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In re N.R.
| 115912 | Administrative child support order; objections; transcript; waiver; notice; process. - Trial court’s judgment adopting the magistrate’s decision affirmed where appellant did not file objections to the magistrate’s decision or provide a transcript of the magistrate’s proceedings. Appellant’s challenge about lack of notice was waived because he could have raised the issue in earlier proceedings. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
5/21/2026
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5/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1873 |
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In re G.P.
| 115914 | Termination of parental rights, manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court’s decision to terminate father’s parental rights and grant permanent custody to the children was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court made all of the required statutory findings and those were all supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record where the children had significant special needs and father did not demonstrate an ability to provide for the needs for reasons include, but are not limited to, his inability to maintain sobriety or to secure safe and stable housing and he had no verifiable employment or income. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/21/2026
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5/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1874 |
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Rocky River v. Preston
| 115530 | Traffic citation; expired license plate; Rocky River Ordinance 335.10(d); pro se; speedy-trial right; App.R. 16(A)(7); failure to raise speedy-trial violation in trial court; waiver of speedy-trial right; alleged violation of Code of Judicial Conduct; no appellate authority to review violations of Code of Judicial Conduct; local ordinance alleged conflict with general statute; no citation to general statute; no conflict; vexatious litigator warning. Appellant appeals pro se not challenging her conviction but raising a speedy-trial violation, alleging the trial court violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and that the municipal ordinance she was convicted of conflicts with state law. Regarding her first assignment of error, appellant failed to raise the alleged speedy-trial violation in the trial court, and thereby waived the issue on appeal. Regarding her second assignment of error, this court does not have authority to review alleged violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct because that is the exclusive authority of the Ohio Supreme Court. Regarding her third assignment of error, appellant failed to specify or cite exactly which statute section she is alleging conflicts with the local ordinance at issue here and thereby fails to establish a conflict claim. All three of appellant’s assignments of error are overruled. Appellant is forewarned if she continues to file frivolous appeals she will be deemed a vexatious litigator. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/21/2026
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5/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1865 |
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Shaker Hts. v. Thompson
| 115785 | No-contest plea; motion to withdraw plea; postsentence plea withdrawal; manifest injustice; missing transcript; destroyed record; records retention; presumption of regularity; collateral consequences; federal sentencing enhancement; firearms disability; waiver; abuse of discretion; hearing on motion to withdraw plea; R.C. 2943.033(C); Crim.R. 11; Crim.R. 32.1; Sup.R. 26.05(C); App.R. 9(C); App.R. 9(D); App.R. 9(E). Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s renewed postsentence motion to withdraw his 2003 no-contest plea without a hearing. Appellant waited more than 20 years to challenge the plea, and any transcript or audio recording had been lawfully destroyed, making him at fault for the missing record and requiring the court to presume regularity in the plea proceedings. The contemporaneous plea form and journal entry further supported that the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The asserted collateral consequences, including federal sentencing enhancements, housing and employment barriers, stigma, and firearm disability, did not establish manifest injustice. The trial court was not required to issue findings of fact or conclusions of law, and R.C. 2943.033(C) barred vacating the plea based on failure to advise about federal firearm restrictions. Appellant also failed to submit evidentiary materials, such as affidavits, warranting a hearing. His App.R. 9(E) arguments regarding reconstruction of the record were either moot based upon the resolution of other assignments of error or were waived for failure to raise such arguments at the trial-court level. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
5/21/2026
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5/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1871 |
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State v. Webb
| 115674 | Aggravated robbery; robbery; attempt; grand theft motor vehicle; obstructing official business; firearm specification; sufficient evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; bench trial; firearm specification; operability; ineffective assistance of counsel; Crim.R. 29. There was sufficient evidence to support appellant’s convictions, and his convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The victim, who was an experienced police officer, identified appellant as the person who pulled a firearm from his waistband. Appellant engaged in a coordinated effort to steal the victim’s car. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to introduce a codefendant’s transcript into evidence or for failing to mention one count in the Crim.R. 29 motion to dismiss. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
5/21/2026
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5/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1868 |
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Yo Properties 47, L.L.C. v. Enbridge Gas Ohio
| 115959 | Dismissal; lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; de novo; jurisdictional-priority rule; same whole issue; whole-issue exception; concurrent jurisdiction; substantially the same parties; similar tort-based claims; affect; interfere; resolution; issues; explosion; injuries; damages; same incident; causation; liability; central legal issue. Affirmed the decision of the trial court dismissing the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Upon a de novo review, it was determined that the jurisdictional-priority rule applied where the earlier-filed lawsuits pending in a court of concurrent jurisdiction and the current case presented part of the same “whole issue.” The cases involved substantially the same parties, and a ruling in the current case could certainly affect or interfere with the resolution of the issues before the court where the earlier filed actions were filed when the cases raised the same and/or sufficiently similar tort-based claims involving the same explosion incident and had the same central legal issues involving causation and liability in common. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/21/2026
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5/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1875 |
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T.S. v. L.J.R.
