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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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Bertalan v. Bertalan
| 113619 | Divorce; abuse of discretion; division of property; retirement assets; distributive award; financial misconduct; attorney fees; trial continuance; show cause motion; motion to compel discovery; spousal support; child support; withdrawal of counsel; motion for new trial; pro se; affidavit; Civ.R. 60(A); App.R. 9(A)(1); App.R. 12(A); R.C. 2319.02; R.C. 2701.03; R.C. 3105.171; R.C. 3105.73; Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(b); affidavit of disqualification; judicial bias; due process; discovery; restraining order. The court affirmed the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Division of Domestic Relations’ decree of divorce and denial of appellant-husband’s motion for new trial, overruling husband’s six assignments of error. Husband argued that the trial court erred in denying his motions for trial continuances, first a motion to continue filed when his attorney withdrew and a second motion filed during the trial itself, when husband claimed he recently suffered a head injury and also needed to care for his ailing mother. Husband also alleged judicial bias and misconduct, pointing to his filing of affidavits of disqualification. Finally, husband argued that the trial court’s final divorce decree resulted in an inequitable division of marital assets, including retirement funds, and unfairly burdened him with the appellee-wife’s attorney fees. The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in denying the motions for continuances considering the length of the case, the inconvenience to wife, and husband’s contribution to the delays. Regarding the allegations of judicial bias, appellate courts lack the authority to rule on such claims, as they fall under the purview of the Ohio Supreme Court’s Chief Justice, and husband’s arguments did not implicate due-process concerns. The ultimate division of marital assets and the award of attorney fees were within the trial court’s discretion, particularly given the husband’s financial misconduct and failure to comply with court orders, which justified a distributive award to wife. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1443 |
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Burke v. Ganelli
| 114016 | Affidavit; trial court; abuse of discretion; factual findings; appellate review; plain error; real estate taxes; setoff; evidence; judicial process; partition; appraised value; property division; notice of election deadline; R.C. 5307.09; equitable relief; appeal; waiver. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s request to reopen evidence or purchase the property more than three months past the deadline. Appellant failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in presenting his evidence. The trial court properly adhered to the statutory requirements of R.C. 5307.09 and 5307.10, and its decision was within its discretion. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1447 |
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S.M. v. T.G.
| 114084 | Civil stalking protection order; R.C. 2903.214; menacing; R.C. 2903.211; pattern of conduct; knowingly; standard of review. Our standard for reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a civil protection order is not abuse of discretion. Rather, when the question on appeal is whether the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a civil protection order, whether it is a domestic violence civil protection order or civil stalking protection order, our standard of review is whether there was sufficient, credible evidence to support a finding that the respondent engaged either in acts of domestic violence or acts of menacing by stalking against the petitioner. But if the scope and terms of a civil protection order are at issue, then we review for an abuse of discretion. The trial court’s decision granting a civil stalking protection order to the petitioner was reversed. The record in this case lacks sufficient, credible evidence to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent knowingly engaged in a pattern of conduct to cause the petitioner to believe that he was going to physically harm her or cause her mental distress. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1448 |
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State v. Tejeda
| 114097 | Sufficiency; manifest weight; inconsistent verdict; bench trial; jury; having a weapon while under disability. Judgment affirmed. There was sufficient evidence to sustain defendant’s having a weapon while under disability conviction because the victim identified the defendant as the person who shot her and the victim’s mother testified to observing defendant threatening her with a gun the day before her daughter was shot. Defendant’s case was not the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Defendant’s not guilty verdict rendered by the jury on attempted murder, felonious assault, sexual imposition, retaliation, and the accompanying firearm specifications was not inconsistent with the trial court’s guilty finding on the having a weapon while under disability count. This case was not the case in which a single issue was sent to the jury that negated an element of the offense tried by the trial court. The inconsistent verdicts pertain to separate and distinct counts in the indictment. Therefore, the inconsistency between the jury’s and the trial court’s verdicts does not require reversal of defendant’s having a weapon while under disability conviction. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1449 |
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Brisbane v. Swagelok Co.
