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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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In re J.R.P.
| 114805 | Termination of shared-parenting; visitation; custody; legal custodian; residential parent; modification of terms in a shared-parenting plan; change in circumstances; best-interest factors; R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(c); R.C. 3109.051; R.C 3109.04(E)(2)(b); R.C. 3109.04(F)(1); R.C. 3109.051(D). Affirmed. The trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s motion to terminate shared parenting, reduced his parenting time, and placed new restrictions on his parenting time. The juvenile court reviewed the relevant best-interest factors and did not abuse its discretion when making its determination. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-827 |
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Kittis v. Cleveland Clinic Found.
| 114990 | Medical malpractice; causation; Civ.R. 26(E); discovery violation; expert report; invited error; harmless error. Affirmed. The trial court did not err by denying a motion for new trial or to declare a mistrial based on new theories of causation being elicited or explored on cross-examination by the plaintiff because the plaintiff did not object to the initial unsolicited statement and, thereafter, asked for additional answers in an effort to impeach the treating physicians. In addition, even if there was error in the introduction of that evidence, it was harmless as a matter of law since the plaintiff’s theory of causation was not impacted by the testimony. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-828 |
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Francis v. Cleveland Clinic Found.
| 115062 | Statute of limitations; medical claims; R.C. 2305.113(B); motion in limine, medical negligence; survivorship; loss of chance, Civ.R. 26(B)(7)(b); expert report. Court did not err in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment, resulting in dismissal of appellant’s medical-negligence survivorship claim. Claim was filed more than a year after the events that gave rise to this case; therefore, the dismissed claim was commenced outside the limitations period for medical claims. Appellant’s counsel failed to extend the limitations period under R.C. 2305.113(B) by sending appellee email notice that he was investigating potential claims, rather than required notice by certified mail. Court did not abuse its discretion in granting appellee’s motion in limine, precluding appellant’s testimony regarding a loss-of-chance theory, where report of appellant’s expert never provided that decedent had a less-than-even chance of the surviving cardiac arrest that caused his death. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-829 |
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State v. Shirilla
| 115101 | Postconviction relief; jurisdiction; timeliness; trial transcript; 365-day deadline; leap year; juvenile court; bindover; hearing; probable cause; direct appeal; equitable tolling; anniversary date; subject-matter jurisdiction; statutory construction; filing date; supplemental transcript; de novo review. The trial court dismissed appellant’s petition for postconviction relief, which was denied for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of untimeliness. The central dispute involves the calculation of the mandatory 365-day filing period established by R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a). The appellant contends that the filing was timely because the statutory clock should have been triggered by the later filing of juvenile bindover transcripts rather than the initial trial transcripts. Furthermore, the appellant argues that the “anniversary date” of the transcript filing should control the deadline, effectively asserting that the occurrence of a leap year should not result in a filing period that is one day shorter than a full calendar year. The filing of a postconviction petition is a jurisdictional act. Because the appellant filed the petition on the 366th day following the filing of the trial transcript, the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the claims, and the application of equitable tolling is prohibited in the context of this jurisdictional bar. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-830 |
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State v. Watson
| 115151, 115502 | Crim.R. 43(A)(1); consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.41; R.C. 2929.14; courses of conduct. Appellant contested term of imprisonment arising from guilty plea. Case remanded for resentencing where court failed to sentence appellant for one of the charged offenses at hearing, attempting to do so only in a subsequent sentencing entry, in violation of Crim.R. 43(A)(1). Court also erred in announcing at hearing that it was running all prison terms consecutively, violating R.C. 2929.41 where appellant’s convictions included both felonies and misdemeanors. Court also failed to make a complete “courses of conduct” finding at hearing under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) to support its imposition of consecutive sentences. On remand, court instructed to make consecutive-sentencing findings in accordance with R.C. 2929.41 and 2929.14, as merited by the record. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-831 |
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State v. Galindez
| 115166 | Rape of a child under the age of ten; joinder; Crim.R. 8(A); Crim.R. 14; ineffective assistance of counsel; “joinder test”; forensic interview; Evid.R. 803(4); manifest weight of the evidence. Affirmed. The failure to file a motion to sever the separate offenses committed against separate victims was not ineffective assistance of counsel because the motion would not have been successful in light of simple and direct evidence the jury was capable of segregating; the defendant failed to demonstrate the inapplicability of Evid.R. 803(4) with respect to the admission of the forensic worker’s interview with the victim; and the convictions were not against the weight of the evidence. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-832 |
