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Citywide RX, L.L.C. v. Providence Healthcare Mgt., Inc.
| 115352 | Attorney fees; reasonableness; breach of contract; Civ.R. 56(C); summary judgment; de novo review; new arguments; waived; App. 16(A)(7); App. 12(A)(2); locale; evidence. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of appellee on a request for attorney fees. Appellee set forth sufficient Civ.R. 56(C) evidence to establish that the rates and hours charged were reasonable. Appellant failed to set forth any Civ.R. 56(C) evidence to establish that a genuine issue of material fact remained to be litigated on the reasonableness of attorney fees charged by appellee. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1377 |
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State v. Stafford
| 115414 | Plain error; waiver; constitutionality; R.C. 2923.13(A)(2); ineffective assistance. Appellant waived argument regarding the constitutionality of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) based on this court’s ruling in State v. Philpotts, 2025-Ohio-1179 (8th Dist.), when he failed to raise it with the trial court. Nevertheless, the record reflects that the trial court did not plainly err, where the Ohio Supreme Court stayed execution of the Philpotts case pending appeal. Appellant did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on allegations that his counsel did not consider or advise him of the Philpotts decision before entering his plea, where the record did not reflect counsel’s failure. To the extent appellant argued events that happened off the record, his remedy was in postconviction-relief proceedings and not direct appeal. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1378 |
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Islam v. Razzak
| 115438 | Domestic relations; post-decree motion hearing; motion for continuance; abuse of discretion; Sup.R. 41(B); ineffective assistance of counsel; right to counsel; ex parte; cumulative-error doctrine; App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16(A)(7). Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff-appellant’s motion for continuance. In light of the discovery delays created by plaintiff-appellant, the trial court’s clear directives regarding continuances based on counsel’s unavailability, plaintiff-appellant’s eleventh-hour motion for continuance, and plaintiff-appellant’s complete failure to appear for the post-decree motion hearing, we cannot say that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in denying the motion. Moreover, Sup.R. 41(B) did not require the granting of plaintiff-appellant’s motion for continuance in this case. Next, we find no grounds for reversal based on plaintiff-appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Plaintiff-appellant did not have a constitutional right to counsel at this domestic-relations hearing, and the trial court was within its right to proceed with the hearing in plaintiff-appellant’s and his counsel’s absence. Finally, since plaintiff-appellant did not provide any legal authority to suggest that (1) any error — let alone multiple — occurred and (2) application of the cumulative-error doctrine is appropriate in this case, we decline to find that the doctrine mandates reversal. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1379 |
|
Frederico v. 1795 Spino Dr., L.L.C.
| 115468 | Civ.R. 12(B)(6); motion to dismiss; political subdivision tort immunity, R.C. 2744.02(B)(3). Judgment reversed. The trial court erred by denying the city’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss on immunity grounds. Plaintiff did not allege facts in his complaint to demonstrate that the tree was an obstruction on the roadway that blocked or clogged the roadway. Thus, the plaintiff failed to allege facts that an exception under R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) to the city’s general grant of immunity applied. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1380 |
|
State v. Sampson
| 115478 | Sixth Amendment; right to counsel of choice; motion to continue; abuse of discretion; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; felony sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G); contrary to law; judicial bias; presumed unbiased and unprejudiced; fair proceeding. Judgment affirmed. The record is clear that appellant’s last-minute request for a continuance to hire an attorney was a delay tactic, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion. The record establishes that the trial court considered the R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 factors when sentencing the appellant and the sentence was not contrary to law. Finally, there is no compelling evidence that the trial court was biased against appellant. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1381 |
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State v. Lewis
| 115526 | Motion to suppress; traffic stop; probable cause; odor; burnt marijuana; vehicle search; automobile exception; R.C. 3780.36; R.C. 3780.99; smoking marijuana while in vehicle. The trial court did not err in determining that the police officer lacked probable cause to search appellant’s vehicle. The odor of burnt marijuana combined with appellant’s admission that he had smoked marijuana in the vehicle earlier that day supported a potential violation of former R.C. 3780.36(D)(2), which prohibits smoking marijuana in a vehicle. However, pursuant to former R.C. 3780.99, this provision only applies to passengers in a vehicle, not the operator of the vehicle. Accordingly, probable cause that a criminal offense had been committed did not exist, and the search of appellant’s vehicle was improper. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1382 |
|
In re L.N.
