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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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Cleveland Hts. v. Preston
| 114908 | Pro se; civil contempt; moot; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; Traf.R. 11(A); not guilty plea; Double Jeopardy Clause; allied offenses; R.C. 2941.25(A); plain error; constitutionality of a statute; new arguments on appeal; waiver. Appellant appealed various aspects of the trial court’s proceedings concerning three traffic citations she was found guilty of, raising five assignments of error. Her first assignment of error raised issues with the trial court’s finding of contempt for her behavior during her arraignment; however, the issues related to the contempt are moot once she complied with the court’s order which was purged. Her second assignment of error alleged the trial court violated her due-process rights by accepting her not guilty plea because it was not knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily made and that the trial court violated Traf.R. 11(A). Appellant pled not guilty at her arraignment and the case went to trial where the court found her guilty of all charges. As such the trial court did not accept a guilty or no contest plea from her and these requirements do not apply. Similarly, the trial court did not violate Traf.R. 11(A) since appellant was given an opportunity to present a motion to dismiss prior to trial and she did in fact make such a motion, which the trial court denied. Appellant’s third assignment of error alleged the trial court violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, committing plain error, by entering two convictions under the same ordinance for the same expired plates and that these offenses should have been merged as allied offenses. Both of these arguments fail because appellant’s two convictions for driving with expired plates occurred on two separate days and therefore constitute separate offenses such that she was not being punished for the same offense twice nor were they allied offenses of a similar import. Appellant’s fourth assignment of error alleged the local ordinance at issue was unconstitutional, but she failed to raise this issue in the trial court and we decline to exercise discretion to review it for plain error. Appellant’s fifth assignment of error made several arguments that were not raised in the trial court, not supported by any case law and contradicted the record. These new issues on appeal were waived. All assignments of error were overruled and judgment affirmed. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-344 |
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State v. Davis
| 114914 | Ineffective assistance of counsel; lesser-included offense; reckless homicide; murder; Bruton; Confrontation Clause; hearsay; prosecutorial misconduct; joinder; severance; jury instructions; transferred intent; cumulative error; sufficiency of the evidence. Trial counsel was not ineffective even though he did not request a lesser-included offense instruction and did not object to out-of-court statements of the defendant’s coconspirators where the evidence did not support the lesser-included offense instruction and the out-of-court statements were not hearsay and did not violate Bruton or the Confrontation Clause. The State did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct and because there were no errors, there was no cumulative error. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of accomplice liability. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-345 |
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State v. Parker
| 114916 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; circumstantial evidence; accomplice testimony; jury credibility determinations; ShotSpotter technology; surveillance video; GPS ankle-monitor data; ballistics evidence; forensic expert testimony; Confrontation Clause; plain-error review; Crim.R. 29 motion; joint jury trial; firearm specifications; murder conviction; attempted murder conviction; allied offenses; jury instructions; rational trier of fact; appellate standard of review; corroborating evidence; shooting; affirmed judgment. In a joint jury trial arising from a shooting that resulted in the death of a three-year-old child and injuries to another victim, appellant was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and related offenses. The evidence established that a black Mercedes-Benz transported the shooter to and from the scene, that surveillance footage and ShotSpotter data placed the vehicle and gunfire at the precise location and time of the offenses, and that GPS ankle-monitor records corroborated the movements of those involved. An accomplice testified that the defendant exited the vehicle armed with a handgun and fired multiple shots toward the victims’ location, and ballistics testing linked the recovered firearm to the fatal projectile. Although the accomplice admitted prior false statements and testified pursuant to a plea agreement, the jury was instructed to view such testimony with grave suspicion. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find that appellant purposefully shot into a moving vehicle. The essential elements of the offenses were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury did not clearly lose its way in resolving credibility issues. The admission of forensic evidence through expert testimony did not constitute plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel under the Confrontation Clause. Accordingly, the convictions are affirmed. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-346 |
