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State v. Azali
| 115501 | Petition for Postconviction Relief; Hearing; Abuse of Discretion. Appellate courts review the disposition of a petition for postconviction relief under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Res judicata bars claims in a petition for postconviction relief that were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal from conviction. A trial court's decision to dismiss a petition for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing will not be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. R.C. 2953.21(D) requires a trial court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law when dismissing or denying a timely filed petition for postconviction relief. | Willamowski | Cuyahoga |
7/23/2026
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7/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-2817 |
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State v. Wilson
| 114998 | R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c) substantial impairment rape; Fifth Amendment Right against self-incrimination; right to remain silent prearrest and pre-Miranda rights being read; prosecutorial misconduct; cross-examination of defendant; direct examination of police officer; State’s closing argument; failure to object; plain error; exclusion of irrelevant evidence; abuse of discretion. Appellant-defendant appealed the trial court’s various rulings regarding prosecutorial questions and comments as well as rulings regarding the admissibility and use of various exhibits at trial. The first assignment of error concerned prosecutorial misconduct regarding questions asked during the direct examination of a police officer, the cross-examination of the defendant and during the State’s closing argument. We find that there were only three objected-to questions by the prosecutor during the defendant’s cross-examination that while they were improper questions they did not substantially prejudice defendant’s right to a fair trial. As to the remaining questions asked by the prosecutor during cross-examination of the defendant, the State’s direct examination of the arresting police officer and the comments made during State’s closing argument these were not objected to and were therefore reviewed under the plain-error analysis. But for their admission it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt the trial outcome would not have been different and therefore no plain error was found. The second assignment of error concerned the exclusion of three demonstrative exhibits. Upon review we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding these exhibits because they were not relevant to the issue in this case. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/23/2026
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7/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-2814 |
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In re A.R.-C.
| 116338 | Permanent custody; termination of parental rights; manifest weight; best interest; clear and convincing; domestic violence; authentication; hearsay; harmless error; R.C. 2151.353; R.C. 2151.353(A)(4); R.C. 2151.353(A)(5); R.C. 2923.02; R.C. 2919.22; R.C. 2903.18(B)(3); R.C. 2919.25; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D); R.C. 2151.414(E); R.C. 2151.414(E)(6); R.C. 2151.414(E)(10); R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). Judgment affirmed. Permanent custody to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) was supported by clear and convincing evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence demonstrated that mother pled guilty to and was convicted of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), with the child specified as the victim. This evidence conclusively established facts satisfying R.C. 2151.414(E)(6). Evidence also supported the juvenile court’s finding that the child’s alleged father, who was not a party to the appeal, had abandoned her. These findings supported the conclusion that the children could not or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. The statutory best-interest factors supported custody to CCDCFS, including, but not limited to, the child’s interactions and relationships with significant individuals in her life, including other relatives and foster caregivers, the guardian ad litem’s recommendation, the child’s custodial history, and the child’s need for a legally secure placement. Mother’s manifest-weight challenge failed because competent, credible evidence established each statutory element. While mother had filed motions requesting that the juvenile court place the child in the legal custody of other individuals, neither individual appeared at trial despite accommodations that included the option to appear virtually and having an interpreter present. Mother’s hearsay challenge was unpersuasive. It focused on aspects of the CCDCFS caseworker’s testimony that were not relevant to the juvenile court’s ultimate determination. Mother stipulated to the facts alleged in the amended complaint, and the evidence of mother’s conviction was supported by certified court records that were self-authenticating and not hearsay. Moreover, a trial judge is presumed to be capable of disregarding improper testimony, and nothing suggested the juvenile court relied on hearsay. Finally, the juvenile court’s erroneous finding that there was a prior termination of mother’s parental rights regarding a different child was harmless error because only one R.C. 2151.414(E) factor was required. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
7/23/2026
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7/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-2833 |
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Cleveland v. Goode
| 115873 | R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a); operating a vehicle while under the influence; manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant’s conviction for operating a vehicle while under the influence was affirmed because it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
7/23/2026
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7/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-2824 |
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In re X.R.
| 115955 | Permanent custody; clear and convincing evidence; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight; lack of commitment; abandonment; R.C. 2151.414(E). The trial court's judgment granting permanent custody to the agency and terminating Father's parental rights was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence supported the court’s finding that Father abandoned the child and has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) and (10). Therefore, the trial court was statutorily obligated to enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should be placed with either parent. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
7/23/2026
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7/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-2828 |
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