| 115250 | Jurisdiction; time-barred. This court lacks the jurisdiction to review this appeal because the defendant’s claims are time-barred. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/21/2026
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5/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1862 |
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Hunter-Bey v. Cleveland Law Dept.
| 115696 | Pro se: App.R. 16; App.R. 12; R.C. 149.43; public-records request; motion to dismiss; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); de novo review; pending motions. Judgment affirmed. There is no requirement that a trial court rule on all pretrial motions before granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Dismissal of appellant’s mandamus action was proper because appellant failed to comply with the procedures set forth in R.C. 149.43(C)(1). | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/21/2026
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5/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1869 |
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Lewis v. BMW of Westlake
| 115771 | Motion for summary judgment; App.R. 16(A)(7); App.R. 12(A)(2); failure to comply with appellate rules; no arguments or legal citation. Appellant appears to appeal the trial court’s granting of appellee’s motion for summary judgment but fails to make any arguments in support of that error and fails to cite to any legal authority to support his arguments in violation of the requirements of App.R. 16(A)(7). Wherefore, pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2) appellant’s assignment of error is disregarded and overruled. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/21/2026
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5/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1870 |
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Bossart v. Brecksville-Broadview Hts. City School Dist.
| 115595 | Motion for judgment on the pleadings, Civ.R. 12(C), political-subdivision immunity, R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), physical defect, negligence. Appellant raised a negligence claim against a school district, alleging that the school district failed to maintain a sand pit used for a long-jump event and that appellant was consequently injured when he jumped into the pit. The school district did not demonstrate that, assuming all allegations in the complaint to be true, appellant could prove no set of facts to show that the condition of the sand pit constituted a physical defect under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4). Trial court’s grant of immunity to the school district is reversed. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/21/2026
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5/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1866 |
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State v. M.A.C.
| 115273 | Application to seal criminal record, final discharge of sentence, restitution, R.C. 2953.32. Appellant, a former attorney, was convicted in 2017 for several offenses arising from his theft of client funds. Related to these offenses, appellant was ordered to pay restitution. In 2024, appellant applied to seal his criminal record. The trial court denied this application, concluding that appellant had not achieved a final discharge of his sentence under R.C. 2953.32 because he still owed restitution. The court did not err in reaching this conclusion where, although victim had received payment from the Lawyer’s Fund for Client Protection, appellant had not filed a motion with the trial court to seek modification of the restitution amount to reflect the payment by the fund. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/21/2026
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5/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1863 |
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In re K.T.
