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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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State v. Bastawros
| 113348 | Drug possession; attempt; conditions of community-control sanctions; judicial bias; R.C. 2701.03; affidavit of disqualification. Affirmed. The trial court did not err by imposing the sale of the defendant’s home as a condition of the community-control sanctions imposed since the sale related to the criminal conduct underlying the offenses as charged and appellate courts lack jurisdiction to consider allegations of bias advanced against the trial judge because those challenges must be advanced through R.C. Ch. 2701 and an affidavit of disqualification filed with the Ohio Supreme Court. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/25/2024
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7/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2809 |
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State v. Greene
| 112931 | Rape; sexual battery; felonious assault; kidnapping; gross sexual imposition; disseminating matter harmful to juveniles; plain error; prejudicial statements to jury; victims; burden of proof; beyond a reasonable doubt; allied offenses; merger; jury instructions; ineffective assistance of counsel. It was plain error for the trial court to have imposed sentence on certain kidnapping and sex offenses where those were clearly allied offenses of similar import. Sentences vacated and case remanded for resentencing. The remaining kidnapping convictions should not merge. The defendant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. It was inadvisable for the trial court to attempt to expand upon the statutory definition of “reasonable doubt” in its jury instructions but the defendant did not show prejudicial error when considering the instructions as a whole. There was substantial, credible evidence presented of the defendant’s guilt and the trial court simply attempted to illustrate, by way of an example, what might constitute an important life decision and what proof might amount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt under those circumstances. The trial court’s passing reference to the alleged victims as the “victims” during voir dire was not prejudicial. The prosecutor’s reference to the alleged victims as the “victims” during trial is also not a basis to order a new trial. Where the defendant presented a complete defense, denying all sexual interactions with the alleged victims, it was not plain error for the trial court to decide not to instruct the jury on the elements of sexual battery as a lesser included offense. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request such an instruction, as that was clearly a tactical decision | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/25/2024
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7/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2804 |
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State v. Bright
| 112799 | Ineffective assistance; plain error; Crim.R. 52(B); expert testimony; lay testimony; Evid.R. 701; Evid.R. 702; Crim.R. 16(K); expert reports; SANE nurse; social worker; DNA analyst; competency of a witness; Evid.R. 601; R.C. 2317.01; prosecutorial misconduct; cumulative error; sufficiency; manifest weight; life sentence; nunc pro tunc. We conclude that Bright’s defense counsel was not deficient, and that the trial court did not commit plain error. Further, his convictions were not against the sufficiency or manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, Bright’s convictions are affirmed. However, we remand the matter to the trial court to correct its sentencing entry nunc pro tunc. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
7/25/2024
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7/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2803 |
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Keyse v. Cleveland Clinic Found.
| 113264 | Biddle claim; unauthorized disclosure; third party; summary judgment; motions in limine. - A Biddle claim requires proof of the unauthorized, unprivileged disclosure to a third party of nonpublic medical information that a physician or hospital has learned within a physician-patient relationship; the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendant hospital on plaintiff’s Biddle claim where there was no evidence that the defendant had intentionally or unintentionally disclosed plaintiff’s medical information to anyone; rather, the evidence was clear that plaintiff’s sister, who was an employee of defendant hospital, had accessed plaintiff’s medical information without authorization to do so; any argument regarding the trial court’s granting of appellee’s pre-trial motions in limine was rendered moot in light of appellate court’s judgment affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to appellee. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
7/25/2024
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7/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2806 |
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State v. Smith
| 113455 | Felonious assault; self-defense; weight of the evidence. The defendant’s conviction for felonious assault, including two separate firearm specifications, is affirmed because it is not against the weight of the evidence presented at the jury trial. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/25/2024
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7/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2811 |
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Camacho v. Rose-Mary, Johanna Graselli Rehab., Inc.
| 112793 | Discovery; Civ.R. 26(B); privilege; physician-patient privilege; R.C. 2317.02; protected health information; records of third parties; de novo review; Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act; HIPAA; 45 C.F.R. 160.103; R.C. Ch. 3798; covered entity; “de-identified health information”; 45 C.F.R. 164.502(d); privilege log. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
7/25/2024
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7/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2802 |
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E.A. v. A.A.