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State v. Jackson
| 115167 | Felony sentence; R.C. 2953.08; not reviewable; agreed sentence; range; indefinite sentence. Where the trial court imposed a base sentence within the recommended sentencing range set forth by the parties in the plea agreement, the sentence was not reviewable on appeal. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-833 |
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Fugo v. Rae
| 115235 | Small claims action; breach of contract; unjust enrichment; conversion; manifest-weight review; cross-appeal; App.R. 3. Affirmed. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s general verdict following a bench trial, in which the plaintiff was awarded $1,200 dollars on her claims generally based on breach of contract, unjust enrichment, or conversion. That verdict is not against the weight of the evidence merely because the judgment was for less than the $6,000 sought. And finally, because the appellee did not file a cross-appeal, the judgment in favor of the appellant cannot be challenged in this appeal. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-834 |
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State v. McFarland
| 116073 | Marsy’s Law; subpoena; electronic devices; compulsory process; Ohio Const. art. I, § 10a; Ohio Const. art. I, § 10. Affirmed, modified, and remanded. The trial court did not err in denying the victim’s motion to quash a subpoena issued by the defendant because the victim’s right to refuse discovery requests or depositions is expressly subordinate to the defendant’s right to compulsory process arising under Ohio Const. art. I, § 10. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-835 |
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Goldshtein v. Cuyahoga Cty. Fiscal Officer
| 115676 | Abuse of discretion; board of revision. The trial court did not abuse its discretion finding, without a hearing, the appellant did not establish reliable evidence that the decision of the board of revision is in error. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-836 |
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Anderson v. Jack Cleveland Casino, L.L.C.
| 115393 | Vexatious litigator; R.C. 2323.52; saving statute; R.C. 2305.19; summary judgment; statute of limitations. The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee where plaintiff-appellant’s complaint was filed outside of the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff-appellant’s attempted initial filing of the action was done without first obtaining leave as he was required to do pursuant to his status as a vexatious litigator under R.C. 2323.52. The saving statute did not apply to extend the statute of limitations more than the several days between when plaintiff-appellant filed an application for leave and when he obtained leave. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-837 |
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State v. Ward
| 115328 | Murder; felonious assault; sufficiency; manifest weight; ineffective assistance of counsel; cumulative error. Appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where eyewitnesses testified that they observed appellant shoot and kill the victim. Appellant failed to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. The cumulative-error doctrine was inapplicable where appellant failed to demonstrate the existence of any error. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-838 |
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Carrington Mtge. Servs., L.L.C. v. Israel
| 115296 | Adoption of magistrate’s decision; abuse of discretion; summary judgment; default judgment; unknown spouse; pro se litigant; foreclosure. Judgment affirmed. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the magistrate’s decision granting summary judgment against defendant-appellant and default judgment against defendant unknown spouse. Specifically, summary judgment was appropriate because appellant failed to file any opposition brief or to properly present any defenses or counterclaims to the foreclosure action pursuant to the rules of civil procedure. A pro se litigant is held to the same standard as all other litigants, and they must comply with the rules of civil procedure as well as accept the consequences of their own mistakes. Default judgment against unknown spouse was also appropriate because they did not file an answer to the complaint. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-839 |
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Jasko v. Sirna Constr., Inc.
| 115287 | Default judgment; final, appealable order; certificate of judgment; Civ.R. 54(B); Ohio Const., art. IV, § 3(B)(2). The appellant filed an appeal from a trial court’s order denying the appellant’s motion to vacate the trial court’s judgment entry. The motion to vacate requested the trial court to vacate a certificate of judgment that certified a default judgment issued by the trial court. The appeal was dismissed for lack of a final appealable order. A denial of a motion to vacate filed pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) is a final, appealable order. However, where the motion to vacate seeks to vacate a nonfinal order, the trial court’s judgment denying the motion is not a final order. The default judgment entry was not a final order because there were multiple defendants and claims that had not been disposed of in that entry and the entry lacked the mandatory Civ.R. 54(B) language that there was “no just reason for delay.” As such, the trial court’s judgment entry denying appellant’s motion to vacate was not a final order. On June 17, 2025, the trial court dismissed the case “without prejudice” for “failure to prosecute.” The trial court’s dismissal was not a final order, and therefore, all interlocutory orders dissolved upon the dismissal of the case. Absent a final order from which appellant appealed, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-840 |
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In re G.M.
