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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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State v. Trujillo
| 114113 | Petition for postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21; denial; findings of fact and conclusions of law; affidavit; credibility. The trial court erred in failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in its denial of appellant’s petition for postconviction relief. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/12/2025
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6/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2069 |
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State v. Jackson
| 114131 | Nunc pro tunc order; clerical errors; jail-time credit. The trial court erred when it issued a nunc pro tunc order to correct jail-time credit. A nunc pro tunc order is confined to correcting clerical errors to adjust an order to reflect what actually happened in court. The trial court’s order did not reflect what happened in court, since it added an additional 78 days of jail-time credit that was never discussed on the record at sentencing. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
6/12/2025
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6/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2070 |
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State v. Flowers
| 114287 | Anders; motion to withdraw; guilty plea; Crim.R. 11(C); knowingly, voluntarily, intelligently; dismissed. - Motion to withdraw of appellant’s counsel granted and the appeal dismissed where, after a thorough review of the record pursuant to the procedures set forth in Anders v. California, the appellate court determined that the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C) when accepting appellant’s guilty plea, appellant’s plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and any appeal would be wholly frivolous. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
6/12/2025
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6/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2071 |
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State v. Tramble
| 114431 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; receiving stolen property; R.C. 2913.51(A); intimidation; R.C. 2921.04(B); right to be present; Crim.R. 43(B); abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. After a thorough review of the record, we find that sufficient evidence was presented for a rational trier of fact to find that the elements of receiving stolen property and intimidation of a victim were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We further find that the defendant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Finally, we cannot say that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably and abused its discretion when Tramble was removed from the courtroom during the State’s rebuttal closing argument. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
6/12/2025
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6/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2073 |
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State v. Ledger
| 114506 | Felony sentencing; purposes and principles; seriousness factors; mitigating factors. Indefinite prison term of five to seven and a half years was not contrary to law where the prison terms imposed were within the statutory range and were clearly and convincingly supported by the record. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/12/2025
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6/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2074 |
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In re T.B.
| 114749 | Permanent custody; termination of parental rights; R.C. 2151.353(A)(4); R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(2); R.C. 2151.414(E); best interests; manifest weight; sufficiency; substance abuse; homelessness; case-plan compliance. Judgment affirmed. The juvenile court did not err in granting permanent custody of T.B. to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services. The evidence supported the court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) that T.B. had been in agency custody for over 12 of 22 consecutive months and that permanent custody was in the child’s best interest. Despite mother’s recent progress, the court found she had a chronic history of substance abuse and relapse, lacked stable housing, and had previously had her parental rights terminated with respect to one of T.B.’s siblings. The agency’s efforts at reunification were unsuccessful, and the child needed permanency after more than two years in care. The court’s determinations under both R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and (D)(2) were supported by clear and convincing evidence and the judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
6/12/2025
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6/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2075 |
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In re Petition of Hicks v. Russo
| 115186 | Petition for writ of mandamus; dismissed; sua sponte; moot. Petition for writ of mandamus dismissed, sua sponte, as moot where respondent common pleas court judge had already ruled on the motions to which relator sought to compel rulings prior to the filing of her petition, such that relator had already received all the relief she could have received through her mandamus claim. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/11/2025
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6/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2077 |
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Jacobs v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas
| 114946 | Writ of prohibition, subject-matter jurisdiction, jurisdictional-priority rule, R.C. 2305.01, R.C. 2701.03, courts of concurrent jurisdiction, Supreme Court of Ohio, judicial bias, breach-of-contract claim, negligence claim, basic statutory jurisdiction, adequate remedy at law, and appeal. Relator commenced prohibition actions in the Supreme Court of Ohio and this court to correct an exercise of judicial bias and other errors. Because the court of appeals and the Supreme Court are courts of concurrent jurisdiction for the extraordinary writs and because the action was instituted first in the Supreme Court, the priority-of-jurisdiction principle divested this court of jurisdiction over the prohibition action. Assuming arguendo that the priority-of-jurisdiction principle does not apply, prohibition will not lie in this case. The trial court had basic statutory jurisdiction to hear the breach-of-contract and negligence claims, precluding prohibition. The relator has and is pursuing her adequate remedy at law, an appeal. Prohibition is designed to act as a preventive measure, not to review an accomplished act. Prohibition does not lie to correct instances of judicial bias. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
