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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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Peiffer Wolf Carr Kane Conway & Wise, APLC v. Washington
| 114319 | Directed verdict; Civ.R. 50(A)(4); quantum meruit; moot; alternate theory of liability; manifest weight of the evidence; jury verdict; remand; new trial on compensatory damages. The trial court did not err when it granted a directed verdict finding the corporate defendants-appellants liable under quantum meruit when, construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the defendants-appellants, demonstrated the only conclusion that could have been reached was that the plaintiff-appellee was entitled to recover its contingency fee under quantum meruit from the corporate defendants. A review of the evidence submitted at trial demonstrated the jury clearly lost its way when it entered its verdict of $8,500,000 in favor of the plaintiff-appellee and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that judgment must be reversed and a new trial on compensatory damages ordered to determine the value of plaintiff-appellee’s legal services rendered to the defendants-appellants. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4839 |
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Rodriguez v. Catholic Charities Corp.
| 114437 | Expert witness testimony; admissibility; causation; speculation; directed verdict; vicarious liability; respondeat superior; apportionment of damages; consent judgment entry; negligent hiring, training, and supervision; wrongful death; survival action; failure to report child abuse or neglect. The Estate of a deceased boy sought damages for claims, including wrongful death, a survival action, failure to report child abuse or neglect and negligent hiring, training and supervision, against Catholic Charities, a community service provider hired by the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services to provide services to the boy’s mother and her family. The boy’s mother and her boyfriend pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter of the boy after law enforcement discovered his body buried in the backyard of his home. Evidence in the record tends to show that the boy died of starvation. The Catholic Charities employee who was assigned to this case pled guilty to food stamp fraud for purchasing the boy’s mother’s food stamps for a reduced price. The Catholic Charities employee and the Estate entered into a consent judgment entry in which the employee admitted liability for the boy’s death. After a jury trial, the court granted a directed verdict on all claims other than Catholic Charities’ negligent hiring, training and supervision of its employee who admitted liability. The court found, as a matter of law, that Catholic Charities was not vicariously liable for the negligence of its employee. The jury found in favor of the Estate and against Catholic Charities and awarded the Estate $12 million. After the court applied the statutory cap on non-economic damages, as well as apportionment under the empty-chair defense, the damage award was reduced to $740,000. The Estate appealed. We find that the trial court erred by refusing to acknowledge the consent judgment entry; ruling that the consent judgment entry was inadmissible at trial; ruling that, as a matter of law, Catholic Charities was not vicariously liable for its employee’s negligence; granting Catholic Charities’ motion for directed verdict; ruling that expert testimony regarding causation was speculative and inadmissible at trial; and apportioning damages. Judgment reversed and case remanded for a new trial. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4840 |
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State v. Kenney
| 114553 | R.C. 2953.21; R.C. 2953.23; successive; untimely; petition for postconviction relief; res judicata; burden of proof; unavoidably prevented; newly discovered evidence; witness recantation; affidavits; Brady claim; suppression. Judgment affirmed. The defendant failed to withstand his burden of proving that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence upon which his untimely and successive petition for postconviction relief was based within the statutory deadline or that the State suppressed evidence. Thus, the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction to entertain his petition, did not err in denying the defendant’s R.C. 2953.23 petition, and had no duty to hold a hearing or issue findings of fact and conclusions of law under R.C. 2953.21. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4841 |
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State v. Carter-El