| 114106 | Civ.R. 12(B)(6); Civ.R. 8; dismissal; defamation; wrongful termination. Trial court erred when it dismissed appellant’s complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), where appellant was only required to set forth a short plain statement of claims, that sufficiently apprised the appellee of the nature of the claims. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1450 |
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State v. Blackwell
| 114129 | Joinder; Crim.R. 14; identity; Evid.R. 404(B); manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant appealed convictions including two aggravated murders that were tried together despite occurring on different days at different locations. Appellant argued court erred in denying motion to sever trials and convictions were against manifest weight of the evidence. Evidence of the first murder was admissible under Evid.R. 404(B) to prove identity in the second murder, meaning joinder of trials was not prejudicial to defendant’s right to a fair trial. Defendant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where he admitted lying to investigators, none of the first victim’s DNA was found on defendant in support of a self-defense claim, and the same firearm he used to kill the first victim was used to kill the second. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1451 |
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Cleveland v. Buckley
| 114143 | Restitution; competent, credible evidence; estimates; damage; vehicle. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution to the victim for the damage appellant caused to her vehicle following an accident. The victim provided competent, credible evidence in the form of pictures, the accident report, and two independent estimates. Appellant failed to demonstrate that the restitution exceeded the victim’s economic loss caused as a direct and proximate result of his offense. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1452 |
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State v. Angelen
| 114181 | Sufficiency of the evidence; aggravated murder; murder; aggravated robbery; allied offenses; merger. The evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant of aggravated murder. The trial court erred when it failed to merge the murder counts with the aggravated murder count because these are allied offenses. The trial court also erred when it failed to merge the aggravated robbery counts together because these are allied offenses. The trial court did not err when it did not merge the aggravated robbery into the aggravated murder count. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1453 |
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State v. Taylor
| 114185 | Rape; sexual battery; presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea; Crim.R. 32.1; abuse of discretion; effective assistance of counsel. - Trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s timely presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea when appointed counsel was not fully prepared for trial, substitute counsel had been retained but did not appear for trial, and the defendant presented a reasonable and legitimate basis for withdrawing his plea. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1454 |
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In re J.M.
| 114192 | Child support; modification; change in circumstance; abuse of discretion; discovery; deemed admitted; Civ.R. 36; challenge to the truth; sanctions; Civ.R. 37; retroactive date. Judgment affirmed. Mother’s challenge to the truth of Father’s admissions during the pretrial proceedings and both Father and Mother’s acquiescence to the court’s resolution to the discovery issue effectively served as a motion to withdraw the admissions under Civ.R. 36(A). Moreover, it was within the court’s discretion to permit the withdrawal in order to resolve the action on its merits, which did not operate to Father’s prejudice. The court did not abuse its discretion by not imposing sanctions because the court addressed the discovery issues and Father never filed a motion to compel. The court also did not abuse its discretion in imputing Mother’s income at minimum wage and finding Father’s income at $0. Father did not put forth any credible evidence to demonstrate why the court’s income calculations are unjust or inappropriate. In addition, without any evidence to substantiate Mother’s lack of 90 overnights per year, we cannot find that the court abused its discretion by including a ten percent credit for Mother in the child support calculation. Lastly, the court did not abuse its discretion in applying the increase in child support retroactive to the trial date. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1455 |
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Wos v. Cleveland
| 114279 | Exhaustion of administrative remedies; declaratory judgment; mandamus; municipal income tax refund; overpayment; interest; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); motion to dismiss; administrative appeal; board of tax review; assessment; nonresident taxpayer; R.C. 2731.02; R.C. 718.11(C); R.C. 718.01(PP)(1); Cleveland Cod. Ord. 192.28(d); Cleveland Cod. Ord. 192.29(a)(4); Cleveland Cod. Ord. 191.0301; Civ.R. 12(B); motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; affirmative defense. Judgment reversed. The appellants, nonresident taxpayers, sought declaratory and mandamus relief concerning statutory interest on allegedly delayed municipal income tax refunds. The trial court erred in granting the City of Cleveland’s motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) on the grounds that the appellants had impermissibly failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. Although exhaustion of remedies is typically required and may apply in this case, it is generally an affirmative defense that should be resolved on a more developed record. The complaint set forth a viable claim for relief, especially given the appellants’ allegation that they had already requested and been denied interest on their tax refunds. The City’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion presented matters outside of the complaint, and the trial court could not have resolved the exhaustion issue without considering matters outside of the complaint. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1456 |
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State v. Williams
| 114284 | Drug trafficking and possession; dominion and control; knowledge; substance; constructive possession; hearsay; bench trial. - Appellant’s convictions for drug possession and trafficking were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. A conviction for drug possession may rest on constructive possession, so long as knowledge of the substances and dominion or control over the premises where the substances are found can be inferred from the evidence presented. Even if hearsay evidence was improperly elicited in a bench trial, we presume that the trial court was capable of distinguishing and disregarding such hearsay unless there is affirmative evidence in the record to the contrary. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1457 |
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New v. Jordan