6/6/2025
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6/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2076 |
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State v. Newberry
| 113844 | Petition for postconviction relief; res judicata; ineffective assistance of counsel; conflict of interest; Brady violation. Appellant convicted for, among other offenses, two counts of murder, petitioned for postconviction relief on basis that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAOC”). IAOC claim was based in part on alleged conflict of interest arising from trial counsel’s prior civil representation of officer that lead investigation of these homicides. Trial counsel’s prior representation of the lead investigator concerned allegations that he and several other officers had failed to complete required trainings. Appellant also alleged IAOC on the basis that trial counsel failed to cross-examine two officers who investigated these homicides about past failures to complete required trainings. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying without hearing appellant’s petition on these claims. Trial counsel disclosed to defendant, prior to trial, his prior representation of the investigator and the officer training issues that case involved. Therefore, appellant could have or did raise these arguments on direct appeal, meaning res judicata prevented him from doing so now. Appellant also claimed the State violated Brady v. Maryland during pretrial discovery by failing to disclose to appellant testimony that one of the officers had provided in an unrelated criminal case regarding his training history. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the State did not violate Brady where this testimony was in the public record of the unrelated criminal trial and, therefore, not in the exclusive control of the prosecution. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
6/5/2025
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6/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2004 |
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Cleveland v. Harvey
| 113877 | Community-control sanctions; failure to comply; housing court; community-control-sanctions-violation hearing; community-control-sanctions-status hearing; R.C. 2929.25; due process. The municipal housing court’s jurisdiction to modify the terms of community-control sanctions is limited by R.C. 2929.25(D)(2), which requires a finding that the offender violated the terms of community-control sanctions before extending the length of the sanctions, imposing a more restrictive term, or imposing a jail term. The court in this case modified the defendant’s community-control sanctions by extending the sanctions for one year and three days and by imposing five days in jail. However, the court failed to first find that the defendant violated the terms of his sanctions. Furthermore, the court did not comply with the defendant’s due-process rights when it spontaneously attempted to “convert” a status hearing into a violation hearing. The court’s judgment is reversed and vacated. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/5/2025
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6/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2005 |
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Broadview Rd. Holdings, L.L.C. v 7800 Broadview, Inc.
| 114298 | Civ.R. 12(C); judgment on the pleadings; allegations in the complaint; breach of contract; fraudulent concealment; negligent misrepresentation; merger doctrine; caveat estoppel; as-is clause; R.C. 5301.253. Appellant appeals the trial court’s grant of appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Reviewing the complaint and answer, we find that appellant properly pled claims for breach of contract, fraudulent concealment and negligent misrepresentation and that the doctrines of caveat emptor and merger, as well as an as-is clause, does not preclude recovery at this stage in the litigation. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/5/2025
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6/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2006 |
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State v. Cooper
| 114411 | Rape; admissibility of evidence; Evid.R. 70; opinion testimony by lay witnesses; delayed disclosures; post-traumatic stress disorder; sufficiency of the evidence; forcible rape; psychological force; manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant’s conviction for rape of a child under 13 years old is affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed three lay witnesses to testify about their opinions pursuant to Evid.R. 701, because the testimony was rationally based on the perception of each witness and it was helpful to the jury. The rape conviction was supported by sufficient evidence in the record. Inconsistent testimony does not factor into a sufficiency analysis, a rape conviction can be based on the victim’s testimony alone, and coercion can be inherent in a parental authority scenario. The rape conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence in the record. Although the victim testified about sexual conduct that she had not disclosed prior to trial, the defendant was convicted of one rape charge, which was consistent with the victim’s disclosure, and acquitted of all other charges. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/5/2025
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6/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2007 |
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State v. Jefferson
