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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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Fannie Mae v. Clarkwood Apts., L.P.
| 114542; 114543; 115105 | Final appealable order; final order; substantial right; receiver’s bond; interim order; appointment of a receiver; subject-matter jurisdiction; case consolidation; motion to consolidate; jurisdictional priority rule; event of default; default; ex parte appointment of a receiver; irreparable harm; waiver of notice; clear and convincing evidence; Ohio Const., art. IV, § 3; R.C. 2505.02; Cuyahoga C.P., Gen.Div., Loc.R. 15(J); Cuyahoga C.P., Gen.Div., Loc.R. 15(H); R.C. 2735.01. Affirmed. Appellants’ appeal of the trial court’s modification of the receiver’s bond is overruled because it does not contain a final appealable order. The trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court’s ex parte appointment of a receiver is affirmed where the appellants expressly consented to the ex parte appointment of a receiver after any event of default in their loan documents and appellee showed multiple events of default. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
11/20/2025
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11/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5221 |
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Ori Group, L.L.C. v. Nicols
| 114641 | Cleveland M.C. Hous.Div., Section 3(B)(4)(a), rental registration certificate; forcible-entry-and-detainer actions, R.C. Ch. 1923; final appealable orders, R.C. 2505.02 and 2505.03; mootness doctrine; exceptions to mootness doctrine; Cleveland Codified Ordinance 365.02, nonowner-occupied residential unit registration required. Cleveland Housing local Rule Cleveland M.C. Hous.Div., Section 3(B)(4)(a) is contrary to law and invalid because it conflicts with the purpose and policy of R.C. Ch. 1923 pursuant to this court’s holding in Shaker House LLC v. Daniel, 2022-Ohio-2778 (8th Dist.). The local rule “effectively adds an additional element to an eviction cause of action that is not required by the eviction statutes.” Id. at ¶ 15. The local rule also “abridge[s], enlarges[s], or modif[ies]” the substantive rights of a landlord under R.C. Ch. 1923 in violation of Ohio Const., art. IV, § 5(B). Id. at ¶ 19. The local rule conflicts with Civ.R. 83, Ohio Const., art. IV, § 5(B), and Civ.R. 1(C)(3); exceeds the trial court’s authority under R.C. 1901.181; and allows the Housing Court to use its equitable powers to negate the summary purpose of R.C. Ch. 1923. The issue of the validity of the local rule falls within the mootness exception of capable of repetition yet evading review. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
11/20/2025
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11/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5222 |
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In re M.P.
| 114661 | Juvenile court; child support; amount; potential income; voluntarily underemployed; imputed income; criteria; statutory requirements; reasons; sound reasoning; Juv.R. 40(D); R.C. Ch. 3119; R.C. 3119.05(A); R.C. 3119.01(C)(18)(a); objections; magistrate’s decision; hearing. Reversed the decision of the juvenile court and remanded the matter for a hearing on the issue of child support. The juvenile court did not evaluate the relevant statutory criteria under R.C. 3119.01(C)(18), and there was not sufficient information in the record from which to ascertain whether the juvenile court’s decision for imputing potential income to the child’s father was the product of a sound reasoning process. A juvenile court is permitted to conduct a hearing when ruling on objections to a magistrate’s decision. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/20/2025
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11/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5223 |
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Parma v. Perotti
| 114803 | Postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21; municipal court jurisdiction; R.C. 1901.18; R.C. 1901.20; void judgment. Appeal dismissed. A municipal court lacks jurisdiction to review a petition for postconviction relief filed under R.C. 2953.21 pursuant to State v. Cowan, 2004-Ohio-1583. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
11/20/2025
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11/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5224 |
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Macron Inv. Co. v. Jack Cleveland Casino, L.L.C.