| 115709 | R.C. 2151.353(A)(4); permanent custody; termination of parental rights; R.C. 2151.414(E)(11); best interest of the child; R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); clear and convincing evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; legal custody; temporary custody. - Juvenile court did not err in granting permanent custody of children to agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(4). The record supported juvenile court’s finding that mother, who had her parental rights terminated as to two of her other children, failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she could provide a legally secure placement for the children under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). The juvenile court’s findings that (1) the children could not be placed with one of the children’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent and (2) permanent custody was in the children’s best interest were supported by clear and convincing evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Given the juvenile court’s determination that permanent custody to the agency was in the children’s best interest, granting legal custody to a relative or temporary custody to the agency necessarily was not in their best interest. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1383 |
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State v. Humphries
| 115756 | Conceded error; statute of limitations; motion to dismiss; ineffective assistance of counsel. - State concede that appellant was deprived of effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to raise a statute-of-limitations argument in the motion to dismiss. A reasonable probability existed that the five-year-old misdemeanor offense would have been dismissed and thus he would not have been subsequently convicted. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1384 |
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State v. Frazier
| 115203 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; murder; having a weapon while under disability; aiding and abetting; ineffective assistance of counsel; jury instructions; abuse of discretion. Convictions affirmed. There was sufficient evidence to support appellant’s convictions for murder and having a weapon while under disability. Appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where both circumstantial and direct evidence linked appellant to the crimes. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on a complicity theory of aiding and abetting, nor did its discretion in instructing the jury that it may compare a picture of the suspect at the scene of the crime to appellant’s in-court appearance as a defendant at trial. Lastly, trial counsel was not ineffective where trial counsel’s actions were a matter of trial strategy. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1275 |
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Hrina v. KLS Martin, L.P.
| 115222 | Motion to dismiss; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); Civ.R. 10(D)(2); Civ.R. 15(C); affidavit of merit. Trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss where plaintiffs failed to timely file an affidavit of merit as required by Civ.R. 10(D)(2). | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1276 |
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State v. Kijanski
| 115281 | Consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); multiple victims; proportionality; criminal history; mitigation evidence, mitigation report; presentence-investigation report; allocution; weapons under disability; felonious assault; discharge of firearm on or near prohibited premises; tampering with evidence. Judgment affirmed. The record supported the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences after appellant pleaded guilty to discharge of firearm on or near prohibited premises, two counts of felonious assault involving two separate teenage victims, tampering with evidence, and having weapons while under disability. Review of a trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) is highly deferential. Here the trial court made the required R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings, and the record supported those findings. Appellant shot two random victims, and the existence of multiple victims reasonably supported consecutive terms on the felonious-assault counts. In addition, his repeated weapons-related conduct, including both juvenile and adult criminal history, supported the finding that consecutive service was necessary to protect the public. The trial court did not err in rejecting appellant’s reliance on mitigation evidence and arguments about consistency with similarly situated offenders. Such arguments are more appropriately raised with respect to findings under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 rather than consecutive-sentence findings. Moreover, the trial court expressly considered the presentence-investigation report, the mitigation report, victim-impact statements, appellant’s statements in allocution, and the arguments of counsel at the sentencing hearing but remained skeptical of his claimed blackout, remorse, and explanation for the shooting. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1277 |
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State v. Fluker
| 115355 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; burglary; force; menacing by stalking; intimidation; unlawful threat of harm; ineffective assistance of counsel; joinder; Crim.R. 8(A); jury instructions; curative instructions; hearsay; state-of-mind exceptions; Evid.R. 803(3); constitutional speedy trial; statutory speedy trial; mistrial. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support appellant’s convictions for burglary, menacing by stalking, and intimidation. Appellant’s convictions for burglary, menacing by stalking, and intimidation were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in joining appellant’s cases together for the purposes of trial because the evidence supporting appellant’s convictions would have been admitted in each trial if tried separately. The error in the jury instructions concerning the date of appellant’s prior convictions was corrected by the court, and the jury was advised of the correct date; therefore, there was no prejudice. The trial court did err in instructing the jury to determine whether appellant used a deadly weapon in a manner calculated to destroy life since there was nothing in the record to support this instruction, but the error was harmless. The trial court did not err in admitting jail calls made by the appellant while incarcerated because they were permitted to demonstrate consciousness of guilt. The trial court did err in allowing an officer to testify as to why the victim in this case was scared of appellant, but that error was harmless since the victim testified at trial and appellant had an opportunity to cross-examine her. Appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel was not required to file a motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds when speedy trial had not yet run. Counsel was also not ineffective for choosing not to move for a mistrial. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1278 |
|
SPM Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Italian Restaurant Group, L.L.C.
