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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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Cleveland v. Glover
| 114796 | Motion to suppress; substantial compliance; National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST") standards; R.C. 4511.19(A); R.C. 4511.19(D); R.C. 3701.143; Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-03; Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05. Affirmed. The trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress alcohol-test results is affirmed because the appellee met its burden of demonstrating substantial compliance with Ohio Adm. Code 3701-53-05 when it introduced the dry gas supplier’s certificate of analysis showing traceability to NIST standards. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1039 |
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State v. Ayers
| 115129 | Motion for new trial; Crim.R. 33(A)(6); Brady violation; de novo review; prejudice; allied offenses; merger; R.C. 2941.25; plain error; concurrent sentence; indefinite sentence; Reagan Tokes Act; R.C. 2929.144(B)(2) and (C); felony sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); “qualifying felony”; R.C. 2929.14(A); 2929.19(B)(2); minimum and maximum terms. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded for resentencing. Appellant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the late disclosure of information. In other words, appellant did not establish that there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the trial would have been different. Accordingly, it was not error for the trial court to deny appellant’s motion for new trial because his due-process rights were not violated. Nevertheless, we reverse appellant’s sentence because the trial court improperly sentenced appellant on allied offenses of similar import. In addition, the trial court incorrectly imposed the minimum and maximum prison terms as set forth in R.C. 2929.144(B)(2) and (C) and failed to properly advise Ayers of the notification requirements as set forth in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2). Therefore, this case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1040 |
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State v. Taylor
| 115154 | Motion to suppress; traffic stop; window tint; Mimms order; Terry frisk; pat-down search; waiver; Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 14; R.C. 2923.13(A)(2); R.C. 2923.12(A)(2); R.C. 2923.16(B); R.C. 2941.1417(A). Judgment affirmed. Following lawful stop for suspected illegal window tint, state trooper lawfully ordered defendant-appellant out of the vehicle under Mimms. Defendant-appellant’s argument that Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution should be interpreted to provide broader protection than the Fourth Amendment in the Mimms context was waived because he did not raise it in the trial court. In addition, defendant-appellant did not argue plain error and nothing in the record suggested plain error. The subsequent pat-down was justified under Terry because defendant-appellant exited the vehicle in an unusual, hunched posture with his right arm pressed toward his waistband, he had provided only an identification card rather than a driver’s license, and there was broken glass inside the car. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1041 |
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State v. Hall
| 115264 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; rape; fellatio; attempted vaginal rape; kidnapping; felonious assault; strangulation; R.C. 2907.02(A)(2); operating a vehicle under the influence; absence of scientific evidence; sexually violent predator; ineffective assistance of counsel; jail-issued clothing; involuntary intoxication; R.C. 2971.01(H); jury instructions; lesser-included offense; unlawful restraint; inferior-offense; allied offenses of similar import; R.C. 2941.25; consecutive sentences; one or more course of conduct. The trial testimony of the victim was sufficient to support the State’s charges of rape (fellatio), attempted vaginal rape, kidnapping, felonious assault, and strangulation and overcome defendant-appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. The evidence was sufficient to overcome the Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal on the operating a vehicle under the influence charge where (1) the defendant-appellant testified that he drove his vehicle and while he was driving he became sleepy and confused about his directions and (2) the responding patrolman testified that he believed the defendant-appellant — who he found asleep in the driver’s seat of his truck with the truck running and stopped in the middle of an intersection — was intoxicated because he smelled strongly of alcohol, had glossy eyes, had wet his pants, and was unable to stand up on his own. There was sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to find the defendant-appellant was likely to engage in a sexually violent offense in the future and, thus, classify him as a sexually violent predator. There was sufficient, competent, credible evidence to support the defendant-appellant’s convictions beyond a reasonable doubt and, accordingly, his convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant-appellant did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not err when it allowed the State to introduce testimony during the sexually violent predator specifications portion of the trial. The Ohio Rules of Evidence do not strictly apply to sexual violent predator classification hearings, and the evidence supported a sexually violent predator classification under R.C. 2971.01(H). The trial court did not err when it chose not to instruct the jury on unlawful restraint, the lesser-included offense of kidnapping, or aggravated assault, the inferior-offense of felonious assault. The evidence did not support merger of the rape (fellatio) conviction with the attempted vaginal rape, kidnapping, felonious assault, and strangulation convictions. The trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences was not contrary to law. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1042 |