| 114816 | Motion to dismiss; 14-day time period to respond; motion to dismiss converted to motion for summary judgment; waiver. The trial court timely ruled on appellees’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss after the briefing period had expired. Appellant’s claim that the trial court should have converted the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment was never raised below and has therefore been waived on appeal. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
11/20/2025
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11/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5225 |
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Overdrive Espresso, L.L.C. v. Finein
| 114870 | Cognovit note; motion for relief from judgment; meritorious defenses to cognovit notes; consumer transaction. Pursuant to an employment agreement, appellant agreed to reimburse appellee for training costs if she quit or breached the contract within a period of two years of signing the employment agreement. She signed a cognovit note simultaneously with signing the employment agreement requiring that $10,000 be paid if she quit before the two year period had expired. Appellant voluntarily terminated her employment before the two years expired. Appellee filed a complaint and an answer confessing judgment on the cognovit note with the court of common pleas. A judgment entry on the cognovit note was filed the same day in favor of appellee. Almost two and a half months later, appellant filed a motion for relief from judgment on the cognovit note that was subsequently denied by the trial court in a single sentence judgment entry. Appellant appealed alleging that the trial court’s judgment entry denying the motion for relief from judgment was insufficient because it did not adequately explain or give reasons for its denial. Appellant also claimed that she presented numerous meritorious defenses to the cognovit note. A trial court is not required to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law when ruling on a motion for relief from judgment. Appellant argued that the trial court was precluded from rendering a judgment on the cognovit note since the note arose out of a consumer transaction. Since the transaction from which the note arose was not a consumer transaction, the trial court had jurisdiction to render a judgment on it. Appellant’s remaining challenges concerning whether the $10,000 on the note adequately represented training costs, and whether New York law or federal law precluded the note’s enforcement, did not fall within the range of meritorious defenses to a cognovit note. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
11/20/2025
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11/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5226 |
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State v. Rembert
| 114876 | Sex offender; Tier II classification; guilty plea; invited error; ineffective assistance of counsel. Affirmed. The defendant pleaded guilty to reduced charges, in part, in exchange for agreeing to be classified as a Tier II sexual offender, and as a result, any error with the classification was invited. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/20/2025
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11/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5227 |
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State v. Saunders
| 114893 | Community-control sanctions; residential sanctions; consecutive sentences; reimbursement of attorney fees; res judicata. The appellant challenged the two six-month terms of residential sanctions imposed as a condition of community control and the trial court’s order running these terms consecutively to one another. Appellant also challenged the trial court’s 2023 sentencing entry ordering him to reimburse attorney fees. It was in the trial court’s discretion to order six-month jail sentences as a condition of community control. However, the trial court’s decision to run those jail terms consecutively to one another is contrary to law. Finally, to the extent that appellant challenged the trial court’s 2023 sentencing entry ordering him to repay assigned attorney fees, that argument is barred by res judicata. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
11/20/2025
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11/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5228 |
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U.S. Bank Trust Natl. Assn. v. Wittman
| 114918 | Foreclosure; mortgage; summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; de novo review; evidentiary materials; affidavit; personal knowledge; tax foreclosure; R.C. 323.65 to 323.79. Because appellant’s mortgage lien was extinguished at the conclusion of the Tax Foreclosure, appellant failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law in a subsequent foreclosure action on the same lien. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees and denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/20/2025
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11/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5229 |
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State v. Bahner
| 114940 | Rape, gross sexual imposition, child victim, delayed disclosure, social worker, lay testimony, manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed. The social worker testified as a lay, not expert, witness. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the social worker to testify that delayed disclosure is common in child-sexual-abuse cases and to explain why it is common. The witness’s testimony was based on her perceptions as a trained sexual-abuse investigator and was helpful for the jury to understand why a sexual-abuse victim may delay disclosure, as required for lay opinion testimony under Evid.R. 701. Further, the social worker did not offer an opinion as to the truth of the victim’s disclosure, which would have been improper. The weight of the evidence supports the conviction. The victim’s testimony was not so incredible as to cast doubt on the conviction and require a new trial. The jury did not lose its way in resolving conflicts in the victim’s testimony. The case is not an exceptional case in which a manifest miscarriage of justice occurred. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
11/20/2025
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11/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5230 |
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State v. Pubill
| 115018 | Competency; abuse of discretion; presumption of competency; competency hearing; volitional misconduct; sovereign citizen beliefs; R.C. 2909.05; R.C. 2945.37(G); R.C. 2945.371(A). Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding to trial without ordering a new competency evaluation. There was ample reliable, credible evidence supporting finding of competency, including repeated prior findings of competency as specified in a detailed June 22, 2022 report and the trial court’s on-the-record observations of appellant’s organized writings and calculated courtroom conduct. This evidenced deliberate noncooperation and volitional obstruction rather than mental illness. Trial counsel did not identify any intervening decompensation or formally request a new evaluation, and the trial court conducted fulsome pretrial hearings addressing competency, satisfying any hearing requirement. Given the statutory presumption of competency and the permissive (“may”) language with respect to ordering evaluations, the trial court reasonably declined to order a new assessment where the record showed patterned, strategic misconduct, including performative outbursts before the jury, consistent with sovereign-citizen views but not incompetency. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