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State v. Inkton
| 115045 | Guilty plea; knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made; Crim.R. 11(C); maximum penalty; consecutive sentences; trial court advisement. Under Ohio law, a trial court is not required to advise a defendant of the possibility that each individual sentence may be imposed consecutively. The trial court fully complied with Crim.R. 11(C), and appellant failed to demonstrate that his pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-347 |
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State v. Ford
| 115098 | Engaging in pattern of corrupt activity, predicate offenses, enterprise, R.C. 2923.32, theft, R.C. 2913.02, sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence. Ford appealed three felony theft convictions, arguing that the State did not provide credible evidence about the value of the stolen items as required to determine the classification of each theft. The manifest weight of the evidence supported all three theft convictions where the State’s witnesses testified as to the value of the stolen merchandise, their basis of knowledge thereof, and where Ford did not introduce contradictory evidence or identify substantial inconsistencies in the estimates of value provided by the State's witnesses. Ford also appealed the sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weight of the evidence regarding his conviction for engaging in pattern of corrupt activity, which was based on these same thefts. Evidence supported this conviction where record, including surveillance video, showed that Ford and codefendant stole cigarettes together in the same manner, arriving together in the same vehicle, at least three times in less than five months. That Ford’s codefendant had been charged, in other incidents, with stealing items other than cigarettes with individuals other than Ford did not preclude a finding that an enterprise existed between Ford and codefendant. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-348 |
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State v. M.F.
| 115110 | Expungement; record sealing; R.C. 2953.32; R.C. 2953.34; R.C. 2953.31; R.C. Ch. 2953. - Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in finding that restitution had been paid and that final discharge occurred, thus allowing the court to grant appellee’s motion to seal his conviction. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-349 |
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State v. T.T.
| 115127 | Expungement; seal; eligible; former R.C. 2953.32; de novo; felony conviction; fifth-degree felony; fourth-degree felony; third-degree felony. Vacated the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion for expungement and remanded the matter to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether T.T. has been rehabilitated to the satisfaction of the court. The trial court erred in finding appellant is not an eligible offender for expungement in this case when the plain and unambiguous language of former R.C. 2953.32 does not exclude fourth- or fifth-degree felony convictions from expungement eligibility based on the existence of a third-degree felony conviction in a different case. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-350 |
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State v. Woods
| 115149 | Community-control sanctions; nonresidential; jail time; R.C. 2929.15; R.C. 2929.16; monitored time. - Defendant’s sentence was not contrary to law because R.C. 2929.15 provides that the trial can impose both residential and nonresidential sanctions, which include a jail sentence and monitored time. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-351 |
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T.K. v. D.O.
| 115177 | Civil stalking protection order; menacing by stalking; R.C. 2903.214; R.C. 2903.11; abuse of discretion; pattern of conduct; knowingly; R.C. 2901.22; First Amendment. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a civil stalking protection order to petitioner. Appellant repeatedly harassed and made inappropriate comments to petitioner, leading her to be in fear for her life. There was competent and credible evidence in the record that appellant acted knowingly. Appellant’s actions and words are not protected speech under the First Amendment. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-352 |
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State v. Aziz
| 115209 | Motion to compel discovery; traffic encounter; police officer; investigation of police officer relative to other traffic encounters; indictment of police officer; Crim.R. 16; pretrial discovery; exculpatory material; favorable to defense; law-enforcement privilege; in camera review. Judgment affirmed, with instructions for trial court to conduct an in camera review on remand. The defendant was entitled to pretrial discovery of investigative materials of a police officer who was indicted for his actions in other traffic encounters. This case involves a traffic encounter with the defendant and therefore the investigatory material of the officer relative to the other incidents is favorable to the defense. The law-enforcement privilege is not an absolute bar to the material—the trial court must conduct an in camera review of the material to determine whether the public interest in confidentiality of the material is outweighed by the defendant’s specific need for the evidence. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-353 |
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In re O.J.