| 115818 | Termination of parental rights; R.C. 2151.414; manifest weight of the evidence; best interest of child; permanent custody; juvenile court; alcohol abuse; mental health; domestic violence; housing; sufficiency; manifest weight.The juvenile court’s award of permanent custody to the agency is supported by clear and convincing evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Father abandoned the children. Mother did not establish sobriety. Mother did not finish domestic-violence services and mental-health services timely. Mother did not allow the agency view of her home. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/21/2026
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5/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1872 |
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State v. Cannon
| 115640; 115641 | Parole; termination of parole; postrelease control; invited error; in-chambers discussion; S.B. 2; R.C. 2967.01(E); R.C. 2967.01(N); R.C. 2929.141(A); App.R. 12(A)(1)(b). Vacated. The trial court erred when it terminated appellee’s parole from previous cases, and nothing in the record supports appellee’s assertion that the error was invited error. In-chambers discussions are not part of the record. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
5/21/2026
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5/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1867 |
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State v. Andrews
| 115160 | Confrontation clause; body camera; testimony. The trial court erred in allowing the body-camera footage to be admitted at trial because the victim did not appear to testify, and the appellant was not permitted to cross-examine the victim in violation of the appellant’s right to confrontation. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/21/2026
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5/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1861 |
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State v. Liccardo
| 115471 | Manifest weight of evidence; sufficiency of evidence; complicity jury instruction; criminal conviction on nontestifying witness; sentence. Judgment affirmed. The State presented sufficient evidence supporting the murder and felonious-assault convictions under either a principal-offender theory or complicity theory. The weight of the evidence supported the convictions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by instructing the jury on complicity. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting the defense from inquiring of the investigating detective about a nontestifying witness’s prior criminal record. The evidentiary rules governing prior convictions relate to testifying witnesses and defendants, not nontestifying witnesses. Pursuant to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State v. Bollar, 2022-Ohio-4370, and this court’s decision in State v. Dobson, 2025-Ohio-2148 (8th Dist.), the trial court did not err by sentencing the defendant on the firearm specifications for merged counts. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
5/21/2026
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5/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1864 |
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State v. Foster
| 114642 | Motion for reopening; denied. Appellant’s pro se application to reopen his appeal is denied because he did not allege a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/20/2026
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5/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1860 |
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State v. Day
| 114582 | App.R. 26(B); application for reopening. Appellant’s application to reopen his direct appeal is denied where his application failed to raise colorable claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
5/18/2026
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5/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1859 |
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Carrington Mtge. Servs., L.L.C. v. Aboytes
| 115174 | Civ.R. 60(B); foreclosure; default judgment; excusable neglect; relief from judgment; plain error; Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b); waiver of objections; magistrate’s decision; service of process; personal jurisdiction; void judgment; sheriff’s sale; mortgage; Civ.R. 60(B)(1); Civ.R. 60(B)(5). Defendant-appellant appeals the trial court’s judgment adopting a magistrate’s decision denying his Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from a default foreclosure judgment. Because appellant failed to file timely objections to the magistrate’s decision under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i), our review is limited to plain error. The record does not demonstrate plain error, and appellant failed to present operative facts establishing a meritorious defense. The trial court also properly denied relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5), which requires substantial grounds and cannot be substituted for Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (4). Judgment affirmed. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1765 |
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Yormick v. King David Post Acute Nursing & Rehab., L.L.C.
| 115662 | Arbitration; motion to stay; time-limitations clause; R.C. 2711.02(B); waiver; right to arbitration; dispositive; abuse of discretion; totality of circumstances; acted inconsistent. Affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant-appellant’s motion to stay pending arbitration. Issues not raised or addressed in the trial court would not be addressed for the first time on appeal. The issue of whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by deciding the timeliness of the arbitration demand under the arbitration agreement’s time-limitation clause was not definitely decided on appeal where neither party provided authority directly on point and the waiver issue was dispositive of the matter. Plaintiff-appellee demonstrated that defendant-appellant knew of its right to arbitration, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining from the totality of the circumstances that appellant acted inconsistently with the right to arbitration. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1776 |
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State v. Yafanaro
| 115275 | Plain error; restitution order; manifest weight of the evidence. The appellant did not object to the restitution order thereby waiving all but a plain error review by the court. However, the appellant did not argue plain error on appeal. Thus, the court need not consider the issue. The appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1766 |
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State v. Blake
| 115430 | Guilty plea; Crim.R. 11(C); complete failure; prejudice; restitution; discretionary; contrary to law; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; purposes and principles of felony sentencing; sentencing factors; Marsy’s Law; defendant’s ability to pay restitution; allied offenses of similar import; plain error. The trial court’s failure to inform appellant that he could be subject to restitution at his plea hearing was not a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11, and therefore, appellant had to demonstrate prejudice to establish his plea was less than knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Nothing in the record demonstrated that appellant would not have entered his guilty plea had he been notified of the possibility of restitution. The trial court’s sentence was not contrary to law where the court considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12, and the corresponding sentencing judgment entry indicated the court considered all required factors of the law. The trial court did not err in ordering restitution. Pursuant to Marsy’s Law, the trial court did not need to consider the appellant’s ability to pay restitution. Appellant did not demonstrate that the trial court committed plain error when it did not merge felonious-assault, strangulation, and domestic-violence convictions for sentencing purposes. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1769 |
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In re A.K.