11/20/2025
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11/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5231 |
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State v. Gaines
| 114223 & 115225 | Reagan Tokes Law; constitutionality; voluntariness of plea; prejudice. - Judgment affirmed. Gaines has not met his burden to demonstrate that the trial court’s imprecise but de minimis, nonconstitutional advisements prejudiced Gaines such that justify vacating the plea. Further, Gaines’s assertions about the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law have already been addressed by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Hacker, 2023-Ohio-2535, and are accordingly overruled. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
11/13/2025
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11/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5132 |
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State v. Steele
| 114554 | Jury instructions; proximate result; ineffective assistance of counsel; plain error; R.C. 1.51; general v. specific statutes; allied offenses; closing argument; vouching; weight of the evidence. The trial court did not commit plain error when it failed to instruct on proximate result where the evidence was straightforward, the issue was not disputed, and the record did not reflect that the jury lost its way when it found the appellant guilty of murder under R.C. 2903.02(B). Additionally, appellant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request the instruction, because appellant was not prejudiced by the omission. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel did not move to dismiss the felonious assault serious physical harm count under R.C. 1.51. While felonious assault serious physical harm is a general statute when compared to felonious assault deadly weapon, the statutes are not irreconcilable. Counsel, therefore, did not commit an error when he did not move to dismiss the count. The trial court did not err when it allowed the prosecution to comment on the failure of the defense to call a witness with knowledge of the crime. A party may comment on the failure of the opposing party to call a witness with knowledge. Here, the appellant generally challenged the State’s key witness’s credibility and the failure of police to pursue investigative leads. The State was permitted to comment on the defense’s failure to call the family member to refute claims made in the State’s case in chief. Further, the State’s commentary did not rise to the level of vouching for its witness. The State was permitted to comment on the testimony of its witness during closing. Appellant’s convictions were supported by the weight of the evidence where the evidence was simple and direct; the sole issue was the identity of the shooter. In addition to eyewitness testimony, there was evidence that appellant took steps to obscure the car driven during the crime and that he was concerned about a witness “snitching” on him. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
11/13/2025
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11/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5133 |
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AGZ Properties, L.L.C. v. Zdolshek
| 114580 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; evidence; personal knowledge; abuse of discretion; genuine issue of material fact; breach of contract; unjust enrichment; fraud; motion to strike. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the parties’ motion to strike evidence. Further, the appellant has not shown that the trial court failed to consider evidence in accordance with Civ.R. 56. Summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee was proper. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
11/13/2025
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11/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5134 |
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State v. Yancy
| 114608 | Admission of evidence; hearsay; excited utterance; Evid.R. 803; foundation; sufficiency of the evidence; complicity; R.C. 2923.03; aid or abet; principal offender; involuntary manslaughter; firearm specification; manifest weight of the evidence; credibility of witness; ineffective assistance of counsel; failure to assert defense; self-defense; trial strategy; nunc pro tunc; appeal perfected; trial court jurisdiction divested; R.C. 2929.14; mandatory prison sentence; R.C. 2941.145; sentencing entry differs from sentence imposed at hearing; Crim.R. 43; sentence contrary to law; plain error; cross-appeal; failure to file brief; App.R. 18(C). The trial court did not err in allowing statements made by the decedent as an excited-utterance exception to hearsay. Appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence with the exception of her conviction on the five-year firearm specification attendant to the involuntary-manslaughter charge. Appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, the trial court erred in failing to sentence appellant on the three-year firearm specification attendant to the aggravated-robbery count. The State’s cross-appeal was dismissed because it failed to file a merit brief in support of its cross-appeal. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/13/2025
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11/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5135 |
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State v. Rykena
| 114702 | Motion to suppress; Fourth Amendment; government actors; state actors; search; Snapchat; National Center for Missing and Exploited Children; private entity; electronic service provider; expectation of privacy; hash matching; child pornography. Affirmed. Trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. The evidence in question was 12 images later determined to contain child pornography that appellant uploaded to his Snapchat account. The trial court did not err when it found that Snapchat was not a state actor when it conducted a hash-matching search of the uploaded images. Once he revealed the images to a third party, Snapchat, appellant no longer had an expectation of privacy in the content of the images. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children conducted their own search that did not extend outside the scope of the search conducted by Snapchat. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
11/13/2025
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11/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5136 |
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State v. Massimiani
| 114755 | Postrelease control; R.C. 2967.28(C). The trial court did not properly impose postrelease control on the appellant because it failed to notify the appellant of the consequences of violating postrelease control. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
11/13/2025
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11/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5137 |
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State v. R.L.