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State v. Bebee
| 115288 | Petition for postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21; findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court erred in failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its denial of the petition for postconviction relief. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1043 |
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State v. Johnson-Coleman
| 115304 | Motion for mistrial; Sixth Amendment right to public trial; no closure by court; officer’s testimony; personal knowledge; not hearsay; no violation of Sixth Amendment right; Confrontation Clause; conceded error; theft is a lesser included offense of robbery. Appellant appeals ruling during trial and his sentencing. Appellant’s first assignment of error alleges the court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial when his family was allegedly accidentally informed by a court employee trial that day had been canceled when it was not. Because there was no action by the court and the trial was not actually closed and still open to the public there is nothing for us to review and thereby no violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Appellant’s second assignment of error alleges the trial court erred permitting testimony from the investigating officer regarding appellant’s out-of-state arrest and extradition to Cuyahoga County arguing the officer did not have personal knowledge of this information, the information was hearsay, and it violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront an out-of-court witness. We find the officer did testify to his personal knowledge and that there were not out-of-court statements made during his testimony such that there was no hearsay and thereby no confrontation clause concerns. Appellant’s third assignment of error alleges the trial court erred by sentencing him to both counts of theft and aggravated robbery, since the theft is lesser included offenses and they should have merged for sentencing. The State concedes assignment of error three. As such we overrule appellant’s first two assignments of error and sustain his third assignment and vacate the trial court’s sentence and remand the matter for resentencing. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1044 |
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State v. Tucker
| 115308 | Suppression; marijuana; citation. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress. The search of the defendant’s vehicle was unlawful. Although marijuana is now legal in Ohio, it is not legal to smoke it in a vehicle. The defendant admitted he smoked marijuana in his car and the officer issued a citation for that. There was no indication that the defendant had committed any other offense, and therefore the search of the defendant’s vehicle was unlawful. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1045 |
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Cleveland v. Brown
| 115332 | Inaccurate transcript; App.R. 9; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; bench trial; alibi defense; credibility; admission of evidence; proffer; hearsay; victim’s statements to officer; plain error; Crim.R. 52; impeachment evidence; extrinsic evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel; prejudice; futile objection; Evid.R. 608; cumulative error. Despite asserting that the transcript was inadequate because it contained a number of instances where testimony was “inaudible,” appellant did not utilize any of the provisions of App.R. 9. Appellant was able to file his brief and did not identify any error that he could have raised but for the transcript issues. The trial court did not preclude appellant from proffering evidence. The officer’s testimony regarding statements made by the victim did not constitute hearsay in violation of the Confrontation Clause because the victim also testified and was subject to cross-examination, and the officer’s testimony was duplicative. Appellant’s conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and was supported by sufficient evidence. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, and the cumulative-error doctrine did not apply. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1046 |
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Smith & Condeni, L.L.P. v. Cavitch Familo & Durkin Co., L.P.A.
| 115362 | Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings; disassociated partner; no attorney-client relationship formed. Judgment affirmed. The trial court properly granted the defendants’ Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings. The disassociated partner was without authority to retain legal representation for the partnership from which he disassociated. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1047 |
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S.K. v. P.K.
