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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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State v. Terrell
| 114674, 114903, 115693 | Abuse of discretion; present and future ability to pay. Trial court abused its discretion in imposing a total of $40,000 in fines when it relied on a year-old post-sentence-investigation report that reported the appellant had two jobs and was financially comfortable when at the time of sentencing the appellant had spent the last year in jail under a $100,000 bond. Further, the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that appellant had the future ability to pay based primarily on his potential to earn disregarding his lengthy prison term and status as a convicted felon with serious felony convictions. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
2/26/2026
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2/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-652 |
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Seminole Industries, Inc. v. Walthaw
| 114911 | Magistrate’s decision; failure to file objections; failure to file transcript; Civ.R. 53; plain error; waiver; App.R. 9; App.R. 16; App.R. 12; pro se litigant. Judgment affirmed. Appellant failed to file a transcript and objections to the magistrate’s decision granting appellee’s eviction action. If a party fails to follow the procedures set forth in Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii) and (iv) by failing to object to a magistrate’s decision and failing to provide a transcript to the trial court, that party waives any appeal as to those findings other than claims of plain error. Appellant failed to argue and demonstrate that this is an “extremely rare case” in which exceptional circumstances exist warranting application of the plain-error doctrine in order to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. Additionally, appellant failed to make any references to the record identifying the alleged errors in violation of App.R. 16(A)(3), failed to provide any arguments supporting the contentions she presented for our review in violation of App.R. 16(A)(7), and failed to provide this court with the transcript from the housing court proceedings below as set forth in App.R. 9(B). Under App.R. 12(A)(2), we may disregard appellant’s assignment of error on these grounds alone. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
2/26/2026
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2/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-653 |
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Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, L.L.P. v. Middleman
| 115121 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); de novo; breach of contract; legal services; payment; pro bono; friends and family matter; standard billable matter; dispute; agreement; whole; handwritten notation; email exchange; incorporated; language; unclear; circumstances; extrinsic evidence; parties’ intention; triable issues. Reversed the trial court’s decision granting plaintiff-appellee’s motion for summary judgment on a claim for breach of contract alleging defendant-appellant failed to pay for legal services rendered. Because appellant did not raise a choice-of-law argument in the trial court, it was not addressed on appeal. The terms of the engagement agreement included a handwritten notation that incorporated exceptions noted in an email exchange. The parties disputed whether the matter was to be handled as a pro bono or friends-and-family matter or as a standard billable matter. Because the language of the agreement was unclear, and it appeared that the circumstances surrounding the agreement invested the language of the contract with a special meaning, extrinsic evidence could be considered in an effort to give effect to the parties’ intention. Triable issues of fact remained, and the case was remanded. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/26/2026
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2/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-654 |
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State v. Ponzie
| 115172 | Guilty plea; indefinite sentence; Reagan Tokes Law; presentence motion to withdraw plea. Judgment affirmed. Appellant’s plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into. Although the trial court did not explain to appellant how it arrived at its calculations under the Reagan Tokes Law, it nonetheless informed appellant of the minimum and maximum times he could receive. Thus, the trial court did not completely fail to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and the appellant was required to show that he was prejudiced, which he failed to do. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw his plea. Although appellant’s motion was timely made, the record demonstrates that appellant was (1) represented by competent counsel, (2) given a full Crim.R. 11 hearing prior to entering his guilty plea at which he indicated that he understood the nature of the charges and possible penalties, and (3) given full and fair consideration on his request to withdraw his plea. Further, the record did not demonstrate that appellant had a plausible defense, and moreover, the State would be prejudiced by allowing him to withdraw his plea. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
2/26/2026
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2/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-655 |
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State v. Hairston
| 115189 | Sufficiency; manifest weight; tampering with evidence. Defendant’s conviction for tampering with evidence was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
2/26/2026
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2/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-656 |
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Hansbrough v. Marshall Dennehey, P.C.