| 114828 | Expungement. The trial court erred when it denied R.L.’s application for expungement and failed to articulate and create a record for this court to engage in a meaningful appellate review. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
11/13/2025
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11/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5138 |
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Cleveland Mun. Court Criminal Div. v. Edgewater Park Manor, L.L.C.
| 114829 | Motion to vacate; subject-matter jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction; mootness. Appellant sought to overturn trial court’s ruling denying its motion to vacate judgment. However, since that decision, the underlying judgment that was the basis of the order has been vacated and the associated judgments and liens were revoked. Appeal dismissed because there were no remaining controversies in issue. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
11/13/2025
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11/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5139 |
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State v. Miller
| 114867 | R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); jail-time credit calculation; competent, credible evidence; plain error. The trial court’s calculation of jail-time credit was not based on competent, credible evidence, and as such, its calculation was plain error. Appellant’s assignment of error is sustained, the trial court’s judgment is vacated and the matter is remanded to the trial court to recalculate appellant’s jail-time credit based on competent, credible evidence. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/13/2025
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11/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5140 |
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State v. Harvey
| 114869 | Guilty plea; ineffective assistance of counsel; statutory speedy trial; judicial bias or intimidation. Judgment affirmed. Trial counsel was not ineffective by failing to raise the issue of statutory speedy trial. The record demonstrates that the trial date was tolled for much of the case because of the defendant’s numerous requests for continuances and his failure to respond to the State’s request for reciprocal discovery. The record further demonstrates that the defendant’s guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into. There was no indication whatsoever of judicial bias or intimidation. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
11/13/2025
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11/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5141 |
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State v. E.B.
| 114897; 114898; 114900 | R.C. 2152.121; mandatory transfer; juvenile court; adult court; bindover; reverse bindover; plain error; ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court committed plain error when it failed to comply with the reverse bindover procedures as mandated in R.C. 2152.121. Counsel’s failure to raise this issue constituted ineffective assistance. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
11/13/2025
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11/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5142 |
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In re S.M.
| 114922 | Termination of parental rights; plain error; limited review; failure to object to magistrate’s decision; failure to provide transcripts for juvenile court’s review. Judgments affirmed. Mother failed to object to the magistrate’s decisions recommending permanent custody of the children be given to the Agency. Mother also failed to file the transcripts in the juvenile and therefore, although she has made them part of the appellate record, we are precluded from reviewing them. Our review is limited and for plain error. We find no error, plain or otherwise, in the trial court’s judgments granting the Agency’s motion for permanent custody. The record demonstrates that both prongs required for an agency to be granted permanent custody were met. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
11/13/2025
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11/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5144 |
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State v. Kirks
| 114949 | Petition for postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21(A)(2); untimely petition; lack of jurisdiction; R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a); unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts. Appellant’s petitions for postconviction relief were properly denied by the trial court. The petitions were facially untimely and appellant failed to present any evidence that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts alleged in his petitions as required pursuant to R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a). As such, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the petitions as a matter of law and they were properly denied without a hearing. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/13/2025
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11/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5145 |
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State v. Jenkins
| 114969 & 114970 | Conceded error; guilty plea; knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made; Crim.R. 11(C); maximum penalty; postrelease control; complete failure to comply. Appellant’s plea was required to be vacated where the trial court completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C) by not advising appellant of the imposition of mandatory postrelease control prior to accepting his plea. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/13/2025
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11/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5146 |
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In re D.C.