| 115840 | Permanent custody; best interests of the child; clear and convincing evidence; temporary custody; juvenile court; substance abuse; mental health; housing; parenting; manifest weight; drug screen; abuse; neglect; dependent; incarceration. The juvenile court’s judgment terminating mother’s parental rights and granting permanent custody of her children to Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (D)(2). | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1778 |
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State v. Finklea
| 113566 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; aggravated murder; murder; felonious assault; prior calculation and design; aggravated burglary; App.R. 26 motion to reopen; reopened appeal. There was insufficient evidence that appellant acted with prior calculation and design. Conviction for aggravated murder vacated. All other convictions affirmed. There was no evidence that appellant and others were planning on killing the victim. There was no evidence that appellant knew the victim or knew that he was going to be in the apartment he visited. The evidence showed that the shooter reacted in the spur of the moment with, at most, momentary consideration that occurred in the seconds after the victim left the apartment. There was sufficient evidence of aggravated murder with the underlying offense being aggravated burglary. There was evidence of trespass. Appellant did not have permission to be in the apartment. Although there was conflicting evidence whether the apartment door was open or closed, the element of force can be met by opening a closed door and the appellant’s DNA was on the inside of the door handle. Moreover, at least one witness testified that the apartment door was closed when appellant entered. A reasonable juror could infer that appellant formed the purpose to commit a criminal offense when he entered the apartment, while in the apartment, or when chasing the victim after he left the apartment. Although the shooting occurred outside the apartment in a commonly used hallway, the shooting was part of a continuous sequence of events and State only had to show that appellant formed the purpose to commit a crime when he trespassed in the apartment or during the course of the trespass. Appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although there was evidence that another man was the shooter and it is doubtful that the shooting occurred as some witnesses testified to, there was also evidence that appellant was the shooter. The trial court did not err in allowing testimony regarding allegations that the victim was a gang member and that some witnesses fled Ohio because they feared retaliation. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1762 |
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J.T. v. J.G.
| 115449 | Civil stalking protection order; Civ.R. 65.1; objections to magistrate’s decision; transcript. Absent a transcript of the trial court’s proceedings on the petitions for civil protection orders, this court must presume regularity of the proceedings and accept that the trial court correctly interpreted the facts. Additionally, this court declines to review claims of a magistrate’s misconduct that were not initially raised before the trial court or any other alleged errors in respect to the magistrate’s conduct. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1771 |
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In re M.D.T.