| 115382 | Summary judgment; breach of contract; motion to disqualify attorney; mitigation of damages; abrogation of duty to mitigate damages. A review of the contracts at issue shows that the landlord had a duty to mitigate its damages in the event the tenant defaulted and landlord retook possession of the property. Furthermore, there was a factual issue for the jury regarding whether the landlord did mitigate its damages. The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord. Because summary judgment was improper, the trial court also erred by rendering moot the motion to disqualify one of the landlord’s attorneys based on conflict of interest. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1279 |
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Marcinkevicius v. Galloway
| 115391 | Probate; appointment of successor trustee; trustee rejects trustee appointment; trust instrument; courts of equity; Ohio Trust Code; priority of trustee appointment; R.C. 5807.04(C). - Judgment affirmed. The court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a successor trustee where there was a vacancy and then an attempted appointment pursuant to the terms of the trust. The court’s jurisdiction was properly invoked and as a court of equity, it was enabled to make the successor appointment when it found that the person named in the trust to make an appointment did not follow the wishes of the settlor. The court’s appointment comported with the order of priority in R.C. 5807.04(C) and aligned with the settlor’s wishes. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1280 |
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M.H. v. B.S.
| 115470 | Domestic violence civil protection order; motion for continuance; abuse of discretion; R.C. 3113.31; Civ.R. 65.1; child abuse; sufficient evidence in the record. The domestic relations court did not abuse its discretion by granting one continuance of the full hearing on a domestic violence civil protection order, because the respondent had not been served with the petition or the ex parte order, and the petitioner’s attorney could not attend the originally scheduled full hearing. The domestic relations court did not err in granting the domestic violence civil protection order, because sufficient evidence in the record showed that the respondent committed child abuse against the victim, which is enough to issue a protection order under R.C. 3113.31 and Civ.R. 65.1. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1281 |
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State v. R.T.
| 115475 | Seal record of federal conviction; R.C. 2953.32. Reversed, vacated, and remanded. The trial court’s order sealing the record of a federal conviction contains requirements exceeding the state court’s limited authority to seal any state-retained record of the federal conviction not used or maintained pursuant to federal law. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1282 |
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R.S. v. G.S.
| 115476 | Domestic-violence civil-protection order (“DVCPO”); domestic violence; R.C. 3113.31; sufficient, credible evidence. Judgment vacated and remanded. The trial court erred in granting a DVCPO because the petitioner did not present sufficient, credible evidence that she was in danger of domestic violence. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1283 |
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State v. Moore
| 115503 | Domestic violence; manifest weight of the evidence; bench trial; credibility; victim testimony; delayed medical treatment; physical harm; attempt to cause physical harm; visible injury not required; Crim.R. 29; R.C. 2919.25(A). Judgment affirmed. Following a bench trial, appellant was convicted of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a felony of the third degree, for assaulting his mother in their shared home by shoving her into a freezer door after she refused to buy him cigarettes. In arguing that the conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence, he claimed that the victim was not credible because she wanted him removed from the home, delayed going to the hospital, and allegedly could have deliberately injured herself after police told her the day before that appellant could not be removed from the home unless he put his hands on her. The trial court, as factfinder in a bench trial, was entitled to credit the victim’s testimony over the appellant’s denial, especially where photographs and medical records supported the victim’s account. Visible injury is not required for a domestic-violence conviction because the statute also prohibits an attempt to cause physical harm. This was not the exceptional case in which the factfinder clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1284 |
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State v. Wright
| 115514 | Effective assistance of counsel; deficient performance; plea bargain; sexual battery; sexual activity; sexual conduct; U.S. Const. amend VI; Ohio Const. art. I, § 10; R.C. 2907.03; R.C. 2907.02; R.C. 2907.01; Crim.R. 11(C)(2). Affirmed. Appellant did not show that defense counsel’s assistance was deficient or that appellant’s defense was prejudiced where defense counsel did not interject after the trial court did not state the elements of an amended charge during the plea colloquy and defense counsel did not move to withdraw the appellant’s guilty plea after appellant made statements at sentencing minimizing his actions. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1285 |
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State v. Clark