| 115133 & 115139 | Department of Youth Services commitment; disposition vacated; remand for new dispositional hearing; R.C. 2907.02; R.C. 2907.05; R.C. 2905.02. Judgment vacated and case remanded. The juvenile court erred by failing to afford D.C. his right of allocution before imposing disposition, committing him to the Ohio Department of Youth Services. Juveniles enjoy a right of allocution analogous to Crim.R. 32(A), and here the juvenile court never invited D.C. to speak in mitigation at his dispositional hearing. Remarks made at the earlier adjudicatory hearing did not cure the error. The juvenile court had moved to the State’s proffer and continued the case for disposition without soliciting mitigation remarks from D.C. Asking only one factual question and proceeding to disposition did not satisfy the allocution requirement. Because alleged lack of remorse and personal accountability were central themes at disposition, the denial was not harmless. The disposition is vacated and the case is remanded for a new dispositional hearing. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
11/13/2025
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11/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5147 |
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State v. Zolikoff
| 114660 | Gross sexual imposition; R.C. 2907.05(A)(4); Evid.R. 404(B); other-acts evidence; motive; preparation or plan; lack of mistake or accident. Defendant appealed his conviction for gross sexual imposition, arguing that he was prejudiced by introduction of other-acts evidence that served no permissible purpose under Evid.R. 404(B). Testimony that defendant had developed relationships with and touched a friend of his daughter years prior to the charged offense did not show motive, preparation or plan, or lack of mistake or accident regarding alleged touching of victim in this case. Inadmissible other-acts evidence prejudiced defense, requiring a new trial, where only defendant and victim had firsthand knowledge regarding the touching at issue. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5040 |
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Estate of Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp.
| 114713 | Motion for class certification; R.C. 2505.39; remand; mandate; law-of-the-case doctrine; standing; concrete injury. The trial court erred in granting class certification where plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not demonstrate that they had suffered a concrete injury. The court further erred by granting class certification in violation of the law-of-the-case doctrine. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5041 |
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State v. Chavers
| 114727 | Sufficient evidence; plain error; ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court erred when it found appellant guilty of the higher degree of the felonies charged because there was not sufficient evidence. The appellant did not argue plain error, so we are not inclined to address it. The appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5042 |
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S. Shore Lake Erie Assets & Operations, L.L.C. v. Johnson
| 114777 | Summary judgment; standing; counterclaims; limited-liability company; vessel; boat; fraud; breach of contract; indemnification; defamation; flooding; broker; third-party defendant; damages; false statement of fact; genuine issue of material fact. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, a boat-brokerage firm, was affirmed as to defendant, the sole member of a limited-liability company, where the defendant failed to present evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact on his counterclaim for defamation. The defendant did not have standing to assert claims on appeal that belonged to the limited-liability company, for which he was the sole member. These claims belonged to the limited-liability company, not the defendant in his individual capacity. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5043 |
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Galloway v. Garmon, Exr.
| 114786, 115075 | Declaratory judgment; summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; de novo; evidence; unauthenticated; contract; agreement; property; real estate; right of first refusal; signed; statute of frauds; offer; acceptance; meeting of the minds; motion for relief from judgment; Civ.R. 60(B); grounds for relief; meritorious claim; abuse of discretion. Affirmed probate court’s decision granting summary judgment to defendants-appellees on plaintiffs-appellants’ claims for “declaration of validity of agreement to sell” and specific performance where there was a lack of admissible evidence to support appellants’ claims, and even if a purported letter were admissible, there was no valid contract. The alleged contract was not signed by a co-owner of the property and arguably violated the statute of frauds, acceptance was not made in a reasonable time, and there was no meeting of the minds. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants’ motion for relief from final judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5044 |
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JTC Solutions, L.L.C. v. New Age Consulting Serv., Inc.
| 114799 | Motion to compel; statutory interpretation; de novo standard of review; R.C. 1335.11(F)(3); mootness; failure to address presented issue; reversal. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it found R.C. 1335.11(F)(3) rendered a contract’s arbitration provision void and denied defendant-appellant’s motion to compel on that basis. Pursuant to this court’s finding that R.C. 1335.11(F)(3) did not void the arbitration provision, the trial court’s alleged failure to state whether the presented facts and parties met the statutory definitions was moot. Where the trial court’s denial of the defendant-appellant’s motion to compel was in error and not based on the merits of the case, the trial court’s order was reversed and the case remanded for further inquiry on the additional arguments raised in the motion to compel. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5045 |
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State v. Smith
| 114814 | Guilty plea; ineffective assistance of counsel; preindictment delay. Judgment affirmed. The defendant failed to establish that his trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to dismiss the indictment based on preindictment delay resulted in actual prejudice to him. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5046 |
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In re K.C.