| 114457 | Discretionary fine; R.C. 2929.19(B)(5); present and future ability to pay; plain error; presentence-investigation report; ineffective assistance of counsel; failure to object. The trial court imposed a $5,000 fine as part of a criminal defendant’s sentence. Prior to imposing the sentence, the trial court indicated that it had reviewed the presentence-investigation report. The report included information regarding the defendant’s age, education, physical and mental health, and employment history. This information contained in the report is sufficient from which a trial court could reasonably conclude that Jefferson had the ability to pay the imposed fine. As such, it may be inferred that the trial court considered the defendant’s present and future ability to pay the imposed fine. Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the imposition of the fine. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
6/5/2025
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6/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2008 |
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State ex rel. Blalock v. O'Malley
| 114487 | Cuyahoga County Prosecutor Conviction Integrity Unit (“CIU”), investigatory file created by CIU, mandamus, right of relator to requested relief, duty of relator to provide requested relief, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The relator’s request for a writ of mandamus is premised upon the claim that he possesses a right to review an investigatory file created by a Conviction Integrity Unit operated by the county prosecutor’s office. In addition, the relator claims that the county prosecutor possesses a duty to allow the relator to review the investigatory file created through the CIU program. The relator has failed to establish any right or duty with regard to the CIU investigatory file. In addition, the relator possesses or possessed an adequate remedy though an appeal. Complaint for mandamus is denied. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
6/5/2025
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6/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2009 |
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State v. Bolden
| 114504 | Sentencing; aggravated robbery; weapons while under disability; failure to comply; R.C. 2921.331(D); plea agreement; community control; mandatory prison term; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2911.01(A)(1); R.C. 2921.331(B); R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b); R.C. 2923.13(A)(2); R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; R.C. 2929.13; R.C. 2929.14(C)(3); R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); R.C. 2941.141(A); R.C. 2941.145(A); Reagan Tokes; restitution; nunc pro tunc; sentencing entry error; Crim.R. 11(C); Crim.R. 36; App.R. 16(A)(4). Judgment reversed and remanded. The trial court erroneously concluded that it was required to impose a prison term for failure to comply under R.C. 2921.331(D) simply because it imposed prison terms on other counts. R.C. 2921.331(D) mandates consecutive service if a prison term is imposed for a violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), but not that a prison term must be imposed. This error, along with ambiguity regarding whether the court believed it was required to impose prison for the offense of aggravated robbery based on the accompanying firearm specification, necessitates a full resentencing. Because the sentences were interdependent, the trial court must resentence on all counts. In addition, the written sentencing entry did not accurately reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncements, particularly as to the length and concurrency of terms on several counts and improperly included a restitution order that had not been announced during the sentencing hearing. While the restitution amount was consistent with the plea agreement, it must be imposed in the defendant’s presence. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
6/5/2025
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6/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2010 |
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In re N.C.
| 114646 | Parental rights; permanent custody; best interest; manifest weight; R.C. 2152.414; case-plan services; completion. Judgment affirmed. The court’s decision to grant permanent custody is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. While the court erroneously granted permanent custody to CCDCFS on the basis set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), this error is harmless because CCDCFS did not rely on R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) in its motion for permanent custody. Rather, CCDCFS relied on the condition listed in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and argued that one or more of the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(E) apply to the parents of the child at issue. Consistent with CCDCFS’s reliance on R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), the juvenile court found under R.C. 2151.414(E) that “the child cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent,” and the juvenile court found multiple factors under R.C. 2151.414(E) were met, including R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (E)(4). A parent’s successful completion of the terms of a case plan is not dispositive on the issue of reunification. In addition, there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s determination that permanent custody to CCDCFS is in the children’s best interest. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
6/5/2025
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6/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2011 |
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In re N.C.
| 114690 | Permanent custody; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a); best interest; preponderance; R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.414(E); R.C. 2151.414(D)(2); clear and convincing; manifest weight; reasonable-efforts finding; due process; fundamental right; parent; ultimate welfare. Affirmed the juvenile court’s judgment granting permanent custody of the minor child to the agency and terminating all parental rights. The juvenile court engaged in the proper analysis and made the requisite determinations under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), (D)(1) and (E). The juvenile court’s judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, its reasonable-efforts finding was not erroneous, and father’s fundamental right to parent his child was not violated. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/5/2025
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6/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2012 |
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State ex rel. Mason v. Supervisor of Edn.
