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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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State v. Chambers
| 114634, 114635, 114636 | Conceded error; Loc.App.R. 16(B); R.C. 2967.191; jail-time credit. The trial court’s application of the total amount of jail-time credit in each of three cases was in error. A defendant is not entitled to an application of the full amount of jail-time credit separately to multiple convictions in a way that results in receiving the full amount more than once. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1837 |
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In re N.B.
| 114398 | Legal custody; dependent; R.C. 2151.353(A); R.C. 2151.353(F)(2); dispositional hearing; manifest weight; best interest; factors; preponderance; substance abuse; dishonesty; fundamental right; parent; ultimate welfare; Sup.R. 48.03(D); guidelines; plain error. Affirmed juvenile court’s judgment that committed the minor child to the legal custody of the child’s nonrelative caregiver. The juvenile court considered relevant best-interest factors and granted legal custody as supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The juvenile court’s decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence; the court did not violate father’s fundamental right to parent his child; and the court did not commit plain error in considering the report and recommendation of the guardian ad litem despite claimed deficiencies under Sup.R. 48.03(D), which only provides general guidelines. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1833 |
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Richmond v. Evans
| 114420 | Modification of spousal support; due process; exclusion of testimony/evidence; magistrate’s decision; R.C. 2315.01(A). Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it adopted magistrate’s decision where magistrate ruled prior to appellant’s completing her case-in-chief. The litigation had been ongoing for six years; appellant had made little to no progress in, presenting her case; failed to appear at the final trial date; and filed an appeal, which the Supreme Court deemed frivolous. Given the totality of the circumstances, the decision did not violate appellant’s right to due process and it did not violate the order of case presentation under R.C. 2315.01(A). Trial court’s order merely prevented appellant from presenting medical records and/or expert testimony when she failed to provide discovery relative to same pursuant to the court’s order. The trial court’s order did not prevent appellant from testifying; accordingly, the order was not an abuse of discretion. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motions to modify spousal support when she failed to establish a substantial change in circumstances that was not contemplated at the time of the divorce decree. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1835 |
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State v. Burnett
| 114495 | Insufficient evidence; identity. Judgment reversed, conviction vacated, and defendant discharged. Our review of the record reveals that the State presented insufficient evidence that the defendant perpetrated the crimes charged. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we cannot say that any rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant’s identity was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1836 |
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S.S. v. T.M.
| 114147 | Shared parenting plan, modification, terms, decree, R.C. 3109.04(E); medical-decision-making-authority; change of circumstances; best interest of the child; R.C. 3109.04(F); abuse of discretion; manifest-weight-of-the-evidence. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the medical-decision-making term in the shared parenting plan. The trial court considered the appropriate factors when determining that it was in the best interest of the child to modify the term. Further, a trial court need not make a “change of circumstances” finding when modifying a term of the shared parenting plan. The trial court’s decision was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1827 |
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State v. S.D.F.
| 114378 | Application to seal a conviction; R.C. 2953.32; applicant’s burden; sufficient evidence or testimony by applicant; abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant-appellant’s application to seal his record of convictions pursuant to R.C. 2953.32. Although the trial court summarily denied the defendant-appellant’s application, the defendant-appellant failed to introduce evidence or testimony at the sealing hearing — except for his attorney’s comments — upon which the trial court could have determined whether his application met the requirements of R.C. 2953.32. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1832 |
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State v. Hutchins
| 114261 | Mandatory bindover; unconstitutional statutes; Reagan Tokes Law. The Supreme Court of Ohio has previously held that the juvenile bindover statutes are not unconstitutional and do not violate due-process and equal-protection rights. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1831 |
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State v. Simmons
| 114231, 114232, 114233, 114234 & 114235 | Guilty pleas; breaking and entering; theft; criminal damaging or endangering; multiple cases; Crim.R. 11(C); Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b); complied; prejudice; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); multiple offenses; violated; community control; criminal history; findings; support. Affirmed the trial court’s judgment in each of the cases appealed, including appellant’s convictions and sentences, as well as the court’s imposition of consecutive sentences between the five cases. The record demonstrated the trial court’s compliance with Crim.R. 11(C), and appellant failed to demonstrate error under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) or any prejudice in relation to his claimed error. The trial court made the requisite findings for imposing consecutive sentences pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and it could not be clearly and convincingly found that the evidence did not support the trial court’s findings. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1828 |
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In re R.T.