| 113295 | Domestic violence; protection order; future harm; conviction; no contact; objections; grant; sufficiency and manifest weight; credibility; relevancy. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the respondent a DVCPO or by granting the respondent’s objections to the original order. The trial court’s judgment was supported by competent and credible evidence. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/25/2024
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7/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2807 |
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Stag Indus. Holdings, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision
| 113500 | Tax; real property; value; board of revision; board of tax appeals; arm’s-length sale; market value; increase; allocation; land; improvements; land value; building value; fiscal officer; auditor; independent judgment; reasonable and lawful; burden; record; lack of evidence; support; reversed; remanded; modify. Reversed and remanded decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) to affirm the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision’s (“BOR’s”) allocation of a property’s total value between land and improvements for the relevant tax year. The BTA’s decision regarding the allocation was unreasonable and unlawful when there was no evidence in the record to support the BOR’s increase in the land value or from which the BTA could independently determine a land value other than the value set by the fiscal officer or county auditor. The matter was remanded with instructions to modify the allocation. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/25/2024
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7/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2814 |
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State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., Co. v. Garcia
| 112434 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; declaratory judgment; auto insurance policy; duty to defend; duty to indemnify; liability coverage; shooting from vehicle; interpretation of auto insurance policy; definition of insured; ownership, maintenance or use; instrumentality of harm; clearly and indisputably outside policy coverage. Trial court did not err in granting insurer’s motion for summary judgment and denying appellant insured’s motion for partial summary judgment on complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that insurer owed appellant no duty under auto insurance policy to defend or indemnify appellant against claims asserted against him in wrongful death action that arose from appellant’s shooting victim while appellant was in the driver’s seat of his vehicle. Claims asserted against appellant in the wrongful death action were clearly and indisputably outside policy coverage. Appellant was an insured under the policy for the ownership, maintenance, or use of his vehicle. The instrumentality that caused the harm was appellant’s gun — not his vehicle. Likewise, the conduct that caused the harm was appellant shooting the victim with his gun — not appellant’s ownership, maintenance, or use of his vehicle. Based on the plain terms of the policy at issue, the vehicle must be more than the mere situs of the injury-causing event. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
7/25/2024
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7/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2800 |
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Fischer v. Monarch Van Lines, L.L.C.
| 113465 | Personal jurisdiction; minimum contacts. The trial court did not err in dismissing because the plaintiffs did not establish at trial that the out-of-state defendants had the requisite contacts with Ohio for the purposes of establishing the trial court’s jurisdiction over the action. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/25/2024
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7/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2812 |
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Pizarro-Allen v. Allen
| 112566 | Sale of marital property; pending foreclosure; moot. Appellant’s appeal challenging the trial court order granting a motion to sell marital property in a divorce proceeding was moot where the property was subject to a separate foreclosure action, the foreclosure was granted and the property sold. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
7/25/2024
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7/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2801 |
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State v. White
| 113255 | Reagan Tokes Law; due process; sentencing agreement; waive. Defendant’s sentence, imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law, is constitutional. Defendant waived his right to challenge the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in exchange for a favorable sentence. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/25/2024
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7/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2805 |
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Pryor v. St. Coleman & Affiliates Fed. Credit Union
| 113450 | Motion for default judgment; Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; Civ. R. 8(A). Judgment affirmed. Pro se appellant’s complaint did not comport with Civ.R. 8(A) when the claim that he is entitled to relief under the theory of quantum meruit is a legal conclusion that he did not support by citing to any statutes, case law, or facts. Trial court properly denied appellant’s motion for default judgment because appellee responded to the complaint with a motion to dismiss and therefore answered the complaint in accordance with Civ.R. 12. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
7/25/2024
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7/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2810 |
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State v. Vega-Medina
| 113320 | Manifest weight; kidnapping; abduction; force; threat of force; ineffective assistance of counsel; violent-offender designation; sentence; R.C. 2929.11; findings; contrary to law. Defendant’s kidnapping and abduction convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where competent, credible evidence showed that defendant’s conduct paralyzed the victim with fear and rendered her incapable of escape. Trial counsel was not ineffective even though he did not impeach the victim on two inconsistencies between her statements to police and her trial testimony because the inconsistencies involved were minor and did not involve facts material to the defendant’s conduct and the evidence overwhelmingly supported the defendant’s convictions. The trial court failed to properly designate the defendant as a violent offender because the court failed to comply with the procedure outlined in the violent-offender statute and it was not clear whether the defendant understood his violent-offender duties. Defendant’s sentences were not contrary to law where his sentences were within the applicable statutory ranges and the court complied with the purposes and principles of sentencing outlined in R.C. 2929.11. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/25/2024