| 115263 | Motion to modify legal custody, prior court decree, R.C. 3109.04(E)(1), R.C. 2151.42(B), changed circumstances, best interest of the child. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s (“Father”) motion to modify legal custody of his child (“the Child”). Father identified no changed circumstances where evidence of abuse pertained only to events that occurred before the prior decree granting the Child’s grandmother (“Grandmother”) legal custody. As a matter of law, Father’s improved conduct was no basis for a changed-circumstances finding under either R.C. 3109.04(E)(1) or 2151.42(B), neither of which address changed circumstances of a biological parent. To the extent that the Child’s enrollment in several schools constituted changed circumstances, the record did not demonstrate that granting Father’s request for legal custody was in the Child’s best interest where Grandmother explained that the Child was enrolled in different schools because of his behavioral and mental-health issues, where the record included evidence of Grandmother’s significant efforts to connect the Child with resources related to those issues, and where evidence existed of Father’s ongoing criminal conduct. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-841 |
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Univ. Hts. v. Weizman
| 114877 | Public nuisance; receiver; R.C. 3767.41; Civ.R. 65(B)(2). The court did not err by finding that the defendant’s property was a public nuisance. Evidence in the record established that the property was not fit for human habitation as well as being a fire hazard, which are two ways that a property can be deemed a public nuisance. Furthermore, despite the defendant’s arguments to the contrary, ample evidence in the record established the property’s condition at the time of trial. Additionally, the court did not err by appointing a receiver to clean out the property prior to submitting a viable estimate to repair the property, because a complete repair estimate could not be provided until a clean-out of the property was completed. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/5/2026
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3/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-733 |
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State v. McInnes
| 115053 | Burden of proof; affirmative defense; qualified immunity; police; excessive force; expert testimony; lay opinion testimony; sufficiency; manifest weight; Graham v. Connor; confrontation; Garrity statements; Garrity v. New Jersey; grand-jury transcript; sentencing. Trial court properly placed burden of proving affirmative defense of reasonableness on the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. Trial court properly admitted lay opinion testimony from three police officers where the opinion testimony was based on the rational perception of the witnesses and the testimony was helpful to clear understanding of the use of force under the circumstances. Defendant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and by the manifest weight of the evidence where the witnesses’ testimony regarding the defendant’s use of excessive force was corroborated by body-camera and other video evidence. Defendant’s right of confrontation was not violated by the absence of one of the victims from trial because no statements by the absent witness were admitted into evidence and all other witnesses were subject to cross-examination. Even though defendant’s supervisor asked him to complete a use-of-force report, there were no Garrity violations because there was no evidence that the defendant was coerced into completing the report. Trial court’s denial of defendant’s request for grand-jury transcripts was not an abuse of discretion where the defendant failed to establish a particularized need for the transcripts. Defendant’s sentence was not contrary to law where the trial court considered applicable sentencing statutes and his sentence was within the statutory range of penalties for his convictions. Defendant’s sentence was also supported by the record. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/5/2026
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3/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-734 |
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Elon Property Mgt. Co., L.L.C. v. Shif Rockside Place, L.L.C.