| 114958 | Kinship Caregiver Act; legal custody; best interests; placement in temporary custody; intensive efforts; foster parents; foster placement; R.C. 2151.353(A)(3); R.C. 2151.011(B)(21); R.C. 2151.4119; R.C. 2151.4115; R.C. 5180.50; R.C. 2151.4118; R.C. 2151.4119; R.C. 2151.412(F)(2); R.C. 2151.417(A). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Order awarding legal custody to foster parents is reversed and remanded for a determination of why legal custody to foster parents rather than maternal great grandmother was in the best interests of the child. Juvenile court did not err when it determined that foster parents have a kin relationship with the child pursuant to the Kinship Caregiver Act and that determination is affirmed. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5047 |
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Monroe v. Petition for Relief From Firearms Disability
| 115011 | R.C. 2923.14(A), “law-abiding life,” application for relief from firearm disability. Denial of application for relief from firearm disability affirmed. Appellant failed to file a hearing transcript, firearm disability arose from appellant’s commission of multiple offenses of violence, and multiple arrest warrants had been issued since appellant’s conviction regarding his failure to appear in court. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5048 |
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Davis v. JLW Constr. Group, L.L.C.
| 115033 | Failure to file transcript; App.R. 9(C); App.R. 9(D); presumption of regularity. The court found in favor of the defendant after a trial. The plaintiff appealed but failed to file the trial transcript. This court must presume regularity and affirm. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5049 |
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In re T.F.
| 115224 | Manifest weight; sufficiency; best interest; clear and convincing; reasonable time; failure to remedy; lack of commitment; abandonment; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e); R.C. 2151.414(E)(1); R.C. 2151.414(E)(4); R.C. 2151.414(E)(10); R.C. 2151.415(D); R.C. 2151.415(A); R.C. 2151.353(G); R.C. 2151.412(H)(2); R.C. 2151.412(F)(2). Judgment affirmed. Permanent custody to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Mother continuously failed to remedy substance abuse, mental-health, housing, and anger-management issues. She had inconsistent visitation with the children, which did not progress beyond supervised visits. Mother missed 39 drug screens and had no prospective sobriety date. Her visits with the children often included 30- to 45-minute phone distractions. One child became inconsolable when mother no-showed. Evidence also supported the juvenile court’s finding that the children’s father had abandoned them. These findings supported the conclusion that the children could not or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. The statutory best-interest factors supported custody to CCDCFS, including, but not limited to, the guardian ad litem’s recommendation, the children’s custodial history since December 2023, and their need for a legally secure placement. Mother’s manifest-weight and sufficiency challenges failed because competent, credible evidence established each statutory element. A finding that a judgment is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a finding that sufficient evidence supports the judgment. We reject mother’s argument that CCDCFS moved too quickly or was required to secure placement with a relative. The agency’s filing of its motion for permanent custody complied with R.C. 2151.415(A) because the R.C. 2151.353(G) one-year temporary custody deadline neared. Temporary custody continued through disposition, and the juvenile court concluded that further extension would have been improper under R.C. 2151.415(D). No relatives filed a motion for legal-custody, CCDCFS was not required to rehabilitate nonparty relatives, and there was no requirement to favor relatives under R.C. 2151.414. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5051 |
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In re E.W.
| 115323 | Parental rights; permanent custody; R.C. 2151.419; reasonable-efforts findings; reasonable efforts by the agency; manifest weight of the evidence; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); child could not or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time; R.C. 2151.414(E)(11); R.C. 2151.414(D); best interests of the child. This court has consistently declined to require findings that reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal or return of a child safely home pursuant to R.C. 2151.419, and we continue to do so. This court found no error when the juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence to support its finding that at least one of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applied and that it was in the best interests of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5052 |
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State v. Landers
| 114910 | Misdemeanor conviction; voluntarily service; mootness doctrine. Dismissed. The defendant has voluntarily served the entirety of the sentence imposed for the misdemeanor domestic-violence offense and has failed to demonstrate a collateral disability, and as a result, this appeal is moot and must be dismissed. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/5/2025
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11/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5143 |
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In re N.A.-S.