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7/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2808 |
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State v. Pizzaro
| 113481 | Language; interpreter; Crim.R. 11; R.C. 2311.14; Sup.R. 88; plea hearing; knowing; intelligent; voluntary; colloquy. The trial court did not err by failing to appoint an interpreter during the plea proceedings. Defendant’s guilty pleas were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/25/2024
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7/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2813 |
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Costa v. O'Malley
| 113896 | Writ of habeas corpus; contempt; adequate remedy; magistrate; sua sponte dismissal; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); moot; judicial notice; stay; custody; direct contempt; indirect contempt; R.C. 2705.01; R.C. 2705.02; adequate remedy at law; appeal. Petition for writ of habeas corpus was sua sponte dismissed where the petitioner’s claims were moot because she was no longer subject to confinement by the respondent warden and an intervening order issued by the respondent judge superseded the respondent magistrate’s order that was alleged to be void. Further, petitioner has and is pursuing an adequate remedy at law that precludes relief in habeas corpus. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/19/2024
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7/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2815 |
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Roe v. Taylor
| 113448 | Summary judgment; child pornography; foreign judgment; R.C. 2111.17; App.R. 12; App.R. 16. Appellant entered into an agreement with federal prosecutors to avoid prosecution for child pornography. The appellees, who were the minor victims and are now adults, obtained a judgment against appellant, who for years has tried to evade paying the judgment. Appellees brought a creditor’s claim against appellant, identifying themselves using pseudonyms, as they had done in all prior litigation. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellees. Appellant’s claim that the appellees are not allowed to file suit using pseudonyms has repeatedly been raised and found to be without merit in both state and federal court. His argument is once again wholly without merit. The court declines to review any assigned error that appellant raised but failed to argue separately in his brief. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
7/18/2024
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7/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2714 |
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Cleveland v. Hale
| 113434 | Aggravated disorderly conduct; disorderly conduct; resisting arrest; harm to law enforcement; Cleveland Cod.Ord. 605.03; R.C. 2921.33(B); misdemeanor convictions; sufficiency; manifest weight. Affirmed appellant’s misdemeanor convictions for two counts of aggravated disorderly conduct, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest with harm to law enforcement. Appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/18/2024
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7/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2712 |
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State v. Thompson
| 113472 | Recognizance bond; surety; forfeiture; defendant incarcerated; | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
7/18/2024
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7/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2715 |
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State v. Allen
| 113430 | Reagan Tokes Law, S.B. 201. Appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law fails based on the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Hacker, 2023-Ohio-2535, that the law is constitutional. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
7/18/2024
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7/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2711 |
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State v. Harris
| 113128 | Felonious assault; aggravated robbery; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel; other acts evidence. Appellant’s convictions for felonious assault and aggravated robbery were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence when the evidence showed that appellant, along with his codefendant girlfriend, used a gun and assaulted the girlfriend’s mother to force the mother to give them more money. Appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel and any other acts evidence that was admitted at trial was either admissible or harmless error. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
7/18/2024
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7/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2707 |
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State v. Harris
| 113364 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; inconsistent testimony; jury instruction; R.C. 2903.03; sufficient provocation. Defendant-appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Absent evidence of sufficient provocation for purposes of R.C. 2903.03(A), the trial court did not err when it declined to provide a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. | Kilbane | Cuyahoga |
7/18/2024
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7/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2709 |
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In re C.M.
| 113440, 113441 | R.C. 2151.28(L); findings of fact and conclusions of law; dependency. Juvenile court’s judgments finding the children dependent reversed and remanded where the juvenile court’s journal entries did not comply with the requirements of R.C. 2151.28(L) because the court did not make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
7/18/2024
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7/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2713 |
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12312 Mayfield Rd., L.L.C. v. High & Low Little Italy, L.L.C.