| 115543 | Criminal contempt; indirect contempt; civil contempt; purge. Juvenile court abused its discretion in finding the Cuyahoga County Office of Child Support Services (“OCSS”) guilty of criminal contempt where there was no evidence that OCSS intentionally violated the court’s order and the juvenile court had other options to cure the alleged violation without resorting to criminal contempt. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1774 |
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State v. Walker
| 115280 | Motion to suppress; sufficiency of the evidence; Crim.R. 29 motion to acquit; manifest weight of the evidence; prior conviction. The trial court did not err when it denied the appellant’s motion to suppress because the search of the vehicle was justified by an exception to the warrant requirement. The appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence, and the trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. The appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err by admitting stipulated certified copies of previous journal entries to establish the appellant’s prior conviction. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1767 |
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State v. Reid
| 115108, 115290 | Manifest weight; self-defense; jury instruction; cell phone extraction; authentication; evidence of search for counsel; Sixth Amendment; right to counsel; Fifth Amendment; right to remain silent; jail-time credit; cumulative error. Defendant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence despite minor inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony. The trial court properly refused to provide a self-defense jury instruction where there was no evidence that the defendant acted in self-defense. Lead detective sufficiently demonstrated that the contents of a cell phone extraction were what the matter claimed to be. Trial court failed to apply jail-time credit. Appellant failed to demonstrate that he was deprived of a fair trial because of cumulative errors when he failed to demonstrate that any errors occurred during the trial. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1764 |
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State v. Moncrief
| 115436 | Principles of felony sentencing; R.C. 2929.11; sentencing factors; R.C. 2929.12; juvenile mitigating factors; R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b); appellate review of felony sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Court did not err sentencing juvenile defendant to a five-year term of imprisonment for first-degree felony. The court imposed a sentence within the statutory range applicable to the offense to which appellant pled guilty. Record did not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that court failed to consider principles of felony sentencing and the sentencing factors, including juvenile mitigating factors. During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel asked the court to consider appellant’s age, past trauma, and home environment as mitigating factors. In response, court stated on the record that it did not believe this information overcame the presumption of prison. Sentencing journal entry stated that court considered all factors required by law and found that prison was consistent with the purpose of R.C. 2929.11. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1770 |
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State v. Soto
| 115582 | Withdrawal of counsel; motion on day of trial; trial strategy; motion for continuance; sufficiency of the evidence; merger; OVI; R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a); absence of field sobriety, blood, or urine test; manifest weight of the evidence; jury instruction; refusal to submit to OVI testing; evidence of intoxication. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defense counsel’s motion to withdraw because disagreements over strategy, particularly those presented at the start of trial, do not establish good cause for withdrawal. Additionally, the trial court’s denial of defendant-appellant’s motion for continuance of trial was not an abuse of discretion because the case had been pending for over a year, the court conducted numerous pretrial hearings, had already granted a continuance several times, and counsel was prepared and ready to proceed to trial. Defendant-appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it provided a jury instruction that conformed with the Ohio Supreme Court’s sanctioned “refusal to submit” jury instruction, the instruction was applicable to the facts in the case, and reasonable minds could reach the conclusion sought by the instruction. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1775 |
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State v. Patterson
| 115294 | Defective indictment; dangerous ordnance; switch; machine gun conversion device; sufficiency; manifest weight; knowingly; possession. Appellant’s conviction for possessing a dangerous ordnance upheld because the direct and circumstantial evidence established that appellant knowingly possessed a firearm modified with a switch or machine gun conversion device, thus rendering the firearm a dangerous ordnance. Indictment was not defective because it tracked the language of the statute and appellant did not establish that he did not have notice of the offense. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1768 |
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Bertalan v. Bertalan
| 115533 | Civ.R. 60(B); motion; relief from judgment; impartial; judicial misconduct; due process; structural error; newly discovered evidence; abuse of discretion; Civ.R. 60(B)(5); extraordinary. Affirmed the trial court’s denial of appellant’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion where appellant relied on findings of judicial misconduct not related to his individual divorce action, and he failed to show any due-process violation or structural error occurred in this case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief under Civ.R. 60(B) where certain grounds were untimely asserted and it was not the extraordinary case warranting relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5). | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1773 |
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State v. Church
| 115480 | R.C. 2929.12; sentencing factors; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); sentencing review. Defendant’s sentence was affirmed. Reviewing courts do not have the authority to review the trial court’s consideration of the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1772 |
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Siniscalchi v. K. Hovnanian Meadow Lakes, L.L.C.