| 115191 | Permanent custody; manifest weight of the evidence; clear and convincing evidence; plain error. The trial court’s decision to grant permanent custody to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) was supported by clear and convincing evidence and was also not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mother’s other assignments of error are overruled because she did not raise them at the trial-court level nor argue plain error on appeal. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
10/31/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5050 |
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State ex rel. Eldridge v. Kilbane
| 115338 | Mandamus; prohibition; jurisdiction; priority of jurisdiction rule; forcible entry and detainer action; quiet title claim; fraud; amendment of pleadings; and unprofessional behavior. This court dismissed a complaint for mandamus and prohibition. The priority of jurisdiction rule did not apply; a forcible entry and detainer action in municipal court does not deprive the common pleas court of jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of quiet title and fraud between the same parties and the same parcel of property. Unprofessional behavior by a judge, even if true, does not deprive the judge of jurisdiction. The relator did not properly seek to amend her complaint. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
10/31/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5053 |
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S. Shore Lake Erie Assets & Operations, L.L.C. v. Johnson
| 114726 | Motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; moot; voluntary dismissal with prejudice; breach of contract; App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16(A)(7); App.R. 16(A); failure to cite any authorities or statutes; failure to separately argue assigned error; failure to construct an argument on appeal. The plaintiff-appellee’s fraud claim became moot when the trial court granted the party’s motion to dismiss the claim with prejudice and, accordingly any challenge to the fraud claim is moot. Where defendant-appellant failed to cite any authorities or statutes and failed to separately argue the second and third assignments of error, those assignments of error are overruled. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
10/30/2025
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10/30/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4950 |
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State v. Lee-Robinson
| 114783 | Forgery; receiving stolen property; sufficiency of the evidence; identity. Affirmed. The defendant’s convictions relating to an altered check were not based on insufficient evidence. Based on the evidence presented, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes based on circumstantial evidence, which included the check clearing in the defendant’s business bank account, the check’s endorsement matching the defendant’s name, the funds being immediately transferred to a CashApp account that bore a username similar to the defendant’s name, and signature comparisons that matched defendant’s signatures on official documents. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
10/30/2025
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10/30/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4951 |
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Cleveland v. Sopjack
| 114807 | Community-control sanction; exterior inspection; abuse of discretion; excessive; overbroad; violation. The trial court abused its discretion when it ordered an exterior inspection of appellant’s uncited residential property as an expanded community-control sanction related to violations on a separate property. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
10/30/2025
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10/30/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4952 |
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State v. Martin
| 114834 | Motion for new trial; Crim.R. 33; newly discovered evidence; recanted testimony; independent review; abuse of discretion; credibility. There was no evidence that trial court failed to independently review the record when ruling on a motion for new trial even though the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law tracked the language in the State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions because the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law accurately reflected the facts and the law and there was no evidence that the court rubber-stamped the State’s proposed findings and conclusions. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that recanting witnesses’ testimony was not credible where the testimony required the court to believe that three law enforcement agencies and the witnesses’ defense lawyer engaged in conspiracy and the witnesses’ original trial testimony was consistent with the testimony of another eyewitness and with other corroborating evidence. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/30/2025
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10/30/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4953 |
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Grand v. Cleveland Clinic Found.
| 114851 | Medical claim, R.C. 2305.113(E)(3); affidavit of merit, Civ.R. 10(D)(2)(a); dismissal without prejudice; Civ.R. 10(D)(2)(d); final appealable order, R.C. 2505.02; motion to dismiss, Civ.R. 12(B)(6); Civ.R. 12(C); motion for judgment on the pleadings. Appellant’s complaint set forth a medical claim as defined by statute. Appellant’s failure to submit an affidavit of merit in support of the claim was properly dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 10(D)(2). Civ.R. 12(C) was not an improper procedural avenue for challenging appellant’s failure to file the affidavit of merit. The judgment did not constitute a final appealable order. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
10/30/2025
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10/30/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4954 |
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In re C.H.