| 113549 | Motion to compel; attorney-client privilege; R.C. 2317.02; discovery request; agency; in camera inspection; evidentiary hearing. The trial court abused its discretion when it granted defendant-appellee’s motion to compel without first conducting an evidentiary hearing or in camera inspection of the documents to determine whether plaintiff-appellant’s real estate agents/brokers were agents for attorney-client privilege purposes. | Kilbane | Cuyahoga |
7/18/2024
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7/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2717 |
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Doe v. Roe
| 113488 | pseudonym; final appealable order; Civ.R. 10(A); abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ultimately denying plaintiff’s motion to proceed under pseudonym status because plaintiff’s privacy interests do not substantially outweigh the presumption of open judicial proceedings. Applying the factors established by Ohio courts, we find that this is not an exceptional circumstance requiring the use of pseudonyms. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
7/18/2024
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7/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2716 |
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Gerace v. Cleveland Clinic Found.
| 113231 | Civ.R. 56; summary judgment; tortious interference; attorney-client privilege; work-product; common-interest doctrine. The trial court did not err in granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment when there was no genuine issue of material fact that appellees did not tortiously interfere in appellant’s relationship with his previous employer. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to compel because the discovery in question was covered by the work-product and common-interest doctrine. Appellees’ counsel also was not required to create a privilege log. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
7/18/2024
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7/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2708 |
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State v. Fitzgerald
| 113400 | Consecutive prison terms; firearm specification; R.C. 2929.14; same act or transaction; separate times, locations, or different victims; joinder for trial; Crim.R. 8; guilty plea; complete admission of facts in indictment. The felonious assault and drug trafficking offenses were not committed as part of the same transaction, and the trial court was therefore required to order all of the firearm specifications to be served consecutively. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
7/18/2024
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7/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2710 |
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State v. Kriwinsky
| 114031 | Marsy’s Law; R.C. 2930.071(A)(2)(b)(i) - (iv). The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the victim’s motions to quash the defense’s motions for discovery because the defense’s request for the records proves the factors in R.C. 2930.071(A)(2)(b)(i) - (iv). | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
7/15/2024
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7/15/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2690 |
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State v. Whitley
| 113350 | R.C. 2945.39; retain jurisdiction; clear and convincing evidence; attempted aggravated arson; lighter fluid; substantial step; threat. Appellant’s conduct of spraying a flammable accelerant in or around her residence building where she knew individuals lived, threatening to burn down the building, possessing two disposable lighters, and dislodging the fire alarm from the wall constitutes clear and convincing evidence that appellant took substantial steps to commit the act of aggravated arson. Trial court did not err in finding that appellant committed attempted aggravated arson to satisfy R.C. 2945.39 to retain jurisdiction over her case. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
7/11/2024
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7/11/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2637 |
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State v. Bolan
| 113695 | Conceded error; imposition of postrelease control; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b); R.C. 2967.28(C); R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(e) and (f); sentence contrary to law. The trial court erred when it imposed postrelease-control sanctions without providing the statutorily required advisements. Sentence is vacated and remanded for a limited purpose sentencing hearing to properly impose the statutorily mandated period of postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2967.28(C). | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
7/11/2024
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7/11/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2640 |
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State v. Hopper
| 113243 | Insufficient evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; ineffective assistance of trial counsel; rape; R.C. 2907.02; Evid.R. 806(6); business records; Evid.R. 803(4); statements for the purposes of treatment and diagnosis; lesser included offense; preindictment delay. Appellant’s rape conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant was not prejudiced by preindictment delay because he was indicted via his DNA before the statute of limitations expired, and his claims that he had witnesses who could have challenged the victim’s recitation of events were speculative. Appellant was not denied the effective assistance of trial counsel when his attorney did not request a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of sexual battery. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
7/11/2024
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7/11/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2635 |
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A.E. v. J.E.