| 115312 | Arbitration; arbitrability; motion to compel arbitration; motion to stay; Ohio Arbitration Act; Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”); interstate commerce; Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (“EFAA”); Franken Amendment; sexual harassment; hostile environment; employment discrimination; sexual-harassment dispute; standard of review; notice pleading; 9 U.S.C. 3; 9 U.S.C. 4; 9 U.S.C. 401; 9 U.S.C. 402; 48 C.F.R. 222.7402; R.C. 2711.02; R.C. 2711.03; R.C. 4112.01; R.C. 4112.02; Civ.R. 8; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); App.R. 3(C)(2); App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). Judgment affirmed and remanded. The trial court correctly denied defendants-appellants’ motion to stay and compel arbitration. The EFAA barred arbitration of plaintiff-appellee’s entire case against his former law firm and the managing attorney of the firm’s Cleveland, Ohio office. Reviewing the complaint de novo under Ohio’s notice-pleading standard, plaintiff-appellee alleged facts occurring after the effective date of the EFAA that, if true, would support a claim of sexual harassment under Ohio law. In addition to some post-EFAA remarks being sexual in nature, hostile environment sexual harassment under Ohio law does not require comments and behavior to be explicitly sexual in nature and can occur when abuse is directed at an employee because of that employee’s sex. The trial court also correctly concluded that if the EFAA renders an arbitration agreement unenforceable, the bar to arbitration applies to the entire case, not merely claims of sexual assault or sexual harassment. Plaintiff-appellee’s argument in the alternative, that defendants-appellants had waived their right to seek an order compelling arbitration by coupling their motion to compel with a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, was moot. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
2/26/2026
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2/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-657 |
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In re A.M.
| 115441 | Juvenile court; mandatory bindover; probable cause; aggravated robbery; gun; final, appealable order; category-two offense; R.C. 2152.02(BB)(1); R.C. 2152.10; R.C. 2152.12; R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b); 2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii); Juv.R. 30(A); actual possession; firearm; reasonable belief. Reversed the juvenile court’s decision denying the State’s request for a mandatory bindover to adult court. In relation to an alleged category-two offense of aggravated robbery, the State presented evidence that raises more than a mere suspicion and provides a reasonable belief that A.M. was in actual possession of a firearm and brandished that firearm in furtherance of the acts charged, and which was sufficient to demonstrate probable cause. The case was remanded for the juvenile court to enter a finding of probable cause and, pursuant to R.C. 2152.12, order the case transferred to the General Division of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/26/2026
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2/26/2026
| 2026-Ohio-658 |
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State v. Lynch
| 114955 | Community-control sanctions; probation; termination; revocation; authority; absconding; tolling; R.C. 2929.15(A)(1); initiated; arrest warrant; State v. Rue, 2020-Ohio-6706; de novo; misapplication. Trial court erred when it terminated the defendant’s community-control sanctions by misapplying State v. Rue, 2020-Ohio-6706. The trial court issued an arrest warrant before the stated expiration of the defendant’s community-control sanctions, thus initiating a revocation proceeding. The trial court did not determine whether the defendant received notice of the violations that would allow the trial court to retain the authority to determine whether any tolling event occurred and what effect that had on the community-control term. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-553 |
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State v. Abdel-Haq
| 114977 | Evid.R. 608; Evid.R. 404; impeachment; extrinsic evidence. The trial court erred by precluding the defendant from testifying as to the victim’s prior conduct for the purposes of establishing the defendant’s state of mind as it related to the claim of self-defense and, in addition, erred by precluding the defense from questioning the victim about that prior conduct after the victim opened the door to the question by making a contradictory statement during trial. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-554 |
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State v. Lott
| 114992 | Civ.R. 60(B)(4); postconviction-relief petition; intellectual disability; capital; death penalty; successive petitions. - Judgment reversed and remanded. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Lott’s motion as a successive petition for postconviction relief because it was properly filed pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). Res judicata should not bar Lott from challenging his capital sentence when the reason for the Civ.R. 60(B) did not exist at the time Lott filed his previous petitions and postconviction appeals. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-555 |
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In re A.C.