| 115392 | Medical records; privilege; waiver; R.C. 2317.02; protective order. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The domestic relations court erred by not granting a protective order to limit the dissemination of the medical records to anyone other than the parties and their counsel of record, or any experts or professionals retained by counsel in preparation for trial. Notwithstanding, the trial court did not err by denying plaintiff’s request to preclude the defendant from reviewing the materially relevant evidence to assist in preparation of the case. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1048 |
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State v. Donerson
| 115422 | Trafficking; cocaine; R.C. 2925.03(A)(2); R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; sentencing factors; considered; negotiated plea agreement; jointly recommended sentencing range; ineffective assistance of counsel; guilty plea; prejudice; confidential informant; speculative; exculpatory information; advocate; minimum sentence. Affirmed appellant’s conviction and sentence for tracking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) with forfeiture specifications. Appellant failed to affirmatively show that the trial court failed to consider the sentencing factors under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 or that his sentence is contrary to law. Appellant also failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel when he entered a guilty plea under a negotiated plea agreement, offered a speculative argument and did not establish the need for disclosure of a confidential informant, his trial counsel advocated for the minimum sentence under a jointly recommended sentencing range, and no deficient performance or prejudice was shown. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1049 |
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Evans v. Davis
| 115433 | Magistrate’s decision; objections; transcript; Civ.R. 53. - Decision affirmed where this court lacked any ability to review appellant’s assignments of error because she did not provide a transcript or affidavit of the evidence, requiring this court to accept the trial court’s factual findings. Moreover, newly raised arguments not raised below are disregarded under Civ.R. 53. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1050 |
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In re M.C.
| 115453 | Permanent custody; juvenile court; custody; best interests of the child; temporary custody; parental rights; best interest; manifest weight of the evidence; clear and convincing evidence; guardian ad litem recommendation; best interest; termination; permanent placement; trial. Mother did not demonstrate any error with regard to claimed procedural irregularities or altered documentation. Mother failed to show how the trial court restricted her cross-examination of witnesses or refused to hear her motions. Further, the trial court’s determination that awarding permanent custody to the agency was in the child’s best interest was supported by clear and convincing evidence. The decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights and award permanent custody to the agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1051 |
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State v. Normile
| 115477 | Crim.R. 29; sufficiency of the evidence; strangulation; domestic violence; R.C. 2903.18(B)(3); R.C. 2919.25(A); hearsay; plain error; Crim.R. 52(B). Judgment affirmed. After viewing the evidence against the defendant-appellant in a light most favorable to the State — and absent authority cited to the contrary — we find that the trial court could reasonably conclude from substantial evidence that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he (1) knowingly caused or created a substantial risk of physical harm to the victim, his then wife, by means of strangulation or suffocation in violation of R.C. 2903.18(B)(3) and (2) knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to the victim in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). Thus, we find that the defendant-appellant’s strangulation and domestic-violence convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and his Crim.R. 29 motions for acquittal were properly denied. Moreover, we decline to address the defendant-appellant’s second assignment of error — claiming that portions of two officers’ testimony amounted to inadmissible hearsay — since no objections were raised at the trial-court level and defendant-appellant failed to make a plain-error argument on appeal. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1052 |
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Cox v. Glenville Homes, III, L.P.
| 115506 | Summary judgment; compulsory counterclaim; res judicata; landlord-tenant dispute; jurisdiction; housing court; forcible entry and detainer; money damages; Civ.R. 13(A); Civ.R. 12(B)(1); R.C. 1901.17; R.C. 1901.131; R.C. 1901.181. Judgment affirmed. Appellant tenant’s common pleas action was barred based on principles of subject-matter jurisdiction and the doctrine of res judicata. Appellant’s common pleas claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, negligence/breach of fiduciary duties, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief all arose from the same landlord-tenant relationship, lease, rent issues, and eviction proceedings as landlord’s housing court action for forcible entry and detainer and money damages. Appellant’s common pleas claims were logically related to the housing court action and were therefore compulsory counterclaims under Civ.R. 13(A). While appellant had attempted to file a counterclaim in the housing court, the counterclaim had been stricken as untimely, the housing court later entered final judgment in favor of landlord on its claims, and no attempt was made to appeal the housing court’s decision. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1053 |
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State v. Pennington
| 115508 | Res judicata; allied offenses; voidable sentence. The trial court’s judgment denying the petitioner’s motion for allied-offense determination was affirmed. The petitioner’s arguments were either not properly before this court or barred by res judicata. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1054 |
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State v. Giles