| 114603 | Sufficiency; Crim.R. 29; manifest weight; aggravated murder; R.C. 2903.01(B); murder; R.C. 2903.02(A); R.C. 2903.02(B); aggravated robbery; R.C. 2911.01(A)(1); R.C. 2911.01(A)(3); felonious assault; R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); R.C. 2903.11(A)(2); accomplice testimony instruction; DNA evidence; surveillance-video identification; sentencing; R.C. 2929.03; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b); R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); juvenile bindover; mandatory transfer; Juv.R. 30; R.C. 2152.10; R.C. 2152.12; probable cause. Judgment affirmed. The State presented sufficient evidence through surveillance footage, eyewitness identification by an accomplice, and corroborating DNA linking appellant to the vehicle involved in the crime to support convictions for aggravated murder and firearm specifications. The trial court therefore properly denied appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motions. In addition, the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The jury heard an accomplice’s identification and robbery narrative, the jury could independently evaluate surveillance video and stills depicting the perpetrator the accomplice identified as appellant, and the jury received a cautionary accomplice instruction before crediting that testimony. In sentencing appellant, the trial court did not fail to consider youth as mitigation. The sentencing record expressly reflected consideration of R.C. 2929.11, 2929.12, and the youth-specific factors in R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b). Constitutional challenges were forfeited by failure to object. The aggregate term of 36 years to life, including consecutive three-year firearm specifications, was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Finally, the juvenile court did not err in its mandatory bindover determination. Because appellant was 16 at the time and charged with category one and category two offenses, transfer under R.C. 2152.10 and 2152.12 was proper upon a showing of probable cause. Testimony and exhibits, including surveillance stills, DNA from the vehicle involved in the incident, and a Faygo bottle, as well as ballistic links tying a common firearm to incidents with common suspects, established more than a mere suspicion. Any credibility disputes were for trial, not the probable-cause phase governed by Juv.R. 30. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4842 |
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CommuteAir, L.L.C. v. Bremer
| 114665 | Manifest weight of the evidence; Federal Railway Labor Act; motion for new trial. The trial court’s judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellant’s claims are not covered by the Federal Railway Labor Act. The trial court did not err when it denied the appellant’s motion for a new trial. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4843 |
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Ellis v. Setjo, L.L.C.
| 114735 | Motion to stay pending arbitration; contract; meeting of the minds; retail installment sales contract; arbitration agreement; Civ.R. 6; abuse of discretion. Trial court did not err in denying Kia’s motion to stay pending arbitration. There was no meeting of the minds as the formation of the contract. Appellee was an elderly woman with vision, hearing, and mobility limitations and who was obviously ill when she purportedly signed two arbitration provisions for the purchase of a car. She told the salesperson she could not read the contract nor hear what he was saying but the dealership proceeded with the sales contract anyway. In addition, the arbitration provisions contained conflicting terms. The trial court also did not err in striking Kia’s reply brief. The court expressly told the parties no reply briefs would be accepted but Kia ignored the court’s order and filed a reply brief. It is well-settled that a trial court has discretion to manage its docket. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4844 |
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Pope v. Abdullah
| 114756 | Replevin; R.C. 2737.03; failure to move for evidence to be admitted; manifest weight of the evidence; certificate of title; R.C. 4505.04; R.C. 4505.10. The trial court did not prevent appellant from presenting sufficient evidence of his claim when trial counsel had neglected to move to have the evidence admitted; the court had previously reviewed the exhibits and had heard testimony about them. The judgment denying appellant’s claim for replevin and award of permanent possession of the vehicle to appellee was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4845 |
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In re J.T.
| 114764 | Juvenile sex offender; register; R.C. 2152.83(D); nature of the offense; remorse; abuse of discretion. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in classifying the juvenile offender as a Tier I juvenile sex offender pursuant to R.C. 2152.83(B) given the victim’s young age, the offender’s relationship to the victim, the offender’s apparent inability to take accountability for what occurred, the serious nature of the offense, and the fact that the offense occurred while the victim was asleep. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4846 |
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Cerreta Interiors, L.L.C. v. New Moon, L.L.C.
| 114815 | Civ.R. 56; summary judgment; evidence; disputed issues of material fact. Vacated and remanded. The trial court erred by granting judgment in favor of both defendants because the first defendant’s motion for summary judgment did not address all claims and the second defendant failed to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4847 |
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Issa v. Cleveland Metro. School Dist.
