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State v. Finklea
| 113566 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; aggravated murder; murder; felonious assault; prior calculation and design; aggravated burglary; App.R. 26 motion to reopen; reopened appeal. There was insufficient evidence that appellant acted with prior calculation and design. Conviction for aggravated murder vacated. All other convictions affirmed. There was no evidence that appellant and others were planning on killing the victim. There was no evidence that appellant knew the victim or knew that he was going to be in the apartment he visited. The evidence showed that the shooter reacted in the spur of the moment with, at most, momentary consideration that occurred in the seconds after the victim left the apartment. There was sufficient evidence of aggravated murder with the underlying offense being aggravated burglary. There was evidence of trespass. Appellant did not have permission to be in the apartment. Although there was conflicting evidence whether the apartment door was open or closed, the element of force can be met by opening a closed door and the appellant’s DNA was on the inside of the door handle. Moreover, at least one witness testified that the apartment door was closed when appellant entered. A reasonable juror could infer that appellant formed the purpose to commit a criminal offense when he entered the apartment, while in the apartment, or when chasing the victim after he left the apartment. Although the shooting occurred outside the apartment in a commonly used hallway, the shooting was part of a continuous sequence of events and State only had to show that appellant formed the purpose to commit a crime when he trespassed in the apartment or during the course of the trespass. Appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although there was evidence that another man was the shooter and it is doubtful that the shooting occurred as some witnesses testified to, there was also evidence that appellant was the shooter. The trial court did not err in allowing testimony regarding allegations that the victim was a gang member and that some witnesses fled Ohio because they feared retaliation. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1762 |
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State v. Reid
| 115108, 115290 | Manifest weight; self-defense; jury instruction; cell phone extraction; authentication; evidence of search for counsel; Sixth Amendment; right to counsel; Fifth Amendment; right to remain silent; jail-time credit; cumulative error. Defendant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence despite minor inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony. The trial court properly refused to provide a self-defense jury instruction where there was no evidence that the defendant acted in self-defense. Lead detective sufficiently demonstrated that the contents of a cell phone extraction were what the matter claimed to be. Trial court failed to apply jail-time credit. Appellant failed to demonstrate that he was deprived of a fair trial because of cumulative errors when he failed to demonstrate that any errors occurred during the trial. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1764 |
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Carrington Mtge. Servs., L.L.C. v. Aboytes
| 115174 | Civ.R. 60(B); foreclosure; default judgment; excusable neglect; relief from judgment; plain error; Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b); waiver of objections; magistrate’s decision; service of process; personal jurisdiction; void judgment; sheriff’s sale; mortgage; Civ.R. 60(B)(1); Civ.R. 60(B)(5). Defendant-appellant appeals the trial court’s judgment adopting a magistrate’s decision denying his Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from a default foreclosure judgment. Because appellant failed to file timely objections to the magistrate’s decision under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i), our review is limited to plain error. The record does not demonstrate plain error, and appellant failed to present operative facts establishing a meritorious defense. The trial court also properly denied relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5), which requires substantial grounds and cannot be substituted for Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (4). Judgment affirmed. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1765 |
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State v. Yafanaro
| 115275 | Plain error; restitution order; manifest weight of the evidence. The appellant did not object to the restitution order thereby waiving all but a plain error review by the court. However, the appellant did not argue plain error on appeal. Thus, the court need not consider the issue. The appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1766 |
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State v. Walker
| 115280 | Motion to suppress; sufficiency of the evidence; Crim.R. 29 motion to acquit; manifest weight of the evidence; prior conviction. The trial court did not err when it denied the appellant’s motion to suppress because the search of the vehicle was justified by an exception to the warrant requirement. The appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence, and the trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. The appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err by admitting stipulated certified copies of previous journal entries to establish the appellant’s prior conviction. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1767 |