| 115572 | Knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea; sex offender registration; Tier II sex offender registration; consecutive sentences; allied offenses; merger; double jeopardy; collateral consequences; Crim.R. 11; R.C. 2941.25; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); R.C. 2967.28(B)(4); ineffective assistance of counsel; postrelease control. Judgment affirmed. Defendant-appellant’s guilty plea to amended counts of abduction with sexual motivation and attempted felonious assault was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 and adequately explained the direct consequences of Tier II sex-offender classification. Any confusion about defendant-appellant’s contact with his nieces concerned collateral rather than direct consequences of the plea. Defendant-appellant expressly waived any merger argument by stipulating pursuant to the plea agreement that the offenses were not allied, which defeated his attack on consecutive sentences and his related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel secured a substantial benefit by reducing two first-degree felonies and eliminating sexually violent predator specifications. The imposition of postrelease control consisting of a statutory range did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1055 |
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State v. Massimiani
| 114755 | App.R. 26; application to reopen an appeal; Murnahan; ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Appellant’s application to reopen his appeal is denied because the appellant was not subject to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and his offenses were not allied offenses. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
3/24/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1056 |
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State v. Griffin
| 114895 | R.C. 2923.02; R.C. 2903.02; attempted felony murder; void conviction. Attempted felony murder is not a cognizable crime in Ohio, and appellant’s conviction must be vacated. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/19/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-925 |
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Toth v. Rocket Mtge., L.L.C.
| 114901 | Employment discrimination; R.C. Ch. 4112; Employment Law Uniformity Act; time-barred; statute of limitations; choice of law; conflict of law; employment agreement. The trial court erred in determining that a contractually agreed upon one-year statute of limitations in an employment agreement controlled the statute of limitations on plaintiff’s employment-discrimination claim, where that determination could not be made absent the court first making a threshold determination about choice of law — that is whether Michigan or Ohio law applied to the substantive employment-discrimination claim. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
3/19/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-926 |
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State v. Wilson
| 114998 | R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c) substantial impairment rape; Fifth Amendment Right against self-incrimination; right to remain silent prearrest and pre-Miranda rights being read; prosecutorial misconduct; cross-examination of defendant; direct examination of police officer; State’s closing argument; failure to object; plain error; exclusion of irrelevant evidence; abuse of discretion. Appellant-defendant appealed the trial court’s various rulings regarding prosecutorial questions and comments as well as rulings regarding the admissibility and use of various exhibits at trial. The first assignment of error concerned prosecutorial misconduct regarding questions asked during the direct examination of a police officer, the cross-examination of the defendant and during the State’s closing argument. We find that there were only three objected-to questions by the prosecutor during the defendant’s cross-examination that while they were improper questions they did not substantially prejudice defendant’s right to a fair trial. As to the remaining questions asked by the prosecutor during cross-examination of the defendant, the State’s direct examination of the arresting police officer and the comments made during State’s closing argument these were not objected to and were therefore reviewed under the plain-error analysis. But for their admission it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt the trial outcome would have been different and therefore no plain error was found. First assignment of error is overruled. The second assignment of error concerned the exclusion of three demonstrative exhibits. Upon review we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding these exhibits because they were not relevant to the issue in this case. Second assignment of error is overruled. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/19/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-927 |
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Griffith v. Chelsea Condominium
| 115032 | Settlement agreement; contract law; final order; attorney’s fees; reasonableness; compensatory damages; mitigation. The trial court did not err when it granted appellee’s motion to enforce settlement agreement where the terms of the agreement were unambiguous and did not allow appellants to deduct expenses from the settlement amount. Further, because the terms were unambiguous the trial court correctly determined that it was not allowed to consider extrinsic evidence to understand the settlement agreement. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the attorney’s fees submitted by appellee were reasonable, where both parties’ witnesses agreed the fee was reasonable, but only disagreed about whether it was proper for the appellee to charge a discounted rate to the insurance company and increase that rate when the insurance company withdrew coverage. The trial court did not err in reconsidering an interlocutory order where the calculation of prejudgment interest was not merely ministerial and where the decision regarding prejudgment interest was unlikely to prevent further appeals. Further the trial court properly determined that appellants had breached the settlement agreement when it withheld expenses contrary to the parties’ agreement. However, the appellants presented evidence that the appellee had an opportunity to mitigate its damages. Because it is unclear whether the trial court considered appellants’ mitigation argument, the award of attorney’s fees is reversed pending further review by the trial court. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
3/19/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-928 |
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State v. Wilson
| 115162 | Vacate; sentence; plea agreement; violated; agreed sentence; jointly recommended sentence; sentencing range; greater sentence; withdraw; due process; ineffective assistance; resentencing. Vacated appellant’s sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. The State failed to fully set forth the jointly recommended sentence at the time of sentencing and arguably violated the plea agreement. The trial court did not expressly indicate whether it was accepting or rejecting the jointly recommended sentencing range, and it is unclear what occurred. Appellant was not given the opportunity to withdraw her guilty pleas, her due-process rights were violated, and ineffective assistance of counsel was shown. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/19/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-929 |
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Temethy v. Dept. Job & Family Servs.