| 114830 | Motion to dismiss; failure to prosecute; motion for relief from judgment; Civ.R. 60(B); bootstrapping. Appeal dismissed. By appealing from the January 15, 2025 journal entry denying appellant’s motion for relief from judgment, appellant is attempting to bootstrap arguments that are time-barred. Appellant is attempting to utilize the instant appeal (denial of her Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment) to improperly seek review of alleged errors that she failed to timely appeal (the dismissal of her refiled case for the failure to prosecute). As a result, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4848 |
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State v. Singleton
| 114841 | No-contact order; prison sentence; hybrid sentence; invited error; plain error; discretion. Vacated and remanded. The imposition of the no-contact order attendant to the prison sentence on the same felony offense is not authorized by statute and constitutes plain error irrespective of the defendant’s agreement to a no-contact order as part of the accepted plea deal under State v. Nelson, 2020-Ohio-6993, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4849 |
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A.L.W.A.Y., L.L.C. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.
| 114845 | R.C. Ch. 119; R.C. 119.01; R.C. 119.12; R.C. 5515.02; Administrative Procedure Act; agency; adjudication; subject-matter jurisdiction; Civ.R. 12(B)(1). The trial court’s judgment dismissing appellants’ appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was affirmed. R.C. 119.12 permits an appeal by a party adversely affected by an order of a state agency issued pursuant to an adjudication. But here, the Ohio Department of Transportation is not an “agency” as defined in R.C. 119.01(A) nor was there an “adjudication” as defined in R.C. 119.01(D). | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4850 |
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In re Z.L.
| 114976 | Permanent custody; domestic violence; manifest weight of the evidence; clear and convincing; best interest; case plan; legal custody; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e); R.C. 2151.414(D); R.C. 2151.414(E); R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)(d); R.C. 2151.353(A)(3). Affirmed. Juvenile court did not err when it granted permanent custody of three children to the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services. The juvenile court’s finding that although Father completed most of the objectives of his case plan, he failed to benefit from those services, which was supported by the record. Permanent custody; domestic violence; manifest weight of the evidence; clear and convincing; best interest; case plan; legal custody; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e); R.C. 2151.414(D); R.C. 2151.414(E); R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)(d); R.C. 2151.353(A)(3). Affirmed. Juvenile court did not err when it granted permanent custody of three children to the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services. The juvenile court’s finding that although Father completed most of the objectives of his case plan, he failed to benefit from those services, which was supported by the record. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4851 |
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In re Z.L.
| 114984, 114986, 114987 | Parental rights; permanent custody; clear and convincing evidence; R.C. 2151.414(D)(2); best interests of the child; manifest weight of the evidence; sufficiency of the evidence; reasonable efforts. It was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the juvenile court granted permanent custody of the children to the agency. The juvenile court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) were supported by competent and credible evidence. Mother was unable substantially remedy the conditions that caused the child to be placed outside the child’s home, which included domestic-violence, mental-health, substance-abuse, and parenting concerns. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4852 |
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In re G.J.
| 114991 | Manifest weight of the evidence; R.C. 2151.414; permanent custody; best interest; clear and convincing evidence. Judgment affirmed. The juvenile court’s decision granting permanent custody to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record demonstrates that the juvenile court properly applied the two-prong statutory analysis required under R.C. 2151.414 and that clear and convincing evidence supports its decision to grant permanent custody of the children to CCDCFS. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4854 |
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In re J.C.
| 115103 | Child support; establishment of support; abuse of discretion; App.R. 9; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; nunc pro tunc; clerical error. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering appellant-father to pay child support. Where the appellant-father failed to comply with the appellate rules and separately argue his assignments of error or provide legal support for his arguments, the assignments of error are disregarded. The trial court’s clerical error, stating in its journal entry that paternity was established in 2019 when the record reflects it was established in 2009, is properly corrected by a nunc pro tunc. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4855 |
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Manning v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth.
| 114429 | New arguments on appeal; identification of error in the record; pro se litigant; App.R. 16(A)(7); App.R. 12(A)(2). Affirmed. Appellant’s assignments of error are disregarded because they either assert new arguments that were not before the trial court or fail to identify the error in the record and argue the assignment separately in the brief. Appellant’s status as a pro se litigant does not excuse the deficiencies in the appeal. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
10/16/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4751 |
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Nemec v. Morledge
| 114664 & 114744 | Arbitration; motion to vacate; timely; filed; electronic filing; clerk of courts; authority to reject filing. Trial court erred in refusing to direct clerk of courts to accept for filing appellant’s motion to vacate an arbitration award and to place the motion on active docket. There was no court rule or law authorizing the clerk of courts to reject a timely filed motion to vacate on the grounds that the wrong defendant was named in the case caption. Consequently, the trial court also erred in granting appellees’ application to confirm the arbitration award where there is a timely filed motion to vacate the award pending before the court. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
10/16/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4752 |
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In re J.C.