| 115009 | Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(1); due process. Judgment reversed and remanded. The trial court erred by prematurely ruling on appellee’s objections to a magistrate’s decision prior to the ten-day extension established by Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(1), depriving appellant of the opportunity to file his own objections or respond to appellee’s objection. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-556 |
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Pivonka v. Partika
| 115056 | Class certification; subject-matter jurisdiction; R.C. 5160.37(L)(3). Appeal dismissed; case remanded for the trial court to address the question of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 5160.37(L)(3), which went into effect on September 30, 2025, and potentially divests the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction in this case. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-557 |
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State v. McDonald
| 115085 | Lay opinion testimony; abuse of discretion; Evid.R. 701; sufficient evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; tampering with records; obstruction of official business; tampering with evidence; dereliction of duty; telecommunications fraud; felony sentence; contrary to law; excessive sentence. Judgment affirmed. Law enforcement officials testified as lay, not expert witnesses. The officials testified based on their law enforcement experiences, previous investigations, and perceptions of the evidence at issue. Their testimonies were permissible lay opinion testimonies under Evid.R. 701. The convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The sentence was neither contrary to law nor excessive. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-558 |
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State v. Bryant
| 115096 | Ineffective assistance of counsel; self-defense; mental-health evaluations; competency to stand trial; sanity at the time of the act; prejudice; expert. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when counsel failed to revisit the trial court’s referral for an examination for sanity at the time of the act after the defendant was restored to competency. Counsel’s strategic decision to advance a self-defense argument at trial necessarily required a complete investigation into the defendant’s mental-health condition, including ensuring all evaluations were completed and potentially retaining an expert. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-559 |
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State v. Cox
| 115137 | Withdrawal of guilty plea; presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea; State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527 (1992); Crim.R. 32.1; nine-factor test. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cox’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea because Cox failed to demonstrate a reasonable and legitimate basis for withdrawing his plea. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-560 |
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State v. Edmond
| 115142 | Joinder; sever; simple and direct evidence; hearsay; police report; harmless error; manifest weight of the evidence; prosecutorial misconduct; effective assistance of counsel; statute of limitations; tolling; John Doe indictment; cumulative error. Judgment affirmed. Appellant’s convictions for rape and kidnapping are affirmed. The State’s evidence at trial was simple and direct and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to sever. The State also satisfied its burden of persuasion, and the convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did abuse its discretion in allowing a portion of the police report at issue to be read to the jury because it was inadmissible hearsay and did not fall into any recognized exception to hearsay. This error, however, was harmless. Additionally, the court’s review of the record demonstrates that there was no prosecutorial misconduct and appellant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel because of the failure of his defense counsel to object during closing arguments. The appellant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel because his defense counsel failed to argue that his offenses were barred by the statute of limitations because the State’s filing of a John Doe indictment appropriately tolled the statute of limitations. The cumulative-error doctrine did not apply to this case. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-561 |
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Combs v. Sherwin-Williams Co.
| 115175 | Motion to show cause; civil contempt; abuse of discretion; agreed order; consent order; due process; pro se. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found appellant in contempt of court. Appellant did not present any testimony or evidence that his attorney was not authorized to enter into an interim agreement with appellee at a status conference; challenge the allegation that he failed to comply with the terms of the resulting agreed order; or otherwise rebut appellee’s initial showing of contempt. Nor were appellant’s due-process rights violated based on the record. Appellant — who was initially represented by counsel but elected to proceed pro se — had notice of appellee’s motion to show cause; a reasonable opportunity to defend against or explain the allegations raised therein, both in writing and at the show-cause hearing; and the opportunity to testify and to call other witnesses in his defense or to offer an explanation for his failure to comply with the agreed order. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-562 |
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State v. Liotta
| 115226 | Voluntary plea; de novo review; Crim.R. 11(C); Dangler; maximum penalty; presumption of prison; R.C. 2929.12; sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); postrelease control; separation-of-powers doctrine; definite term. Judgment affirmed. Appellant’s plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. A trial court is not required to advise defendant at the time of the plea that there is a presumption of prison. Although a trial court must consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12, findings are not required. Finally, postrelease control does not violate the separation-of- powers doctrine. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-564 |
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State v. Dowdell