| 114831 | Public record; request; mandamus; writ; statutory damages; custodian; public office; exception; affidavit; mootness; existing record. The respondent had no duty to produce records that either did not exist or were not clearly described by the relator. The relator’s mandamus claim is moot as to the records that were produced prior to the filing of this action. However, the relator is entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the respondent to disclose the requested educational records because the respondent failed to demonstrate that those records were exempt from public-records disclosure. The relator is entitled to statutory damages in the amount of $1,000. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/4/2025
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6/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2013 |
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Parma Hts. v. Story
| 114006 | Waiver of right to counsel; Crim.R. 10(C); Crim.R. 44; Crim.R. 2(D); Crim.R. 2(C). Vacated and remanded. Appellant’s waiver of his right to counsel was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made where the trial court did not engage in a Crim.R. 10(C) colloquy with appellant. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
5/29/2025
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5/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1928 |
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Shephard v. CrossCountry Mtge., Inc.
| 114149 | Jury trial; age discrimination; McDonnell Douglas analysis; motion for directed verdict; motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV"); R.C. 4112.14(A); prima facie case; legitimate nondiscriminatory reason; pretextual; punitive damages; actual malice; motion for new trial; Civ.R. 59(A); abuse of discretion; Civ.R. 49(B); jury interrogatories; jury verdict; jury confusion and irregularities; Evid.R. 408; severance agreement; failure to object. Appellant appeals trial court’s judgments entries journalizing jury verdicts and the denial of various motions and evidentiary rulings by the trial court throughout the ten-day jury discrimination trial against its ex-employee appellee. On review, we find the trial court properly denied appellant’s motions for directed verdict and motion for JNOV as to appellee’s claims for discrimination and for punitive damages. The case properly went to the jury who found discrimination and awarded punitive damages. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in making evidentiary rulings against appellant or in denying appellant’s several motions for a new trial. The trial court properly resolved the jury’s confusion regarding the multiple interrogatories and general verdict forms. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/29/2025
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5/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1929 |
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State v. Daniels
| 114259 | Admission of evidence; abuse of discretion; photographs; plain error; bench trial; ineffective assistance of counsel; discharge of appointed counsel; good cause; communication breakdown; failure to file motion to suppress; identification procedure; unduly suggestive; futile act; sufficiency of the evidence; R.C. 2917.32(A)(3); false report; burden of production; manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not commit plain error in admitting photographs. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. There was insufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction for making false alarms under R.C. 2917.32(A)(3). Appellant’s other convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/29/2025
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5/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1930 |
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In re C.W.
| 114274 | Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment; abuse of discretion; notice; excusable neglect; hearing. Judgment reversed; case remanded for hearing. The trial court abused its discretion by denying the appellant’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment without a hearing. Appellant presented sufficient evidence of excusable neglect to warrant a hearing on the Civ.R. 60(B) motion. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
5/29/2025
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5/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1931 |
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State v. Menefee
| 114396 | Agreed upon sentence; R.C. 2953.08(D)(1). Appellant’s sentence for involuntary manslaughter and felonious assault was not subject to appellate review because it was authorized by law, recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution, and imposed by the trial court. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
5/29/2025
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5/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1932 |
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In re J.G.