| 112847 | Financial misconduct; spousal support; child support; marital property; marital home; temporary spousal support; attorney fees; marital debt; loan; life insurance; proposed shared parenting; parenting time; restraining orders. Trial court erred in finding that husband committed financial misconduct by dissipating marital funds when he liquidated restricted stock units when the court restrained his income and he had no other means of paying his tax liabilities. The trial court erred by ordering husband to pay wife more than half of his income as temporary spousal support. The trial court erred in substituting its own valuation for the marital home based on the court’s review of comparable home values instead of the valuation of husband’s appraiser, who appraised the property one month before trial. Trial court erred in ordering husband to pay wife’s attorney fees when there was no evidence that he was in a superior financial position or that he caused wife to incur an increase in attorney fees. Trial court erred in requiring husband to pay off a loan wife received from her parents when the loan was used to pay college tuitions for the parties’ adult children and to pay real estate taxes on the parties’ marital home, which was wife’s responsibility. Trial court erred in designating wife the beneficiary of a lapsed insurance policy. Trial court erred in not adopting the husband’s shared parenting plan and in finding that a reduction in father’s parenting time was in the child’s best interest. The trial court failed to account for funding missing from wife’s lawyer’s IOLTA account. Trial court erred in leaving all restraining orders in place without specifically identifying the restraining orders and identifying the restrained parties. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/11/2024
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7/11/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2644 |
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State v. Ransom
| 113225 | Sufficient; manifest weight; credibility; inconsistent; aid; abet; complicit; encourage; support; intent; closing; prosecutorial misconduct; prejudice; ineffective assistance of counsel; gruesome; autopsy; crime scene; photographs; excessive. The defendant’s convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the State’s introduction of crime scene and autopsy photographs. The State did not commit prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments by referencing the metadata that was incorporated into a video exhibit introduced by the defense. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/11/2024
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7/11/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2634 |
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Aurora Smile Ctr., L.L.C. v. Seats
| 113574 | Civ.R. 55; default judgment; Civ.R. 54(B); R.C. 2505.02; final, appealable order. Because the trial court’s default judgment entry did not dispose of all claims, it was not a final, appealable order and this court lacks jurisdiction to consider plaintiff-appellant’s arguments. | Kilbane | Cuyahoga |
7/11/2024
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7/11/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2639 |
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State v. Chmura
| 113421 | Postrelease control; PRC; R.C. 2967.28; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); leave to appeal; R.C. 2953.08(A)(2); consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); R.C. 2929.13(B); community-control sanctions. Judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Chmura’s consecutive-sentencing argument cannot be reviewed because R.C. 2953.08(A)(2) bars appellate review of a prison term imposed upon a fourth- or fifth-degree felony pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(B), absent a motion for leave. Nevertheless, Chmura’s argument regarding PRC is sustained, because the trial court failed to advise Chmura of PRC at the sentencing hearing but imposed it in the sentencing entry. Therefore, the case is remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of advising Chmura of PRC. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
7/11/2024
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7/11/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2638 |
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State v. Finley
| 113247 | Murder; right to counsel; Giglio/Brady material; Evid.R. 608; Evid.R. 402; Evid.R. 403; manifest weight of the evidence. Murder conviction affirmed. Appellant was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceeding and knowingly and voluntarily waived the appearance of one of his two attorneys for a limited portion of the trial because the attorney was ill. There was no Brady or Giglio violation. The law espoused in those cases did not apply because the subject information — the investigating detective’s social media posts — was publicly available information; it was neither in the State’s sole possession nor suppressed by the State. Further, in accordance with Evid.R. 402, 403, and 608, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing the defense to cross-examine the detective on his past social media posts. Appellant’s murder conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
7/11/2024
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7/11/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2636 |
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State v. Martin
| 113177 | Anders Brief; felony sentencing; Crim.R. 11 colloquy; knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea; sentence not contrary to law; Regan Tokes Law; indefinite sentencing. Defendant’s appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted because there are no meritorious arguments that exist and an appeal would be wholly frivolous. The three potential issues for review are overruled, appellant counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted, and the appeal is dismissed. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
7/11/2024
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7/11/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2633 |
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State ex rel. KeltanBW, Inc. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm.