| 115087 | R.C. 2711.13; confirmation or arbitration award; opposing arbitration award; Civ.R. 60(B). - Judgment reversed and remanded. The trial court erred in vacating its confirmation of an arbitration award based on a Civ.R. 60(B) filing that was intended to circumvent the requirements under R.C. 2711.13 and the reason R.C. 2711.13 was not timely filed is only addressed vaguely. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
3/5/2026
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3/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-735 |
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State v. Holmes
| 115123 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; tampering with records; telecommunications fraud; verdict form; enhancing element; R.C. 2945.75(A)(2); plain error; ineffective assistance; motion to compel; medical records; discovery; privilege; joinder; simple and direct; Crim.R. 8(A); Crim.R. 14; jury instructions; data; R.C. 2913.01(R); R.C. 2913.47(A)(1); jury unanimity; alternative means; multiple acts; merger; allied offenses; R.C. 2941.25. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support appellant’s convictions for interfering with civil rights, dereliction of duty, tampering with records, and telecommunications fraud. Appellant’s convictions for interfering with civil rights, dereliction of duty, tampering with records, and telecommunications fraud were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The verdict form for appellant’s conviction for tampering with records was improper in order to enhance his conviction to a felony of the third degree since it did not state the degree of the offense, the additional elements necessary to enhance the offense, or even a cite to the statutory provision mandating that the appellant be convicted of the higher-level offense. However, appellant failed to demonstrate that the conviction would have been any different absent the error and, therefore, appellant failed to demonstrate plain error. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to compel the victim’s mental-health records without first holding an in camera inspection since appellant failed to demonstrate the victim’s mental-health report from the mental-health court contained any evidence that would have aided or furthered his impeachment efforts of the victim to the extent that it would have affected the trial. The trial court did not err in joining appellant’s case with that of his codefendant’s for the purposes of trial the evidence supporting appellant’s convictions was simple and direct. The trial court erred in providing the jury with a broadened definition of the word “data,” but the improper instruction did not affect the outcome of the trial. Appellant was not entitled to an amendment to the telecommunications fraud statute exempting certain law enforcement from prosecution under this statute since it did not go into effect until after the commission of the offense and it was not retroactive. Appellant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict was not violated since the indictment included alternative means in which appellant could have committed tampering with records, rather than separate acts. The trial court did not err in failing to merge his convictions of tampering with records and telecommunications fraud prior to sentencing. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
3/5/2026
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3/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-736 |
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Cleveland v. Shaker Hts. Apts. Owner, L.L.C.
| 115214 | Motion for leave to dismiss case; abuse of discretion; Crim.R. 48(A); R.C. 2941.33. The housing court abused its discretion when it denied the City’s motion for leave to file a dismissal entry because the court refused to allow the City to argue any facts on the record, applied only part of the test for good cause, and ignored the City’s substantial reason behind its decision to file for leave to dismiss, which was that the defendant substantially complied with the housing code. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/5/2026
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3/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-737 |
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State v. Green
| 115234 | Motion to withdraw guilty plea; principles of felony sentencing; sentencing factors; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12. Appellant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea is outside the scope of this appeal where motion was filed in a related trial court case, rather than the case underlying this appeal. Court did not err in imposing the maximum sentence for second-degree robbery where the court imposed a sentence within the statutory range, considered the factors required in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 both at hearing and in its journal entry, and where the record included information indicating that appellant’s conduct inflicted both physical and financial harm on an elderly victim. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
3/5/2026
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3/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-738 |
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Cleveland v. Johnson
| 115262 | Traffic violation; R.C. 4511.34, oath of office; R.C. 3.23, jurisdiction; due process; abuse of discretion; Crim.R. 16; discovery violation; discovery sanction. Judgment reversed and remanded. The trial court had jurisdiction over appellant’s minor-misdemeanor-traffic violation. However, the trial court abused its discretion by expecting the appellant to proceed to trial without discovery. In addition, the trial court abused its discretion by not compelling the appellee to provide discovery to appellant in accordance with Crim.R. 16. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
3/5/2026
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3/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-739 |
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State v. Washington
| 115266 | Statute of limitations; R.C. 2901.13(A)(4); John Doe indictment; rape; kidnapping. Appellant challenged convictions for two counts of rape and one count of kidnapping based on events that occurred in 1995, arguing that the State commenced its prosecution outside the applicable limitations period and that law enforcement did not act with reasonable diligence as to toll the statute of limitations. The State filed a John Doe indictment in 2014 and did not move to amend the indictment to name a defendant until 2023. However, appellant failed to raise a statute-of-limitations defense before the trial court, waiving the defense. Convictions affirmed. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
3/5/2026
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3/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-740 |
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State v. Jackson
| 115292 | Crim.R. 29; sufficiency of the evidence; R.C. 2919.22(A); substantial risk. State failed to establish appellant created a substantial risk to the health or safety of the child where the evidence at most established the possibility of a risk or the possibility of significant risk but failed to establish the type of substantial risk under R.C. 2919.22(A), i.e., an inexcusable failure to act in discharge of one’s duty to protect a child where such failure to act results in a substantial risk to the child’s health or safety. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
3/5/2026
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3/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-741 |
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Mitchell Family Trust Fund v. Cole
| 115340 | Summary judgment; third-party claims; Civ.R. 14(A); transaction or occurrence; derivative; primary claims; vacated; moot. Vacated the trial court’s decision granting the third-party defendant’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the matter with instructions for the trial court to issue a journal entry deeming the third-party claims moot and the motion for summary judgment on those claims moot. Once summary judgment was rendered in favor of the third-party plaintiff on the primary claims asserted against it, the third-party claims, which were derivative claims, were implicitly rendered moot. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/5/2026
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3/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-742 |
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In re A.P.