| 115700 | Motion to dismiss; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); res judicata; spoliation of evidence; attorney fees; frivolous conduct. The court committed reversible error by dismissing plaintiff’s spoliation of evidence claim under both Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff properly alleged a spoliation claim and the court’s determination that plaintiff had previously filed a spoliation claim was not supported by the record. The court also erred by awarding attorney fees for frivolous conduct because there is no reason at this stage of the proceeding to dismiss the case. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1777 |
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State ex rel. Holloway v. Saffold
| 116122 | Civ.R. 12(B)(6); motion to dismiss; failure to state a claim; writ of mandamus; findings of fact; motion to vacate void judgment. Petition for writ of mandamus dismissed where, assuming the truth of the factual allegations of the petition and making all reasonable inferences in relator’s favor, it appeared beyond doubt that relator could prove no set of facts entitling him to a writ of mandamus based on claim that respondent judge had a duty to enter findings of fact relating to denial of motion to vacate void judgment. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/12/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1779 |
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Lakewood v. Smith
| 114186 | App.R. 26(B); ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; violation of an ex parte protection order; R.C. 2903.214; hearsay evidence; course of investigation; professional judgment that this court will not second guess. A jury convicted defendant of violating an ex parte protection order. Appellate counsel exercised professional judgment in successfully arguing that a transcript from a related case was inadmissible hearsay. The appellant’s other arguments did not establish prejudice; they did not undermine this court’s confidence that Smith violated the protection order. This court ruled that it would not second guess appellate counsel’s professional judgment and that there was no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
5/8/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1763 |
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State v. Garcia-Toro
| 107940 | State v. Murnahan; App.R. 26(B)(1); application to reopen; good cause. Application to reopen appeal from judgment of conviction and sentence denied where applicant did not demonstrate good cause for filing after the 90-day deadline. This court affirmed applicant’s convictions and sentence for aggravated murder and attempted murder more than six years before the application was filed. Applicant argued that good cause existed for the late filing because he was unaware of the 90-day deadline for an application to reopen, he did not have reasonable access to a library, and appellate counsel continued to represent him after his conviction was affirmed. In prior cases, this court has found each of these circumstances did not demonstrate good cause for a late-filed application to reopen. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/8/2026
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5/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1761 |
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W. 6th St. Partners, Inc. v. Culkar
| 115527 | Civ.R. 50(A); motion for directed verdict; breach of contract; shareholder dispute; Close corporation; breach of fiduciary duty; unjust enrichment; money had and received; statute of limitations; conversion; discovery rule. Both appellants/cross-appellees and appellee/cross-appellant appeal the trial court’s granting of each other’s motions for directed verdicts at trial. Appellants appeal the trial courts directed verdict as to their claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty/misappropriation of funds, unjust enrichment, and money had and received. The directed verdict for the breach-of-contract claim was correctly granted because there was insufficient evidence that appellee breached the agreement. The directed verdict for the breach of fiduciary duty/misappropriation of funds was improperly granted as there was sufficient evidence presented to support this claim. The directed verdict for unjust enrichment was properly granted as there was insufficient evidence that appellant’s conferred any benefit to appellee. Last, the directed verdict for the claim of money had and received was properly granted as this is a quasi-contract claim that was based entirely on the breach of an express contract, which is not permitted under Ohio law. Appellee appealed the trial court’s granting of directed verdicts for his two counterclaims for unjust enrichment and conversion. The directed verdict for the unjust-enrichment claim was properly granted as such a claim is reserved for when services are provided to the benefit of another and here there was no evidence of appellee providing any services or conferring any benefit to appellants. The directed verdict for appellee’s conversion claim was improperly granted in its entirety. There was sufficient evidence presented that appellee possessed ownership interest in the business and that he stopped receiving distribution payments and that his shares were taken from him. The four-year statute of limitations is applicable here however, because the first converted distribution check occurred in 2013 and appellee was aware of this conversion but did not file his counterclaim for conversion until 2022. As such, his conversion claim for distribution payments is limited to distributions made in 2018 and later. As to his ownership interest, which was taken and redistributed to the other partners in 2017, the undisputed evidence at trial was that he did not discover this until 2022 when the amended complaint was filed. Further, it was not documented until his 2017 K-1 which he should have, but did not receive, in 2018 so even if he had discovered this in 2018 at the earliest, this would be within the statute of limitations. Therefore, the trial court properly granted a directed verdict as to his conversion claim of distribution payments prior to 2018 and improperly granted the directed verdict for distribution payments from 2018 to present and for the conversion claim of his shares. The matter is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the parties to retry the remaining issues. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
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5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1654 |