| 114694 & 114711 | Child support; cash medical support; abuse of discretion; bootstrapping; res judicata; nunc pro tunc; parenting time; clarification of court order; disqualification of trial judge. Appellant cannot use this appeal to challenge previous court orders that appellant did not appeal. The trial court has the authority to clarify its previous orders. The court of appeals is not the proper forum to try and have a trial judge disqualified from a case; that jurisdiction lies with the Ohio Supreme Court. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
10/16/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4753 |
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AMG Peterbilt Group, L.L.C. v. Apple Growth Partners, Inc.
| 114704 | Motion for sanctions; R.C. 2323.51; sanctions award; hearing; frivolous conduct; abuse of discretion; reasonable attorney; real party in interest. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct was frivolous under R.C. 2323.51 and awarded one defendant attorney fees and costs. Because the trial judge had the benefit of viewing the entire course of the proceedings and was the most familiar with the parties and their attorneys, the court’s finding of frivolous conduct is subject to substantial deference by a reviewing court. Here, plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct adversely affected the defendants because no reasonable attorney would continue to pursue plaintiff’s claims after knowing that plaintiff was not the real party in interest by virtue of its sale to another corporation prior to filing the underlying lawsuit. Additionally, plaintiff’s counsel’s post-summary judgment conduct continued to provide no justification for pursuing plaintiff’s claims. Because the trial court must hold a hearing prior to a sanctions award in accordance with R.C. 2323.51(B)(2)(c), we reverse the portion of the award regarding one defendant’s motion and remand the matter solely for a hearing on that defendant’s motion for sanctions. The sanctions award with regard to the other defendant shall remain undisturbed. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
10/16/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4754 |
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State v. Bethel
| 114722 | Prosecutorial misconduct; ineffective assistance of counsel; trial strategy; manifest weight. Appellant’s convictions for felonious assault are upheld. Prosecutor’s statements during closing argument did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct since the statements did not prejudice appellant. Furthermore, defense counsel was not ineffective for deciding not to delay the trial to recall a witness during appellant’s case-in-chief that was subject to cross-examination during the State’s case-in-chief since the decision amounted to trial strategy. Counsel was also not ineffective for not objecting during the prosecutor’s close because there was no misconduct for the defense counsel to object to. Last, the appellant’s convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the jury did not clearly lose its way and create a manifest injustice. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/16/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4755 |
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State v. Schumacher
| 114773 | Driver’s license suspension; bootstrapping; Civ.R. 60; App.R. 4; App.R. 5; Crim.R. 57; bootstrapping. Appellant did not file a direct appeal of his conviction. After filing an untimely appeal as of right, this court dismissed his appeal. The appellant then filed a motion to terminate his driver’s license suspension, arguing that it was contrary to law, an argument he could have made on direct appeal. Appellant attempted to bootstrap a claim that is now time-barred. Therefore, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider his appeal. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
10/16/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4756 |
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Berea v. Blackshear
| 114819 | Domestic violence; R.C. 2919.25; attempt to cause physical harm; no evidence of physical harm needed; manifest weight of the evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel; bench trial; failure to object. Defendant’s conviction for domestic violence is affirmed. The conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The victim testified that the defendant kicked her in the face and attempted to kick her in the body when she was lying on the floor. Defendant failed to show that his counsel’s failure to object to certain testimony was prejudicial to him in this bench trial. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/16/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4757 |
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State v. Molina
| 114849 | Guilty plea; prejudice; completely fail; effect of guilty plea. Guilty pleas vacated where trial court completely failed to explain the effect of a guilty and the fact that a guilty plea is an admission of guilt was not obvious from the plea colloquy. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/16/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4758 |
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FAM 13375, Inc. v. Brook Park