| 115202 | Motion to dismiss; Civ.R. 12; subject-matter jurisdiction; Court of Claims; unemployment benefits; administrative appeals; App.R. 16(A); App.R. 12(A); R.C. 4141.282. Judgment affirmed. The trial court’s dismissal of Temethy’s case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was proper — the Ohio Court of Claims cannot be sued and appellant’s claim for money damages against the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services can only be brought in the Ohio Court of Claims because unemployment compensation claims are governed by a special statutory proceeding. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
3/19/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-930 |
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State v. Litt
| 115230 | Curative instruction; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence. In response to defense counsel’s potentially misleading comments during closing statements, the trial court properly provided a curative instruction and included the instruction in the written jury instructions. Defendant-appellant’s trafficking conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
3/19/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-931 |
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State v. Matos
| 115244 | Maximum sentence; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); clearly and convincingly; gross sexual imposition; different victims; minor children. - Maximum sentence on one count charging gross sexual imposition involving a ten-year-old victim affirmed where the record supports that the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Consecutive sentences affirmed because this court did not have a firm conviction or belief that the trial court’s R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings were not clearly and convincingly supported by the record. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
3/19/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-932 |
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State v. Toney
| 115261 | Rape; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); remote testimony; Confrontation Clause; harmless error; duplicative testimony; Crim.R. 16(I); witness lists; plain error; cumulative error; manifest weight; credibility; sentencing factors; life terms; R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(b). Affirmed. Although the trial court erred by permitting the forensic interviewer to testify remotely, that error was harmless based on the remaining evidence and the duplication of testimony from the investigating detective. Because the defendant did not object to a statement made to the venire before the jury was picked and failed to object to any testimony encroaching on victim-impact territory, and because the appellant failed to discuss plain error, there is no reversible error. The defendant’s claim that the defendant’s father’s absence from trial was commented on by the prosecutor is not supported by the record and none of the convictions are against the weight of the evidence solely based on the inconsistencies in the testimony heard by the jury. And finally, a trial court has authority to impose indefinite life sentences consecutively, which are statutorily required under R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(b). | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/19/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-933 |
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Jones v. State
| 115291 | Pro se litigant; motion to dismiss; Civ.R. 12(B)(1); Civ.R. 12(B)(6); motion for judgment on the pleadings; Civ.R. 12(C); de novo; political subdivision immunity; R.C. Ch. 2744; intentional tort; App.R. 12; App.R. 16. Judgment affirmed. Appellant’s intentional tort claim for money damages against the State was properly dismissed because money damages against the State belong in the Court of Claims. Appellant’s claims against the County and City were also properly dismissed because appellant failed to overcome statutory immunity. Appellant could not demonstrate that one of the five exceptions contained in R.C. 2744.02(B) applies. Appellant failed to comply with the Ohio Appellate Rules by failing to reference the record identifying the alleged errors made in the trial court; reference the assignment of error to which the statement of the issues relates; and include an argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies. App.R. 12(A)(2) permits the court to disregard an assignment of error if the party raising it fails to comply with the requirements of App.R. 16(A). | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
3/19/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-934 |
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Marrs v. Mikel
| 115299 | Motion for relief from judgment; Civ.R. 60(B); evidentiary hearing; agreed order; bootstrapping. Judgment affirmed. Defendant-appellant has not established that she is entitled to Civ.R. 60(B) relief or an evidentiary hearing on her motion. The trial court merely adopted a qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”) based on the express terms of an agreed judgment entry executed by the parties (“agreed entry”). The appeal — in effect — bootstraps challenges to the agreed entry, where conditions resolving defendant-appellant’s contempt were established, and the QDRO, one of the conditions established in the agreed entry, after she failed to timely contest or appeal either. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
3/19/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-935 |
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Hopkins v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth.