| 115520 | Sentencing hearing, presumption of incarceration, sexual battery, R.C. 2907.03, plain error, Crim.R. 52(B), purposes of felony sentencing, R.C. 2929.11, seriousness and recidivism factors, R.C. 2929.12. Appellant’s sentence for sexual battery affirmed. During sentencing hearing, court mistakenly stated that sexual battery under R.C. 2907.03 carries a presumption of incarceration. However, appellant did not demonstrate that this affected the outcome of the proceeding or amounted to a manifest miscarriage of justice. Court made explicit finding that community-control sanction would not have been appropriate in this case, where appellant’s victim was under the age of 12, was a family member, and where appellant had a significant criminal history, including for prior violent offenses. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1286 |
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State v. Green
| 115598 | Effective assistance of counsel; knowing and voluntary plea; plea colloquy; mental-health-court docket; postsentence motion to withdraw guilty plea; manifest injustice; Crim.R. 11(C); Cuyahoga C.P., Gen.Div., Loc.R. 30.1; Crim.R. 32.1. Affirmed. The trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea because appellant did not establish a manifest injustice. Defense counsel’s assistance was not ineffective when defense counsel did not request a transfer to the mental-health-court docket because appellant did not establish that he qualified for the specialized docket, that the trial court would have applied for a transfer, or that the administrative judge would have granted a request for a transfer. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1287 |
|
State ex rel. Scott v. Costello
| 116037 | Prohibition; mandamus; community-control sanctions; probation-violation hearings; adequate notice; jurisdiction; adequate remedy at law; clerk of court; indigency; mootness; discretion of court; recusal; and rejection of filings. The failure to give notice of a probation-violation hearing does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the hearing; appeal is an adequate remedy at law. The termination of probation rendered the notice issues moot. Mandamus does not lie to compel a judge to recuse or reassign a case. Given the procedural posture of the underlying case, a delayed appeal presented an adequate remedy at law precluding mandamus to address filing issues and any other irregularities. Mandamus does not lie to compel the law generally or for anticipation of the nonperformance of duty. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1385 |
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State ex rel. JTC Solutions, L.L.C. v. Kelley
| 116096 | Writ of mandamus; arbitration; motion to dismiss; mandate; disobey; clear legal right; remedy at law; legal duty; law of the case; appeal; adequate remedy. -The equities of the situation demand that a writ of mandamus issue directing respondent to adhere to the court’s prior mandate. Relator established a clear legal right to the requested relief and a clear legal duty on the part of respondent, and an appeal was an inadequate remedy at law. | Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/8/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1288 |
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State ex rel. Otis v. Clancy
| 116317 | Mandamus, jail-time credit; discretion of court; appeal with a motion for stay is an adequate remedy at law. Relator sought mandamus to compel the trial court judge to grant him 13 days of jail-time credit. This court dismissed the mandamus action sua sponte because a judge has discretion in deciding a motion of jail-time credit and mandamus does not control judicial discretion even if it is grossly abused. Moreover, appeal with a motion for stay is an adequate remedy at law precluding mandamus. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/7/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1290 |
|
Richards v. Cuyahoga Cty. Corr. Ctr. Warden Shemo
| 116238 | Petition for writ of habeas corpus; not cognizable in habeas corpus; R.C. 2725.04(D); commitment papers; improper respondent; R.C. 2969.25(C)(1); sua sponte dismissal. -Habeas corpus petition dismissed, sua sponte. Claims of false charges, police misconduct, due-process violations, double jeopardy, prosecutorial misconduct, and judicial bias and misconduct alleged in petition were not cognizable in habeas corpus; petition lacked commitment papers as required by R.C. 2725.04(D); and petitioner did not provide an inmate account statement certified by the institutional cashier as required by R.C. 2969.25(C)(1). Because habeas corpus claims can be maintained only against the jailer or warden who presently has legal custody of the individual, trial judge was an improper respondent. | Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/6/2026
|
4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1289 |
|
Allan v. Allan
| 114193 | Judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”); JNOV; fraudulent transfer; statute of limitations; Civ.R. 50(B); R.C. 1336.09; R.C. 1336.06; reasonably could have discovered; discovery rule; manifest weight of the evidence; perfection; accrual; domestic relations; divorce. In a fraudulent-transfer case, the trial court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of defendants on statute-of-limitations grounds. The jury was entitled to weigh the competing evidence on whether and when the transfers occurred and whether the plaintiff reasonably could have discovered the transfers. The trial court exceeded its authority under Civ.R. 50(B) by substituting its own judgment for that of the jury’s by improperly applying a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard rather than a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard. The evidence that the jury considered in determining the accrual date of the action for statute-of-limitations purposes was sufficient to support its ruling. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
|
4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1187 |
|
Bradley v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., L.L.C.