| 114490 | Declaratory judgment; facial constitutional challenge to municipal ordinance; home rule amendment; dismissal of claims. Plaintiff was denied an occupancy permit for a retail store based on a municipal zoning ordinance. In addition to filing an administrative appeal, plaintiff filed this declaratory-judgment action alleging that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because it conflicted with a state statute. Plaintiff also requested that the court use the declaratory-judgment action to declare that plaintiff succeeded on the merits of the case. The court declared the ordinance constitutional in that it did not conflict with the statute and, at the same time, dismissed the entire case. We affirm the declaration that the ordinance is constitutional in this regard. We also affirm the dismissal of all other claims because the merits of the zoning issue were subject to the Administrative Appeal. The portion of the journal entry ruling on the merits of the zoning issue are vacated. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/9/2025
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10/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4667 |
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FAM 13375, Inc. v. Brook Park Bd. of Zoning Appeals
| 114498 | Notice of appeal; administrative appeal; zoning decision. Judgment reversed; case remanded. The trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s administrative appeal from a decision of the zoning board. The plaintiff perfected a timely appeal under R.C. 2505.03 and 2505.04 and, therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider its appeal. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
10/9/2025
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10/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4668 |
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Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections v. Bardwell
| 114579 | Declaratory judgment; public-records request; compliance; disposal; Board of Elections; jurisdiction; dismiss; Court of Claims; mandamus; R.C. 149.43; justiciable controversy; moot. - Trial court erred in failing to dismiss the Board of the Elections’ complaint for declaratory judgment in total because the court lacked jurisdiction over the action. Once the court determined that the Board’s first declaration concerned R.C. 149.43 and thus under the jurisdiction of either the Court of Claims or mandamus, the justiciable controversy between the Board and the defendant ceased. The second declaration request did not present any conflict or controversy with the defendant, but merely requested permission to dispose of public records. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
10/9/2025
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10/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4669 |
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State v. Glass
| 114607 | Manifest weight of the evidence; felonious assault; aggravated assault; reckless assault; simple assault; jury instructions; plain error; ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant punched victim’s head multiple times, resulting in facial fractures. The manifest weight of the evidence supported appellant’s conviction for felonious assault. By punching victim in the face, appellant acted knowing that serious physical harm was likely to result, even though victim was fighting back and both fighters were women. Under these circumstances, the court did not err by not instructing the jury on certain lesser assault offenses and trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by not requesting them. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
10/9/2025
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10/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4670 |
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Terrell v. Ford Motor Co.
| 114613 | Subject-matter jurisdiction; jurisdiction; asbestos; wrongful death; Bureau of Workers’ Compensation ("BWC"); lung cancer; estate; next of kin; R.C. 2307.92; R.C. Ch. 2125; R.C. 4123.59; Industrial Commission; exclusive jurisdiction; administrative appeal; constitutionality; declaratory-judgment action; workplace injury; Article II, Section 35 of the Ohio Constitution; right to a remedy. The trial court’s administrative dismissal of the Estate’s wrongful-death and personal-injury claims against Ford Motor Company is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court to enter a dismissal based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Estate’s claims against Ford Motor Company are based on an alleged workplace injury that resulted in the decedent’s death. Accordingly, the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and the Industrial Commission have exclusive jurisdiction over the claims asserted, including the claim asserting an as-applied constitutional challenge to R.C. 4123.59. The trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the constitutional challenge as an administrative appeal from the agency’s decision. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
10/9/2025
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10/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4671 |
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Petroff v. HDV Cleveland, L.L.C.