| 114248 | Custody granted; to mother; from paternal grandmother; child’s best interest; R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(d); R.C. 2151.23(A)(2); R.C. 2151.42(B); modification of custody; termination of custody; R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). Paternal grandmother appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating her custody of granddaughter R.T. and granting legal custody to R.T.’s mother. We find trial court properly granted legal custody of R.T. to mother from paternal grandmother since it was in the best interest of the child. The evidence put forth at the custody hearing established that paternal grandmother was significantly interfering with mother’s parenting time and that custody with grandmother was no longer in the best interests of the child. Grandmother’s two assignments of error are overruled. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1829 |
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Pincus v. Pincus
| 114071 | Statute of limitations; saving statute; R.C. 2305.19; one-use restriction; fraudulent transfer; R.C. 1336.09; double-dismissal rule. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. The saving statute, R.C. 2305.19, does not save claims that are refiled a second time after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the defense of statute of limitations as to plaintiff’s claims that had been refiled twice outside the statute of limitations. The trial court did err in granting judgment on the pleadings for plaintiff’s claims that were refiled only once outside of the statute of limitations because the saving statute applied to those claims. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1826 |
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State v. D.G.
| 114412 | Trial judge; conflict of interest; prosecutor; expungement; vacated; remanded. We find there was a conflict of interest for the trial court judge to hear appellant’s expungement application since the presiding judge was also the prosecutor for appellant’s original underlying criminal case from 2001. Judgment denying expungement motion is vacated and matter is remanded to the lower court to be assigned to a judge without a conflict who can hear the motion. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1834 |
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In re J.D.
| 114698 | Permanent custody; R.C. 2151.414(E); R.C. 2907.05 and 2919.22(A). Juvenile court’s finding that the child had not been in the custody of the agency for 12 months out of the past 22 consecutive months and that the child could not and should not be returned to the custody of the parent was supported by clear and convincing evidence where there was a documented history of substance abuse; appellant was in jail for a crime where the victim was one of the child’s siblings; and the crimes were in violation of R.C. 2907.05 and 2919.22(A). Additionally, the juvenile court was not required to extend temporary custody for the full two years, where the record did not support a finding that the parent had made significant progress on the case plan, or that there was reasonable cause to believe that the child would be reunified with the parent within the extension period. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1839 |
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In re C.H.
| 114663 | Permanent custody; magistrate’s decision; transcript; objections to magistrate’s decision. Judgment reversed. The juvenile court abused its discretion by prematurely adopting the magistrate’s decision without waiting for the transcript to be submitted in order to conduct the independent review required by Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d). | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
5/22/2025
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5/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1838 |
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Cleveland v. Johnson
| 114266 | Housing-code violations; community-control conditions; sanctions; ripeness doctrine. The trial court’s sentence imposing community-control conditions for the defendant's housing-code violations was affirmed. The community-control conditions do not apply to properties the defendant might own in the future. The defendant’s argument that the community-control conditions could apply to properties that she might own in the future is not ripe for review. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1731 |
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K&D Mgt., L.L.C. v. Marshall
| 114365 | Pro se; transcript; App.R. 9; presume validity of lower court proceedings. Where appellant failed to file a transcript or an appropriate substitute as permitted under App.R. 9(C) or (D), this court is required to presume the validity of the lower court’s proceedings and affirm its decision. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1736 |
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In re C.M.
| 114416 | Parental rights; adjudication; dependent; manifest weight of the evidence; res judicata; amended complaint; parental conduct; adverse conditions; R.C. 2151.04(C); Juv.R. 22(B); Civ.R. 15(B); Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS"). Judgment affirmed. Father’s newly presented arguments are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and could have been raised in Father’s initial appeal. The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C) and placed the children under the protective supervision of CCDCFS. While the complaint referenced R.C. 2151.04(D), the juvenile court effectively amended the complaint pursuant to Juv.R. 22(B) and Civ.R. 15(B). Lastly, CCDCFS presented evidence of conditions that were adverse to the normal development of the children, including unsanitary conditions in the home and the fact that children did not attend school on a consistent basis, which warranted state intervention. The record supported the juvenile court’s findings, and the judgments are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1738 |
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In re A.M.