| 115301 | Summary judgment; common carrier; negligence; open-and-obvious doctrine; static condition; dynamic condition; sudden stop; unusual stop; forceful stop; violent stop; excessive speed; political-subdivision immunity; affidavit; deposition; experts; R.C. 2744.02(B)(1); R.C. 2744.02(B)(2); R.C. 2744.03(A)(3); R.C. 2744.03(A)(5); Civ.R. 30(B)(5); Civ.R. 56. Judgment reversed and remanded. Although plaintiff-appellant admitted he observed the wet bus floor, he did not bring a premises-liability claim based on a static condition. He also alleged active negligence in the driver’s operation of the bus. The evidence, construed in the plaintiff-appellant’s favor, created genuine issues of material fact as to whether the bus was traveling above the speed limit and came to an unusually sudden, forceful, and violent stop, causing plaintiff-appellant to fall and tear his quadriceps tendon. Plaintiff’s affidavit describing the violent stop did not contradict his deposition, both lay and expert evidence supported his theory that the bus was traveling at an excessive speed, and defendant-appellee’s internal rules and representative testimony were relevant to negligence. Defendant-appellee could not restore immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) or (A)(5) because ordinary bus-driving negligence is not protected policymaking or high-level discretionary conduct, and no evidence of an emergency stop rebutted the inference of negligence arising from the purportedly unusual sudden stop. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/19/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-936 |
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In re A.N.
| 115692 | Permanent custody; best interests of the child; clear and convincing evidence; temporary custody; juvenile court; substance abuse; mental health; housing; parenting; sufficiency; manifest weight; extension; abuse of discretion; dependent. The juvenile court’s award of permanent custody to the agency is supported by clear and convincing evidence and is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mother’s motion to extend temporary custody. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
3/19/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-939 |
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State v. Fung
| 115593 | Successive petition for postconviction relief; res judicata; newly discovered evidence; bootstrapping; bootstrap; App.R. 4(A)(1). Dismissed. Appellant’s appeal of a successive petition for postconviction relief is dismissed because the petition was res judicata and the appeal is an impermissible attempt at bootstrapping. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/19/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-940 |
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Grace v. Jack Thistledown Racino
| 115574 | Civ.R. 12(B)(6); motion to dismiss; without prejudice; not a final appealable order; lack of jurisdiction; appeal dismissed. Appellant appeals the trial court’s granting of appellee’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss without prejudice. Because a dismissal of a complaint “without prejudice” is generally not a final appealable order, and this case does not fall under the exception to the rule as the appellant can restate his claims, this is not a final appealable order and we do not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Appeal dismissed. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/19/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-941 |
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Shields v. McCloud
| 115499 | R.C. 4123.512(F); workers’ compensation; attorney fees; appellate-attorney fees; App.R. 24. The trial court’s $4,200 award of attorney fees, inclusive of appellate-attorney fees, was a proper application of the unambiguous statutory cap in R.C. 4123.512(F). | Clary | Cuyahoga |
3/19/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-942 |
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Rizk v. Droco Roofing
| 115331 | Small claims; Civ.R. 60(B); relief from judgment; denied; abuse of discretion; change of address; notice; duty; check; docket; hearing date. Affirmed the trial court’s denial of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding no excusable neglect was shown when appellant and its counsel failed to file a change-of-address notice and failed to check the docket and stay informed of the status of a motion for continuance and of the small-claims hearing date. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/19/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-943 |
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State v. Martin
| 113955 | App.R. 26; application to reopen an appeal; Murnahan; ineffective assistance of counsel; untimely filing; good cause. An appellant’s application to reopen his appeal is denied where the appellant filed his application outside the 90-day requirement specified in App.R. 26, and appellant failed to provide good cause for his untimely filing. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
3/18/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-924 |
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State ex rel. James v. Kelley