| 115092 | Pro se; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; Civ.R. 56; summary judgment; negligence; duty; foreseeable. The trial court did not err in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant was unable to show a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The appellant did not comply with appellate rules in his assignments of error by failing to point to places in the record to support his claims. A claim of judicial bias or misconduct is not properly before this court. There was no cumulative error. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
|
4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1188 |
|
State v. Franklin
| 115200 | Motion to suppress; traffic stop; protective sweep; search; reasonable belief that suspect was dangerous; totality of the circumstances. The protective sweep of appellant’s vehicle was proper when there were specific and articulable facts demonstrating a reasonable belief that appellant was dangerous and that he would gain access to a weapon upon his return to the vehicle. The presence of a loaded magazine and the officers’ experience that a loaded magazine often meant the presence of a firearm, combined with appellant’s prohibition from owning a firearm and his admission that he owned one at his home was sufficient to meet the test set forth in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). The traffic stop was not significantly prolonged for the exterior sniff by the canine. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as the result of the protective sweep of the vehicle. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
|
4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1189 |
|
State v. Slaughter
| 115252 | Strangulation; domestic violence; lay opinion testimony; testimony about another case; manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the investigating detective to testify as a lay witness regarding domestic violence and strangulation. The detective was a veteran law-enforcement official who had over two decades of experience investigating domestic-violence cases. The detective also had specialized training and education on strangulation. His testimony was based on his training and experience, and it assisted the jury. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the victim to testify that, in the hours leading up to the within incident, a case against the appellant, in which she was also the named victim, had been dismissed. The testimony about the dismissed case was not offered to show that appellant had a propensity to commit a crime or that he acted in conformity with bad character. Rather, it was offered because it was inextricably intertwined with this case and was necessary to give context to what occurred in this case. The strangulation and domestic-violence convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The jury was in the best position to make credibility determinations, and there is nothing exceptional about its determinations in this case. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
|
4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1190 |
|
In re I.J.
| 115279 | Parental rights and responsibilities; modification; change in circumstances; R.C. 3109.04(E); best interests; R.C. 3109.051(D); witness list; exhibit list; Guardian ad litem (“GAL”); fees; local rules; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the parties’ parental rights and responsibilities agreement and declining to find a change in circumstances. The juvenile court exercised sound discretion when allowing the child’s half-brother to testify and allowing certain exhibits from Father even though Mother’s witness list and Father’s supplemental exhibit list were untimely. Father failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances under R.C. 3109.04(E) to warrant a change in Mother’s status as residential parent and legal custodian. Additionally, the modifications by the court to the agreement were in the child’s best interest under R.C. 3109.051(D). Lastly, the court did not err when it denied in part Father’s motion to exclude the GAL report. The court remedied any error by striking the improper legal conclusions by the GAL regarding change in circumstances and allowed the GAL to testify regarding the child’s best interests. The court complied with the local rules by allowing Father 14 days to request a hearing on the GAL’s motion for fees prior to ruling on the motion. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
|
4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1191 |
|
Jay Realty, L.L.C. v. J.P.S. Properties Diversified, Inc.