| 115272 | examination; expert witness; expert report; psychologist; mental-health diagnoses; learning disability; adjudication; disposition; hearing; admission; colloquy; voluntary; knowing; intelligent; rebuttable presumption; allocution; plain error; sufficient indicia of incompetence; R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); R.C. 2152.51; R.C. 2152.52; R.C. 2152.10(8); R.C. 2152.12(E)(6); R.C. 2152.12(E)(7); Juv.R. 30; App.R. 16(A)(4). Judgment affirmed. The juvenile court did not err by accepting appellant’s admission without further exploring his competency. Neither appellant’s counsel nor the State ever raised the issue of appellant’s competency or requested a competency evaluation, and the juvenile court had the opportunity to observe and interact with appellant extensively over the course of several hearings. Nothing in the record suggests sufficient indicia of incompetence requiring the juvenile court to inquire into appellant’s competence sua sponte. In addition, nothing in the record suggested appellant had ever been found incompetent or that competency issues were even raised, in previous juvenile proceedings. Testimony at the amenability hearing, along with the testifying psychologist’s report, established that appellant was of average intelligence, that he could identify risks and address potential outcomes, that his thinking was logical, and that he displayed adequate insight. Further, appellant’s behavior at every hearing indicated he understood the nature and objective of the proceedings and could assist in his own defense. This included his right to remain silent because he immediately sought clarification from the court when it asked him to speak about the offense in allocution. Appellant’s statements in allocution were articulate and rational. Appellant’s responses to the juvenile court during previous hearings likewise reflected his understanding of the court process. Furthermore, appellant’s mental-health history and learning disability did not render him incompetent or require further inquiry into his competence. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-354 |
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Kaba v. Cuyahoga Cty. Treasurer
| 115274 | Pro se; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16; failure to make and support arguments for why trial court’s judgment was wrong; assignment of error disregarded. Pro se appellant appeals the trial court’s judgment entry granting the appellees’ motions to dismiss, alleging the dismissal failed to satisfy the notice requirements of Civ.R. 41(B). This argument is without merit since the trial court’s dismissal was pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), which does not have notice requirements. Appellant fails to make and support any arguments for why the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is wrong. The burden is on the appellant to make and substantiate one’s argument pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2). It is not an appellate court’s job to make arguments for an appellant. Assignment of error is disregarded and the judgment is affirmed. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-355 |
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Cleveland v. Damato
| 115295 | Dismissal; jurisdiction; untimely; App.R. 4(B)(3)(d); Crim.R. 19(D)(3)(a)(ii); trial judge; magistrate. - Appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Defendant attempted to use App.R. 4(B)(3)(d) to resurrect an otherwise untimely appeal. Crim.R. 19(D)(3)(a)(ii) only applies to magistrates; the trial judge conducted the trial. No findings of fact or conclusions of law were required. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-356 |
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In re C.K.
| 115324 | Permanent custody; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a); best interest; R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.414(E); clear and convincing; sufficiency; manifest weight. Affirmed the juvenile court’s judgment granting permanent custody of the minor children to the agency and terminating all parental rights. The juvenile court engaged in the proper analysis and made the requisite determinations under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), (D)(1), and (E). The juvenile court’s judgment was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-357 |
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State ex rel. Miller v. Saffold
| 115886 | Procedendo, mootness, and postconviction-relief petition. - Procedendo action to compel a ruling on a postconviction-relief petition was rendered moot by the respondent judge denying the subject petition. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
2/4/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-358 |
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State v. Hilton
| 114888 | R.C. 2950.02(B); R.C. 2950.021(B)(4); R.C. 2950.09; R.C. 2950.021(B)(1); R.C. 2950.021(B)(3); Megan’s Law; the law of the case; sexual predator; aggravated sexually oriented offender; sexual-offender classification; Tier offender; Adam Walsh Act; de novo evidentiary hearing; res judicata; reporting requirements. Affirmed in part; remanded in part. This court previously affirmed appellant’s classification as a sexual predator pursuant to former R.C. 2950.09, Ohio’s version of the federal Megan’s Law (“Megan’s Law”), in State v. Hilton, 2008-Ohio-3010 (8th Dist.) (“Hilton I”). The Hilton I decision remains the law of the case. The trial court’s entry did not comply with R.C. 2950.021(B)(4); therefore, we remand and direct the trial court to issue an entry that complies with the statute. We also find that the trial court did not err when it classified Hilton as both a sexual predator and an aggravated sexually oriented offender because the reporting requirements are the same for both classifications. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-255 |
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Eagle Ridge Subdivision, Inc. v. Ott & Assocs. Co., L.P.A.