| 114426 | Business records; detention-center recordings; authentication; Evid.R. 901; prosecutorial misconduct; prejudice; vouch for; credibility; manifest weight of the evidence. Trial court’s erroneous admission of defendant’s school profile record without proper authentication was harmless where the evidence contained in the record was duplicative of other evidence. Trial court’s admission of detention-center phone calls into evidence was proper where the content of the phone calls was sufficient to identify the caller as the defendant. Trial court’s erroneous admission into evidence of detention-center phone log was harmless where the evidence contained in the log was duplicative of other evidence. Although prosecutor inappropriately vouched for the credibility of witnesses, his misconduct did not warrant reversal where there was no evidence of prejudice. Delinquency adjudications were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/29/2025
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5/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1933 |
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Yellow Brick Rd. Auctions, L.L.C. v. Dixon
| 114467 | Contract damages; compensatory damages; specific performance; adequate remedy; money damages; sale of automobile at auction; App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). Appellant and appellee entered into a contract for appellee to sell appellant’s vehicle at an online auction. Appellant’s vehicle received the agreed upon minimum bid of $12,000. Appellant then breached the agreement and refused to sell the vehicle. Under the terms of the agreement, appellee was entitled to 12 percent of the selling bid and 8 percent from at bidder’s premium when the vehicle was sold. The case proceeded to a bench trial where the trial court awarded appellee specific performance ordering appellant to transfer his vehicle to the winning bidder. On appeal, appellant argued in his first assignment of error the trial court erred in awarding specific performance, and we agree. The evidence presented at trial shows that money damages are an adequate relief for appellee. We therefore sustain his first assignment of error finding the trial court abused its discretion awarding specific performance. We also find appellant’s assignments of error Nos. 2 and 3 as moot pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/29/2025
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5/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1934 |
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State v. Warr
| 114686 | Reagan Tokes Law; indefinite sentence; R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c); advisements. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court did not fully notify the defendant-appellant of the Reagan Tokes Law advisements specified in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). The error did not undermine the conviction, but the appropriate remedy is to remand the case for the limited purpose of the trial court providing the required notifications. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
5/29/2025
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5/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1935 |
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State ex rel. Holloway v. Saffold
| 115017 | Writ of mandamus; motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); moot. Respondent’s motion for summary judgment granted; writ denied. Relator was not entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering trial judge to grant his motion to vacate void judgment. Mandamus claim became moot when judge denied relator’s motion during pendency of action. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
5/23/2025
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5/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1936 |
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Pincus v. Pincus
| 114071 | Statute of limitations; saving statute; R.C. 2305.19; one-use restriction; fraudulent transfer; R.C. 1336.09; double-dismissal rule. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. The saving statute, R.C. 2305.19, does not save claims that are refiled a second time after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the defense of statute of limitations as to plaintiff’s claims that had been refiled twice outside the statute of limitations. The trial court did err in granting judgment on the pleadings for plaintiff’s claims that were refiled only once outside of the statute of limitations because the saving statute applied to those claims. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1826 |
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S.S. v. T.M.
| 114147 | Shared parenting plan, modification, terms, decree, R.C. 3109.04(E); medical-decision-making-authority; change of circumstances; best interest of the child; R.C. 3109.04(F); abuse of discretion; manifest-weight-of-the-evidence. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the medical-decision-making term in the shared parenting plan. The trial court considered the appropriate factors when determining that it was in the best interest of the child to modify the term. Further, a trial court need not make a “change of circumstances” finding when modifying a term of the shared parenting plan. The trial court’s decision was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1827 |
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State v. Simmons
| 114231, 114232, 114233, 114234 & 114235 | Guilty pleas; breaking and entering; theft; criminal damaging or endangering; multiple cases; Crim.R. 11(C); Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b); complied; prejudice; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); multiple offenses; violated; community control; criminal history; findings; support. Affirmed the trial court’s judgment in each of the cases appealed, including appellant’s convictions and sentences, as well as the court’s imposition of consecutive sentences between the five cases. The record demonstrated the trial court’s compliance with Crim.R. 11(C), and appellant failed to demonstrate error under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) or any prejudice in relation to his claimed error. The trial court made the requisite findings for imposing consecutive sentences pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and it could not be clearly and convincingly found that the evidence did not support the trial court’s findings. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1828 |
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In re R.T.
| 114248 | Custody granted; to mother; from paternal grandmother; child’s best interest; R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(d); R.C. 2151.23(A)(2); R.C. 2151.42(B); modification of custody; termination of custody; R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). Paternal grandmother appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating her custody of granddaughter R.T. and granting legal custody to R.T.’s mother. We find trial court properly granted legal custody of R.T. to mother from paternal grandmother since it was in the best interest of the child. The evidence put forth at the custody hearing established that paternal grandmother was significantly interfering with mother’s parenting time and that custody with grandmother was no longer in the best interests of the child. Grandmother’s two assignments of error are overruled. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1829 |
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State v. Hutchins
| 114261 | Mandatory bindover; unconstitutional statutes; Reagan Tokes Law. The Supreme Court of Ohio has previously held that the juvenile bindover statutes are not unconstitutional and do not violate due-process and equal-protection rights. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1831 |
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State v. S.D.F.