| 115322 | Law of the case; appellate mandate; remand. Reversed and remanded. The trial court erred by reinstating the granting of summary judgment reversed on appeal. On remand, the judgment must be rendered in favor of the defendant because there are no claims in the complaint left unresolved by the earlier appeal. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
|
4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1192 |
|
State v. Warren
| 115327 | Sufficiency; manifest weight; sexually-violent-predator designation; R.C. 2971.01(H)(1); R.C. 2971.01(H)(2). Judgment affirmed. Defendant-appellant’s rape convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements for rape were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, defendant-appellant is not entitled to a reversal on manifest-weight grounds merely because certain evidence or aspects of a witness’ testimony were inconsistent. Nor is defendant-appellant entitled to reversal because the trier of fact chose to believe the State’s version of events over his. Finally, we decline to find that the trial court erred in designating defendant-appellant a sexually violent predator based on the facts and circumstances of this case. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
|
4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1193 |
|
State v. Rachells
| 115358 | Sufficiency; manifest weight of the evidence; Crim.R. 16; ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence where he chose to challenge video evidence and cell phone data but ignored the direct evidence tying him to the crime, e.g., possession of the murder weapon. The trial court did not err in allowing the State to present evidence based on the State’s failure to disclose some of the cell mapping data, where the failure was not willful, and the appellant failed to establish how foreknowledge of the evidence would have benefited him or how he was prejudiced by the introduction of the evidence. Appellant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel where he failed to establish how he was prejudiced by his lawyer’s failure to request a continuance after learning of a discovery violation, where the benefit of the continuance was speculative and there was ample evidence connecting the appellant to the crime. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
|
4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1194 |
|
State v. Lawrence
| 115383 | Plea hearing; Crim.R. 11(C)(2); “understandingly and voluntarily”; “maximum penalty involved”; fines; Reagan Tokes advisements; R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c); concurrent sentence; life sentence; manifest miscarriage of justice; plain error. Appellant did not demonstrate that he did not understand the consequences of his guilty plea or that he did not plead guilty voluntarily where court misstated which offense carried which potential fine but did not impose fines. Appellant did not demonstrate manifest miscarriage of justice under plain-error analysis where court failed to give Reagan Tokes advisements but first-degree felony conviction to which such advisements applied was run concurrently to a life sentence, meaning appellant would never be eligible for early release nor to serve additional time under the Reagan Tokes Law. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
|
4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1195 |
|
MAZCleveland, L.L.C. v. Hall
| 115389 | Motion for sanctions; frivolous conduct; post-judgment motion; R.C. 2323.51. - Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants’ post-judgment motion for sanctions, arguing that appellee's counsel filed the complaint knowing that it would be frivolous. The conduct was not egregious, nor does it matter that appellee was ultimately unsuccessful. A hearing is not required on a post-judgment motion for sanctions where the record does not clearly evidence frivolous conduct. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
|
4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1196 |
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State v. Etheridge
| 115415 | Petition for postconviction relief; untimely; constitutional right; youth; juvenile; findings of fact and conclusions of law. Trial court properly denied appellant’s petition for postconviction relief where appellant claimed violation of a new constitutional right created by the Ohio Supreme Court but the right was not recognized by the United States Supreme Court. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1197 |
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S. Euclid v. Hall
| 115445 | Domestic violence; family member; sufficiency; ineffective assistance of counsel; self-defense. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file notice of intent to assert a claim of self-defense where uncontroverted evidence showed that the defendant caused the situation that gave rise to the affray. Defendant’s conviction was sustained by sufficient evidence where the victim testified that the defendant entered her home without her permission, placed his hands on her neck, and pushed her into the wall causing visible injuries to the victim’s neck. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1198 |
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Broadview Hts. v. Dunn
| 115523 | Personal jurisdiction; subject-matter jurisdiction; lack of live controversy. Appeal dismissed in part; affirmed in part. The appeal is dismissed at it relates to drug-related case. The trial court acquitted the defendant of the charges and, thus, there is no live controversy for this court to consider. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed as it relates to the traffic case. The municipal court had both personal jurisdiction over the defendant and subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1199 |
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Lofty Holding 656 E. 126th St., L.L.C. v. 656 E. 126th, Ltd.
| 115529 | Personal jurisdiction; service; certified mail; ordinary mail; Civ.R. 4.6(D); motion for default judgment; rebuttable presumption; “evidentiary-quality information”; hearing. Judgment affirmed. The trial court’s grant of default judgment was proper when plaintiff perfected service on the defendant. A court can acquire personal jurisdiction over the defendant by service of process upon the defendant. There is a rebuttable presumption of proper service when the civil rules governing service are followed. The presumption of proper service can be rebutted if the defendant presents sufficient “evidentiary-quality information demonstrating” that service was not accomplished. Here, the record demonstrates that plaintiff perfected service by ordinary mail upon defendant. Defendant then failed to present any evidence rebutting the presumption when he failed to appear at the hearing regarding service, and plaintiff presented evidence that its ordinary mail service was sent to an address where there was a reasonable expectation that it would be delivered to the defendant. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1200 |
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In re S.B.