| 114907 | Res judicata; final, appealable order; interlocutory; attorney-client relationship; legal malpractice; pro se litigant. Trial court properly dismissed legal-malpractice claim brought by a nonattorney because a nonattorney cannot represent the interests of a corporation. Trial court properly dismissed legal-malpractice claim where there was no evidence or allegation of an attorney-client relationship between the plaintiff and defendant law firm. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-256 |
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State v. Clemons
| 115030 | Victim-impact testimony; plain error; prejudicial; ineffective assistance of counsel; self-defense; consecutive sentences. - Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not plainly err in allowing the family of the decedent to give a victim-impact statement at sentencing where the record demonstrates that the trial court considered numerous factors aside from the victim’s testimony. Since there was no error in receiving the testimony, defendant has not shown that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-257 |
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L.G. v. R.G.
| 115041 | Abuse of discretion, de novo review, competent credible evidence, R.C. 3127.16, continuing jurisdiction, exclusive jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, intent to relocate, R.C. 3109.05(G)(1), change of circumstances, best interest, R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), alienation, terminating spousal support, child support, imputed income, R.C. 3119.01, R.C. 3119.02, attorney fees, R.C. 3105.73(B). Judgment affirmed. We find that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the parties even though none of the parties resided in Ohio because once Ohio courts obtained jurisdiction over a child-custody determination, it retains continuing jurisdiction, even when the parties no longer reside in Ohio, so long as no other court has asserted jurisdiction. Further, a notice of relocation does not strip the trial court of jurisdiction to modify parental rights and responsibilities when a motion is pending before the court. There was competent, credible evidence of a change of circumstances and that it was in the best interest of the children to modify custody. In addition, spousal support was properly terminated. Moreover, ordering appellant to pay child support was not an abuse of discretion, and imputing income to appellant was proper when she was voluntarily unemployed. Finally, the trial court is not required to consider appellant’s income when awarding attorney fees. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-258 |
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State v. Burks
| 115054 | Sexual-predator classification; sexual-predator hearing; Megan’s Law; manifest weight of the evidence; insufficient record for review. Appellant pleaded guilty to sexual battery, a felony of the third degree. Prior to sentencing, the trial court held a sexual-predator hearing pursuant to Megan’s Law. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court classified appellant as a sexual predator. On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial court’s decision to classify him as a sexual predator. The appellate court held that when pronouncing its decision to classify appellant as a sexual predator, the trial court failed to have a discussion on the record to explain its decision, nor did the trial court discuss the relevant evidence, facts, or statutory factors it considered or relied upon in coming to its decision. As a result, the appellate court vacated the sexual-predator designation and remanded the case to the trial court to hold a new sexual-predator hearing consistent with its opinion. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-259 |
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Osborne v. Parkview Fed. Sav. Bank
| 115067, 115068, & 115069 | Receivership; R.C. 2735.04; notice; sale of personal property; subject-matter jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction, venue. Judgment affirmed. The trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the receivership proceedings. Although the subject assets were out of the county, courts of common pleas are courts of general jurisdiction and have original jurisdiction in all civil suits that fall within the monetary requirements of a common pleas court. The trial court did not enter a judgment against the nonparty appellants; personal jurisdiction was not implicated. Venue was not raised in the trial court and therefore is waived on appeal. The pipeline was personal property, and under R.C. 2735.04(D), the receiver was not required to provide notice to the appellants prior to selling it. Further, under R.C. 2735.04, the trial court had the authority to authorize the receiver to sell the personal property free and clear of any liens. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-260 |
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Pinnacle Condominiums Unit Owners' Assn. v. 701 Lakeside, L.L.C.