| 114596 | Permanent custody; clear and convincing evidence; sufficient evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; best interest of the child; violence; aggression. Trial court’s conclusion that the child could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time and that permanent custody was in child’s best interest was supported by sufficient evidence and by the manifest weight of the evidence. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1741 |
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State v. Hughes
| 114098 | Sufficiency of the evidence; lay-opinion testimony; Evid.R. 701; character evidence; Evid.R. 404(A); character for truthfulness; Evid.R. 608(B); endangering children; felony murder. Hughes appeals convictions including endangering children and felony murder, asserting there was insufficient evidence that he pushed a wipe down his baby’s throat, causing him to die by asphyxiation. The record contained sufficient evidence to support his convictions, including that Hughes was the only person present when the baby choked on the wipe, the medical-examiner’s testimony that the baby did not have the developmental ability to force a wipe down his own throat, and videos in which the baby’s arms hang or reach or flail without direction. The court did not err in allowing a doctor to testify without providing an expert report that she was concerned the baby could not have pushed the wipe down his own throat. This testimony was given to explain why she called the police and any opinion she provided was a permissible lay-opinion based on facts within her perception. The court did not commit plain error by allowing the State to question appellant about a variety of unrelated matters that were relevant to his character for truthfulness and to which he opened the door during his own testimony. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1730 |
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Wright v. Mallet
| 113980 | Motion for default judgment; Civ.R. 55; abuse of discretion; Civ.R. 8; pleadings should be liberally construed; cases should be decided on their merits; pro se litigants; motion for summary judgment; genuine issues of material fact; Civ.R. 56; de novo review. The trial court erred in granting default judgment and should have liberally construed pro se litigant’s filed affidavit as an answer. The trial court further erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee where appellant demonstrated genuine issues of material fact with regard to claims asserted. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1729 |
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In re A.M.
| 114418 | Parent; child; adjudication; dependent; manifest weight; amended; complaint; Juv.R. 22(B); Civ.R. 15(B); R.C. 2151.04(C); condition or environment; unsanitary conditions; home; school attendance. Affirmed juvenile court’s judgments that adjudicated two of mother’s children to be dependent pursuant to R.C. 2151.04(C) and adopted the court’s earlier orders placing the children under the protective supervision of the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services. The juvenile court effectively amended the complaint pursuant to Juv.R. 22(B) and Civ.R. 15(B). The agency presented evidence of conditions or environmental elements that were adverse to the normal development of the children, including unsanitary conditions in the home, the non-existent or extremely poor school attendance of the children, and other factors, which warranted state intervention. The record supported the juvenile court’s findings, and the judgments were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1739 |
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Metzger v. Strongsville Care Group, L.L.C.
| 114290 | Arbitration agreement; alternate dispute resolution; motion to stay and compel arbitration; successor judge; judgment on the transcript; credibility; electronic signature. Judgment reversed and remanded. Credibility is a vital factor in rendering judgment in the instant case. The crux of the case is whether plaintiff electronically signed the alternate dispute resolution agreement. The transcript is full of conflicting testimony, which would be difficult to evaluate absent observation of the witnesses. Plaintiff testified that she never received a copy of the agreement, that was not her signature on the agreement, and that she does not believe she signed anything electronically at the defendant’s skilled care facility. Plaintiff’s daughter testified that her mother signed all the documents by “[p]en and ink.” Moreover, there are issues with defendant’s testimony as to the DocuSign audit trail because the decedent was in the hospital at the time the audit trail indicates he electronically signed a document. In the trial court’s ruling, the successor judge essentially determined that defendant’s witness was more credible than plaintiff and her daughter when the court concluded that plaintiff “signed” the agreement and was bound by its terms. Because credibility issues were involved at the motion to stay proceedings and compel mediation and arbitration hearing, the court erred in granting the motion on the basis of the transcript. The factfinder must weigh the credibility of the witnesses’ testimony in order to make a determination. Therefore, the matter is remanded for a new hearing on defendants’ motion. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1732 |
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KeyBank Natl. Assn. v. Midtown Inspirion, L.L.C.