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State v. Patterson
| 115294 | Defective indictment; dangerous ordnance; switch; machine gun conversion device; sufficiency; manifest weight; knowingly; possession. Appellant’s conviction for possessing a dangerous ordnance upheld because the direct and circumstantial evidence established that appellant knowingly possessed a firearm modified with a switch or machine gun conversion device, thus rendering the firearm a dangerous ordnance. Indictment was not defective because it tracked the language of the statute and appellant did not establish that he did not have notice of the offense. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1768 |
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State v. Blake
| 115430 | Guilty plea; Crim.R. 11(C); complete failure; prejudice; restitution; discretionary; contrary to law; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; purposes and principles of felony sentencing; sentencing factors; Marsy’s Law; defendant’s ability to pay restitution; allied offenses of similar import; plain error. The trial court’s failure to inform appellant that he could be subject to restitution at his plea hearing was not a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11, and therefore, appellant had to demonstrate prejudice to establish his plea was less than knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Nothing in the record demonstrated that appellant would not have entered his guilty plea had he been notified of the possibility of restitution. The trial court’s sentence was not contrary to law where the court considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12, and the corresponding sentencing judgment entry indicated the court considered all required factors of the law. The trial court did not err in ordering restitution. Pursuant to Marsy’s Law, the trial court did not need to consider the appellant’s ability to pay restitution. Appellant did not demonstrate that the trial court committed plain error when it did not merge felonious-assault, strangulation, and domestic-violence convictions for sentencing purposes. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1769 |
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State v. Moncrief
| 115436 | Principles of felony sentencing; R.C. 2929.11; sentencing factors; R.C. 2929.12; juvenile mitigating factors; R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b); appellate review of felony sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Court did not err sentencing juvenile defendant to a five-year term of imprisonment for first-degree felony. The court imposed a sentence within the statutory range applicable to the offense to which appellant pled guilty. Record did not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that court failed to consider principles of felony sentencing and the sentencing factors, including juvenile mitigating factors. During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel asked the court to consider appellant’s age, past trauma, and home environment as mitigating factors. In response, court stated on the record that it did not believe this information overcame the presumption of prison. Sentencing journal entry stated that court considered all factors required by law and found that prison was consistent with the purpose of R.C. 2929.11. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1770 |
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J.T. v. J.G.
| 115449 | Civil stalking protection order; Civ.R. 65.1; objections to magistrate’s decision; transcript. Absent a transcript of the trial court’s proceedings on the petitions for civil protection orders, this court must presume regularity of the proceedings and accept that the trial court correctly interpreted the facts. Additionally, this court declines to review claims of a magistrate’s misconduct that were not initially raised before the trial court or any other alleged errors in respect to the magistrate’s conduct. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1771 |
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State v. Church
| 115480 | R.C. 2929.12; sentencing factors; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); sentencing review. Defendant’s sentence was affirmed. Reviewing courts do not have the authority to review the trial court’s consideration of the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1772 |
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Bertalan v. Bertalan
| 115533 | Civ.R. 60(B); motion; relief from judgment; impartial; judicial misconduct; due process; structural error; newly discovered evidence; abuse of discretion; Civ.R. 60(B)(5); extraordinary. Affirmed the trial court’s denial of appellant’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion where appellant relied on findings of judicial misconduct not related to his individual divorce action, and he failed to show any due-process violation or structural error occurred in this case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief under Civ.R. 60(B) where certain grounds were untimely asserted and it was not the extraordinary case warranting relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5). | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1773 |
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In re M.D.T.