| 115118 & 115119 | Contempt; final appealable order; untimely; purge; first time on appeal. Appellants appealed from the trial court’s order finding that two nonparty witnesses remained in contempt of court, stemming from a previously issued contempt order. Neither of appellants’ arguments are properly before the court. The trial court’s initial contempt order finding the nonparty witnesses in contempt was a final appealable order from which appellants could have appealed but chose not to do so. As such, appellants were precluded from challenging the court’s finding of contempt in this later appeal. Also, appellants never moved the trial court to purge the contempt order and the trial court never made any determination whether nonparty witnesses had complied with the purge conditions set forth in the initial contempt order. As such, we will not determine, for the first time on appeal, whether the purge conditions had been met. The court further held that one of the appellants that had not been found in contempt was precluded from intervening in a matter between the contemnor and the court. The court therefore dismissed the appeal that had been filed by the appellant that was not subject to the trial court’s contempt order. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-261 |
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State v. Hawkins
| 115145 | Successive; petition for postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.23; hearing; jurisdiction; de novo; abuse of discretion; unavoidably prevented; evidence outside the record; res judicata. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain defendant’s successive petition for postconviction relief as a matter of law and did not abuse its discretion by dismissing it without a hearing. Appellant failed to meet the requirements of R.C. 2953.23 by failing to demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering any evidence. Furthermore, because appellant raised his sentencing issue in his direct appeal, and has failed to demonstrate evidence outside of the record, this issue is barred by res judicata. While Ohio law permits the filing of multiple petitions, a petitioner does not have carte blanche to file successive petitions endlessly. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-262 |
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Pizzuli v. Yurko
| 115206 | Political-subdivision immunity; statute of limitations; motion to dismiss. The trial court did not err in granting the appellees’ motion to dismiss because the appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-263 |
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In re B.M.
| 115239 | R.C. 3119.96, et seq.; paternity; motion for relief from paternity; genetic-test results; willfully failed to comply. The trial court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to consider appellant’s motion for relief from paternity because he did not provide timely genetic-test results. While the court could not grant relief without the proper results, the submission of such results was not a jurisdictional impediment. Where appellant argued that the mother of the child had refused to submit the child to genetic testing, the trial court was required under R.C. 3119.963 to determine whether the mother had “willfully” failed to submit the child to genetic testing. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-264 |
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Bello v. Highland Pointe Health & Rehab Ctr.
| 115326 | R.C. 2711.03; enforcement of arbitration provision; oral hearing unequivocally and specifically requested is mandatory; abuse of discretion. Appellants appealed the trial court’s denial of their motion to stay and enforce an arbitration agreement before conducting an oral hearing as requested in their motion. We find that while an oral hearing is not always required to satisfy the “hearing” mandate of R.C. 2711.03, an oral hearing is required and shall be granted when unequivocally and specifically requested by a party pursuant to R.C. 2711.03. As such the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to stay and enforce arbitration before conducting an oral hearing. The matter is reversed and remanded to the trial court to conduct an oral hearing to determine whether the validity of the arbitration agreement is at issue. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-265 |
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In re K.L.
| 115381 | Parental rights; motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody; abandon; failure to remedy; incarcerated parent; manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review; sufficiency-of-the-evidence review. - The juvenile court did not err in placing the child in the permanent custody of the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services because its decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence demonstrated that mother abandoned the child by failing to visit the child for almost two years and that she failed to present verifiable documentation that she completed any of her case-plan objectives, remedying the reasons for removal. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-266 |
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In re Y.G.
| 115538 | Permanent custody; manifest weight of the evidence; best interest of the child; legal custody; permanent planned living arrangement. The juvenile court’s judgments awarding permanent custody of three children to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS"), granting legal custody of two children to their respective caregivers, and placing one child in a permanent planned living arrangement ("PPLA") are supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-267 |
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In re A.G.