| 114378 | Application to seal a conviction; R.C. 2953.32; applicant’s burden; sufficient evidence or testimony by applicant; abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant-appellant’s application to seal his record of convictions pursuant to R.C. 2953.32. Although the trial court summarily denied the defendant-appellant’s application, the defendant-appellant failed to introduce evidence or testimony at the sealing hearing — except for his attorney’s comments — upon which the trial court could have determined whether his application met the requirements of R.C. 2953.32. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1832 |
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In re N.B.
| 114398 | Legal custody; dependent; R.C. 2151.353(A); R.C. 2151.353(F)(2); dispositional hearing; manifest weight; best interest; factors; preponderance; substance abuse; dishonesty; fundamental right; parent; ultimate welfare; Sup.R. 48.03(D); guidelines; plain error. Affirmed juvenile court’s judgment that committed the minor child to the legal custody of the child’s nonrelative caregiver. The juvenile court considered relevant best-interest factors and granted legal custody as supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The juvenile court’s decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence; the court did not violate father’s fundamental right to parent his child; and the court did not commit plain error in considering the report and recommendation of the guardian ad litem despite claimed deficiencies under Sup.R. 48.03(D), which only provides general guidelines. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1833 |
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State v. D.G.
| 114412 | Trial judge; conflict of interest; prosecutor; expungement; vacated; remanded. We find there was a conflict of interest for the trial court judge to hear appellant’s expungement application since the presiding judge was also the prosecutor for appellant’s original underlying criminal case from 2001. Judgment denying expungement motion is vacated and matter is remanded to the lower court to be assigned to a judge without a conflict who can hear the motion. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1834 |
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Richmond v. Evans
| 114420 | Modification of spousal support; due process; exclusion of testimony/evidence; magistrate’s decision; R.C. 2315.01(A). Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it adopted magistrate’s decision where magistrate ruled prior to appellant’s completing her case-in-chief. The litigation had been ongoing for six years; appellant had made little to no progress in, presenting her case; failed to appear at the final trial date; and filed an appeal, which the Supreme Court deemed frivolous. Given the totality of the circumstances, the decision did not violate appellant’s right to due process and it did not violate the order of case presentation under R.C. 2315.01(A). Trial court’s order merely prevented appellant from presenting medical records and/or expert testimony when she failed to provide discovery relative to same pursuant to the court’s order. The trial court’s order did not prevent appellant from testifying; accordingly, the order was not an abuse of discretion. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motions to modify spousal support when she failed to establish a substantial change in circumstances that was not contemplated at the time of the divorce decree. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1835 |
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State v. Burnett
| 114495 | Insufficient evidence; identity. Judgment reversed, conviction vacated, and defendant discharged. Our review of the record reveals that the State presented insufficient evidence that the defendant perpetrated the crimes charged. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we cannot say that any rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant’s identity was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1836 |
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State v. Chambers
| 114634, 114635, 114636 | Conceded error; Loc.App.R. 16(B); R.C. 2967.191; jail-time credit. The trial court’s application of the total amount of jail-time credit in each of three cases was in error. A defendant is not entitled to an application of the full amount of jail-time credit separately to multiple convictions in a way that results in receiving the full amount more than once. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1837 |
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In re C.H.
| 114663 | Permanent custody; magistrate’s decision; transcript; objections to magistrate’s decision. Judgment reversed. The juvenile court abused its discretion by prematurely adopting the magistrate’s decision without waiting for the transcript to be submitted in order to conduct the independent review required by Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d). | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1838 |
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In re J.D.