| 114313 | Landlord; tenant; deposit; rent; court; late; full amount; magistrate’s decision; failed; objections; transcript; Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(c); Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv); waived; challenge; findings of fact; error of law; plain error; regularity; fair trial; discovery; Civ.R. 37. Affirmed trial court’s judgment that adopted a magistrate’s decision, entered judgment in favor of the appellee-landlord, awarded the landlord damages for back rent and property damage, ordered the release of funds that were deposited as rent with the court to the landlord, and also dismissed the appellant-tenant’s complaint for money damages with prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 37 for failure to comply with discovery. Because no objections were filed to the magistrate’s decision and no transcript was filed, appellant waived all but plain error, which was not argued on appeal. Nonetheless, appellant did not establish any error of law, the limited record reflected she was afforded a fair and impartial trial, and the case did not present exceptional circumstances warranting application of the plain-error doctrine. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1458 |
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State v. Griffin
| 114338 | Gross sexual imposition; sexually violent predator specification; forensic interview of child victim of sex offense; Evid.R. 803(4); victim credibility; cumulative error. The defendant’s convictions for two counts of gross sexual imposition with sexually violent predator specifications are affirmed. Because the child victim testified at trial, the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause does not apply. Rather, the evidentiary rules against hearsay apply. Specifically, Evid.R. 803(4), which renders statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment admissible at trial, allows the introduction of videos of the child’s forensic interview conducted at a child advocacy center. The admission of any statements the child victim made that were unrelated to medical diagnosis or treatment was harmless, because the remainder of the evidence – particularly the child victim’s testimony – was enough to convict the defendant of gross sexual imposition. The social worker’s testimony was admissible because she did not testify that the child victim’s disclosures were credible, as the defendant argued on appeal. The social worker testified that the agency made an interdepartmental determination that the allegations were “substantiated,” which has been ruled admissible by Ohio courts. There was no cumulative error issue here, because there were no errors at all. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1459 |
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N. Olmsted v. J.S.
| 114355 | Expungement; eligible offender. Judgment reversed; case remanded. The record demonstrates, and the city concedes, that the defendant was an eligible offender for expungement. The trial court’s finding that the defendant was ineligible was error. Therefore, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for a hearing at which the trial court will consider the remaining statutory factors for expungement. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1460 |
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In re E.W.
| 114403 | Juvenile delinquency adjudication; manifest weight of the evidence; witness credibility; criminal damaging or endangering; R.C. 2909.06(A)(1); circumstantial evidence; burglary; R.C. 2929.12(A)(1); trespass; intent. Judgment affirmed. After reviewing the record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and considering the credibility of witnesses, we are unable to conclude that the juvenile court clearly lost its way in resolving conflicts in evidence in the State’s favor. Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the juvenile court, who was in the best position to determine credibility, created a manifest miscarriage of justice by finding a witness to be credible. Moreover, the juvenile court could properly conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that E.W. committed criminal damaging or endangering in violation of R.C. 2909.06(A)(1) and burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(1). This is not the exceptional case in which the evidence weighed heavily against the juvenile’s delinquency adjudication and required a new trial. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1461 |
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State v. Howard
| 114410 | Conceded error; plea; self-incrimination. - Defendant did not enter a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea because the trial court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) when it failed to advise him that by pleading guilty he would waive his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. The State conceded the error. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1462 |
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State v. Cotton
| 114474 | R.C. 2929.18(A)(1); restitution hearing. The trial court’s restitution hearing complied with R.C. 2929.18(A)(1), the restitution award was supported by competent, credible evidence, and the economic loss was proven by a preponderance of the evidence. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1463 |
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State v. Lindsey
| 114514 | Crim.R. 11; Reagan Tokes; knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; plea hearing. Affirmed. Trial court fully complied with Crim.R. 11 when it explained the Reagan Tokes sentencing structure during the plea hearing. Trial court has discretion to impose a sentence more severe than the jointly recommended sentence. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1464 |
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In re B.G.M.
| 114600 | Permanent custody; R.C. 2151.353; R.C. 2151.414; best interest; manifest weight. The juvenile court’s judgment granting permanent custody of the child to Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services was affirmed. The juvenile court’s findings that several R.C. 2151.414(E) factors applied such that the child could not or should not be returned to the parent within a reasonable time were supported by clear and convincing evidence. Additionally, the juvenile court’s finding that it was in the child’s best interest to be placed in the permanent custody of the agency was supported by clear and convincing evidence. We further conclude that the juvenile court’s judgment granting permanent custody to the agency is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1465 |
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In re A.E.
| 114605 | Permanent custody; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a); best interest; R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(2); R.C. 2151.414(E); clear and convincing; manifest weight; legal custody. Affirmed the juvenile court’s judgments granting permanent custody of five children to the agency and terminating mother’s parental rights. The juvenile court engaged in the proper analysis and made the requisite determinations under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), (D)(1), (D)(2), and (E), and its judgments were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1466 |
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In re A.E.