| 115558 | Motion for continuance; abuse of discretion. Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s request for a continuance. Appellant’s attorney made the request at the dispositional hearing when appellant failed to show for the proceeding. Appellant had notice of the hearing and offered no reason for his failure to appear. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-268 |
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State ex rel. Powell v. Sheehan
| 115809 | Petition for writ of mandamus; dismissal; sua sponte; jail-time credit; moot; adequate remedy at law. Petition for writ of mandamus dismissed, sua sponte, where trial court had already awarded relator jail-time credit in sentencing journal entry and had already ruled on all motions for jail-time credit before relator filed his petition, such that to the extent relator sought to compel a ruling on his motions for jail-time credit, his petition was moot. Further, alleged errors regarding jail-time credit are not cognizable in mandamus because relator has or had an adequate remedy at law to address the issue. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/28/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-269 |
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State v. Macklin
| 111117 | Juvenile court; jurisdiction; bindover; indictment. When a juvenile is bound over to adult court, the State may pursue charges for any crime that was bound over by the juvenile court, in addition to any crimes that were not presented to the juvenile court but were rooted in the underlying crimes. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
1/22/2026
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1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-181 |
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W.A. Smith Fin., L.L.C. v. Doe
| 114884 | Motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; unopposed; issue of fact; hearsay; App.R. 12(A)(2); defamation; fact or opinion; jury interrogatory; invited error. Affirmed. The trial court did not err in denying the unopposed motion for summary judgment leading to a jury trial in which the defendant presented questions of fact as to the truth of the alleged defamatory statements in an online review of plaintiff’s services and the amount of damages. Further, the plaintiff failed to identify the place in the record where the jury was presented newspaper articles in violation of hearsay principles, such that evidentiary errors cannot be reviewed. And finally, plaintiff’s claim that the jury considered a legal question of whether the alleged defamatory statement was an opinion was invited error. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/22/2026
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1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-184 |
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Perozeni v. Perozeni
| 114960 | App.R. 16; App.R. 12; marital property; separate property; clerical errors. Trial court’s finding that the marital residence was wholly marital property was supported by clear and convincing evidence where the sole evidence of a gift was appellant’s testimony and there was contradictory testimony that appellant paid consideration for the property in the past. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. Although the trial court’s entry designates appellee as the health insurance obligor, a clerical error in the entry suggests appellant is responsible; accordingly, the case is remanded for the trial court to correct its entry. The court of appeals may disregard any assignment of error where the party fails to comply with App.R. 16. Where assigned errors are not supported by citations to legal authority, the brief is out of compliance with the rule. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
1/22/2026
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1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-185 |
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State v. Crenshaw
| 115006 | Unlawful possession of dangerous ordnance, firearm specifications, ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Crim.R. 11, guilty plea, “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Appellant appealed conviction for unlawful possession of dangerous ordnance. Appellant argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because plea agreement guaranteed that he would be sentenced on the greater of two firearm specifications. However, the record did not indicate that appellant's plea was less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and the court engaged in a full Crim.R. 11 colloquy. Further, nothing in the record indicated that, absent the plea agreement, appellant would have been sentenced to the lesser firearm specification. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
1/22/2026
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1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-186 |
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In re M.R.
| 115035 | Temporary custody; case plan; Juv.R. 40; failure to file objections to magistrate’s decision; transcript; App.R. 12; effective assistance of trial counsel; abuse of discretion; disposition; adjudication; statutory time limit. The trial court did not err when it placed the children in the agency’s temporary custody. Father failed to file objections to the magistrate’s decision finding the children dependent and recommending they be placed in the agency’s temporary custody. Because father failed to file objections to the magistrate’s decision he has waived all but plain error on appeal. Although father filed a transcript of the dispositional hearing with this court, he did not file a transcript of the adjudicatory hearing. Even if he had filed the proper transcript, we cannot consider the transcript because it was not filed in the trial court. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the timing of the adjudicatory and dispositional hearings. The dispositional hearing was held within the statutory timeframe and the statute governing adjudicatory hearings in not jurisdictional. Father’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the magistrate’s decision. The record shows that a case plan was developed with the goal of returning the children to father’s custody but father failed to follow the case plan recommendations and requirements. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
1/22/2026
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1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-187 |
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State v. Watson
| 115036 | Felonious assault; self-defense; jury instructions; manifest weight of the evidence. Jury verdict finding defendant guilty of felonious assault affirmed. Surveillance videos show defendant assaulting the victim in a car repair shop, including her punching him in the face, pushing him multiple times and hitting him with a baseball bat. Her claim of self-defense failed. A defendant’s belief that she was in immediate danger must be objectively reasonable, and as shown by the videos, the victim did nothing to cause the defendant to fear for her life. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/22/2026
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1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-188 |
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In re H.C.