| 115543 | Criminal contempt; indirect contempt; civil contempt; purge. Juvenile court abused its discretion in finding the Cuyahoga County Office of Child Support Services (“OCSS”) guilty of criminal contempt where there was no evidence that OCSS intentionally violated the court’s order and the juvenile court had other options to cure the alleged violation without resorting to criminal contempt. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1774 |
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State v. Soto
| 115582 | Withdrawal of counsel; motion on day of trial; trial strategy; motion for continuance; sufficiency of the evidence; merger; OVI; R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a); absence of field sobriety, blood, or urine test; manifest weight of the evidence; jury instruction; refusal to submit to OVI testing; evidence of intoxication. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defense counsel’s motion to withdraw because disagreements over strategy, particularly those presented at the start of trial, do not establish good cause for withdrawal. Additionally, the trial court’s denial of defendant-appellant’s motion for continuance of trial was not an abuse of discretion because the case had been pending for over a year, the court conducted numerous pretrial hearings, had already granted a continuance several times, and counsel was prepared and ready to proceed to trial. Defendant-appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it provided a jury instruction that conformed with the Ohio Supreme Court’s sanctioned “refusal to submit” jury instruction, the instruction was applicable to the facts in the case, and reasonable minds could reach the conclusion sought by the instruction. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1775 |
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Yormick v. King David Post Acute Nursing & Rehab., L.L.C.
| 115662 | Arbitration; motion to stay; time-limitations clause; R.C. 2711.02(B); waiver; right to arbitration; dispositive; abuse of discretion; totality of circumstances; acted inconsistent. Affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant-appellant’s motion to stay pending arbitration. Issues not raised or addressed in the trial court would not be addressed for the first time on appeal. The issue of whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by deciding the timeliness of the arbitration demand under the arbitration agreement’s time-limitation clause was not definitely decided on appeal where neither party provided authority directly on point and the waiver issue was dispositive of the matter. Plaintiff-appellee demonstrated that defendant-appellant knew of its right to arbitration, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining from the totality of the circumstances that appellant acted inconsistently with the right to arbitration. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1776 |
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Siniscalchi v. K. Hovnanian Meadow Lakes, L.L.C.
| 115700 | Motion to dismiss; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); res judicata; spoliation of evidence; attorney fees; frivolous conduct. The court committed reversible error by dismissing plaintiff’s spoliation of evidence claim under both Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff properly alleged a spoliation claim and the court’s determination that plaintiff had previously filed a spoliation claim was not supported by the record. The court also erred by awarding attorney fees for frivolous conduct because there is no reason at this stage of the proceeding to dismiss the case. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1777 |
|
In re A.K.
| 115840 | Permanent custody; best interests of the child; clear and convincing evidence; temporary custody; juvenile court; substance abuse; mental health; housing; parenting; manifest weight; drug screen; abuse; neglect; dependent; incarceration. The juvenile court’s judgment terminating mother’s parental rights and granting permanent custody of her children to Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (D)(2). | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1778 |
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State ex rel. Holloway v. Saffold
| 116122 | Civ.R. 12(B)(6); motion to dismiss; failure to state a claim; writ of mandamus; findings of fact; motion to vacate void judgment. Petition for writ of mandamus dismissed where, assuming the truth of the factual allegations of the petition and making all reasonable inferences in relator’s favor, it appeared beyond doubt that relator could prove no set of facts entitling him to a writ of mandamus based on claim that respondent judge had a duty to enter findings of fact relating to denial of motion to vacate void judgment. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/12/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1779 |
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State v. Garcia-Toro
| 107940 | State v. Murnahan; App.R. 26(B)(1); application to reopen; good cause. Application to reopen appeal from judgment of conviction and sentence denied where applicant did not demonstrate good cause for filing after the 90-day deadline. This court affirmed applicant’s convictions and sentence for aggravated murder and attempted murder more than six years before the application was filed. Applicant argued that good cause existed for the late filing because he was unaware of the 90-day deadline for an application to reopen, he did not have reasonable access to a library, and appellate counsel continued to represent him after his conviction was affirmed. In prior cases, this court has found each of these circumstances did not demonstrate good cause for a late-filed application to reopen. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/8/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1761 |
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Lakewood v. Smith
| 114186 | App.R. 26(B); ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; violation of an ex parte protection order; R.C. 2903.214; hearsay evidence; course of investigation; professional judgment that this court will not second guess. A jury convicted defendant of violating an ex parte protection order. Appellate counsel exercised professional judgment in successfully arguing that a transcript from a related case was inadmissible hearsay. The appellant’s other arguments did not establish prejudice; they did not undermine this court’s confidence that Smith violated the protection order. This court ruled that it would not second guess appellate counsel’s professional judgment and that there was no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
5/8/2026
|
5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1763 |
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In re A.N.