| 115350 | Civ.R. 60(B); child-support order; jurisdiction; bootstrapping. This court did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Appellant did not appeal the trial court’s initial denial of his Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Instead, he filed a second Civ.R. 60(B) motion and is challenging the denial of that motion. Appellant is improperly trying to “bootstrap” the denial of his second Civ.R. 60(B) motion to indirectly and untimely appeal the denial of his first Civ.R. 60(B) motion. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
3/5/2026
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3/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-743 |
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Mitchell Family Trust Fund v. Cole
| 115426 | Production of documents; depositions; corporate designee; motion to compel; motion to show cause; new arguments on appeal; summary judgment; de novo review; App.R. 9; Civ.R. 26; Civ.R. 34; Civ.R. 30; Civ.R. 30(B)(5); Civ.R. 37; Civ.R. 56(F); Civ.R. 56. Affirmed. The trial court’s orders granting appellees’ motions for summary judgment are affirmed because appellants demand a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review. In addition, appellants did not properly raise discovery disputes with the trial court. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/5/2026
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3/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-744 |
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Shaker Hts. v. Patterson
| 115432 | Pro se litigants; traffic violations; discovery disputes; failure to file transcript; presume regularity; party cannot raise new issue for first time on appeal. Defendant was found guilty of two traffic violations after a trial by the municipal court. Defendant appealed alleging discovery violations. Defendant failed to file a transcript of any proceedings in the trial court and there is no evidence in the record that he brought this alleged discovery violation to the attention of the trial court. No discovery motions were filed and no discovery rulings were made. A party cannot raise a new issue for the first time on appeal. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/5/2026
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3/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-745 |
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State v. Terrell
| 114674, 114903, 115693 | Abuse of discretion; present and future ability to pay. Trial court abused its discretion in imposing a total of $40,000 in fines when it relied on a year-old post-sentence-investigation report that reported the appellant had two jobs and was financially comfortable when at the time of sentencing the appellant had spent the last year in jail under a $100,000 bond. Further, the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that appellant had the future ability to pay based primarily on his potential to earn disregarding his lengthy prison term and status as a convicted felon with serious felony convictions. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
2/26/2026
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2/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-652 |
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Seminole Industries, Inc. v. Walthaw
| 114911 | Magistrate’s decision; failure to file objections; failure to file transcript; Civ.R. 53; plain error; waiver; App.R. 9; App.R. 16; App.R. 12; pro se litigant. Judgment affirmed. Appellant failed to file a transcript and objections to the magistrate’s decision granting appellee’s eviction action. If a party fails to follow the procedures set forth in Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii) and (iv) by failing to object to a magistrate’s decision and failing to provide a transcript to the trial court, that party waives any appeal as to those findings other than claims of plain error. Appellant failed to argue and demonstrate that this is an “extremely rare case” in which exceptional circumstances exist warranting application of the plain-error doctrine in order to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. Additionally, appellant failed to make any references to the record identifying the alleged errors in violation of App.R. 16(A)(3), failed to provide any arguments supporting the contentions she presented for our review in violation of App.R. 16(A)(7), and failed to provide this court with the transcript from the housing court proceedings below as set forth in App.R. 9(B). Under App.R. 12(A)(2), we may disregard appellant’s assignment of error on these grounds alone. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
2/26/2026
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2/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-653 |
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Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, L.L.P. v. Middleman