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State v. Baldwin
| 115525 | R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(e); having weapons while under disability; firearm specification; sentencing; subsection (e)(i) and (ii); postrelease control; date of offense; ineffective assistance of counsel; no error so no deficient performance; futile act not deficient. Appellant appeals the trial court’s sentence alleging it committed plain error by sentencing him to a prison term for a firearm specification for violating having weapons while under disability pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(e), which only permits a prison sentence when subsections (e)(i) and (ii) are met. Appellant admitted that subsection (i) was satisfied as he had been convicted of aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony. He argued subsection (ii) was not met because he was still on postrelease control (“PRC”) for the prior offense and therefore it had not been less than five-years since he had been released from PRC. We find appellant ignored the first part of subsection (ii) that it had been less than five years since offender was released from prison as he was released from prison for the prior offense in 2021 and committed the underlying offense in 2025, which is less than five years from his release. The language “whichever is later” is important because appellant had not yet been released from PRC when he committed the offense such that the date did not exist so the only date that could be considered was from when he was released from prison. Therefore, the trial court had sufficient evidence for finding the requirement of subsection (ii) was met and thereby the trial court did not commit plain error in sentencing appellant to a prison term for the firearm specification. Appellant also alleged in his assignment of error that his counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to this sentence at sentencing. We find that his counsel’s performance was not deficient as the sentence was legal and that appellant was not prejudiced by his counsel not objecting as this would not have changed the outcome of his sentence. Appellant’s counsel cannot be deficient or ineffective for failing to perform a futile act. As such, appellant’s assignment of error is overruled. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
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5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1653 |
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In re A.N.
| 115219 & 115302 | Modification of agreed shared parenting plan; abuse of discretion; best interest of the child; R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b); R.C. 3109.05(D); App.R. 12 and 16. The court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the parties’ agreed shared parenting plan to put the father in charge of the child’s passport and expand the conditions under which the father is permitted to travel internationally with the child. The evidence in the record shows that the mother consistently and blatantly violated the terms of the agreed shared parenting plan regarding the child’s passport and international travel. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
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5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1646 |
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Republic Fin., L.L.C. v. Johnson
| 115678 | Arbitration; R.C. Ch. 2711; sua sponte; waiver. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err by failing to sua sponte order the parties to arbitration. The initiation of arbitration proceedings falls on the parties and not the trial court. Appellant waived any right to arbitration by participating, without objection, in the lower court proceedings. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
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5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1659 |
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In re C.H.
| 115580, 116147 | Permanent custody; best interests of the child; clear and convincing evidence; temporary custody; juvenile court; alcohol abuse; mental health; housing; parenting best interests; sufficiency; manifest weight; ineffective assistance, prejudice. The juvenile court’s award of permanent custody to the agency is supported by clear and convincing evidence and is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
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5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1658 |
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One Main Fin. Group, L.L.C. v. Knight
| 115883 | Service of process; Civ.R. 4.1; due process; personal jurisdiction; void; plain error. Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to vacate default judgment against her where service was sent without requiring a signature and defendant submitted an affidavit that she did not reside at the address where the summons and complaint were sent and she had no notice of the lawsuit until after the default judgment was entered. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
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5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1660 |
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State v. Wallace
| 115576 | Fifth Amendment; harmless error; falsification. The admission of a brief video of an attempted interview with defendant-appellant did not constitute reversible error where the video was introduced to establish the elements of a falsification offense and there was overwhelming evidence of defendant-appellant’s guilt independent of the video evidence in question. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
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5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1657 |
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Parma v. Young
| 115493 | Right to jury trial; demand; Crim.R. 23; written waiver; R.C. 2945.05; signed by defendant; bench trial; jurisdiction; invited error. Because appellant had not waived her right to a jury trial in compliance with R.C. 2945.05, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a bench trial. The matter is remanded for a new trial. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
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5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1651 |
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Estate of Morales v. Pavilion Rehab. & Nursing Ctr.