| 114393 | Civ.R. 60(B); motion for relief from judgment; cognovit note; warrant of attorney; confession of judgment; meritorious defense; evidentiary hearing. The trial court’s judgment denying the defendants’ motion to vacate cognovit judgments entered against them was affirmed. The defendants did not set forth operative facts with sufficient specificity for the trial court to determine whether they had a meritorious defense to the cognovit judgments. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1737 |
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State v. Singleton
| 114336 | Petition for postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21; res judicata; ineffective assistance of counsel; prosecutorial misconduct. Affirmed. All of the petitioner’s claims for postconviction relief could have been addressed in the direct appeal because the claims that her trial attorneys failed to share the State’s video evidence before trial, explain the mandatory minimum sentence created by the firearm specifications, and call her mother as an alibi witness and the claims that the prosecutor coerced the codefendant into testifying to an untruth were all apparent in, if not contradicted by, the record. Those claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata from being considered in a petition for postconviction relief. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1735 |
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Berman v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision
| 114481 | Board of tax appeals ("BTA"); county fiscal officer; board of revision; administrative appeal; triennial update; arm’s-length transaction; discovery; Ohio administrative code. Judgment affirmed. The BTA did not err in upholding the BOR’s decision to retain the county’s valuation, which was based on the recent arm’s-length sale of the subject property. The appellants voluntarily waived their right to a hearing before the BTA; therefore, the exhibits they attached to their merit brief amounted to new evidence that the board rightly struck from evidence. There is no merit to appellants’ constitutional claims because appellants could not show that they were subjected to an intentional and systematic attempt by county officials to discriminate against them. The use of a sale price that was a result of an arm’s-length transaction, even if not uniform with neighboring property values, does not violate uniformity under the Ohio Constitution. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1740 |
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In re E.V.
| 113910 | Contempt; direct contempt; indirect contempt; civil contempt; criminal contempt; trial in absentia; neglected child; emergency custody; temporary custody; due process; manifest weight; abuse of discretion; adjudication; disposition; show cause order; purge conditions; incarceration; warrant; habeas corpus; magistrate; juvenile court; case plan; reunification; objections to magistrate’s decision; standard of proof; clear and convincing evidence; proof beyond a reasonable doubt; preponderance of the evidence; educational neglect; truancy; parental engagement; R.C. 2705.01; R.C. 2705.02; R.C. 2705.03; R.C. 2151.03; R.C. 2151.011; R.C. 2151.28; R.C. 2151.35; R.C. 2151.353; Juv.R. 40; Civ.R. 53. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The juvenile court erred in holding mother in direct contempt and imposing a jail sentence without affording her required due-process protections. Even if mother’s underlying conduct, failure to comply with an emergency custody order, constituted indirect contempt, the court did not hold a proper evidentiary hearing with mother present, nor did it find her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before imposing an unconditional term of confinement, a criminal-contempt sanction. The resulting contempt finding and jail term are vacated. The court properly adjudicated E.V. to be a neglected child. Evidence showed that he was chronically truant and ultimately expelled from school after minimal attendance. The agency made repeated but unsuccessful efforts to contact the parents, and the mother failed to attend a virtual expulsion hearing and ignored the agency’s attempts to have her participate in diversion programs. The juvenile court reasonably found that the child’s educational neglect and the lack of parental engagement supported a neglect adjudication under R.C. 2151.03(A)(3). The dispositional order placing E.V. in the temporary custody of the child welfare agency is also affirmed. The agency demonstrated reasonable efforts to avoid removal but was unable to assess the child’s safety due to the mother’s evasiveness. The child was missing for some two months before being located, and there were no viable alternatives for placement. The case plan focused on reunification with services addressing school attendance, supervision, and substance use. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1728 |
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State v. Dodson
| 114326 | Consecutive sentences; child sexual assault material; manifest weight; sufficiency of the evidence; pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor; possessing criminal tools. Judgment affirmed. Appellant’s convictions for pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor and possessing criminal tools were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court made the statutory findings necessary to impose consecutive sentences, and we cannot say that the trial court’s sentence clearly and convincingly was unsupported by the record. The appellant was on postrelease control for similar crimes when he committed the crimes in this case. The court noted that appellant committed the worst form of the offense and disseminated child sexual assault material on his computer. Appellant’s sentence on each of his crimes is not disproportionally long, and he has failed to demonstrate that the record did not support the imposition of consecutive sentences that totaled 41 years in prison. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1733 |
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State v. Jeffries
| 114331 | Modify sentence; final judgment; jurisdiction. Reversed and vacated. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the indefinite life term to reduce the minimum term for parole eligibility from 20 to 15 years, even if the original sentence was contrary to law. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1734 |
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State ex rel. Wilberger v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas
| 115031 | Procedendo, issue ruling on pending motion, moot. The complaint for a writ of procedendo, to compel the trial court judge to render a ruling, regarding a motion for jail-time credit, is moot. The trial court judge granted the relator’s motion. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/14/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1743 |