| 114734 | Arbitration provision; arbitration clause; motion to compel arbitration; order to stay proceedings; stolen credit card; unauthorized charges; choice-of-law provision; Federal Arbitration Act; FAA; breach of contract; negligence; contract; ambiguity; contract interpretation; cardholder; Cardmember Agreement; covered borrower; Military Lending Act. The trial court erred in denying appellants’ motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings pending the outcome of arbitration where the plain language of the Cardmember Agreement gave appellants the right to compel arbitration over all disputes related to the Cardmember Agreement and cardholder’s account | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
10/9/2025
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10/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4672 |
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Mohammad v. Seven Hills
| 114754 | Political-subdivision immunity; R.C. 2744.02(A)(1); R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)-(5). The trial court erred when it dismissed the appellant’s motion to dismiss, because the appellant is a political subdivision with immunity under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) and none of the exceptions under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)-(5) apply. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
10/9/2025
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10/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4673 |
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State v. Hutchinson
| 114781 | Rape; attempted rape; gross sexual imposition; forensic interview; hearsay; medical diagnosis or treatment; manifest weight. Victim’s statements in forensic interview were properly considered as being made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment even though they described sexual abuse and identified the perpetrator because they were made to a sex-abuse worker who was assessing whether the allegations were indicated and whether the child victim was still at risk. Appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victim’s testimony was consistent with prior statements made to the social worker and the video evidence of the child victim depicted a credible witness. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/9/2025
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10/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4674 |
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State v. Ellis
| 114788 | Murder; firearm; postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.23(A)(1); jurisdiction; untimely; Brady violation; exculpatory evidence; material; handgun; ballistic; report; undisclosed; reasonable probability; mere possibility; reasonable diligence; constitutional error; clear and convincing; guilty. Affirmed trial court’s denial of appellant’s petition for postconviction relief because the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the untimely petition. Appellant did not demonstrate a Brady violation where he had not shown a reasonable probability of a different outcome or that there was any failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence, and he offered nothing more than a mere possibility that the undisclosed evidence might have helped the defense. He otherwise failed to meet the requirements of R.C. 2953.23(A)(1). | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/9/2025
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10/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4675 |
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Foreback v. Accuspray Application Technologies
| 114813 | Motion for summary judgment; de novo; R.C. 4123.85; R.C. 4123.84. Judgment affirmed. We find that R.C. 4123.85 exclusively applies to the plaintiff-appellant’s workers’ compensation claim seeking benefits for the alleged occupational-disease death of her husband. Because plaintiff-appellant has neither argued nor established that the claim is not precluded by the statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 4123.85, no genuine issue of material fact remains and the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”) is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting the BWC’s motion for summary judgment. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
10/9/2025
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10/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4676 |
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In re C.J.F.
| 114881 | Claim as a dependent for tax purposes; R.C. 3119.82; Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iii); presumption of regularity; pro se litigant. Affirmed. Appellant-father appeals the juvenile court’s decision allowing appellee-mother to claim their minor child as a dependent for tax purposes. Because father failed to file the transcript with the juvenile court, the appellate court could not review the transcript to make a determination. Without a transcript to review, the appellate court is limited to presuming the regularity of the juvenile court proceedings. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
10/9/2025
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10/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4677 |
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E.A. v. A.A.
| 113654 | divorce, child support, spousal support, distributive award, financial misconduct, R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(b), date of marriage, equitable distribution, attorneys’ fees, guardian ad litem fees, abuse of discretion, manifest weight of the evidence, | Sutton | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4583 |
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State v. Hartness
| 114241 | Consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); fines; indigency; right to allocution. Affirmed. Appellant has not demonstrated that his consecutive sentences are clearly and convincingly contrary to the record, that the trial court erred by imposing the fine, or that the trial court deprived him of the right to allocution by interrupting his statements attempting to minimize his conduct. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4584 |
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Cleveland v. Hero Homes JV2, L.L.C.