| 115219 & 115302 | Modification of agreed shared parenting plan; abuse of discretion; best interest of the child; R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b); R.C. 3109.05(D); App.R. 12 and 16. The court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the parties’ agreed shared parenting plan to put the father in charge of the child’s passport and expand the conditions under which the father is permitted to travel internationally with the child. The evidence in the record shows that the mother consistently and blatantly violated the terms of the agreed shared parenting plan regarding the child’s passport and international travel. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
|
5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1646 |
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Estate of Vasquez v. Tallmadge Health & Rehab Ctr.
| 115395 | R.C. Ch. 2711; motion to stay and enforce arbitration agreement; valid agreement; principles of contract; electronic signature; R.C. 1306.01; R.C. 1306.08; rebuttable presumption. Appellee rebutted the presumption that the decedent had electronically signed an arbitration agreement, and appellants failed to submit any evidence demonstrating the validity of the decedent’s electronic signature. The trial court did not err in denying appellants’ motion to stay and enforce the arbitration agreement. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
|
5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1647 |
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Omnia Med., L.L.C. v. Overmann
| 115404 | Motion to dismiss; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); de novo review; statute of limitations; R.C. 2305.11(A); accrual of claim; legal malpractice; affirmative defense; cognizable event; attorney-client relationship terminated. Judgment reversed and remanded. The trial court erred in dismissing the complaint based on the one-year statute of limitations. After accepting all the factual allegations of the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the complaint for legal malpractice was not time-barred. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
|
5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1648 |
|
Nouraldin v. Swipe USA, L.L.C.
| 115408 | Summary judgment; motion for judgment on the pleadings; converting motion; oral contract; essential terms; partnership; promissory estoppel; breach of fiduciary duty; declaratory judgment. The trial court did not err in converting a motion for judgment on the pleadings to a motion for summary judgment where the court allowed the parties time to supplement their motion with Civ.R. 56 materials and appellant did not object. Summary judgment was improper where appellant demonstrated the existence of genuine issues of material fact regarding his claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
|
5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1649 |
|
Asriian v. Pribish
| 115483 | Expert testimony; residual diminution in value; Daubert; Evid.R. 702: specialized knowledge; experience; certifications. Trial court properly allowed defense expert to provide expert opinions regarding the residual diminution in value of plaintiff’s car following a car accident where the defense witness demonstrated specialized knowledge derived from extensive experience buying, repairing, and reselling cars. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
|
5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1650 |
|
Parma v. Young
| 115493 | Right to jury trial; demand; Crim.R. 23; written waiver; R.C. 2945.05; signed by defendant; bench trial; jurisdiction; invited error. Because appellant had not waived her right to a jury trial in compliance with R.C. 2945.05, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a bench trial. The matter is remanded for a new trial. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
|
5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1651 |
|
State v. Tolliver
| 115496 | Fifth Amendment; double jeopardy; mistrial; retrial; de novo review. Judgment affirmed. The trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy was not error. The State did not intentionally cause or invite a mistrial. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
|
5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1652 |
|
State v. Baldwin