| 115804 | Mandamus, petition for postconviction relief, sentence reduction, new trial, evidentiary hearing. To be granted mandamus, the relator must establish (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent-judge, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The Ohio Supreme Court has held “[t]he availability of an appeal is an adequate remedy sufficient to preclude a writ.” The availability of an appeal is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law even if the relator fails to pursue an appeal. Herein, the relator has failed to establish that he possesses the right to sentence reduction, a new trial, or an evidentiary hearing because vague allegations of various violations of constitutional and statutory rights, such as the denial of due process or equal protection, cannot be addressed through mandamus. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/18/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-937 |
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Goodykoontz v. Moore
| 115755 | Procedendo, petition for postconviction relief; motion for leave to file a motion for new trial; and mootness. Procedendo action to compel rulings on motions for leave to file a motion for new trial and a postconviction-relief petition was rendered moot when the respondent judge ruled on the outstanding matters. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/18/2026
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3/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-938 |
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In re J.R.P.
| 114805 | Termination of shared-parenting; visitation; custody; legal custodian; residential parent; modification of terms in a shared-parenting plan; change in circumstances; best-interest factors; R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(c); R.C. 3109.051; R.C 3109.04(E)(2)(b); R.C. 3109.04(F)(1); R.C. 3109.051(D). Affirmed. The trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s motion to terminate shared parenting, reduced his parenting time, and placed new restrictions on his parenting time. The juvenile court reviewed the relevant best-interest factors and did not abuse its discretion when making its determination. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-827 |
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Kittis v. Cleveland Clinic Found.
| 114990 | Medical malpractice; causation; Civ.R. 26(E); discovery violation; expert report; invited error; harmless error. Affirmed. The trial court did not err by denying a motion for new trial or to declare a mistrial based on new theories of causation being elicited or explored on cross-examination by the plaintiff because the plaintiff did not object to the initial unsolicited statement and, thereafter, asked for additional answers in an effort to impeach the treating physicians. In addition, even if there was error in the introduction of that evidence, it was harmless as a matter of law since the plaintiff’s theory of causation was not impacted by the testimony. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-828 |
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Francis v. Cleveland Clinic Found.
| 115062 | Statute of limitations; medical claims; R.C. 2305.113(B); motion in limine, medical negligence; survivorship; loss of chance, Civ.R. 26(B)(7)(b); expert report. Court did not err in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment, resulting in dismissal of appellant’s medical-negligence survivorship claim. Claim was filed more than a year after the events that gave rise to this case; therefore, the dismissed claim was commenced outside the limitations period for medical claims. Appellant’s counsel failed to extend the limitations period under R.C. 2305.113(B) by sending appellee email notice that he was investigating potential claims, rather than required notice by certified mail. Court did not abuse its discretion in granting appellee’s motion in limine, precluding appellant’s testimony regarding a loss-of-chance theory, where report of appellant’s expert never provided that decedent had a less-than-even chance of the surviving cardiac arrest that caused his death. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-829 |
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State v. Shirilla
| 115101 | Postconviction relief; jurisdiction; timeliness; trial transcript; 365-day deadline; leap year; juvenile court; bindover; hearing; probable cause; direct appeal; equitable tolling; anniversary date; subject-matter jurisdiction; statutory construction; filing date; supplemental transcript; de novo review. The trial court dismissed appellant’s petition for postconviction relief, which was denied for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of untimeliness. The central dispute involves the calculation of the mandatory 365-day filing period established by R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a). The appellant contends that the filing was timely because the statutory clock should have been triggered by the later filing of juvenile bindover transcripts rather than the initial trial transcripts. Furthermore, the appellant argues that the “anniversary date” of the transcript filing should control the deadline, effectively asserting that the occurrence of a leap year should not result in a filing period that is one day shorter than a full calendar year. The filing of a postconviction petition is a jurisdictional act. Because the appellant filed the petition on the 366th day following the filing of the trial transcript, the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the claims, and the application of equitable tolling is prohibited in the context of this jurisdictional bar. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-830 |
