| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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Caldwell v. Custom Craft Builders, Inc.
| 113209 | Reconsideration; App.R. 26(A)(1)(a); error of law; contract; breach of contract; conspiracy to commit fraud; fraud; consumer sales practices act ("CSPA"); permit; employee; employer; relevant evidence; Evid.R. 401; Evid.R. 403; damages; insufficient evidence; manifest weight; unfair or deceptive acts; piercing the corporate veil; alter ego; apparent authority; principal; agent; attorney fees. The trial court’s journal entry following a bench trial is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The evidence presented at trial supported the trial court’s finding that the defendant-appellant LLC contracted with the plaintiff-appellee to do HVAC work through the apparent authority of its employee/agent and that the LLC breached the contract and violated the CSPA. However, there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the owner of the LLC was individually liable on these claims. There was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding of a civil conspiracy to commit fraud and, therefore, the award of punitive damages and the award of statutory damages are vacated; however, the trial court’s award of attorney fees was supported by sufficient evidence. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-115 |
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State v. Carpenter
| 114655 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; strangulation; domestic violence; endangering children; discovery; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Crim.R. 16. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Defendant-appellant’s convictions for strangulation and domestic violence are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, there is insufficient evidence to support his endangering-children conviction; we cannot say that a substantial risk to the child’s health or safety was created based on the child’s witnessing of the incident alone. Moreover, we find that the State’s allegedly delayed disclosure of a cassette-tape recording did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), or Crim.R. 16. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-116 |
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Wells v. Right Choice Contracting, L.L.C.
| 114802 | Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act; supplier; purchaser; consumer transaction; personal purposes; breach of contract; existence of a contract. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. The trial court committed reversible error when it determined that the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act did not apply to the transaction between appellant and appellee as a matter of law. The trial court also committed reversible error when it determined that appellant failed to substantially perform the obligations he owed to appellee under their contract. The trial court misidentified the documents that constitute the parties’ contract. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-117 |
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In re D.L.T.
| 114925 | Objections to magistrate’s decision; failure to file transcript; raising issues for the first time on appeal; Juv.R. 40; subject-matter jurisdiction. Appellant’s failure to file the transcript with the juvenile court precludes our review of the lower court’s factual findings related to granting father legal custody, granting the grandparents visitation, and in allowing expert testimony. Because appellant’s arguments are based on the court’s factual findings, or were not made at the trial-court level, and because appellant’s objections were not stated with sufficient specificity, we are unable to review these arguments. Appellant also raised the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, for which we do not need the transcript to determine. The trial court did not have jurisdiction to award attorney or expert fees for work done in another court on another case. Award of attorney fees is void and issue of expert fees is remanded for the court to calculate the amount of fees relating to the juvenile case. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-118 |
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Morgan v. Applied Med. Technology, Inc.
| 114963 | Motion for sanctions; hearing; R.C. 2323.51; Civ.R. 11; frivolous conduct; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motions for sanctions without a hearing. The mere fact that plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims is not enough to warrant sanctions, especially when the record is devoid of any evidence of frivolous conduct throughout the litigation. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-119 |
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State v. Newton
| 114965 | Marsy’s Law; restitution; guilty plea; sentencing; innocence; affirmative defenses. Reversed and remanded. The trial court erred by denying the victim restitution based on the defendant’s protestations of innocence raised for the first time at sentencing following a guilty plea. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-120 |
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M.E. v. M.A.
| 115021 | Domestic-violence civil protection order (“DVCPO”); abuse of discretion; domestic violence; Civ.R. 65.1; R.C. 3113.31; sufficient credible evidence; competency of a minor; R.C. 2317.01; motion to strike. The domestic relations court issued a DVCPO in favor of petitioner-appellee (“Petitioner”) against Respondent-appellant (“Respondent.”) Respondent appealed claiming (1) the court abused its discretion in overruling his objections to the magistrate’s order and adopting the DVCPO issued by the magistrate, and (2) the magistrate erred in denying Respondent’s motion to strike the testimony of his seven-year-old daughter S.A. The lower court’s issuance of the DVCPO was supported by sufficient credible evidence. Petitioner testified with respect to multiple instances of physical abuse from Respondent towards herself and S.A. Respondent also testified at the full hearing, claiming that he was never physically abusive towards Petitioner or S.A. The trial court was in the best position to consider the contradictory testimony between Petitioner and Respondent. As such, the reviewing court declined to substitute its judgment for that of the lower court. Respondent and Petitioner’s seven year old daughter S.A. testified at the hearing. Prior to the hearing, the magistrate conducted an in camera voir dire of S.A., which neither party objected to. The magistrate concluded that S.A. was competent to testify. Following S.A.’s testimony, Respondent filed a motion to strike S.A.’s testimony that was denied by the magistrate. Respondent claims that S.A.’s testimony at the hearing demonstrate that she was incompetent to testify because she did not recall certain facts concerning the abuse. However, the court determined that even if S.A. may not have remembered the date the assault occurred or of certain particulars of the assault does not relate so much to her competency to testify, but rather to S.A.’s credibility as a witness. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-121 |
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State v. Hicks
| 115116 | Conceded error; nunc pro tunc. The trial court erred by issuing a sentencing journal entry that stated the appellant was sentenced on Count 185, when the appellant was not. The State conceded the error, and the trial court must issue a nunc pro tunc to correct the sentencing entry. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-122 |
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Cleveland v. Hall
| 115143 | Separation-of-powers doctrine; prosecutor; court; pretrial diversion program. Trial court violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by referring defendant to a pretrial diversion program over the prosecutor’s objection. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-123 |
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In re T.W.
