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State v. Gill
| C-250472 | JURISDICTION — FINAL JUDGMENT: Where defendant filed a notice of appeal from this court’s judgment in the direct appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction to resentence defendant pursuant to our remand in that appeal, rendering the trial court’s resentencing entry null and void, as were all subsequent judgments flowing from that void entry. Because the judgment appealed from is void, there is no final, appealable order, and the appeal must be dismissed. | Bock | Hamilton |
8/21/2026
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8/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3255 |
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Women's Med Dayton v. Vanderhoff
| C-250549 | DEPOSITION — SEPARATION OF POWERS — PRIVILEGE — APPELLATE JURISDICTION — FINAL ORDERS — PROVISIONAL REMEDIES — SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION — ABORTION — AMBULATORY SURGICAL FACILITIES — ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM AMENDMENT — INJUNCTIONS: The trial court’s order compelling the Ohio director of health to testify in a deposition was an order denying a provisional remedy, which the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), because (1) the parties agreed that the director was a “high-ranking government official,” (2) the deposition pertained to the director’s performance of his official duties, and (3) the director showed that sitting for the deposition would impose some burden on his ability to perform his duties. Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any need to depose the Ohio director of health regarding their facial challenges to the statutes governing licensure of ambulatory surgical facilities, because the director had no special and personal knowledge regarding those statutes’ enactment. The trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ as-applied constitutional challenges, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ prior denials of administrative relief, because plaintiffs’ current lawsuit requested only prospective relief and did not seek to invalidate any prior decision of the Ohio director of health or the Department of Health. The trial court did not err in ordering the Ohio director of health to sit for deposition with respect to plaintiffs’ as-applied challenges where (1) plaintiffs alleged the director had applied unconstitutional criteria to deny them licensure, (2) the director had sole authority and discretion to grant variances from the requirements for obtaining an ambulatory-surgical-facility license, (3) other officials within the Ohio Department of Health testified that only the director could speak to the criteria used to make variance determinations, (4) the matter in controversy was substantial, (5) the ruling would not require the director to sit for deposition in numerous similar cases, and (6) less onerous discovery procedures had already proved unsuccessful. | Crouse | Hamilton |
8/21/2026
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8/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3256 |
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State v. Jackson
| C-250649 | CONFLICT OF INTEREST — INQUIRY — DISQUALIFICATION — VOIR DIRE — PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE — BATSON CHALLENGE — RACE NUETRAL — TELECOMMUNICATIONS HARASSMENT — R.C. 2917.21(B) — SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE — VENUE — R.C. 2901.12(I)(1) — MANIFEST WEIGHT: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defense counsel’s motion to withdraw for a potential conflict where the court adequately inquired into the nature of the conflict before it correctly concluded that no conflict existed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant’s challenge to the State’s use of a peremptory strike of a juror under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), where the State’s race-neutral explanation was that the prospective juror was observed with both eyes closed during voir dire, appeared inattentive, and was at times nonresponsive to questioning, and where defendant failed to establish that the striking of the juror was the result of purposeful racial discrimination. The State established venue where the victim testified he received the harassing texts and calls in his home, located in Hamilton County. Defendant’s conviction for telecommunications harassment was supported by sufficient evidence and not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the State presented a Cellebrite data extraction report from defendant’s phones showing defendant had sent texts threatening to shoot up the complaining witness, his home, and his church. | Moore | Hamilton |
8/21/2026
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8/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3257 |
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American Express Natl. Bank v. Mayes
| C-250651 | REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS — CIV.R. 36 — SERVICE — CIV.R. 5 —EMAIL — CIV.R. 60(A) — RECORD ON APPEAL — APP.R. 9(E) — CONTINUANCES — INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL — FAILURE TO PROSECUTE — CIV.R. 41(B)(1) — NOTICE: The trial court did not err by deeming admitted the matter in plaintiff’s Civ.R. 36 requests for admissions where defendant failed to provide his email address in his signature block, plaintiff had served the requests on defendant by regular mail, and defendant had failed to respond within the prescribed time. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s request to withdraw his admissions pursuant to Civ.R. 36(B) where defendant had filed his responses to the requests on the day of trial, more than five months after being served with the requests, and where defendant did not request withdrawal of his prior admissions for months after that. The trial court properly denied a motion to correct a clerical mistake under Civ.R. 60(A) where the record disclosed no clerical error. The trial court did not err by failing to grant defendant’s motion to supplement the record pursuant to App.R. 9(E) where defendant’s motion had concerned the record for a prior appeal, and where the materials he sought to add to the record were already a part of the record. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting a 28-day continuance rather than defendant’s requested continuance of “30-45 days,” where defendant offered no explanation as to why those two days made a difference and did not object to the 28-day continuance after receiving notice. The trial court erred by dismissing defendant’s counterclaim for failure to prosecute pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1), without providing either (A) a clear warning that failure to appear at trial would lead to dismissal with prejudice or (B) an opportunity after the trial date to explain the reason for his absence. See Vinebrook Homes, L.L.C. v. Perkins, 2023-Ohio-3721, ¶ 12-18 (1st Dist.). | Crouse | Hamilton |
8/21/2026
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8/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3258 |
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State v. Maiocco
| C-250498 | MISDEMEANOR ASSAULT — DISORDERLY CONDUCT — DUPLICATIVE CHARGE — MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE: Defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct was supported by sufficient evidence and not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the State presented circumstantial evidence that the victim was inconvenienced, annoyed, or alarmed. Defendant’s conviction for misdemeanor assault was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the State presented evidence that defendant did not act in self-defense because he was the initial aggressor and then escalated the situation by introducing a deadly weapon. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict defendant of a duplicative disorderly-conduct charge where the State did not file a valid complaint charging defendant with that offense. | Nestor | Hamilton |
8/19/2026
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8/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3211 |
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