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State ex rel. Martin v. McCormick
| 114928 | Writ of procedendo; motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); moot. Respondent’s motion for summary judgment granted; writ denied. Relator was not entitled to a writ of procedendo ordering trial judge to journalize an order granting relator’s motion for leave to supplement petition and motion to proceed to hearing related to his successive petition for postconviction relief. Procedendo claim became moot when trial court denied relator’s successive petition for postconviction relief during pendency of action. Further, relator did not show that respondent had, in fact, reconsidered prior ruling denying relator’s motion for leave to supplement petition and motion to proceed to hearing and had issued a subsequent ruling granting the motion. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/13/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1742 |
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State v. Winston
| 113318 | App.R. 26(B) application for reopening, sufficiency of the evidence, R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) — rape by digital penetration, R.C. 2971.01(H)(1) — sexually violent predator, R.C. 2971.03(A)(2) — life in prison without parole. The appellant’s App.R. 26(B) application for reopening is denied. The appellant has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the failure of appellate counsel to raise four proposed assignments of error. The outcome of the appellant’s appeal would not have been different had the proposed assignments of error been raised by appellate counsel, because sufficient evidence was presented at trial that established the offense of rape of a ten-year-old child by digital penetration, sufficient evidence was presented at trial that established that the appellant was a sexually violent predator, and the trial court properly sentenced the appellant to life in prison without parole. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/12/2025
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5/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1727 |
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State v. Levy
| 114653 | Crim.R. 36; clerical error; collateral attack; sentence; res judicata; direct appeal; State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913; State v. Henderson, 2020-Ohio-4784. Judgment affirmed. Since the case was within the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and the defendant was properly before the court, any error in the imposition of postrelease control renders the trial court’s judgment voidable and subject to res judicata pursuant to Harper. Our review of the record and procedural background reveals that now, over 20 years after his conviction, Levy raises a new collateral attack on his sentence that could have been raised at the time of his direct appeal. Under Henderson, Levy’s failure to timely assert the alleged error, which would render the judgment voidable, amounts to the forfeiture of that objection. Thus, the trial court properly determined that any arguments challenging the imposition of postrelease control are barred by res judicata. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
5/8/2025
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5/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1662 |
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Cleveland v Kirby
| 114670 | Motion for return of seized property; R.C. 2981.03(A)(4); hearing; preponderance of the evidence; unlawfully seized; entitled to return of property; R.C. 2981.11; property in custody of law enforcement agency; lawfully seized; no longer needed as evidence or for another lawful purpose. The trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion to return property following dismissal of the case. Appellee did not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the property had been unlawfully seized or that she was entitled to its return. The seized property was lawfully retained under R.C. 2981.11. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/8/2025
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5/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1663 |
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State v. Upton
| 114276 | Motion to dismiss; motion for reconsideration; mistrial; jury polling; double jeopardy. The trial court did not err when it denied defendant-appellant’s motion to dismiss two counts pursuant to the double-jeopardy doctrine. Specifically, double jeopardy did not bar retrial of the two counts where the trial court granted defendant-appellant’s motion for a mistrial due to irregularities in the jury polling process, and not because of prosecutorial misconduct. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
5/8/2025
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5/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1660 |
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State v. Perkins
| 114430 | Ineffective assistance of counsel; bench trial; felonious assault; R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); R.C. 2903.11(A)(2); aggravated assault; R.C. 2903.12(A); sudden passion; sudden fit of rage; serious provocation; inferior-degree offense; trial strategy; acquittal strategy; accident; mens rea; intent; bench trial presumptions; Crim.R. 31(C). Judgment affirmed. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek a conviction for aggravated assault instead of felonious assault. The decision to argue the shooting was accidental rather than provoked was a reasonable trial strategy aimed at acquittal. In a bench trial, the court is presumed to consider inferior-degree offenses warranted by the evidence, and no prejudice was shown under Strickland. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
5/8/2025
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5/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1661 |
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State v. Long
| 113805 & 113806 | R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); consecutive sentences; clearly and convincingly; gross sexual imposition. The trial court’s R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) consecutive-sentence findings were not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record where the record showed that the defendant engaged in serious conduct that resulted in significant physical and emotional harm to multiple victims and the defendant committed the acts in one case while he was awaiting trial in another case. The trial court was not required to make a separate set of findings for each case. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
5/8/2025
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5/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1654 |
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Tseng v. MetroHealth Sys.