| 114941 | Delinquent; rape; abduction; R.C. 2907.02(A)(2); R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b); R.C. 2905.02(B); sufficiency; manifest weight; consecutive; commitment; R.C. 2152.17(F); R.C. 2929.14(C); juvenile offender; confinement; discretion. Affirmed the juvenile court’s decision adjudicating appellant delinquent of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and of abduction in violation of R.C. 2905.02(B). The decision was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The findings required under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) are not required under R.C. 2152.17(F), which vests the juvenile court with discretion to impose consecutive commitments to the department of youth services. Juvenile offenders are treated differently from adult offenders for purposes of confinement. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/30/2025
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10/30/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4955 |
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State v. D.L.L.
| 115025 | Expungement; eligibility; R.C. 2953.32; statutory construction; de novo; plain language. Judgment vacated and remanded. The statutory language of the applicable version of R.C. 2953.32(A)(1) conveys a clear and definite list of exceptions and plainly and unambiguously enumerates the convictions that are ineligible for expungement. Accordingly, the trial court was required to apply the statute as written and any further interpretation of legislative intent was unwarranted. Based on the statute’s plain language, the two fourth-degree-felony convictions that the defendant sought to expunge are clearly not excluded; the statute does not prohibit the sealing or expunging of fourth-degree-felony convictions in relation to third-degree-felony convictions when the fourth-degree felony convictions are nonviolent and otherwise eligible for expungement. Consequently, the trial court erred in finding that the defendant’s two fourth-degree-felony convictions were not eligible for expungement. Since the trial court incorrectly determined the defendant was an ineligible offender based on its interpretation of excluded convictions alone and did not determine whether he was otherwise ineligible under other statutory requirements and considerations, we remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
10/30/2025
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10/30/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4956 |
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Peiffer Wolf Carr Kane Conway & Wise, APLC v. Washington
| 114319 | Directed verdict; Civ.R. 50(A)(4); quantum meruit; moot; alternate theory of liability; manifest weight of the evidence; jury verdict; remand; new trial on compensatory damages. The trial court did not err when it granted a directed verdict finding the corporate defendants-appellants liable under quantum meruit when, construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the defendants-appellants, demonstrated the only conclusion that could have been reached was that the plaintiff-appellee was entitled to recover its contingency fee under quantum meruit from the corporate defendants. A review of the evidence submitted at trial demonstrated the jury clearly lost its way when it entered its verdict of $8,500,000 in favor of the plaintiff-appellee and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that judgment must be reversed and a new trial on compensatory damages ordered to determine the value of plaintiff-appellee’s legal services rendered to the defendants-appellants. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4839 |
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Rodriguez v. Catholic Charities Corp.
| 114437 | Expert witness testimony; admissibility; causation; speculation; directed verdict; vicarious liability; respondeat superior; apportionment of damages; consent judgment entry; negligent hiring, training, and supervision; wrongful death; survival action; failure to report child abuse or neglect. The Estate of a deceased boy sought damages for claims, including wrongful death, a survival action, failure to report child abuse or neglect and negligent hiring, training and supervision, against Catholic Charities, a community service provider hired by the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services to provide services to the boy’s mother and her family. The boy’s mother and her boyfriend pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter of the boy after law enforcement discovered his body buried in the backyard of his home. Evidence in the record tends to show that the boy died of starvation. The Catholic Charities employee who was assigned to this case pled guilty to food stamp fraud for purchasing the boy’s mother’s food stamps for a reduced price. The Catholic Charities employee and the Estate entered into a consent judgment entry in which the employee admitted liability for the boy’s death. After a jury trial, the court granted a directed verdict on all claims other than Catholic Charities’ negligent hiring, training and supervision of its employee who admitted liability. The court found, as a matter of law, that Catholic Charities was not vicariously liable for the negligence of its employee. The jury found in favor of the Estate and against Catholic Charities and awarded the Estate $12 million. After the court applied the statutory cap on non-economic damages, as well as apportionment under the empty-chair defense, the damage award was reduced to $740,000. The Estate appealed. We find that the trial court erred by refusing to acknowledge the consent judgment entry; ruling that the consent judgment entry was inadmissible at trial; ruling that, as a matter of law, Catholic Charities was not vicariously liable for its employee’s negligence; granting Catholic Charities’ motion for directed verdict; ruling that expert testimony regarding causation was speculative and inadmissible at trial; and apportioning damages. Judgment reversed and case remanded for a new trial. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4840 |
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