| 115919 | Bail; bond; R.C. 2937.222; clear and convincing evidence. The court did not err by denying the defendant bail after he allegedly raped a 14-year-old at gunpoint. The court held a hearing and evidence was presented that the defendant committed the offense, that he posed a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the community and that no release conditions would assure the safety of the community. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-565 |
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State v. Gilmore
| 115243 | Manifest weight of the evidence; having weapons while under disability; credibility; inconsistent statements; split sentences; no-contact order; prison term. Appellant was convicted of two counts of having weapons while under disability and one count of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle. Appellant’s convictions arose from a dispute he had with the victim, his ex-girlfriend. The victim testified that he drove to her work and threatened to kill her. When he left, she followed him in her car. When she stopped at a stop sign, she testified that he pointed a gun at her. Appellant alleged that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence, alleging that the testimony of the victim was not credible because of her inconsistent statements she made to police and her testimony at trial. The State responded directing the appellate court to the credibility of appellant’s mother who also testified at trial. The appellate court held that credibility issues are primarily for the finder of fact and that the finder of fact is in the best position to judge a witness’s credibility. The court also noted that a trier of fact is free to accept or reject any or all testimony of any witness. The court held that appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant also challenged the trial court’s imposition of a no-contact order. The State conceded that the trial court’s no-contact order was improper. The appellate court agreed, recognizing that when person is sentenced to prison on an offense, the trial court is precluded from imposing a community-control sanction, such as a no-contact order, on the same offense. As a result, the appellate court vacated the no-contact order. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
2/19/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-577 |
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State v. Smith
| 111274 | Remand from Ohio Supreme Court; admissibility of police body-camera video; victim’s out-of-court statements; victim does not testify at trial; Confrontation Clause; hearsay; harmless error; medical treatment or diagnosis exception to rule against hearsay. On remand from the Ohio Supreme Court we were instructed to review the nontestimonial out-of-court statements a victim, who did not testify at trial, made to EMTs that were captured by a police officer’s body camera. Upon review, we found that the statements were admissible as hearsay under the medical treatment or diagnosis exception. We were further instructed to revisit our harmless error analysis of the admissible evidence, excluding the inadmissible out-of-court statements the victim made to the police officers, which violated the Confrontation Clause. Upon review, we found insufficient evidence to identify the defendant as the person who assaulted the victim. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/13/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-552 |
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State ex rel. Winn v. Krivosh
| 115888 | Civ.R. 12(B)(6); motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; writ of prohibition; patently and unambiguously lacked personal jurisdiction; waiver; guilty pleas; R.C. 2969.25(C)(1). Complaint for a writ of prohibition alleging that trial court patently and unambiguously lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant in underlying criminal cases dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Relator waived any challenge to personal jurisdiction by entering guilty pleas. Complaint was also subject to dismissal for failure to strictly comply with R.C. 2969.25(C)(1). | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
2/13/2026
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2/19/2026
| 2026-Ohio-566 |
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Cleveland v. Shaker Hts. Apts. Owner, L.L.C.
| 114852, 114853, 114854 | Motion to suppress; consent to search/inspect; criminal penalties for organizations; community-control sanctions; fines; R.C. 2929.31. Trial court properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress where there was competent, credible evidence in the record to establish that the inspector obtained consent from persons with common and/or apparent authority. Trial court abused its discretion in imposing fines well over the statutory maximum. Trial court was permitted to impose community-control sanctions on an organization where R.C. 2929.31 applied to organizational fines but did not preclude the court from imposing penalties under R.C. 2929.24-2929.28. However, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing community- control conditions that were overbroad and did not meet the misdemeanor sentencing requirements of rehabilitation and preventing future crime. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-449 |
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Patrick v. Patrick
| 115037 | Divorce; marital property division; valuation dates; financial accounts; retirement accounts; posttrial evidence; spousal support; temporary spousal support; temporary support; economic misconduct; distributive award; attorney’s fees; R.C. 3105.171(A)(2); R.C. 3105.171(E)(4); R.C. 3105.18(C)(1); R.C. 3105.73(A); App.R. 16(A)(7). Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The trial court, which determined that the marriage terminated on the first day of trial (August 4, 2020), abused its discretion by dividing the parties’ marital financial accounts using February 2023 balances while dividing marital retirement accounts as of August 4, 2020, without an adequate explanation, logically related to the facts of the case, for the inconsistent valuation dates. On remand, the court must divide the financial accounts as of August 4, 2020, based on testimony and admitted exhibits, without reopening trial or rebalancing equities elsewhere. The court also erred to the extent it relied on posttrial, nonadmitted materials to assign a $148,025 value to appellant’s Thrift Savings Account. The decree must be corrected to the only value supported by the evidence, $77,219, though no broader recalculation of the defined-contribution retirement division is required because the decree divides those accounts as of August 4, 2020, plus earnings/gains/losses. The trial court’s spousal support determinations are affirmed. The award of $4,000 per month for 44 months from appellant to appellee commencing August 1, 2023, was within the court’s discretion under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1), and appellant was not entitled to a credit that would shorten the permanent-support duration based on temporary support previously paid. The trial court also acted within its discretion in finding that appellee was not entitled to her request of $12,000 per month indefinitely with the trial court to retain jurisdiction. Appellee’s economic misconduct claim, through which she sought a distributive award, failed for lack of proof of the requisite wrongful intent under R.C. 3105.171(E)(4). Finally, the attorney’s fee award to appellee of $35,000 is affirmed as equitable under R.C. 3105.73(A) given the parties’ income disparity and the stipulation to the reasonableness of appellee’s fees. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-450 |