| 114057 | Directed verdict; wage discrimination; Ohio’s Equal Pay Act; R.C. 4111.17; age discrimination; disparate treatment; disparate impact; prima facie case; indirect evidence; R.C. 4112.02; de novo. Judgment affirmed. The trial court’s grant of appellee’s motion for directed verdict on appellant’s wage- and age-discrimination claims was proper. Appellant failed to demonstrate that the employee wage compensation plan adopted by appellee is discriminatory and violates R.C. 4111.17 and 4112.02. When construing the facts most strongly in appellant’s favor, we find that appellant did not meet his burden to establish the elements of his wage-discrimination claim or his age-discrimination claim. Appellant admitted that all of the vascular interventional radiologists with the same academic rank were paid the same base salary, failed to present evidence of adverse employment actions by appellee, and failed to present a statistically relevant analysis to prove that appellee’s wage compensation plan caused an adverse impact on employees over 40. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/8/2025
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5/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1657 |
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State v. Thompson
| 114159 | Substantial-impairment rape; lesser-included offense; R.C. 2907.05(A)(5); R.C. 2907.02(A)(2); nunc pro tunc. The trial court’s journal entries did not reflect the proper statutory section for which the defendant was found guilty after a bench trial, and therefore, those entries could be corrected under Crim.R. 36. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/8/2025
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5/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1547 |
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Morgan v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth.
| 113875 & 113973 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; negligence; proximate cause; political-subdivision immunity; exceptions to immunity; R.C. 2744.02(B)(1); “negligent operation of any motor vehicle”; R.C. 2744.02(B)(2); discovery; motion to compel; Civ.R. 45; motion to show cause; civil contempt; sanctions. We affirm in part and reverse in part. We affirm the trial court’s judgment denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) and (2). We agree with the trial court that questions of fact remain regarding whether the defendant’s employee negligently operated the bus and whether that negligence proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries. However, we reverse the trial court’s judgment finding the defendant and its counsel in contempt of court. The trial court’s contempt and sanction power for a nonparty witness’s failure to appear for deposition extends only to the subpoenaed nonparty witness and not to the defendant. The trial court cannot force a defendant to produce nonparty witnesses, even when the nonparty witnesses are the corporate defendant’s own employees. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
5/8/2025
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5/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1655 |
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Cleveland v. Kushlak
| 113956 | Community-control sanctions; probation-violation hearing; housing court; imposition of additional community-control sanction; dismissed; journal entry. Appellant’s sole assignment of error appeals the trial court’s modification of his community-control sanctions. The court added the condition orally at a status hearing in court, but did not add the condition in the subsequent journal entry, which appellant appealed. As such, appellant’s assignment of error that the court imposed an improper community-control sanction is disregarded and the appeal is dismissed because the court did not properly impose the condition via its journal entry. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/8/2025
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5/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1656 |
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Brooklyn v. Qasem
| 114204 | Domestic violence; R.C. 2919.25; manifest weight; reasonable parental discipline; affirmative defense; proper and reasonable; totality of the circumstances. Father’s conviction for domestic violence is vacated as against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence established that father’s discipline of his ten-year-old son was proper and reasonable under the totality of the circumstances such that the affirmative defense of reasonable parental discipline applied. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/8/2025
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5/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1659 |
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Cleveland v. Simmons
| 114109 | Motion to continue; abuse of discretion. Trial court abused its discretion when it denied appellant’s day-of-trial motion to continue where the trial court had held the appellant in jail for contempt of court for 22 days; on release immediately set the case for trial; appellant did not receive discovery until mere days before trial; appellant was not advised of his right to request a jury trial; and appellant had never, prior to the date of trial, requested a continuance of the trial date. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
5/8/2025
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5/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1658 |
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State ex rel. Stansell v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas
| 114902 | Mandamus; postconviction-relief petition; findings of fact and conclusions of law; and adequate remedy through appeal. The court denied a mandamus seeking to compel findings of fact and conclusions of law for a postconviction-relief petition because the failure to issue such findings and conclusions is an error at law remedied on appeal. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/7/2025
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5/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1664 |
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Lynch v. FIG OH18, L.L.C.