| 115525 | R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(e); having weapons while under disability; firearm specification; sentencing; subsection (e)(i) and (ii); postrelease control; date of offense; ineffective assistance of counsel; no error so no deficient performance; futile act not deficient. Appellant appeals the trial court’s sentence alleging it committed plain error by sentencing him to a prison term for a firearm specification for violating having weapons while under disability pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(e), which only permits a prison sentence when subsections (e)(i) and (ii) are met. Appellant admitted that subsection (i) was satisfied as he had been convicted of aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony. He argued subsection (ii) was not met because he was still on postrelease control (“PRC”) for the prior offense and therefore it had not been less than five-years since he had been released from PRC. We find appellant ignored the first part of subsection (ii) that it had been less than five years since offender was released from prison as he was released from prison for the prior offense in 2021 and committed the underlying offense in 2025, which is less than five years from his release. The language “whichever is later” is important because appellant had not yet been released from PRC when he committed the offense such that the date did not exist so the only date that could be considered was from when he was released from prison. Therefore, the trial court had sufficient evidence for finding the requirement of subsection (ii) was met and thereby the trial court did not commit plain error in sentencing appellant to a prison term for the firearm specification. Appellant also alleged in his assignment of error that his counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to this sentence at sentencing. We find that his counsel’s performance was not deficient as the sentence was legal and that appellant was not prejudiced by his counsel not objecting as this would not have changed the outcome of his sentence. Appellant’s counsel cannot be deficient or ineffective for failing to perform a futile act. As such, appellant’s assignment of error is overruled. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
|
5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1653 |
|
W. 6th St. Partners, Inc. v. Culkar
| 115527 | Civ.R. 50(A); motion for directed verdict; breach of contract; shareholder dispute; Close corporation; breach of fiduciary duty; unjust enrichment; money had and received; statute of limitations; conversion; discovery rule. Both appellants/cross-appellees and appellee/cross-appellant appeal the trial court’s granting of each other’s motions for directed verdicts at trial. Appellants appeal the trial courts directed verdict as to their claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty/misappropriation of funds, unjust enrichment, and money had and received. The directed verdict for the breach-of-contract claim was correctly granted because there was insufficient evidence that appellee breached the agreement. The directed verdict for the breach of fiduciary duty/misappropriation of funds was improperly granted as there was sufficient evidence presented to support this claim. The directed verdict for unjust enrichment was properly granted as there was insufficient evidence that appellant’s conferred any benefit to appellee. Last, the directed verdict for the claim of money had and received was properly granted as this is a quasi-contract claim that was based entirely on the breach of an express contract, which is not permitted under Ohio law. Appellee appealed the trial court’s granting of directed verdicts for his two counterclaims for unjust enrichment and conversion. The directed verdict for the unjust-enrichment claim was properly granted as such a claim is reserved for when services are provided to the benefit of another and here there was no evidence of appellee providing any services or conferring any benefit to appellants. The directed verdict for appellee’s conversion claim was improperly granted in its entirety. There was sufficient evidence presented that appellee possessed ownership interest in the business and that he stopped receiving distribution payments and that his shares were taken from him. The four-year statute of limitations is applicable here however, because the first converted distribution check occurred in 2013 and appellee was aware of this conversion but did not file his counterclaim for conversion until 2022. As such, his conversion claim for distribution payments is limited to distributions made in 2018 and later. As to his ownership interest, which was taken and redistributed to the other partners in 2017, the undisputed evidence at trial was that he did not discover this until 2022 when the amended complaint was filed. Further, it was not documented until his 2017 K-1 which he should have, but did not receive, in 2018 so even if he had discovered this in 2018 at the earliest, this would be within the statute of limitations. Therefore, the trial court properly granted a directed verdict as to his conversion claim of distribution payments prior to 2018 and improperly granted the directed verdict for distribution payments from 2018 to present and for the conversion claim of his shares. The matter is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the parties to retry the remaining issues. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
|
5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1654 |
|
Estate of Morales v. Pavilion Rehab. & Nursing Ctr.