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State v. Centers
| 115050 | Rape; kidnapping; gross sexual imposition; hearsay; abuse of discretion; prior consistent statement; merger; allied offenses of similar import; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the victim’s prior consistent statement to rebut the charge that she was fabricating allegations against the defendant-appellant. The rape and gross sexual imposition offenses were committed separately and were not allied offenses of similar import. The convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-451 |
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State v. Willis
| 115052 | Misdemeanor sentencing; definite jail term; suspended sentence; community control; R.C. 2929.24; R.C. 2929.25; R.C. 2929.41(A); concurrency; felony prison term; contrary to law; sentencing error; illegal sentence; jail-time credit; remand for resentencing; statutory authority; ripeness; cross-appeal; jurisdiction. When a trial court imposes a definite misdemeanor jail term under R.C. 2929.24, it may not suspend that jail term unless it also imposes community-control sanctions in accordance with R.C. 2929.25; a sentence that imposes definite misdemeanor jail terms but suspends them without community control is contrary to law. Further, absent a statutory exception, R.C. 2929.41(A) requires misdemeanor jail terms to be run concurrently with a felony prison term imposed in the same case, and a sentencing entry that suspends the misdemeanor jail terms rather than imposing a lawful concurrent disposition is subject to correction on direct appeal. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-452 |
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State v. Al-Shami
| 115077 | Rape; R.C. 2907.02(A); anal intercourse; cunnilingus; penetration; sufficiency. Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. Penetration is not required to prove cunnilingus; therefore, testimony that appellant was eating or licking the victims’ vaginas was sufficient to establish cunnilingus. Nevertheless, penetration, however slight, is required to establish anal intercourse. Testimony that appellant was trying to get “his private” in the victim’s “behind” was not sufficient to establish penetration. However, when victim testified that there were times when appellant put his penis in her “behind” and “it hurt” there was sufficient evidence to establish penetration. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-453 |
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M.T.O. v. A.O.
| 115091, 115208 | Subject-matter jurisdiction; R.C. 3109.051; R.C. 3107.15; visitation and companionship rights post-adoption; final appealable orders. Judgment vacated, in part, remanded in part and dismissed in part. Ohio’s adoption statute R.C. 3101.15 divests a trial court of its subject-matter jurisdiction under R.C. 3109.051 to grant visitation rights to relatives of biological parents whose rights have been terminated by an adoption decree. Thus, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear appellant’s motion to intervene in the underlying action. Accordingly, the trial court’s order dismissing appellant’s motion to intervene is vacated and this matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to dismiss appellant’s motion to intervene for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Additionally, the trial court had no subject-matter jurisdiction to issue its order denying appellant’s motion for relief from judgment and, therefore, this order is void. A void order is not a final appealable order. The appeal from this order is dismissed. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-454 |
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State v. Sowell
| 115120 | Postrelease control; res judicata; voidable. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to terminate postrelease control. Any challenge to appellant’s sentence should have been brought up on direct appeal, and appellant’s untimely argument is barred by res judicata. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-455 |
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Highland Hills v. Safford
| 115179 | Codified ordinances; minor misdemeanor; right to counsel; venue; plain error; R.C. 2901.12; Ohio Const., art. X, § 12; manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant’s conviction for a violation of Village of Highland Hills Cod.Ord. 331.08 was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant was not entitled to assigned counsel because he was cited with a minor misdemeanor and the right to counsel does not apply to minor misdemeanors that have no possibility of jail time. Appellant did not challenge venue at the trial court level; therefore, we review appellant’s claim that the city did not establish venue for plain error. We find no plain error — venue was clearly established by witness testimony. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-456 |
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Euclid v. R.C.
| 115182 | Application; expungement; minor misdemeanor; conviction; de novo; expunge; R.C. 2953.31(B)(1); R.C. 2953.32; former R.C. 2953.32; R.C. 2953.32(D)(2); R.C. 2953.32(D)(5); Ohio Rules of Superintendence; guidelines; public policy. Vacated the trial court’s denial of appellant’s application to expunge the record of his minor-misdemeanor conviction and remanded the matter to the trial court to engage in the required analysis under R.C. 2953.32. The trial court erred in finding R.C. 2953.32 does not permit the physical destruction of records, in finding the records at issue may not be expunged pursuant to the Ohio Rules of Superintendence, and in finding an expungement of appellant’s record would be per se against public policy. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-457 |
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J.E.S. v. A.S.