| 115670 | Application for shared parenting; application to determine custody; custody; parental rights and responsibilities; abuse-of-discretion standard of review; best interest of the child. - Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in designating the child’s mother as the legal custodian and residential parent because the parents’ ill will towards each other and inability to shield this ill will from the child suggests that shared parenting would not be in the child’s best interest. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1201 |
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State v. Lewis
| 115827 | Postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21(H); findings of fact; conclusions of law; timely petition; collateral civil attack; meaningful appellate review; notice of conceded error. The petitioner’s timely petition for postconviction relief triggered the trial court’s statutory obligation under R.C. 2953.21(H) to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law when denying relief. Because the trial court’s one-sentence journal entry failed to identify the claims raised, the legal standards applied, or the factual bases for its decision, the record does not permit meaningful appellate review of the denial. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for the trial court to enter a new judgment that includes findings of fact and conclusions of law in compliance with R.C. 2953.21(H). | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1202 |
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State v. Woods
| 114861 | Motion to suppress; warrantless search; Fourth Amendment; unreasonable search and seizure; voluntary consent; implied consent; protective sweep; totality of the circumstances; Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990). Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of a firearm confiscated during an alleged protective sweep of his apartment. Without consent to enter other areas of the apartment, and without a reason to believe that their safety was at risk, the police officers could not and did not need to conduct a protective sweep of the bedroom where they discovered the firearm. Thus, defendant’s constitutional rights were violated. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/2/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1204 |
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Richards v. Cuyahoga Cty. Corr. Ctr. Warden Shemo
| 116235 | Habeas corpus; R.C. 2725.04(D); commitment papers; proper parties; police misconduct; and judicial misconduct. The court sua sponte dismissed this habeas corpus petition because claims of police and judicial misconduct are not cognizable in habeas corpus. Petitioner did not include commitment papers as required by R.C. 2725.04(D). Only the jailer is the proper respondent in a habeas corpus petition; thus, the judge and the police department were dismissed as improper parties. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2026
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4/2/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1203 |
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Cleveland v. Glover
| 114796 | Motion to suppress; substantial compliance; National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST") standards; R.C. 4511.19(A); R.C. 4511.19(D); R.C. 3701.143; Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-03; Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05. Affirmed. The trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress alcohol-test results is affirmed because the appellee met its burden of demonstrating substantial compliance with Ohio Adm. Code 3701-53-05 when it introduced the dry gas supplier’s certificate of analysis showing traceability to NIST standards. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1039 |
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State v. Ayers
| 115129 | Motion for new trial; Crim.R. 33(A)(6); Brady violation; de novo review; prejudice; allied offenses; merger; R.C. 2941.25; plain error; concurrent sentence; indefinite sentence; Reagan Tokes Act; R.C. 2929.144(B)(2) and (C); felony sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); “qualifying felony”; R.C. 2929.14(A); 2929.19(B)(2); minimum and maximum terms. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded for resentencing. Appellant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the late disclosure of information. In other words, appellant did not establish that there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the trial would have been different. Accordingly, it was not error for the trial court to deny appellant’s motion for new trial because his due-process rights were not violated. Nevertheless, we reverse appellant’s sentence because the trial court improperly sentenced appellant on allied offenses of similar import. In addition, the trial court incorrectly imposed the minimum and maximum prison terms as set forth in R.C. 2929.144(B)(2) and (C) and failed to properly advise Ayers of the notification requirements as set forth in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2). Therefore, this case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1040 |
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State v. Taylor
| 115154 | Motion to suppress; traffic stop; window tint; Mimms order; Terry frisk; pat-down search; waiver; Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 14; R.C. 2923.13(A)(2); R.C. 2923.12(A)(2); R.C. 2923.16(B); R.C. 2941.1417(A). Judgment affirmed. Following lawful stop for suspected illegal window tint, state trooper lawfully ordered defendant-appellant out of the vehicle under Mimms. Defendant-appellant’s argument that Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution should be interpreted to provide broader protection than the Fourth Amendment in the Mimms context was waived because he did not raise it in the trial court. In addition, defendant-appellant did not argue plain error and nothing in the record suggested plain error. The subsequent pat-down was justified under Terry because defendant-appellant exited the vehicle in an unusual, hunched posture with his right arm pressed toward his waistband, he had provided only an identification card rather than a driver’s license, and there was broken glass inside the car. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1041 |