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State v. Watson
| 115151, 115502 | Crim.R. 43(A)(1); consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.41; R.C. 2929.14; courses of conduct. Appellant contested term of imprisonment arising from guilty plea. Case remanded for resentencing where court failed to sentence appellant for one of the charged offenses at hearing, attempting to do so only in a subsequent sentencing entry, in violation of Crim.R. 43(A)(1). Court also erred in announcing at hearing that it was running all prison terms consecutively, violating R.C. 2929.41 where appellant’s convictions included both felonies and misdemeanors. Court also failed to make a complete “courses of conduct” finding at hearing under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) to support its imposition of consecutive sentences. On remand, court instructed to make consecutive-sentencing findings in accordance with R.C. 2929.41 and 2929.14, as merited by the record. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-831 |
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State v. Galindez
| 115166 | Rape of a child under the age of ten; joinder; Crim.R. 8(A); Crim.R. 14; ineffective assistance of counsel; “joinder test”; forensic interview; Evid.R. 803(4); manifest weight of the evidence. Affirmed. The failure to file a motion to sever the separate offenses committed against separate victims was not ineffective assistance of counsel because the motion would not have been successful in light of simple and direct evidence the jury was capable of segregating; the defendant failed to demonstrate the inapplicability of Evid.R. 803(4) with respect to the admission of the forensic worker’s interview with the victim; and the convictions were not against the weight of the evidence. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-832 |
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State v. Jackson
| 115167 | Felony sentence; R.C. 2953.08; not reviewable; agreed sentence; range; indefinite sentence. Where the trial court imposed a base sentence within the recommended sentencing range set forth by the parties in the plea agreement, the sentence was not reviewable on appeal. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-833 |
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Fugo v. Rae
| 115235 | Small claims action; breach of contract; unjust enrichment; conversion; manifest-weight review; cross-appeal; App.R. 3. Affirmed. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s general verdict following a bench trial, in which the plaintiff was awarded $1,200 dollars on her claims generally based on breach of contract, unjust enrichment, or conversion. That verdict is not against the weight of the evidence merely because the judgment was for less than the $6,000 sought. And finally, because the appellee did not file a cross-appeal, the judgment in favor of the appellant cannot be challenged in this appeal. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-834 |
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State v. McFarland
| 116073 | Marsy’s Law; subpoena; electronic devices; compulsory process; Ohio Const. art. I, § 10a; Ohio Const. art. I, § 10. Affirmed, modified, and remanded. The trial court did not err in denying the victim’s motion to quash a subpoena issued by the defendant because the victim’s right to refuse discovery requests or depositions is expressly subordinate to the defendant’s right to compulsory process arising under Ohio Const. art. I, § 10. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-835 |
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Goldshtein v. Cuyahoga Cty. Fiscal Officer
| 115676 | Abuse of discretion; board of revision. The trial court did not abuse its discretion finding, without a hearing, the appellant did not establish reliable evidence that the decision of the board of revision is in error. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-836 |
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Anderson v. Jack Cleveland Casino, L.L.C.
| 115393 | Vexatious litigator; R.C. 2323.52; saving statute; R.C. 2305.19; summary judgment; statute of limitations. The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee where plaintiff-appellant’s complaint was filed outside of the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff-appellant’s attempted initial filing of the action was done without first obtaining leave as he was required to do pursuant to his status as a vexatious litigator under R.C. 2323.52. The saving statute did not apply to extend the statute of limitations more than the several days between when plaintiff-appellant filed an application for leave and when he obtained leave. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-837 |
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State v. Ward
| 115328 | Murder; felonious assault; sufficiency; manifest weight; ineffective assistance of counsel; cumulative error. Appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where eyewitnesses testified that they observed appellant shoot and kill the victim. Appellant failed to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. The cumulative-error doctrine was inapplicable where appellant failed to demonstrate the existence of any error. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/12/2026
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3/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-838 |
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