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Wells Fargo Bank, Natl. Assn. v. Doberdruk
| 113637 | Foreclosure; summary judgment; default; allonge; standing; loan modification; settlement agreement; affidavit; personal knowledge requirement. The trial court's judgment granting summary judgment to the bank on its foreclosure action against defendant was affirmed. The bank established that it was the holder of the note and mortgage and was the party entitled to enforce the instrument, that the mortgage was in default and the amount due, and that all conditions precedent had been met. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
10/22/2026
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10/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-4137 |
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Crocker Park, L.L.C. v. Westlake
| 115356 | Summary judgment; slander of title; discovery; Civ.R. 56(F); abuse of process; right of first refusal; counteroffer. Trial court did not err in ordering parties to file motions for summary judgment where issues involved questions of law and responding party could request time for discovery pursuant to Civ.R. 56(F) if discovery were needed. Trial court properly granted summary judgment on appellant’s slander-of-title claim where appellant failed to produce evidence establishing that the appellees maliciously or recklessly refused to remove a lien on appellant’s property. Trial court properly granted summary judgment on appellant’s abuse-of-process claim that was based on a lien placed on appellant’s property where the undisputed evidence established that appellees had a legitimate basis for maintaining the lien on appellant’s property. Trial court erred in declaring that the appellees did not waive their right of first refusal where instead of accepting the terms of the sale, the appellees proposed different terms that amounted to a counteroffer. However, based on the plain language of the contract, the waiver of the right of first refusal did not apply to subsequent offers if the sale to the first buyer was never consummated. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/22/2026
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10/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-4138 |
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State v. Marbury
| 115559; 115560; 115561 | Juvenile bindover; mandatory bindover; probable cause; felony murder; guilty plea; waiver; involuntary manslaughter; discharge of firearm on or near prohibited premises; ineffective assistance of counsel; sentencing; mitigation evidence; juvenile sentencing factors; trial strategy; prejudice; agreed sentencing range; R.C. 2903.02(B); R.C. 2903.04(A); R.C. 2152.12; R.C. 2923.162(A)(3); R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b); Crim.R. 11(B)(1); Juv.R. 30. Judgment affirmed. By pleading guilty to involuntary manslaughter and its predicate offense of discharge of firearm on or near prohibited premises, appellant waived his challenge to the juvenile court’s probable-cause determination supporting mandatory bindover. The guilty pleas admitted to the same conduct underlying the probable-cause determination. Trial counsel was not ineffective for allegedly failing to investigate and present additional mitigating evidence at sentencing. Trial counsel addressed several statutory mitigating factors relating to the youth of an offender, and the decision not to introduce potentially unfavorable juvenile court records could be attributed to trial strategy. Moreover, even if trial counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable, appellant could not establish prejudice because his sentence fell within the agreed recommended sentencing range. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
10/22/2026
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10/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-4140 |
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State v. Dejournett
| 115589 | Batson challenge; peremptory challenge; racial discrimination; Equal Protection Clause; African American prospective juror; race-neutral explanation; purposeful discrimination; pretext; three-step Batson analysis; comparative-juror analysis; juror attentiveness; juror demeanor; inaccurate explanation; failure to conduct third-step inquiry; clearly erroneous; structural error; harmless-error review; new trial; ineffective assistance of counsel; motion to suppress; mootness. The trial court clearly erred by overruling appellant’s Batson challenge. The prosecutor attributed the prospective juror’s alleged failure to respond to a question the trial court never asked, relied on an unsupported connection between telephone games and a short attention span, and did not meaningfully question the prospective juror about her attentiveness. The trial court made no inquiry or findings demonstrating that it evaluated the plausibility of the State’s explanations in light of the defense objection and the surrounding circumstances. The denial of appellant’s Batson challenge constitutes structural error. Appellant’s conviction is reversed, the cause is remanded for a new trial, and appellant’s ineffective-assistance claim concerning counsel’s withdrawal of the motion to suppress is moot. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
10/22/2026
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10/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-4141 |
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State v. Shaw
| 115801 | Joinder; motion to sever; Crim.R. 8; Crim.R. 14; simple and direct evidence; prejudice. Defendant was charged in one indictment for offenses associated with three sexual assaults occurring in 2001, 2012, and 2023, respectively. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to sever the counts for separate trials. This denial was in error. The jury was allowed to consider significant evidence that would have been inadmissible as improper propensity evidence in separate trials. Additionally, the evidence in the first two assaults was weak, and the State benefitted from the bootstrapping effect of the evidence in the third assault. The public policy reasons for joinder are not present in this case because there are no duplicate witnesses. The delays in charging the defendant for two of the three assaults are attributable to the State’s lack of investigation. Rape kits were conducted, police reports were filed and the defendant’s identity was known but nothing was done until the defendant was identified in a third assault decades later. Defendant met his burden to show prejudice and the State failed to overcome that because the evidence was complicated and confusing to the jury. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/22/2026
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10/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-4142 |
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