| 115183 | Support; spousal; child; impute income; minimum wage; voluntarily underemployed; abuse of discretion; R.C. 3105.18 factors; R.C. 3119.01 factors; pending appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court; mandate; subject-matter jurisdiction; S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.04(D). Judgment affirmed. The trial court had jurisdiction to proceed with the case following the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision to decline Husband’s jurisdictional appeal on May 27, 2025, and issue an amended judgment entry, two days later on May 29, 2025. S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.04(D) does not require a mandate as Husband contends. Therefore, May 27, 2025, the day the decision was issued, guides us. Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imputing minimum wage income to Wife, declining to award spousal support, and ordering Husband to pay child support. Husband reargues the same facts and issues we considered in the previous appeal, referencing the gifts Wife received from B.T. (her father), her monthly expenses, and the money in B.T.’s trust account that Wife receives as a beneficiary. However, we found that the trial court’s consideration of these gift was improper. As a result, the trial court and this court cannot consider B.T.’s gifts to Wife when determining Wife’s income. When reviewing the other evidence in the record, it is clear that Wife did not have any source of income in her own name. The court found the testimony established that Wife is voluntarily underemployed based upon her education, work history, and potential employment. Notably, other than referring to the gifts Wife received from B.T., which we previously found was improper for the trial court to consider, Husband can point to no evidence of Wife’s income. Therefore, the trial court’s conclusion that Wife was voluntarily underemployed and imputing an annual minimum wage income of $22,256 was not an abuse of discretion. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-458 |
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J.S. v. A.S.
| 115184 | Attorney fees; mandate rule; guardian ad litem fees; R.C. 3105.73(A); Ohio Sup.R. 48.02(H)(3). Reversed and remanded. The trial court’s award of attorney fees to appellee is reversed and remanded because the trial court was considering financial support appellant received from her father when making determinations, the award of attorney fees was not supported by the record, and the trial court failed to follow the mandate of the appellate court on remand. The trial court’s allocation of guardian ad litem fees is reversed and remanded because it is not supported by the record and does not follow Ohio Sup.R. 48.02(H)(3). | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-459 |
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D.E. v. R.M.
| 115201 | Separation agreement; divorce; contract; duress. The parties entered into a separation agreement regarding all matters involved in their divorce. Defendant stated on the record that he read the agreement, that he voluntarily signed it, and that he was not forced or coerced to sign it. Thus, defendant’s assigned errors were overruled, and the trial court’s judgment entry of divorce was affirmed. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-460 |
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Fast Tract Title Servs., Inc. v. Barry
| 115213 | Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss; fraud claim; tort claim; contract claim; economic-loss rule; separate and distinct damages; piercing-the-corporate-veil claim. Where the plaintiff-appellant’s fraud claim failed to seek damages separate and distinct from damages awarded under a breach-of-contract claim, the trial court properly dismissed the fraud complaint and its related piercing-the-corporate-veil claim. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-461 |
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DiSanto v. United States Steel Corp.
| 115241 | Denial of pro hac vice motion; Gov.Bar R. XII; factors for trial court to review; decision to deny the motion lacked any rationale; failure to apply factors; abuse of discretion; judgment reversed and remanded. Appellants appealed the trial court’s denial of their three motions for pro hac vice admission. Upon review we find the trial court failed to support its decision with any rationale and failed to apply any the nine factors appellate courts instruct trial courts to use when reviewing motions for pro hac vice. The trial court’s failure to support its decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. Judgment reversed and matter remanded. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-462 |
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SRS 2019, L.L.C. v. ARK Mgt., L.L.C.
| 115251 | Breach of contract; unjust enrichment; void; R.C. 4735.02; weight of the evidence; damages; R.C. 2323.51; frivolous conduct. Affirmed. The trial court did not err by concluding that an enforceable contract existed based on the claims asserted in the complaint and at trial for damages stemming from a breach of the agreement, and the trial court’s determination that the plaintiff failed to prove damages was not against the weight of the evidence. And finally, because the plaintiff failed to file a motion for attorney fees under R.C. 2323.51, no claim for fees was preserved. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-463 |
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Independence v. Murphy
| 115268 | Ineffective assistance of counsel; trial strategy; prejudice; mistrial; discovery irregularity; evidentiary irregularity; cross-examination; impeachment; bench trial; operating a vehicle while intoxicated; ("OVI"); speeding; seatbelt violation; R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a); R.C. 4511.21(D)(5); R.C. 4513.263(B)(1); Crim.R. 29; body-camera footage; impaired-driver report. Judgment affirmed. Appellant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel where, during cross-examination of state trooper, it emerged that defense counsel and the trooper had different versions of the trooper’s impaired-driver report (a draft used by defense counsel lacking language that the trooper smelled alcohol on appellant’s person versus a final report adding that detail). The record was adequately preserved because the transcript and trial video detailed the discrepancy and the trial court itself explored the differences on the record. Counsel’s decision not to seek a mistrial or extend cross-examination was reasonable trial strategy, particularly in a bench trial where the judge was plainly aware of the inconsistency. There was no showing of prejudice because the City’s case rested on live testimony and body-camera evidence, not the report, the report discrepancy did not meaningfully undercut the trooper’s testimony, and nothing suggested a mistrial would have been granted or the outcome would probably have changed. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-464 |
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In re S.H.