| 115158 | Permanent custody; motion to continue; R.C. 2151.353(A)(3); Juv.Loc.R. 35(C); Juv.R. 23; manifest weight; sufficiency of the evidence; clear and convincing evidence; R.C. 2151.353(A)(4); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.414(E). Judgment affirmed. Weighing the potential prejudice to appellant-mother against the juvenile court’s right to control its docket, the public’s interest in the prompt and efficient dispatch of justice, and the minor child’s best interests and need for stability and permanency, we find that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant-mother’s motion for continuance. Moreover, clear and convincing evidence supports each of the juvenile court’s R.C. 2151.414(E) and (D)(1) findings. Accordingly, the juvenile court’s award of permanent custody to Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) is supported by sufficient evidence within the record and is not contrary to that evidence’s manifest weight. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-124 |
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2222 Internatl., L.L.C. v. Law Search, L.L.C.
| 115220 | Foreclosure; summary judgment; objections to magistrate’s decision; statute of limitations; quiet title; mortgage; retroactive application of statute; constitutionality. The trial court’s judgment adopting the magistrate’s decision entering summary judgment in favor of appellee on appellant’s foreclosure action is affirmed. All necessary parties were joined to the action and the trial court had jurisdiction to issue its decision. Furthermore, application of an eight-year statute of limitations on the foreclosure action was proper and not an unconstitutionally retroactive application of the law. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-125 |
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Cleveland Hts. v. Watts
| 115265 | App.R. 9; record on appeal; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; appellate brief requirements; pro se party. Judgment affirmed. Appellant’s assignments of error are overruled for noncompliance with App.R. 9 and 16. Appellant’s failure to identify errors with reference to the record and to present an argument containing his contentions with respect to the claimed errors permit this court to disregard his assignments of error under App.R. 12. Further, we must presume the regularity of the proceedings below because of appellant’s failure to provide us with a transcript. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-126 |
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In re K.G.
| 115351 | Parental rights; motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody; incarcerated parent; manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review; sufficiency-of-the-evidence review; motion for continuance. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-127 |
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State v. Redding
| 115633 | Conceded error; driver’s license suspension; motion to modify or terminate; R.C. 4510.54(B); hearing. The trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing under R.C. 4510.54(B) prior to granting the defendant’s motion to vacate or modify his driver’s license suspension and reinstating his driving privileges. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-128 |
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In re J.U.
| 114400 | Companionship; visitation; custody; adoption; grandparents; mother; juvenile; best interest; Juv.R. 40(D); R.C. 3109.12; R.C. 2505.02; de novo; abuse of discretion; sexual offenses; stay; Lorain; therapy. A parent’s fundamental interest in the care, custody, and control of a child is a substantial right; therefore, an order resolving a statutorily created companionship claim under R.C. 3109.12 is a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02 when it fully disposes of the grandparents’ request and the parent’s objections. A juvenile court satisfies Juv.R. 40(D)(4)’s independent review requirement when, after timely objections, it conducts its own evaluation of the record and modifies a magistrate’s decision to narrow companionship time, incorporating Troxel’s “special weight” for a fit parent’s wishes. In the absence of an abuse of discretion, a trial court does not err by granting limited, structured virtual companionship to grandparents when the record demonstrates the trial court balanced the best interest of the child and the parent’s wishes under R.C. 3109. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
1/8/2026
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1/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-34 |
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Fulkroad v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth.