| 115567 | Medical negligence; long-term care facility; statute of repose; R.C. 2305.113(C); unsound mind; R.C. 2305.16; Estate; voluntary dismissal; saving statute; summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); notice pleading; tolling; dementia; cognitive deficits; attorney-in-fact; affidavit of merit; refiled complaint; genuine issue of material fact; time-barred. Appellant’s refiled medical negligence action is barred by the four-year statute of repose under R.C. 2305.113 (C) because it was commenced more than four years after the last alleged act or omission of malpractice. Appellant failed both to properly plead unsound mind as a tolling ground, or produce admissible Civ.R. 56(C) evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact, on that issue. Unauthenticated medical records and lay affidavits were insufficient to invoke the narrow statutory exception. Absent a viable tolling theory, the refiled complaint is barred by R.C. 2305.113(C), that the saving statute cannot overcome. Summary judgment for appellees is affirmed. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
|
5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1655 |
|
Orlove v. Bringht
| 115571 | Forcible entry and detainer; money damages; service of process; personal jurisdiction; perfected service; certified mail; good cause; motion to quash service; motion to dismiss complaint; waiver of affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process; R.C. 1923.06(H)(2); Civ.R. 4; Civ.R. 4(E); Civ.R. 4.1(A)(1); Civ.R. 3(A). Vacated and remanded. The trial court erred when it denied appellant’s motion to quash service of process and motion to dismiss appellee’s complaint. We vacate and remand the trial court’s order because appellee did not perfect service on the second cause of action for money damages pursuant to Civ.R. 4. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
|
5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1656 |
|
State v. Wallace
| 115576 | Fifth Amendment; harmless error; falsification. The admission of a brief video of an attempted interview with defendant-appellant did not constitute reversible error where the video was introduced to establish the elements of a falsification offense and there was overwhelming evidence of defendant-appellant’s guilt independent of the video evidence in question. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
|
5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1657 |
|
In re C.H.
| 115580, 116147 | Permanent custody; best interests of the child; clear and convincing evidence; temporary custody; juvenile court; alcohol abuse; mental health; housing; parenting best interests; sufficiency; manifest weight; ineffective assistance, prejudice. The juvenile court’s award of permanent custody to the agency is supported by clear and convincing evidence and is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
|
5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1658 |
|
Republic Fin., L.L.C. v. Johnson
| 115678 | Arbitration; R.C. Ch. 2711; sua sponte; waiver. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err by failing to sua sponte order the parties to arbitration. The initiation of arbitration proceedings falls on the parties and not the trial court. Appellant waived any right to arbitration by participating, without objection, in the lower court proceedings. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
|
5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1659 |
|
One Main Fin. Group, L.L.C. v. Knight
| 115883 | Service of process; Civ.R. 4.1; due process; personal jurisdiction; void; plain error. Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to vacate default judgment against her where service was sent without requiring a signature and defendant submitted an affidavit that she did not reside at the address where the summons and complaint were sent and she had no notice of the lawsuit until after the default judgment was entered. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
|
5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1660 |
|
In re A.C.
| 115887 | Permanent custody; clear and convincing evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; best interest of the child; R.C. 2151.414; offenses against a child; endangering children; retaliation; incarceration; credibility; custody to maternal grandmother. Trial court’s conclusion that the children could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time and that permanent custody was in the children’s best interest was supported by sufficient evidence and by the manifest weight of the evidence. Mother was convicted of child endangerment and retaliation and sentenced to 27 months in prison. Maternal grandmother was not credible in her ability to protect the children. Thus, she should not have custody of the children. The children were too young to express their wishes. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
|
5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1661 |
|
State v. Spivey
| 115015 | Aggravated murder; plain error; Crim.R. 52; ineffective assistance of counsel; identification testimony; hearsay; surveillance footage; manifest weight of the evidence; juror bias; abuse of discretion. It was not plain error to admit testimony as to how the defendant-appellant was identified as a suspect or the defendant-appellant’s identity in the surveillance footage, and it was not ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel to fail to object to this testimony. It was not plain error to admit palm-print evidence or evidence regarding attempts to locate the defendant-appellant, and it was not ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel to fail to object to this evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to separately inquire of a juror where it inquired of the foreperson following an allegation of misconduct. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1550 |
|
State v. Greene
| 115111 | Hearsay; sufficient evidence; manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err or prejudice appellant by admitting hearsay statements from forensic interviews of the victims. The appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1551 |
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State v. Burge
| 115282, 115563 | Vacate plea; withdrawal of plea; Crim.R. 11; knowing and voluntary pleas; plea agreement; colloquy; State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; purposes of felony sentencing; ineffective assistance of counsel. - Judgment affirmed. Defendant-appellant failed to demonstrate that his plea was entered unknowingly, involuntarily, or unintelligently. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences. The trial court complied with the principles and purposes of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Defendant-appellant has not demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
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4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1552 |
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State v. Peterson
| 115313 | Withdrawal of plea; Crim.R. 11; knowing, voluntary and intelligent; State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765; ineffective assistance of counsel; cruel and unusual punishment; consecutive sentences; maximum sentence. - Judgment affirmed. Defendant-appellant did not demonstrate that his plea was entered unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily nor did he demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective for such reason. The trial court’s sentence is not contrary to law. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
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4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1553 |
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In re A.C.-L.