| 115276 | Adjudication; abused; neglected; temporary custody; injury; Brittle Bone Disease. - Juvenile court’s decision adjudicating the child abused and neglected was based on sufficient clear and convincing evidence because the evidence showed that the child suffered from several unexplained multiple leg fractures while in the care and custody of Mother. Medical testing and testimony revealed that the child did not suffer from Brittle Bone Disease. Temporary custody was in the child’s best interest and properly granted to the agency. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
1/22/2026
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1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-189 |
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Miles v. Cleveland Clinic Health Sys.-E. Region
| 115648 | Motion to compel payment of expert witness deposition fees; abuse of discretion. The court’s granting the appellee’s motion to compel payment of expert witness deposition fees is affirmed. Appellant failed to demonstrate that the court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion when she knew of the fees prior to taking the deposition. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/22/2026
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1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-190 |
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State v. Skanes
| 114528 | App.R. 26(B) application for reopening, res judicata, prosecutorial misconduct. The appellant’s App.R. 26(B) application for reopening is denied because appellate counsel was not ineffective on appeal. The issues raised in support of the application for reopening are barred from further review by the doctrine of res judicata. The appellant has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by appellate counsel on appeal. Application for reopening is denied. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/21/2026
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1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-182 |
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State v. Smith
| 114637 | Conviction; sufficiency; manifest weight; investigation; preparation; trial tactics; strategy, appellate counsel; ineffective-assistance claim; colorable; joinder; severance; selective prosecution; prosecutorial misconduct; expert. Appellant’s application to reopen his appeal under App.R. 26(B) is denied because he failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
1/16/2026
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1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-183 |
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State ex rel. Peterson v. Miday
| 115723 | Procedendo, moot, Civ.R. 58(B), petition for postconviction relief is civil in nature. The relator’s complaint for procedendo, to require the respondent-judge to issue a ruling with regard to a pending successive petition for postconviction relief, is moot. The respondent-judge rendered a judgment that denied the relator’s successive petition for postconviction relief. However, the respondent-judge failed to comply with Civ.R. 58(B). Thus, the respondent-judge must comply with Civ.R. 58(B) and reissue any judgment, that denied a petition for postconviction relief, with language that directs the clerk of courts to serve upon all parties notice of the judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
1/16/2026
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1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-191 |
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Caldwell v. Custom Craft Builders, Inc.
| 113209 | Reconsideration; App.R. 26(A)(1)(a); error of law; contract; breach of contract; conspiracy to commit fraud; fraud; consumer sales practices act ("CSPA"); permit; employee; employer; relevant evidence; Evid.R. 401; Evid.R. 403; damages; insufficient evidence; manifest weight; unfair or deceptive acts; piercing the corporate veil; alter ego; apparent authority; principal; agent; attorney fees. The trial court’s journal entry following a bench trial is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The evidence presented at trial supported the trial court’s finding that the defendant-appellant LLC contracted with the plaintiff-appellee to do HVAC work through the apparent authority of its employee/agent and that the LLC breached the contract and violated the CSPA. However, there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the owner of the LLC was individually liable on these claims. There was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding of a civil conspiracy to commit fraud and, therefore, the award of punitive damages and the award of statutory damages are vacated; however, the trial court’s award of attorney fees was supported by sufficient evidence. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-115 |
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State v. Carpenter
| 114655 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; strangulation; domestic violence; endangering children; discovery; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Crim.R. 16. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Defendant-appellant’s convictions for strangulation and domestic violence are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, there is insufficient evidence to support his endangering-children conviction; we cannot say that a substantial risk to the child’s health or safety was created based on the child’s witnessing of the incident alone. Moreover, we find that the State’s allegedly delayed disclosure of a cassette-tape recording did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), or Crim.R. 16. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-116 |
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Wells v. Right Choice Contracting, L.L.C.