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State v. Hall
| 115264 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; rape; fellatio; attempted vaginal rape; kidnapping; felonious assault; strangulation; R.C. 2907.02(A)(2); operating a vehicle under the influence; absence of scientific evidence; sexually violent predator; ineffective assistance of counsel; jail-issued clothing; involuntary intoxication; R.C. 2971.01(H); jury instructions; lesser-included offense; unlawful restraint; inferior-offense; allied offenses of similar import; R.C. 2941.25; consecutive sentences; one or more course of conduct. The trial testimony of the victim was sufficient to support the State’s charges of rape (fellatio), attempted vaginal rape, kidnapping, felonious assault, and strangulation and overcome defendant-appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. The evidence was sufficient to overcome the Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal on the operating a vehicle under the influence charge where (1) the defendant-appellant testified that he drove his vehicle and while he was driving he became sleepy and confused about his directions and (2) the responding patrolman testified that he believed the defendant-appellant — who he found asleep in the driver’s seat of his truck with the truck running and stopped in the middle of an intersection — was intoxicated because he smelled strongly of alcohol, had glossy eyes, had wet his pants, and was unable to stand up on his own. There was sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to find the defendant-appellant was likely to engage in a sexually violent offense in the future and, thus, classify him as a sexually violent predator. There was sufficient, competent, credible evidence to support the defendant-appellant’s convictions beyond a reasonable doubt and, accordingly, his convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant-appellant did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not err when it allowed the State to introduce testimony during the sexually violent predator specifications portion of the trial. The Ohio Rules of Evidence do not strictly apply to sexual violent predator classification hearings, and the evidence supported a sexually violent predator classification under R.C. 2971.01(H). The trial court did not err when it chose not to instruct the jury on unlawful restraint, the lesser-included offense of kidnapping, or aggravated assault, the inferior-offense of felonious assault. The evidence did not support merger of the rape (fellatio) conviction with the attempted vaginal rape, kidnapping, felonious assault, and strangulation convictions. The trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences was not contrary to law. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1042 |
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State v. Bebee
| 115288 | Petition for postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21; findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court erred in failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its denial of the petition for postconviction relief. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1043 |
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State v. Johnson-Coleman
| 115304 | Motion for mistrial; Sixth Amendment right to public trial; no closure by court; officer’s testimony; personal knowledge; not hearsay; no violation of Sixth Amendment right; Confrontation Clause; conceded error; theft is a lesser included offense of robbery. Appellant appeals ruling during trial and his sentencing. Appellant’s first assignment of error alleges the court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial when his family was allegedly accidentally informed by a court employee trial that day had been canceled when it was not. Because there was no action by the court and the trial was not actually closed and still open to the public there is nothing for us to review and thereby no violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Appellant’s second assignment of error alleges the trial court erred permitting testimony from the investigating officer regarding appellant’s out-of-state arrest and extradition to Cuyahoga County arguing the officer did not have personal knowledge of this information, the information was hearsay, and it violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront an out-of-court witness. We find the officer did testify to his personal knowledge and that there were not out-of-court statements made during his testimony such that there was no hearsay and thereby no confrontation clause concerns. Appellant’s third assignment of error alleges the trial court erred by sentencing him to both counts of theft and aggravated robbery, since the theft is lesser included offenses and they should have merged for sentencing. The State concedes assignment of error three. As such we overrule appellant’s first two assignments of error and sustain his third assignment and vacate the trial court’s sentence and remand the matter for resentencing. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1044 |
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State v. Tucker
| 115308 | Suppression; marijuana; citation. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress. The search of the defendant’s vehicle was unlawful. Although marijuana is now legal in Ohio, it is not legal to smoke it in a vehicle. The defendant admitted he smoked marijuana in his car and the officer issued a citation for that. There was no indication that the defendant had committed any other offense, and therefore the search of the defendant’s vehicle was unlawful. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
3/26/2026
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3/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1045 |
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