| 115359 | R.C. 2151.23(A)(2); application to determine custody; best interest; R.C. 3109.04(F)(1); objections to the magistrate’s decision; guardian ad litem; notice. Court did not abuse its discretion in designating Father as legal custodian and residential parent the Child. Mother did not file a transcript with the trial court to support her late-filed objections to the magistrate’s decisions, so we must accept as true the court’s findings of fact. Court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding to hearing despite inactive guardian ad litem where none was required and where Mother identified no resulting prejudice. Reviewing for plain error, no manifest injustice resulted from week-on, week-off parenting schedule. Because the docket indicated that the magistrate’s decisions and trial court’s judgment entry were sent to wrong address for Mother, we review her late-filed objections out of caution. Because we find no merit in her other assignments of error, we also find that she can demonstrate no manifest injustice resulting from any notice issue. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
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4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1554 |
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State v. Jones
| 115378 | Abduction; rape; attempted rape; firearm specifications; firearm; gun; sufficiency; manifest weight; threatened; reasonable inferences; circumstantial evidence; direct evidence; possession; control; facilitate. Affirmed appellant’s conviction upon finding the challenged firearm specifications accompanying the charges for rape and attempted rape were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trier of fact could reasonably infer from the direct and circumstantial evidence provided that the firearm displayed during the victim’s abduction from her home was used to facilitate the rape and attempted rape offenses that followed 10 to 15 minutes thereafter at another location and that appellant had the firearm in his possession and under his control throughout the entire course of criminal conduct committed against the victim. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
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4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1555 |
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Shechter v. Dubick
| 115412, 115413 | Divorce; arbitration; R.C. Ch. 2711; confirmation; award; judgment. Affirmed. The domestic relations court’s order confirming and entering the final decree of divorce in conformity with the arbitration award was not in error because that judgment was based on the domestic relations court’s jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration award and no motion to vacate, modify, or otherwise change the arbitration award was filed by the appellant. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
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4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1556 |
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Joy v. MetroHealth Sys.
| 115437 | Motion for judgment on the pleadings; Civ.R. 12(C); breach of contract; at-will employment; handbook; policy; wrongful termination in violation of public policy; clear public policy; clarity element; specificity. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in granting defendant-appellee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing plaintiff-appellant’s complaint asserting breach-of-contract and wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claims. Neither the complaint’s factual allegations nor the documents attached the pleadings support the conclusion that an employment contract existed between plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee. Moreover, plaintiff-appellant did not cite any specific statement of law in support of his claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Consequently, plaintiff-appellant did not sufficiently plead the claim’s clarity element. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
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4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1557 |
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In re M.W.H.