| 115278 | Pro se litigant; Loc.App.R. 3(B)(1); presume regularity; transcript of lower court proceedings; wishes of minor’s parents; special weight accorded to parent’s wishes. This court has discretion to consider an appeal even if the defendant-appellant failed to affix a judgment entry to his or her notice of appeal. Where the defendant-appellant failed to file a copy of the transcript of the lower court proceedings, the court of appeals must presume regularity of those proceedings and overrule the assigned errors. Additionally, language in the lower court’s judgment entry that the court considered the parents’ wishes and concerns as expressed by them to the court — coupled with the absence of a trial transcript — indicated that the lower court applied the correct standard and accorded special weight to the Father’s wishes. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-465 |
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Grdn. DST Servs., L.L.C. v. Elite Technology, L.L.C.
| 115283 | Motion for sanctions; contempt; jurisdiction; agreed judgment entry; consent decree; retention of jurisdiction after final judgment; inherent authority to enforce judgments; contempt; R.C. 2705.02. Because the terms of the parties’ settlement were outlined in an agreed judgment entry, the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce the judgment and address a party’s failure to comply. The trial court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to consider appellant’s motion for sanctions. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-466 |
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In re A.H.
| 115457 | Permanent custody, parental rights, best interest of the child, motion to continue, abuse of discretion, R.C. 2151.352, Unger factors, R.C. 2151.414, unconstitutional as applied, abandonment, R.C. 2151.011(C), manifest weight, clear and convincing evidence. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s motion to continue when she was properly notified and failed to appear on numerous occasions. The trial court’s finding that Mother abandoned the child was not against the manifest weight of the evidence when Mother had not visited or supported the child in two years. Finally, it was in the best interest of the child to terminate Mother’s parental rights and grant permanent custody to the agency. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-467 |
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In re K.C.
| 115491 | Permanent custody; manifest weight of the evidence; clear and convincing evidence; best interests; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.415(D)(4). Affirmed. We affirm the juvenile court’s decision granting the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services’ motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody and terminating appellant’s parental rights where the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that permanent custody was in the child’s best interests pursuant to both R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-468 |
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Strongsville v. Smith
| 115551, 115552 | Accelerated appeal; traffic citations; motion to dismiss; speedy trial; tolling; reasonable; R.C. 2945.72(H). - Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for violating speedy trial. The record did not demonstrate that the trial court’s setting of trial beyond the speedy-trial time frame was reasonable for this court to conclude that it qualified as a tolling provision under R.C. 2945.72(H). | Keough | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-469 |
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State v. Evans
| 111986 | App.R. 26; application to reopen an appeal; Murnahan; ineffective assistance of counsel; untimely filing; good cause. An appellant’s application to reopen his appeal is denied where the appellant filed his application outside the 90-day requirement specified in App.R. 26, and appellant failed to provide good cause for his untimely filing. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
2/11/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-448 |
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State v. Velez
| 115848 | Mandamus; Civ.R. 10(A); R.C. 2731.04; R.C. 2969.25(A); R.C. 2969.25(C). The respondent-judge’s motion to dismiss is granted. The complaint for mandamus does not comply with Civ.R. 10(A) that requires the caption of a complaint must include the names and addresses of all the parties. The relator has failed to comply with R.C. 2731.04 that requires an application for a writ of mandamus must be by petition and in the name of the state in the relation of the person applying. In addition, the relator’s complaint for mandamus complaint fails to contain a sworn affidavit that contains a description of each civil action or appeal filed in the previous five years as required by R.C. 2969.25(A). The complaint also fails to contain a statement certified by the institutional cashier setting forth the balance in the inmate’s account for the preceding six months as required by R.C. 2969.25(C). The requirements of R.C. 2969.25 are mandatory and failure to comply with them requires dismissal. Motion to dismiss is granted. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/11/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-470 |
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State ex rel. Annayan v. Gall
| 115966 | Mandamus, pending motions, issue ruling on pending motions, moot. The complaint for a writ of mandamus, to compel the trial court judge to render rulings with regard to pending motions, is moot. The trial court judge has rendered rulings with regard to the claimed pending motions in the underlying consolidated civil actions. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
2/10/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-471 |
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Cleveland Hts. v. Preston