| 114309 | Quiet title; adverse possession; subject-matter jurisdiction; jurisdiction; probate court; probate; will; title; general division; common pleas court; bequeath; property; foreclosure. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. The general division of common pleas court did not err when it sua sponte dismissed plaintiff-appellant’s quiet-title claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, since the quiet-title claim was based upon a will that had yet to be probated and, therefore, needed to proceed through probate court. The general division of common pleas court did err, however, when it sua sponte dismissed plaintiff-appellant’s adverse-possession claim because the adverse-possession claim was not based on any theory that title passed through the will. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/1/2025
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5/1/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1553 |
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State v. Mahalli
| 114300 | Trespass into a habitation when a person is present or likely to be present; R.C. 2911.12(B); R.C. 2911.12(E); Crim.R. 29; sufficiency of the evidence. - Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29. Sufficient evidence existed upon which the jury could have found that the defendant was not privileged to enter the premises and that a person was present or likely to be present at the time of the trespass. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
5/1/2025
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5/1/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1551 |
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State v. Ramirez
| 113988 | Hybrid sentences, community-control sanction, child-support order, invited-error doctrine, motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Ramirez appeals the journal entry sentencing him to 11 months in prison for attempted unlawful sexual conduct with a minor and requiring him to pay child support while incarcerated. The child-support order is a community-control sanction, which cannot be imposed along with a prison term for a felony offense. Ramirez did not “invite” this sanction under the invited-error doctrine because it was not part of the settlement agreement the parties presented to the court. The court also did not abuse its discretion in denying Ramirez’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The 11-month sentence was less than the maximum authorized for a fifth-degree felony, and the record did not support Ramirez’s claims that the court was swayed by emotion, failed to adequately consider his request, or that he was under the influence of medication during his sentencing hearing. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/1/2025
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5/1/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1542 |
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ShiftMed, L.L.C. v. Westchester Parkway Consulting, L.L.C.
| 114351 | Service of process; failure of service; rebuttal presumption of proper service; personal jurisdiction. Judgment reversed. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to set aside the default judgment entered against defendant Goldner. Service of process was not effective on the facts of this case, and consequently, the court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant Goldner. Therefore, the default judgment was void and should have been vacated by the trial court. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
5/1/2025
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5/1/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1554 |
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In re A.J.
| 114251 | Plain error; abused and dependent child; multiple sexual abuse exams; legal custody; case-plan requirements; mental-health assessment; parenting classes; visitation restrictions; best interests of the child; removal of child; reasonable efforts to prevent removal/reunify; incomplete investigation; sexual abuse allegations; failure to reappoint counsel; medical abuse. The trial court did not err in adjudicating the child as abused and dependent and granting legal custody to Father. Mother was represented by counsel after the case was remanded to the trial court. Mother failed to object to the magistrate’s decision finding the child abused and dependent and did not argue plain error. The trial court properly found that granting custody to Father was in the child’s best interest. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/1/2025
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5/1/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1550 |
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State v. Smith
| 114209 | Plea advisement; Dangler; prejudice; Reagan Tokes Law; R.C. 2929.144; Crim.R. 11; maximum sentence; complete failure. Judgment affirmed. Appellant’s plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, despite the trial court not specifically advising appellant that he was subject to an indefinite sentence under Reagan Tokes. Because we found that the trial court’s advisement was not a complete failure to advise of the maximum penalty under Crim.R. 11(C), appellant was required to prove prejudice. Appellant did not establish that he was prejudiced. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/1/2025
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5/1/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1548 |
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Semary v. Celebrezze
| 114219 | Civil liability for criminal acts; R.C. 2307.60; notice pleading; Civ.R. 8; judgment on the pleadings; Civ.R. 12(C). | Eklund | Cuyahoga |
5/1/2025
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5/1/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1549 |
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State v. Field
| 114100 | Speedy-trial rights; R.C. 2945.71; tolling events; evidentiary hearing; reasonableness. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/1/2025
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5/1/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1543 |
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