| 114698 | Permanent custody; R.C. 2151.414(E); R.C. 2907.05 and 2919.22(A). Juvenile court’s finding that the child had not been in the custody of the agency for 12 months out of the past 22 consecutive months and that the child could not and should not be returned to the custody of the parent was supported by clear and convincing evidence where there was a documented history of substance abuse; appellant was in jail for a crime where the victim was one of the child’s siblings; and the crimes were in violation of R.C. 2907.05 and 2919.22(A). Additionally, the juvenile court was not required to extend temporary custody for the full two years, where the record did not support a finding that the parent had made significant progress on the case plan, or that there was reasonable cause to believe that the child would be reunified with the parent within the extension period. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1839 |
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In re E.V.
| 113910 | Contempt; direct contempt; indirect contempt; civil contempt; criminal contempt; trial in absentia; neglected child; emergency custody; temporary custody; due process; manifest weight; abuse of discretion; adjudication; disposition; show cause order; purge conditions; incarceration; warrant; habeas corpus; magistrate; juvenile court; case plan; reunification; objections to magistrate’s decision; standard of proof; clear and convincing evidence; proof beyond a reasonable doubt; preponderance of the evidence; educational neglect; truancy; parental engagement; R.C. 2705.01; R.C. 2705.02; R.C. 2705.03; R.C. 2151.03; R.C. 2151.011; R.C. 2151.28; R.C. 2151.35; R.C. 2151.353; Juv.R. 40; Civ.R. 53. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The juvenile court erred in holding mother in direct contempt and imposing a jail sentence without affording her required due-process protections. Even if mother’s underlying conduct, failure to comply with an emergency custody order, constituted indirect contempt, the court did not hold a proper evidentiary hearing with mother present, nor did it find her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before imposing an unconditional term of confinement, a criminal-contempt sanction. The resulting contempt finding and jail term are vacated. The court properly adjudicated E.V. to be a neglected child. Evidence showed that he was chronically truant and ultimately expelled from school after minimal attendance. The agency made repeated but unsuccessful efforts to contact the parents, and the mother failed to attend a virtual expulsion hearing and ignored the agency’s attempts to have her participate in diversion programs. The juvenile court reasonably found that the child’s educational neglect and the lack of parental engagement supported a neglect adjudication under R.C. 2151.03(A)(3). The dispositional order placing E.V. in the temporary custody of the child welfare agency is also affirmed. The agency demonstrated reasonable efforts to avoid removal but was unable to assess the child’s safety due to the mother’s evasiveness. The child was missing for some two months before being located, and there were no viable alternatives for placement. The case plan focused on reunification with services addressing school attendance, supervision, and substance use. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1728 |
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Wright v. Mallet
| 113980 | Motion for default judgment; Civ.R. 55; abuse of discretion; Civ.R. 8; pleadings should be liberally construed; cases should be decided on their merits; pro se litigants; motion for summary judgment; genuine issues of material fact; Civ.R. 56; de novo review. The trial court erred in granting default judgment and should have liberally construed pro se litigant’s filed affidavit as an answer. The trial court further erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee where appellant demonstrated genuine issues of material fact with regard to claims asserted. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1729 |
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State v. Hughes
| 114098 | Sufficiency of the evidence; lay-opinion testimony; Evid.R. 701; character evidence; Evid.R. 404(A); character for truthfulness; Evid.R. 608(B); endangering children; felony murder. Hughes appeals convictions including endangering children and felony murder, asserting there was insufficient evidence that he pushed a wipe down his baby’s throat, causing him to die by asphyxiation. The record contained sufficient evidence to support his convictions, including that Hughes was the only person present when the baby choked on the wipe, the medical-examiner’s testimony that the baby did not have the developmental ability to force a wipe down his own throat, and videos in which the baby’s arms hang or reach or flail without direction. The court did not err in allowing a doctor to testify without providing an expert report that she was concerned the baby could not have pushed the wipe down his own throat. This testimony was given to explain why she called the police and any opinion she provided was a permissible lay-opinion based on facts within her perception. The court did not commit plain error by allowing the State to question appellant about a variety of unrelated matters that were relevant to his character for truthfulness and to which he opened the door during his own testimony. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1730 |
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Cleveland v. Johnson
| 114266 | Housing-code violations; community-control conditions; sanctions; ripeness doctrine. The trial court’s sentence imposing community-control conditions for the defendant's housing-code violations was affirmed. The community-control conditions do not apply to properties the defendant might own in the future. The defendant’s argument that the community-control conditions could apply to properties that she might own in the future is not ripe for review. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1731 |
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Metzger v. Strongsville Care Group, L.L.C.