| 114908 | Pro se; civil contempt; moot; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; Traf.R. 11(A); not guilty plea; Double Jeopardy Clause; allied offenses; R.C. 2941.25(A); plain error; constitutionality of a statute; new arguments on appeal; waiver. Appellant appealed various aspects of the trial court’s proceedings concerning three traffic citations she was found guilty of, raising five assignments of error. Her first assignment of error raised issues with the trial court’s finding of contempt for her behavior during her arraignment; however, the issues related to the contempt are moot once she complied with the court’s order which was purged. Her second assignment of error alleged the trial court violated her due-process rights by accepting her not guilty plea because it was not knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily made and that the trial court violated Traf.R. 11(A). Appellant pled not guilty at her arraignment and the case went to trial where the court found her guilty of all charges. As such the trial court did not accept a guilty or no contest plea from her and these requirements do not apply. Similarly, the trial court did not violate Traf.R. 11(A) since appellant was given an opportunity to present a motion to dismiss prior to trial and she did in fact make such a motion, which the trial court denied. Appellant’s third assignment of error alleged the trial court violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, committing plain error, by entering two convictions under the same ordinance for the same expired plates and that these offenses should have been merged as allied offenses. Both of these arguments fail because appellant’s two convictions for driving with expired plates occurred on two separate days and therefore constitute separate offenses such that she was not being punished for the same offense twice nor were they allied offenses of a similar import. Appellant’s fourth assignment of error alleged the local ordinance at issue was unconstitutional, but she failed to raise this issue in the trial court and we decline to exercise discretion to review it for plain error. Appellant’s fifth assignment of error made several arguments that were not raised in the trial court, not supported by any case law and contradicted the record. These new issues on appeal were waived. All assignments of error were overruled and judgment affirmed. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-344 |
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State v. Davis
| 114914 | Ineffective assistance of counsel; lesser-included offense; reckless homicide; murder; Bruton; Confrontation Clause; hearsay; prosecutorial misconduct; joinder; severance; jury instructions; transferred intent; cumulative error; sufficiency of the evidence. Trial counsel was not ineffective even though he did not request a lesser-included offense instruction and did not object to out-of-court statements of the defendant’s coconspirators where the evidence did not support the lesser-included offense instruction and the out-of-court statements were not hearsay and did not violate Bruton or the Confrontation Clause. The State did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct and because there were no errors, there was no cumulative error. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of accomplice liability. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-345 |
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State v. Parker
| 114916 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; circumstantial evidence; accomplice testimony; jury credibility determinations; ShotSpotter technology; surveillance video; GPS ankle-monitor data; ballistics evidence; forensic expert testimony; Confrontation Clause; plain-error review; Crim.R. 29 motion; joint jury trial; firearm specifications; murder conviction; attempted murder conviction; allied offenses; jury instructions; rational trier of fact; appellate standard of review; corroborating evidence; shooting; affirmed judgment. In a joint jury trial arising from a shooting that resulted in the death of a three-year-old child and injuries to another victim, appellant was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and related offenses. The evidence established that a black Mercedes-Benz transported the shooter to and from the scene, that surveillance footage and ShotSpotter data placed the vehicle and gunfire at the precise location and time of the offenses, and that GPS ankle-monitor records corroborated the movements of those involved. An accomplice testified that the defendant exited the vehicle armed with a handgun and fired multiple shots toward the victims’ location, and ballistics testing linked the recovered firearm to the fatal projectile. Although the accomplice admitted prior false statements and testified pursuant to a plea agreement, the jury was instructed to view such testimony with grave suspicion. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find that appellant purposefully shot into a moving vehicle. The essential elements of the offenses were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury did not clearly lose its way in resolving credibility issues. The admission of forensic evidence through expert testimony did not constitute plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel under the Confrontation Clause. Accordingly, the convictions are affirmed. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-346 |
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State v. Inkton
| 115045 | Guilty plea; knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made; Crim.R. 11(C); maximum penalty; consecutive sentences; trial court advisement. Under Ohio law, a trial court is not required to advise a defendant of the possibility that each individual sentence may be imposed consecutively. The trial court fully complied with Crim.R. 11(C), and appellant failed to demonstrate that his pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-347 |
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