| 114561 & 114800 | Housing court; articles of organization; statutory agent; Cleveland Cod.Ord. 367.131; strict liability; finding of guilt; fine; contrary to law; community control; unwarranted; cured. - Housing court did not err in finding the organization-appellant guilty, following a no contest plea, because Cleveland Code Ordinance ("CCO") 367.131 is a strict liability ordinance. Court’s imposition of a $20,000 fine on a first-degree misdemeanor was contrary to law. Court’s imposition of a period of community control and the terms was unwarranted because it did not relate to rehabilitation or the underlying offense, nor were they narrowly tailored to the offense. The administrative, non-dwelling infraction was cured prior to service of the complaint. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4585 |
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Parma v. Wojas
| 114586 | Dangerous dogs; attempt; abuse of discretion; contrary to law. Order vacated. The trial court was without authority to order the removal or destruction of the dog when the owner pled guilty under the attempt ordinance. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4586 |
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State v. Bigbee
| 114647 | Guilty pleas; Alford plea; ineffective assistance of counsel; Reagan Tokes Law. The appellant’s guilty pleas were made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the trial court fully complied with Crim.R. 11, and there was no need for the trial court to comply with the Alford mandates. Appellant’s trial counsel was not ineffective. Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4587 |
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Barttile Recovery Solutions, L.L.C. v. Cleavenger
| 114708 | Arbitration clause; R.C. 2711.03(A) and (B); hearing. Trial court erred when it denied appellants’ motion to compel arbitration without a hearing, despite the parties’ failure to request a hearing, where the record reflected that the making of the arbitration agreement was at issue, and the evidence established there was a genuine issue of material fact but was insufficient to rule on the motion without more evidence and/or testimony. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4589 |
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NEO Garage, L.L.C. v. Saad
| 114737 | Motion to dismiss; mootness; satisfaction of judgment; voluntary payment; stay of execution; Civ.R. 62(B); App.R. 7; R.C. 2505.09; supersedeas bond; counterclaims; jurisdiction; final appealable order; Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a); voluntary dismissal; self-executing; journalization; docket. Appeal dismissed. Appellee’s motion to dismiss is granted. Appellant’s first assignment of error was rendered moot by the satisfaction of judgment. And we lack jurisdiction to address appellant’s second assignment of error because appellant’s initial notice of voluntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) is self-executing and not an adjudication on the merits. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4590 |
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State v. Amodei
| 114763 | Jury instructions; self-defense; at fault; affray; initial aggressor; burden of production; sufficiency; abuse of discretion; R.C. 2901.05(B)(1); R.C. 2901.09(B). Judgment affirmed. Defendant-appellant was convicted of murder, felonious assault, and discharge of a firearm near prohibited premises after shooting the victim seven times following a verbal argument. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a self-defense jury instruction. Self-defense requires legally sufficient evidence on all three elements, beginning with proof that a defendant was not at fault in creating the affray. The evidence, including surveillance video and appellant’s own testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to appellant, showed that the victim had made only verbal threats and displayed no weapon before appellant drew, racked, and pointed his firearm. Because appellant advanced toward the victim and escalated a verbal dispute into a deadly confrontation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding appellant had not produced sufficient evidence to show he was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray. Because appellant failed to meet his burden of production on the first element of self-defense, the trial court properly refused the instruction. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4592 |
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In re J.H.
| 115038 | Permanent custody; manifest weight; clear and convincing evidence; best interest; prior removals; lack of basic needs; failure to remedy; lack of commitment; R.C. 2151.353(A)(4); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.414(E)(1); R.C. 2151.414(E)(4); timeliness of dispositional hearing; continuance; R.C. 2151.35(B)(1); case plan timing; R.C. 2151.412(D); leave to amend; Juv.R. 22(B); guardian ad litem recommendations. Judgment affirmed. The juvenile court’s grant of permanent custody to the Agency under R.C. 2151.353(A)(4) was supported by clear and convincing evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record established that despite reasonable case-planning efforts, mother failed to remedy chronic conditions such as unsafe and unsanitary housing, failure to meet basic, educational, and medical needs. She refused access to the home and did not comply with offered services. Parents demonstrated lack of commitment. The children benefited from structured placements, and permanent custody served their best interests. The court complied with R.C. 2151.35(B)(1) because the dispositional trial was set within the statutory deadline and was continued (at the mother’s request) within the permissible 45-day extension period. Mother’s complaint that the case plan was filed one day late under R.C. 2151.412(D) was waived by not raising it below, and mother further failed to show prejudice. Finally, proceeding with and deciding the permanent-custody disposition, rather than granting the Agency’s request to amend the proposed disposition to temporary custody, was within the court’s discretion under Juv.R. 22(B). The parties tried the disposition on the merits, and the court was not bound by the guardian ad litem’s oral shift away from his written recommendation of permanent custody. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4593 |
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In re Z.B.