| 113884 | Prohibition, Ohio Civil Rights Commission, R.C. Chapter 4112 and general subject-matter jurisdiction to investigate employer discrimination, adequate remedy by appeal, voidable versus void judgment. The relator seeks a writ of prohibition on the basis that the Ohio Civil Rights Commission possesses no jurisdiction to investigate a discrimination claim based upon the facts pertinent to the claim of discrimination. Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a judicial entity or quasi-judicial entity having general jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action has the authority to determine its own jurisdiction. In addition, a party challenging a judicial entity or quasi-judicial entity’s jurisdiction possesses an adequate remedy at law through an appeal from the court’s holding that it has jurisdiction. Pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4112, the OCRC possesses the general subject-matter jurisdiction to investigate the claim that an employee, who is disabled, was unlawfully discriminated against by an employer for failing to accommodate her and provide time off for medical procedures. Also, when a specific action is within a judicial entity or quasi-judicial entity’s subject-matter jurisdiction, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction renders any judgment voidable, not void. Finally, when a judicial entity or quasi-judicial entity possesses basic subject-matter jurisdiction to act, and an appeal is available, a writ of prohibition will not issue. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/10/2024
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7/11/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2641 |
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State v. Miller
| 112894 | Consecutive sentences. The court failed to make the appropriate statutory finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the danger the offender poses to the public. Case remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting a resentencing hearing. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2024
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7/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2578 |
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State v. Bates
| 113454 | Formal withdrawal of not guilty pleas; acceptance of guilty pleas; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); consecutive-sentence findings; clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Trial court did not err in accepting defendant’s guilty pleas notwithstanding defendant’s failure to formally withdraw his previously entered not guilty pleas. By knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily pleading guilty to the charges at issue in connection with his negotiated plea agreement, defendant withdrew his previously entered not guilty pleas. The record did not clearly and convincingly fail to support the trial court’s findings in support of the imposition of consecutive sentences. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2024
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7/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2587 |
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Blagg v. S.T.O.F.F.E. Fed. Credit Union
| 112993 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; employer; R.C. 4112.01(A)(2); racial harassment; hostile work environment; R.C. 4112.01(A); severe or pervasive; retaliation; R.C. 4112.02(I); termination; voluntary resignation; failure to investigate; aiding and abetting retaliation; R.C. 4112.02(J). Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees on appellant’s claims of a hostile work environment in violation of R.C. 4112.02(A), retaliation in violation of R.C. 4112.02(I) and aiding and abetting retaliation in violation of R.C. 4112.02(J). Where credit union employed four employees in Ohio at the time of the alleged racial harassment at issue, credit union was an employer for purposes of appellant’s hostile-work-environment claim under R.C. 4112.01(A)(2) and 4112.02(A). Even assuming appellant, a white woman, subjectively perceived her workplace to be a racially hostile work environment, there was no genuine issue of fact that a reasonable person would not find appellant’s work environment to be objectively racially hostile. The evidence appellant presented involving black coworkers’ discussion of race and race-related current events following the murder of George Floyd, offhand comments relating to race and the playing of videos of protests of violence against blacks, which appellant stated made her uncomfortable, was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an objectively racially hostile work environment. Because the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence was that appellant voluntarily quit her employment at the credit union and appellant did not present evidence showing a causal connection between her filing a discrimination charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and the credit union’s alleged mishandling of her account funds, appellant could not recover on retaliation claims against the credit union. Appellant could not prevail on retaliation claim based on appellee’s failure to investigate her harassment complaint because the alleged failure to investigate was not separate from the alleged uninvestigated complaint but was, in fact, the same harassment complaint. Given that appellees were entitled to summary judgment on appellant’s retaliation claims, appellant’s claims of aiding and abetting that retaliation necessarily fail as a matter of law. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2024
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7/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2579 |
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In re D.D.J.
| 113283 | Legal custody; R.C. 2151.23; R.C. 3109.04 best interest of the child; abuse of discretion. The trial court considered the evidence presented at trial and explicitly applied the pertinent factors under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). Assessing the credibility of the witnesses, the trial court found mother’s allegations of sexual and physical abuse unsubstantiated and that mother’s persistent allegations despite the lack of proof are counter to the child’s best interest. Having reviewed the record and testimony presented in this case, we decline mother’s request to independently review the credibility of the witnesses and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding legal custody to father. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2024
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7/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2581 |
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State v. K.O.
| 113368; 113369; 113370 | Application for sealing record; R.C. 2953.32; convictions of more than two third-degree felonies. Trial court’s granting of defendant’s motion to seal record of conviction is reversed. Per the plain language of the statute, R.C. 2953.32 does not apply to convictions of more than two third-degree felonies. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2024
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7/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2582 |
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Montgomery v. ExchangeBase, L.L.C.
