allowed the GAL to testify regarding the child’s best interests. The court complied with the local rules by allowing Father 14 days to request a hearing on the GAL’s motion for fees prior to ruling on the motion. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1191 |
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Jay Realty, L.L.C. v. J.P.S. Properties Diversified, Inc.
| 115322 | Law of the case; appellate mandate; remand. Reversed and remanded. The trial court erred by reinstating the granting of summary judgment reversed on appeal. On remand, the judgment must be rendered in favor of the defendant because there are no claims in the complaint left unresolved by the earlier appeal. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1192 |
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State v. Warren
| 115327 | Sufficiency; manifest weight; sexually-violent-predator designation; R.C. 2971.01(H)(1); R.C. 2971.01(H)(2). Judgment affirmed. Defendant-appellant’s rape convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements for rape were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, defendant-appellant is not entitled to a reversal on manifest-weight grounds merely because certain evidence or aspects of a witness’ testimony were inconsistent. Nor is defendant-appellant entitled to reversal because the trier of fact chose to believe the State’s version of events over his. Finally, we decline to find that the trial court erred in designating defendant-appellant a sexually violent predator based on the facts and circumstances of this case. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1193 |
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State v. Rachells
| 115358 | Sufficiency; manifest weight of the evidence; Crim.R. 16; ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence where he chose to challenge video evidence and cell phone data but ignored the direct evidence tying him to the crime, e.g., possession of the murder weapon. The trial court did not err in allowing the State to present evidence based on the State’s failure to disclose some of the cell mapping data, where the failure was not willful, and the appellant failed to establish how foreknowledge of the evidence would have benefited him or how he was prejudiced by the introduction of the evidence. Appellant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel where he failed to establish how he was prejudiced by his lawyer’s failure to request a continuance after learning of a discovery violation, where the benefit of the continuance was speculative and there was ample evidence connecting the appellant to the crime. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1194 |
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State v. Lawrence
| 115383 | Plea hearing; Crim.R. 11(C)(2); “understandingly and voluntarily”; “maximum penalty involved”; fines; Reagan Tokes advisements; R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c); concurrent sentence; life sentence; manifest miscarriage of justice; plain error. Appellant did not demonstrate that he did not understand the consequences of his guilty plea or that he did not plead guilty voluntarily where court misstated which offense carried which potential fine but did not impose fines. Appellant did not demonstrate manifest miscarriage of justice under plain-error analysis where court failed to give Reagan Tokes advisements but first-degree felony conviction to which such advisements applied was run concurrently to a life sentence, meaning appellant would never be eligible for early release nor to serve additional time under the Reagan Tokes Law. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1195 |
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MAZCleveland, L.L.C. v. Hall
| 115389 | Motion for sanctions; frivolous conduct; post-judgment motion; R.C. 2323.51. - Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants’ post-judgment motion for sanctions, arguing that appellee's counsel filed the complaint knowing that it would be frivolous. The conduct was not egregious, nor does it matter that appellee was ultimately unsuccessful. A hearing is not required on a post-judgment motion for sanctions where the record does not clearly evidence frivolous conduct. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1196 |
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State v. Etheridge
| 115415 | Petition for postconviction relief; untimely; constitutional right; youth; juvenile; findings of fact and conclusions of law. Trial court properly denied appellant’s petition for postconviction relief where appellant claimed violation of a new constitutional right created by the Ohio Supreme Court but the right was not recognized by the United States Supreme Court. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1197 |
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S. Euclid v. Hall
| 115445 | Domestic violence; family member; sufficiency; ineffective assistance of counsel; self-defense. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file notice of intent to assert a claim of self-defense where uncontroverted evidence showed that the defendant caused the situation that gave rise to the affray. Defendant’s conviction was sustained by sufficient evidence where the victim testified that the defendant entered her home without her permission, placed his hands on her neck, and pushed her into the wall causing visible injuries to the victim’s neck. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1198 |
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Broadview Hts. v. Dunn
| 115523 | Personal jurisdiction; subject-matter jurisdiction; lack of live controversy. Appeal dismissed in part; affirmed in part. The appeal is dismissed at it relates to drug-related case. The trial court acquitted the defendant of the charges and, thus, there is no live controversy for this court to consider. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed as it relates to the traffic case. The municipal court had both personal jurisdiction over the defendant and subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1199 |
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Lofty Holding 656 E. 126th St., L.L.C. v. 656 E. 126th, Ltd.
| 115529 | Personal jurisdiction; service; certified mail; ordinary mail; Civ.R. 4.6(D); motion for default judgment; rebuttable presumption; “evidentiary-quality information”; hearing. Judgment affirmed. The trial court’s grant of default judgment was proper when plaintiff perfected service on the defendant. A court can acquire personal jurisdiction over the defendant by service of process upon the defendant. There is a rebuttable presumption of proper service when the civil rules governing service are followed. The presumption of proper service can be rebutted if the defendant presents sufficient “evidentiary-quality information demonstrating” that service was not accomplished. Here, the record demonstrates that plaintiff perfected service by ordinary mail upon defendant. Defendant then failed to present any evidence rebutting the presumption when he failed to appear at the hearing regarding service, and plaintiff presented evidence that its ordinary mail service was sent to an address where there was a reasonable expectation that it would be delivered to the defendant. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1200 |
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