| 115498 | Best interest of the child; R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b); R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(c); shared parenting agreement; contempt of court. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to terminate shared parenting where the record reflected that there was evidence in the record establishing that it was in the best interest of the child to continue parenting time with appellee, most of the issues that led to appellant filing the motion had been addressed, and appellant testified that she did not oppose parenting time as long as it did not occur in appellee’s house. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suspend overnight visits with appellee where the record established that appellee had addressed most of the issues, there still remained concerns about appellee’s residence, but he established that he had utilities in his name, had remained in the residence for two years after its sale at foreclosure, and appellant testified that she was not opposed to overnight visits only the location. The trial court erred in holding appellant in contempt of court where appellant established by a preponderance of the evidence that she had a good-faith basis for her decision to terminate parenting time where the minor child reported no heat or water in the home, and appellee refused to discuss the issues with appellant or show her that he had addressed the issues in the home until several months later. Further, throughout the case, appellee refused to allow the guardian ad litem to inspect his home and appellee did not complete court-ordered substance-abuse assessments in a timely manner. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
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4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1558 |
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Semaj v. Savelli
| 115531 | Settlement agreement; motion to enforce settlement agreement; jurisdiction. The parties resolved a tort claim by settlement agreement, the terms of which the court read into the record at hearing, including that the court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. The court’s journal entry failed to reflect the settlement provision concerning the court’s ongoing enforcement authority. Case remanded for issuance of a nunc pro tunc order noting that the court retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and for further proceedings regarding appellant’s motion to enforce the agreement’s terms. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
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4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1559 |
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McIntyre v. Landscape Mgt. & Design, Inc.
| 115539 | Pro se litigant; small claims court; manifest-weight standard of review; negligence claim; competent, credible evidence; App.R. 9(C). The municipal court’s judgment, under a manifest-weight standard, was supported by competent, credible evidence and the applicable case law. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
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4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1560 |
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State v. Abraham
| 115553 | Motion for new trial; Crim.R. 33; motion for leave. The trial court properly denied defendant’s untimely motion for new trial because it was filed without first obtaining leave to file the motion for new trial. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
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4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1561 |
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State v. Jordan
| 115625 | Motion to withdraw guilty plea; Crim.R. 11; hearing; change of heart. Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, where the scope of the hearing was sufficient to address appellant’s claims and the trial court fully and completely considered the motion; appellant’s decision was based on a change of heart where he engaged in a detailed conversation with the trial court, was advised that he had the option of proceeding to trial if he wanted to tell his version of events, was given the opportunity to consult with counsel and entered the guilty pleas, and later moved to withdraw the pleas because he claimed that the advice of counsel scared him into entering a plea rather than proceed to trial. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
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4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1562 |
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Leghart v. Schuler Painting, Inc.
| 115657, 115663 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); workers’ compensation; employee; independent contractor; right to control test. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants-appellees because plaintiff-appellant failed to demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether he was an employee of defendant-appellee when he injured himself on the job. The evidence presented in support of the trial court’s finding that plaintiff-appellant was an independent contractor and not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits included the undisputed fact that prior to starting work for defendant-appellee, plaintiff-appellant never (1) signed a Form I-9; (2) provided a driver’s license or any documents to Schuler Painting establishing his eligibility to work in the country; (3) executed a Form W-4; (4) received an employee handbook; or (5) received any employee benefits, including health insurance. Defendant-appellee also produced text messages between the parties demonstrating that the job was to be for a week. Defendant-appellee also introduced medical records that indicated that when plaintiff-appellant sought treatment, he told the treating physician that he was “self-employed.” The only evidence plaintiff-appellant presented to establish that he was an employee were his own claims made at a deposition. This was insufficient to meet his reciprocal burden on summary judgment. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
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4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1563 |
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Abdelmalek v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio
| 115665 | Standard of review; findings of fact and conclusions of law; R.C. 4731.22(F)(5); burden of proof. The common pleas court did not err when it did not issue factual findings and legal conclusions where R.C. 119.12 did not require them. The fact that the common pleas court found the testimony of the seven patients more credible than the five chaperones who testified in support of appellant did not equate to the common pleas court impermissibly shifting the burden of proof. The common pleas court erred when it found that the State Medical Board’s decision was supported by reliable and probative evidence when R.C. 119.12(N) requires a finding that the evidence is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, particularly where the appellant challenged the weight of the evidence. The common pleas court did not err when it refused to allow appellant access to an ombudsman report. Appellant requested the report four days before trial, and the common pleas court denied the request because it was untimely and appellant failed to show good cause for the delay. Additionally, the State Medical Board used an excerpt from the report to impeach a witness whose statement at trial was different from a statement she gave in an earlier investigation and provided a copy of the excerpt to appellant the day before trial. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
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4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1564 |
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