| 115121 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); de novo; breach of contract; legal services; payment; pro bono; friends and family matter; standard billable matter; dispute; agreement; whole; handwritten notation; email exchange; incorporated; language; unclear; circumstances; extrinsic evidence; parties’ intention; triable issues. Reversed the trial court’s decision granting plaintiff-appellee’s motion for summary judgment on a claim for breach of contract alleging defendant-appellant failed to pay for legal services rendered. Because appellant did not raise a choice-of-law argument in the trial court, it was not addressed on appeal. The terms of the engagement agreement included a handwritten notation that incorporated exceptions noted in an email exchange. The parties disputed whether the matter was to be handled as a pro bono or friends-and-family matter or as a standard billable matter. Because the language of the agreement was unclear, and it appeared that the circumstances surrounding the agreement invested the language of the contract with a special meaning, extrinsic evidence could be considered in an effort to give effect to the parties’ intention. Triable issues of fact remained, and the case was remanded. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/26/2026
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2/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-654 |
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State v. Ponzie
| 115172 | Guilty plea; indefinite sentence; Reagan Tokes Law; presentence motion to withdraw plea. Judgment affirmed. Appellant’s plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into. Although the trial court did not explain to appellant how it arrived at its calculations under the Reagan Tokes Law, it nonetheless informed appellant of the minimum and maximum times he could receive. Thus, the trial court did not completely fail to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and the appellant was required to show that he was prejudiced, which he failed to do. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw his plea. Although appellant’s motion was timely made, the record demonstrates that appellant was (1) represented by competent counsel, (2) given a full Crim.R. 11 hearing prior to entering his guilty plea at which he indicated that he understood the nature of the charges and possible penalties, and (3) given full and fair consideration on his request to withdraw his plea. Further, the record did not demonstrate that appellant had a plausible defense, and moreover, the State would be prejudiced by allowing him to withdraw his plea. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
2/26/2026
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2/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-655 |
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State v. Hairston
| 115189 | Sufficiency; manifest weight; tampering with evidence. Defendant’s conviction for tampering with evidence was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
2/26/2026
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2/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-656 |
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Hansbrough v. Marshall Dennehey, P.C.
| 115312 | Arbitration; arbitrability; motion to compel arbitration; motion to stay; Ohio Arbitration Act; Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”); interstate commerce; Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (“EFAA”); Franken Amendment; sexual harassment; hostile environment; employment discrimination; sexual-harassment dispute; standard of review; notice pleading; 9 U.S.C. 3; 9 U.S.C. 4; 9 U.S.C. 401; 9 U.S.C. 402; 48 C.F.R. 222.7402; R.C. 2711.02; R.C. 2711.03; R.C. 4112.01; R.C. 4112.02; Civ.R. 8; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); App.R. 3(C)(2); App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). Judgment affirmed and remanded. The trial court correctly denied defendants-appellants’ motion to stay and compel arbitration. The EFAA barred arbitration of plaintiff-appellee’s entire case against his former law firm and the managing attorney of the firm’s Cleveland, Ohio office. Reviewing the complaint de novo under Ohio’s notice-pleading standard, plaintiff-appellee alleged facts occurring after the effective date of the EFAA that, if true, would support a claim of sexual harassment under Ohio law. In addition to some post-EFAA remarks being sexual in nature, hostile environment sexual harassment under Ohio law does not require comments and behavior to be explicitly sexual in nature and can occur when abuse is directed at an employee because of that employee’s sex. The trial court also correctly concluded that if the EFAA renders an arbitration agreement unenforceable, the bar to arbitration applies to the entire case, not merely claims of sexual assault or sexual harassment. Plaintiff-appellee’s argument in the alternative, that defendants-appellants had waived their right to seek an order compelling arbitration by coupling their motion to compel with a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, was moot. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
2/26/2026
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2/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-657 |
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In re A.M.