| 115567 | Medical negligence; long-term care facility; statute of repose; R.C. 2305.113(C); unsound mind; R.C. 2305.16; Estate; voluntary dismissal; saving statute; summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); notice pleading; tolling; dementia; cognitive deficits; attorney-in-fact; affidavit of merit; refiled complaint; genuine issue of material fact; time-barred. Appellant’s refiled medical negligence action is barred by the four-year statute of repose under R.C. 2305.113 (C) because it was commenced more than four years after the last alleged act or omission of malpractice. Appellant failed both to properly plead unsound mind as a tolling ground, or produce admissible Civ.R. 56(C) evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact, on that issue. Unauthenticated medical records and lay affidavits were insufficient to invoke the narrow statutory exception. Absent a viable tolling theory, the refiled complaint is barred by R.C. 2305.113(C), that the saving statute cannot overcome. Summary judgment for appellees is affirmed. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
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5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1655 |
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Estate of Vasquez v. Tallmadge Health & Rehab Ctr.
| 115395 | R.C. Ch. 2711; motion to stay and enforce arbitration agreement; valid agreement; principles of contract; electronic signature; R.C. 1306.01; R.C. 1306.08; rebuttable presumption. Appellee rebutted the presumption that the decedent had electronically signed an arbitration agreement, and appellants failed to submit any evidence demonstrating the validity of the decedent’s electronic signature. The trial court did not err in denying appellants’ motion to stay and enforce the arbitration agreement. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
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5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1647 |
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Orlove v. Bringht
| 115571 | Forcible entry and detainer; money damages; service of process; personal jurisdiction; perfected service; certified mail; good cause; motion to quash service; motion to dismiss complaint; waiver of affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process; R.C. 1923.06(H)(2); Civ.R. 4; Civ.R. 4(E); Civ.R. 4.1(A)(1); Civ.R. 3(A). Vacated and remanded. The trial court erred when it denied appellant’s motion to quash service of process and motion to dismiss appellee’s complaint. We vacate and remand the trial court’s order because appellee did not perfect service on the second cause of action for money damages pursuant to Civ.R. 4. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
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5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1656 |
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State v. Tolliver
| 115496 | Fifth Amendment; double jeopardy; mistrial; retrial; de novo review. Judgment affirmed. The trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy was not error. The State did not intentionally cause or invite a mistrial. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
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5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1652 |
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Asriian v. Pribish
| 115483 | Expert testimony; residual diminution in value; Daubert; Evid.R. 702: specialized knowledge; experience; certifications. Trial court properly allowed defense expert to provide expert opinions regarding the residual diminution in value of plaintiff’s car following a car accident where the defense witness demonstrated specialized knowledge derived from extensive experience buying, repairing, and reselling cars. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
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5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1650 |
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In re A.C.
| 115887 | Permanent custody; clear and convincing evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; best interest of the child; R.C. 2151.414; offenses against a child; endangering children; retaliation; incarceration; credibility; custody to maternal grandmother. Trial court’s conclusion that the children could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time and that permanent custody was in the children’s best interest was supported by sufficient evidence and by the manifest weight of the evidence. Mother was convicted of child endangerment and retaliation and sentenced to 27 months in prison. Maternal grandmother was not credible in her ability to protect the children. Thus, she should not have custody of the children. The children were too young to express their wishes. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2026
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5/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1661 |
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