| 115115 | Permanent custody; parental rights; Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services; manifest weight of the evidence; R.C. 2151.414; best interest of the child; clear and convincing evidence; dependency; protective supervision; unsafe housing; mental health; parenting classes; guardian ad litem recommendation; child welfare; Ohio juvenile law; repeated removals; statutory factors; prior terminations; developmental delays; legal custody; agency case plan; temporary custody; unsanitary conditions; appellate review; trial court findings. Mother failed to remedy the conditions leading to removal, including unsafe housing, lack of engagement in services, and minimal participation in the child’s developmental care. The record demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, the child could not or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time and that permanent custody was in the child’s best interest pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). The record also reflected that Mother previously lost custody of four other children under similar circumstances. The trial court’s judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4594 |
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State v. Tyson
| 114691 | Application to reopen appeal; App.R. 26(B); genuine issue of a colorable claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel; guilty pleas; waiver. Application to reopen appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B) denied. Appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise alleged issues on appeal that defendant had waived by his guilty pleas. Applicant failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of a colorable claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel based on appellate counsel’s failure to advance assignments of error related to denial of speedy-trial rights, alleged misidentification of defendant during arraignment, unlawful detention, manipulation and backdating of the trial court docket, and appellate counsel’s alleged failure to adequately communicate and consult with defendant before filing appellate brief. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
9/30/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4588 |
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State v. Skanes
| 114528 | Motion to suppress; statement; argument abandoned in the trial court is waived on appeal; party-presentation principle; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; motion for acquittal; sufficiency of the evidence; assignments of error must be separately argued. Appellant’s argument regarding his motion to suppress had been abandoned in the trial court and thus was waived on appeal. The State presented sufficient evidence to support appellant’s convictions. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/25/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4462 |
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State v. Beasley
| 114589 | Sufficiency; abuse of discretion; Crim.R. 29; felonious assault; R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); serious physical harm; R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(a); mental condition; consecutive sentences; life without parole; moot; gruesome photographs; Evid.R. 403; ineffective assistance of counsel; plain error; lay witness testimony; Evid.R. 701; demonstrative evidence; indefinite sentences with life sentences. Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. The State failed to present sufficient evidence of serious physical harm when there was no testimony regarding the child victims’ mental condition. The autopsy photos were not gruesome, repetitive, or cumulative. Furthermore, they were relevant to establish the elements of murder and felonious assault. The detective’s testimony regarding his experience with semiautomatic and automatic weapons was properly admitted lay witness testimony. Moreover, the video demonstrating the difference between semiautomatic and automatic weapons was relevant and helpful for the jury to determine the six-year firearm specifications. Whether the trial court made the requisite consecutive-sentencing findings is moot when the appellant was sentenced to life without parole. Finally, the trial court did not err and, in fact, is required to sentence on each count, even when sentencing an offender to life without parole. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
9/25/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4463 |
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Cleveland v. State Emp. Relations Bd.
| 114616 | State Employment Relations Board; SERB; abuse of discretion; collective bargaining; R.C. 4117.11(A)(5); R.C. 4117.08; effects; policy change; collective-bargaining agreement; CBA. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the State Employment Relations Board’s (“SERB”) order and opinion finding that the City of Cleveland committed an unfair labor practice in violation of R.C. 4117.11(A)(5) when it refused to bargain with the Cleveland Police Patrolmen’s Association regarding the effects of a wearable-camera system, because the collective-bargaining agreement between the parties did not expressly and specifically state that the association was giving up the right to bargain the effects of the policy change. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
9/25/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4464 |
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RFK Bldg., L.L.C. v. RELD & G Ent., Inc.
| 114640 | Promissory note; breach of contract; nonparty subpoena duces tecum; Civ.R. 26(B); Civ.R. 45(C); relevancy; not relevant; not admissible; not discoverable. The trial court erred by denying the Nonparties’ motions to quash the subpoenas duces tecum issued by plaintiff-appellee because they requested irrelevant and thereby undiscoverable documents and information. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/25/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4465 |
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