| 114802 | Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act; supplier; purchaser; consumer transaction; personal purposes; breach of contract; existence of a contract. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. The trial court committed reversible error when it determined that the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act did not apply to the transaction between appellant and appellee as a matter of law. The trial court also committed reversible error when it determined that appellant failed to substantially perform the obligations he owed to appellee under their contract. The trial court misidentified the documents that constitute the parties’ contract. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-117 |
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In re D.L.T.
| 114925 | Objections to magistrate’s decision; failure to file transcript; raising issues for the first time on appeal; Juv.R. 40; subject-matter jurisdiction. Appellant’s failure to file the transcript with the juvenile court precludes our review of the lower court’s factual findings related to granting father legal custody, granting the grandparents visitation, and in allowing expert testimony. Because appellant’s arguments are based on the court’s factual findings, or were not made at the trial-court level, and because appellant’s objections were not stated with sufficient specificity, we are unable to review these arguments. Appellant also raised the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, for which we do not need the transcript to determine. The trial court did not have jurisdiction to award attorney or expert fees for work done in another court on another case. Award of attorney fees is void and issue of expert fees is remanded for the court to calculate the amount of fees relating to the juvenile case. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-118 |
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Morgan v. Applied Med. Technology, Inc.
| 114963 | Motion for sanctions; hearing; R.C. 2323.51; Civ.R. 11; frivolous conduct; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motions for sanctions without a hearing. The mere fact that plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims is not enough to warrant sanctions, especially when the record is devoid of any evidence of frivolous conduct throughout the litigation. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-119 |
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State v. Newton
| 114965 | Marsy’s Law; restitution; guilty plea; sentencing; innocence; affirmative defenses. Reversed and remanded. The trial court erred by denying the victim restitution based on the defendant’s protestations of innocence raised for the first time at sentencing following a guilty plea. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-120 |
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M.E. v. M.A.
| 115021 | Domestic-violence civil protection order (“DVCPO”); abuse of discretion; domestic violence; Civ.R. 65.1; R.C. 3113.31; sufficient credible evidence; competency of a minor; R.C. 2317.01; motion to strike. The domestic relations court issued a DVCPO in favor of petitioner-appellee (“Petitioner”) against Respondent-appellant (“Respondent.”) Respondent appealed claiming (1) the court abused its discretion in overruling his objections to the magistrate’s order and adopting the DVCPO issued by the magistrate, and (2) the magistrate erred in denying Respondent’s motion to strike the testimony of his seven-year-old daughter S.A. The lower court’s issuance of the DVCPO was supported by sufficient credible evidence. Petitioner testified with respect to multiple instances of physical abuse from Respondent towards herself and S.A. Respondent also testified at the full hearing, claiming that he was never physically abusive towards Petitioner or S.A. The trial court was in the best position to consider the contradictory testimony between Petitioner and Respondent. As such, the reviewing court declined to substitute its judgment for that of the lower court. Respondent and Petitioner’s seven year old daughter S.A. testified at the hearing. Prior to the hearing, the magistrate conducted an in camera voir dire of S.A., which neither party objected to. The magistrate concluded that S.A. was competent to testify. Following S.A.’s testimony, Respondent filed a motion to strike S.A.’s testimony that was denied by the magistrate. Respondent claims that S.A.’s testimony at the hearing demonstrate that she was incompetent to testify because she did not recall certain facts concerning the abuse. However, the court determined that even if S.A. may not have remembered the date the assault occurred or of certain particulars of the assault does not relate so much to her competency to testify, but rather to S.A.’s credibility as a witness. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-121 |
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State v. Hicks
| 115116 | Conceded error; nunc pro tunc. The trial court erred by issuing a sentencing journal entry that stated the appellant was sentenced on Count 185, when the appellant was not. The State conceded the error, and the trial court must issue a nunc pro tunc to correct the sentencing entry. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-122 |
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Cleveland v. Hall
| 115143 | Separation-of-powers doctrine; prosecutor; court; pretrial diversion program. Trial court violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by referring defendant to a pretrial diversion program over the prosecutor’s objection. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
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1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-123 |
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