| 114570; 115257 | Workers’ compensation; default judgment; sanction; case-management conference; abuse of discretion; failure to appear. The trial court abused its discretion by sua sponte entering default judgment for the plaintiff when defense counsel failed to appear for the initial case-management conference. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
1/8/2026
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1/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-35 |
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McCoy v. Avon Place Skilled Nursing & Rehab. Ctr.
| 114779 | Nursing home malpractice; admitted liability; jury instructions; jury interrogatories; punitive damages; R.C. 2315.21; invited error; plain error; wavier; judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”); de novo; ratification; corporate entity; scope of employment; actual malice; damages cap; noneconomic damages; R.C. 2315.18; $250,000; separate incident; nursing home resident’s bill of rights (“NHRBR”); abuse of discretion; attorney fees; reconstructed hours; expenses; lodestar; prejudgment interest; R.C. 1343.04; good-faith settlement. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in denying defendants’ JNOV motion as to punitive damages in Plaintiffs’ nursing home malpractice case. In the instant case, there is no dispute that Defendants drafted the jury instructions that it complains of on appeal. The trial court adopted the jury instructions verbatim, and the Defendants’ did not object at trial. Because defendants invited this error by providing the court with jury instructions and never objected to the instructions, it may not now seek to use the instruction to its advantage on appeal. In addition, Defendants’ failure to object to the interrogatory constituted waiver of any error on appeal. Furthermore, trial court did not apply the wrong standard for punitive damages against a corporate entity as Defendants contend. Defendants failed to raise ratification in its JNOV motion and, therefore, waived the issue on appeal, but for plain error. We do not find plain error because Plaintiffs established ratification at trial. Plaintiffs adduced evidence demonstrating that the nurse’s job responsibilities included decedent’s trach care and the Defendants ratified the nurse’s conduct when Defendants failed to terminate or discipline the nurse. The evidence at trial also demonstrated actual malice. The Defendants’ staff nurse ignored the Plaintiff’s cries for help. A reasonable person could conclude that the staff’s conduct amounted to a conscious disregard for the decedent’s rights, health, and safety, which had great probability of causing substantial harm. The trial court did not err in permitting the Estate to recover $250,000 in noneconomic damages for decedent’s pain and suffering as a result of the failures in care on August 1, 2020. The trial court was also correct in permitting the Estate to recover $250,000 in noneconomic damages for the decedent’s NHRBR claim, which related to a separate incident on July 23, 2020. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees and expenses. The trial court was in the best position to determine if Plaintiffs’ reconstructed fee request was accurate. The beginning point for determining the award of attorney fees is the reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the number of hours worked, a calculation that is sometimes referred to as lodestar. Here, the trial court considered the factors such as the fee customarily charged in the locality, the injuries and damages involved in the case, the results obtained, the fact that Plaintiffs’ counsel was not paid during the litigation and that they advanced litigation expenses, as well as the fact that the fee was contingent. The court found that a multiplier of 2.65 was an appropriate modification to the lodestar. Lastly, the trial court did not err in awarding pre-judgment interest because the evidence indicates that Defendants made no effort to consider the risk of an adverse verdict at trial and did not negotiate in good faith. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
1/8/2026
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1/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-36 |
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State v. Morris
| 114927 | Guilty plea; motion to withdraw; Crim.R. 32.1; res judicata; manifest injustice; newly discovered evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. Because the exhibits appellant attached to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea are not newly discovered, res judicata bars his claims. Furthermore, appellant fails to demonstrate that a manifest injustice has occurred, particularly because he was aware of these exhibits before his guilty plea and trial counsel was not ineffective. This is not the case where “an extraordinary and fundamental flaw in the plea proceeding” occurred. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
1/8/2026
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1/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-37 |
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Selzer v. Union Home Mtge. Corp.
| 114959 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; evidence; age discrimination; direct evidence; discriminatory intent; prima facie case. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for employer where employee presented direct evidence of discriminatory intent in his age-discrimination suit. This evidence created a genuine issue of material fact. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
1/8/2026
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1/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-38 |
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Taye v. Cuyahoga Hills Juvenile Corr. Facility
| 115004 | Motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; workers’ compensation claim; R.C. 4123.01(C)(5); preexisting condition; substantially aggravated; clear and unambiguous statute; and objective pre-injury medical evidence. The trial court erred when it granted an employer’s motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff-appellant worker provided, pursuant to R.C. 4123.01(C)(5), objective clinical findings, objective test results, and subjective complaints to support his claim that his work incident caused a substantial aggravation of preexisting conditions. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
1/8/2026
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1/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-39 |