| 114290 | Arbitration agreement; alternate dispute resolution; motion to stay and compel arbitration; successor judge; judgment on the transcript; credibility; electronic signature. Judgment reversed and remanded. Credibility is a vital factor in rendering judgment in the instant case. The crux of the case is whether plaintiff electronically signed the alternate dispute resolution agreement. The transcript is full of conflicting testimony, which would be difficult to evaluate absent observation of the witnesses. Plaintiff testified that she never received a copy of the agreement, that was not her signature on the agreement, and that she does not believe she signed anything electronically at the defendant’s skilled care facility. Plaintiff’s daughter testified that her mother signed all the documents by “[p]en and ink.” Moreover, there are issues with defendant’s testimony as to the DocuSign audit trail because the decedent was in the hospital at the time the audit trail indicates he electronically signed a document. In the trial court’s ruling, the successor judge essentially determined that defendant’s witness was more credible than plaintiff and her daughter when the court concluded that plaintiff “signed” the agreement and was bound by its terms. Because credibility issues were involved at the motion to stay proceedings and compel mediation and arbitration hearing, the court erred in granting the motion on the basis of the transcript. The factfinder must weigh the credibility of the witnesses’ testimony in order to make a determination. Therefore, the matter is remanded for a new hearing on defendants’ motion. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1732 |
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State v. Dodson
| 114326 | Consecutive sentences; child sexual assault material; manifest weight; sufficiency of the evidence; pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor; possessing criminal tools. Judgment affirmed. Appellant’s convictions for pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor and possessing criminal tools were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court made the statutory findings necessary to impose consecutive sentences, and we cannot say that the trial court’s sentence clearly and convincingly was unsupported by the record. The appellant was on postrelease control for similar crimes when he committed the crimes in this case. The court noted that appellant committed the worst form of the offense and disseminated child sexual assault material on his computer. Appellant’s sentence on each of his crimes is not disproportionally long, and he has failed to demonstrate that the record did not support the imposition of consecutive sentences that totaled 41 years in prison. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1733 |
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State v. Jeffries
| 114331 | Modify sentence; final judgment; jurisdiction. Reversed and vacated. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the indefinite life term to reduce the minimum term for parole eligibility from 20 to 15 years, even if the original sentence was contrary to law. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1734 |
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State v. Singleton
| 114336 | Petition for postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21; res judicata; ineffective assistance of counsel; prosecutorial misconduct. Affirmed. All of the petitioner’s claims for postconviction relief could have been addressed in the direct appeal because the claims that her trial attorneys failed to share the State’s video evidence before trial, explain the mandatory minimum sentence created by the firearm specifications, and call her mother as an alibi witness and the claims that the prosecutor coerced the codefendant into testifying to an untruth were all apparent in, if not contradicted by, the record. Those claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata from being considered in a petition for postconviction relief. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1735 |
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K&D Mgt., L.L.C. v. Marshall
| 114365 | Pro se; transcript; App.R. 9; presume validity of lower court proceedings. Where appellant failed to file a transcript or an appropriate substitute as permitted under App.R. 9(C) or (D), this court is required to presume the validity of the lower court’s proceedings and affirm its decision. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1736 |
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KeyBank Natl. Assn. v. Midtown Inspirion, L.L.C.
| 114393 | Civ.R. 60(B); motion for relief from judgment; cognovit note; warrant of attorney; confession of judgment; meritorious defense; evidentiary hearing. The trial court’s judgment denying the defendants’ motion to vacate cognovit judgments entered against them was affirmed. The defendants did not set forth operative facts with sufficient specificity for the trial court to determine whether they had a meritorious defense to the cognovit judgments. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1737 |
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