| 113401 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; expanding allegations on summary judgment; disparate treatment sex discrimination; hostile work environment; constructive discharge; appellant’s burden on appeal; App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16(A)(7). It was appellant’s burden, as the appellant, to affirmatively demonstrate reversible error in the record and to substantiate her arguments in support thereof. Appellant did not show that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees on appellant’s claims of sex discrimination, hostile work environment, constructive discharge, violation of public policy, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Appellant made no mention of her claims for violation of public policy or intentional infliction of emotional distress in her appellate brief. As to her remaining claims, while appellees met their burden under Civ.R. 56(C), presenting evidence of specific facts in the record demonstrating their entitlement to summary judgment based on the lack of evidence of essential elements of each of appellant’s claims, appellant did not meet her reciprocal burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial on her claims. Appellant did not apply the applicable legal standards and did not show, based on evidence in the record, that a reasonable factfinder could find in favor of appellant on her sex discrimination, hostile work environment, or constructive discharge claims. Review of the record did not reveal any genuine issues of material fact that would preclude summary judgment in favor of appellees. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2024
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7/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2585 |
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State v. Hsu
| 113392 | Sufficiency of the evidence; promoting prostitution; R.C. 2907.22(A); possession of criminal tools; circumstantial evidence; establishing, maintaining, supervising, or operating a brothel; supervising, managing, or controlling the activities of a prostitute; manifest weight of the evidence; merger; allied offenses of similar import; R.C. 2941.25; offenses committed separately; different animus. Appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In addition, the trial court did not err in declining to merge the two separate offenses of promoting prostitution for purposes of sentencing because the offenses were not allied offenses of similar import. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2024
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7/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2584 |
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Quellos v. Johnson
| 113428 | Summary judgment; savings statute; R.C. 2305.19; one-use restriction; substantially similar claims. Summary judgment affirmed where plaintiffs’ third complaint was barred by the one-use restriction that prohibits more than one use of the savings statute to refile a complaint. The allegations in plaintiffs’ third complaint are substantially the same as those alleged in their prior two complaints and are, therefore, barred by the one-use restriction applicable to the savings statute. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2024
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7/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2586 |
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RSS UBSCM2018C9-OH IMG, L.L.C. v. 1360 E. Ninth CLE, L.L.C.
| 112858 | Foreclosure; summary judgment; admission; default; Evid.R. 803(6); business records exception. Judgment affirmed. Plaintiff established all the necessary elements to entitle it to a foreclosure. No genuine issues of material fact remain, plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and when construing the evidence most strongly in defendant’s favor, summary judgment is appropriate. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2024
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7/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2577 |
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State v. Contes
| 113215 | Consecutive sentences; maximum sentences; statutory findings; nunc pro tunc; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); ineffective assistance of counsel; interpreter; hearing impaired. The trial court properly made the requisite statutory findings in the record to satisfy the requirements of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) to impose consecutive sentences; however, the court’s judgment entry does not reflect the findings made in open court. The convictions and consecutive sentences are affirmed, but the case is remanded for the limited purpose of the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc to correct its journal entry to match the findings made in open court pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). The imposition of maximum sentence was proper and upheld. Last, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to secure an interpreter or hearing-impaired assistance when defendant never requested these aids and nothing in the record indicates defendant was unable to understand or hear during the proceedings. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2024
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7/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2580 |
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State v. Harris
| 113388 | Rape; R.C. 2907.03(A)(2); sufficiency; Crim.R. 29; manifest weight. The defendant’s conviction for rape was supported by sufficient evidence where the victim testified that, after consensually cuddling with the defendant, the defendant forcibly compelled sexual conduct over the victim’s objections by grabbing her wrists, strangling her by the neck using both hands, putting his weight on her, removing her pants and penetrating her. The conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. While the two had a history of consensual sexual encounters and had exchanged flirtatious electronic messages before the encounter at issue, the victim’s testimony about the assault was not significantly contradicted by other evidence in the record. This is not the exceptional case where the evidence weighs heavily against a conviction. Judgment affirmed. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2024
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7/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2583 |
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Alami v. Khalid
| 113140 | Settlement agreement; default judgment; Civ.R. 6(C)(1); may; permissive; mandatory; damages; reasonable certainty; manifest weight; harmless error. Trial court properly overruled oral motion for default judgment where defendants appeared in the action, defendants did not waive any defenses, and plaintiff failed to provide written notice of intent to seek default judgment. Trial court properly denied motion to enforcement settlement agreement even though it made a minor error of law in interpreting the contract because plaintiff failed to prove damages with reasonable certainty. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/27/2024
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6/27/2024
| 2024-Ohio-2456 |
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