| 115441 | Juvenile court; mandatory bindover; probable cause; aggravated robbery; gun; final, appealable order; category-two offense; R.C. 2152.02(BB)(1); R.C. 2152.10; R.C. 2152.12; R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b); 2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii); Juv.R. 30(A); actual possession; firearm; reasonable belief. Reversed the juvenile court’s decision denying the State’s request for a mandatory bindover to adult court. In relation to an alleged category-two offense of aggravated robbery, the State presented evidence that raises more than a mere suspicion and provides a reasonable belief that A.M. was in actual possession of a firearm and brandished that firearm in furtherance of the acts charged, and which was sufficient to demonstrate probable cause. The case was remanded for the juvenile court to enter a finding of probable cause and, pursuant to R.C. 2152.12, order the case transferred to the General Division of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/26/2026
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2/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-658 |
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State v. Lynch
| 114955 | Community-control sanctions; probation; termination; revocation; authority; absconding; tolling; R.C. 2929.15(A)(1); initiated; arrest warrant; State v. Rue, 2020-Ohio-6706; de novo; misapplication. Trial court erred when it terminated the defendant’s community-control sanctions by misapplying State v. Rue, 2020-Ohio-6706. The trial court issued an arrest warrant before the stated expiration of the defendant’s community-control sanctions, thus initiating a revocation proceeding. The trial court did not determine whether the defendant received notice of the violations that would allow the trial court to retain the authority to determine whether any tolling event occurred and what effect that had on the community-control term. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-553 |
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State v. Abdel-Haq
| 114977 | Evid.R. 608; Evid.R. 404; impeachment; extrinsic evidence. The trial court erred by precluding the defendant from testifying as to the victim’s prior conduct for the purposes of establishing the defendant’s state of mind as it related to the claim of self-defense and, in addition, erred by precluding the defense from questioning the victim about that prior conduct after the victim opened the door to the question by making a contradictory statement during trial. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-554 |
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State v. Lott
| 114992 | Civ.R. 60(B)(4); postconviction-relief petition; intellectual disability; capital; death penalty; successive petitions. - Judgment reversed and remanded. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Lott’s motion as a successive petition for postconviction relief because it was properly filed pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). Res judicata should not bar Lott from challenging his capital sentence when the reason for the Civ.R. 60(B) did not exist at the time Lott filed his previous petitions and postconviction appeals. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-555 |
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In re A.C.
| 115009 | Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(1); due process. Judgment reversed and remanded. The trial court erred by prematurely ruling on appellee’s objections to a magistrate’s decision prior to the ten-day extension established by Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(1), depriving appellant of the opportunity to file his own objections or respond to appellee’s objection. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-556 |
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Pivonka v. Partika
| 115056 | Class certification; subject-matter jurisdiction; R.C. 5160.37(L)(3). Appeal dismissed; case remanded for the trial court to address the question of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 5160.37(L)(3), which went into effect on September 30, 2025, and potentially divests the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction in this case. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-557 |
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State v. McDonald
| 115085 | Lay opinion testimony; abuse of discretion; Evid.R. 701; sufficient evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; tampering with records; obstruction of official business; tampering with evidence; dereliction of duty; telecommunications fraud; felony sentence; contrary to law; excessive sentence. Judgment affirmed. Law enforcement officials testified as lay, not expert witnesses. The officials testified based on their law enforcement experiences, previous investigations, and perceptions of the evidence at issue. Their testimonies were permissible lay opinion testimonies under Evid.R. 701. The convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The sentence was neither contrary to law nor excessive. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-558 |
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State v. Bryant
| 115096 | Ineffective assistance of counsel; self-defense; mental-health evaluations; competency to stand trial; sanity at the time of the act; prejudice; expert. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when counsel failed to revisit the trial court’s referral for an examination for sanity at the time of the act after the defendant was restored to competency. Counsel’s strategic decision to advance a self-defense argument at trial necessarily required a complete investigation into the defendant’s mental-health condition, including ensuring all evaluations were completed and potentially retaining an expert. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-559 |
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State v. Cox
| 115137 | Withdrawal of guilty plea; presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea; State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527 (1992); Crim.R. 32.1; nine-factor test. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cox’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea because Cox failed to demonstrate a reasonable and legitimate basis for withdrawing his plea. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-560 |
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State v. Edmond
| 115142 | Joinder; sever; simple and direct evidence; hearsay; police report; harmless error; manifest weight of the evidence; prosecutorial misconduct; effective assistance of counsel; statute of limitations; tolling; John Doe indictment; cumulative error. Judgment affirmed. Appellant’s convictions for rape and kidnapping are affirmed. The State’s evidence at trial was simple and direct and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to sever. The State also satisfied its burden of persuasion, and the convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did abuse its discretion in allowing a portion of the police report at issue to be read to the jury because it was inadmissible hearsay and did not fall into any recognized exception to hearsay. This error, however, was harmless. Additionally, the court’s review of the record demonstrates that there was no prosecutorial misconduct and appellant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel because of the failure of his defense counsel to object during closing arguments. The appellant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel because his defense counsel failed to argue that his offenses were barred by the statute of limitations because the State’s filing of a John Doe indictment appropriately tolled the statute of limitations. The cumulative-error doctrine did not apply to this case. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-561 |
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Combs v. Sherwin-Williams Co.
| 115175 | Motion to show cause; civil contempt; abuse of discretion; agreed order; consent order; due process; pro se. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found appellant in contempt of court. Appellant did not present any testimony or evidence that his attorney was not authorized to enter into an interim agreement with appellee at a status conference; challenge the allegation that he failed to comply with the terms of the resulting agreed order; or otherwise rebut appellee’s initial showing of contempt. Nor were appellant’s due-process rights violated based on the record. Appellant — who was initially represented by counsel but elected to proceed pro se — had notice of appellee’s motion to show cause; a reasonable opportunity to defend against or explain the allegations raised therein, both in writing and at the show-cause hearing; and the opportunity to testify and to call other witnesses in his defense or to offer an explanation for his failure to comply with the agreed order. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-562 |
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State v. Liotta
| 115226 | Voluntary plea; de novo review; Crim.R. 11(C); Dangler; maximum penalty; presumption of prison; R.C. 2929.12; sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); postrelease control; separation-of-powers doctrine; definite term. Judgment affirmed. Appellant’s plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. A trial court is not required to advise defendant at the time of the plea that there is a presumption of prison. Although a trial court must consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12, findings are not required. Finally, postrelease control does not violate the separation-of- powers doctrine. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-564 |
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State v. Dowdell
| 115919 | Bail; bond; R.C. 2937.222; clear and convincing evidence. The court did not err by denying the defendant bail after he allegedly raped a 14-year-old at gunpoint. The court held a hearing and evidence was presented that the defendant committed the offense, that he posed a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the community and that no release conditions would assure the safety of the community. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-565 |
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State v. Gilmore
| 115243 | Manifest weight of the evidence; having weapons while under disability; credibility; inconsistent statements; split sentences; no-contact order; prison term. Appellant was convicted of two counts of having weapons while under disability and one count of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle. Appellant’s convictions arose from a dispute he had with the victim, his ex-girlfriend. The victim testified that he drove to her work and threatened to kill her. When he left, she followed him in her car. When she stopped at a stop sign, she testified that he pointed a gun at her. Appellant alleged that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence, alleging that the testimony of the victim was not credible because of her inconsistent statements she made to police and her testimony at trial. The State responded directing the appellate court to the credibility of appellant’s mother who also testified at trial. The appellate court held that credibility issues are primarily for the finder of fact and that the finder of fact is in the best position to judge a witness’s credibility. The court also noted that a trier of fact is free to accept or reject any or all testimony of any witness. The court held that appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant also challenged the trial court’s imposition of a no-contact order. The State conceded that the trial court’s no-contact order was improper. The appellate court agreed, recognizing that when person is sentenced to prison on an offense, the trial court is precluded from imposing a community-control sanction, such as a no-contact order, on the same offense. As a result, the appellate court vacated the no-contact order. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-577 |
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State v. Smith
| 111274 | Remand from Ohio Supreme Court; admissibility of police body-camera video; victim’s out-of-court statements; victim does not testify at trial; Confrontation Clause; hearsay; harmless error; medical treatment or diagnosis exception to rule against hearsay. On remand from the Ohio Supreme Court we were instructed to review the nontestimonial out-of-court statements a victim, who did not testify at trial, made to EMTs that were captured by a police officer’s body camera. Upon review, we found that the statements were admissible as hearsay under the medical treatment or diagnosis exception. We were further instructed to revisit our harmless error analysis of the admissible evidence, excluding the inadmissible out-of-court statements the victim made to the police officers, which violated the Confrontation Clause. Upon review, we found insufficient evidence to identify the defendant as the person who assaulted the victim. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/13/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-552 |
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State ex rel. Winn v. Krivosh
| 115888 | Civ.R. 12(B)(6); motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; writ of prohibition; patently and unambiguously lacked personal jurisdiction; waiver; guilty pleas; R.C. 2969.25(C)(1). Complaint for a writ of prohibition alleging that trial court patently and unambiguously lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant in underlying criminal cases dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Relator waived any challenge to personal jurisdiction by entering guilty pleas. Complaint was also subject to dismissal for failure to strictly comply with R.C. 2969.25(C)(1). | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
2/13/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-566 |
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