| 114614 | Legal custody; permanent custody; R.C. 2151.414(E). The trial court did not err in its decision to deny legal custody of the children to Father. The trial court did not err when it awarded permanent custody to Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS") because there was clear and convincing evidence that it was in the best interest of the children, and the trial court’s judgment is supported by sufficient evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1467 |
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State v. Abraham
| 113782 | Application to reopen; App.R. 26(B); ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; ineffective assistance of trial counsel; lack of record support; Brady v. Maryland; suppression of exculpatory evidence; State’s exclusive control of such evidence; authentic assignments of error; manifest weight; trial strategy and tactics; exercise of professional judgment. This court denied an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen. Counsel in the exercise of professional judgment properly declined to argue matters without record support and that came within trial strategy and tactics, such as seeking a bench trial, and not having the defendant testify. A Brady violation did not occur because the State did not have exclusive control over the subject Facebook and text messages. Appellate counsel argued that the verdict was against the manifest weight, and this court held that the conviction for impaired rape was supported by the evidence. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/18/2025
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4/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1446 |
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State v. King
| 114081 | Crim.R. 11; guilty plea; knowing, intelligent, voluntary; R.C. 2929.14; consecutive sentences. Appellant’s guilty pleas were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. The trial court partially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b), and the appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice. The trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences was pursuant to law. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/17/2025
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4/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1365 |
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State v. Alwan
| 114168 | Felonious assault; serious physical harm; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the State presented evidence that the victim suffered serious physical harm in the form of a laceration requiring stitches and a diagnosis of post-concussion syndrome. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; decisions about introducing evidence, calling or not calling witnesses, and the scope of cross-examination are within the scope of trial strategy. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
4/17/2025
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4/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1366 |
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State v. Orenich
| 114242 | R.C. 2945.75; lifetime driver’s license suspension; Crim.R. 52(B); plain error; R.C. 2921.331; R.C. 4510.02; Crim.R. 11; guilty plea; prior conviction. Judgment affirmed. The appellant is unable to show that the trial court erred in imposing the mandatory lifetime driver’s license suspension. When a prior conviction enhances the punishment for committing a subsequent crime but does not raise the degree of the offense, the prior conviction does not have to be included in the indictment because it is not an essential element of the subsequent crime. Thus, the State was not required to provide appellant notice of his prior conviction because the prior conviction is only relevant as a sentencing enhancement; it is not an element of the offense charged under R.C. 2921.331. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/17/2025
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4/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1367 |
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Lagunzad v. Parma Estates, L.L.C.
| 114260 | Motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; genuine issues of material fact; breach of contract; statute of limitations; exclusion of warranties; R.C. 5321.04; R.C. Ch. 4781; R.C. Ch. 5321; common areas; criminal activity by tenants; covenant of quiet enjoyment; rent increase; retaliation; OAC 4781-12-28; R.C. 955.28; strict liability; dog bite and personal property damage; landlord; misrepresentation; fraud; Consumer Sales Practices Act; OAC 4781-12-08; slander; scope of employment; intentional and malicious torts; destruction of personal property; and notice. The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment to a defendant-appellee because the complaint alleged no causes of action against that particular defendant-appellee. The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment to a defendant-appellee on a breach-of-contract claim where the claims were time-barred by the contractually agreed to statute of limitations and the purchase agreement excluded any express or implied warranties. The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment to a defendant-appellee because a landlord or manufactured park operator is not responsible for the alleged criminal activity and resulting damage caused by tenants on a resident’s own property. The trial court also did not err when it found there were no genuine issues of material fact stemming from the plaintiffs-appellants’ allegations that another tenant, rather than the landlord, breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Because the landlord imposed a rent increase on all residents due to increased operational costs and the lease agreement permitted rent increases with the requisite notice, the trial court did not err when it found the plaintiffs-appellants’ allegations of a rent increase due to retaliation did not create a genuine issues of material fact. The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment to defendant-appellant landlord where the plaintiffs-appellants failed to demonstrate the alleged incident with a dog occurred in the common area. Plaintiffs-appellants claimed they relied on a document from the community property manager when they executed the lease agreement. However, the defendant-appellant was entitled to summary judgment on the claim of misrepresentation and fraud because the lease agreement specifically stated (1) the document constitutes the entire agreement and (2) the plaintiffs-appellants did not rely on any representations, written or oral, as an inducement to execute the lease. The trial court correctly granted defendants-appellees’ motion for summary judgment because the claimed violation of Ohio Administrative Code 4781-12-08 lacked merit. Absent evidence to demonstrate an employee’s alleged intentional, malicious torts were performed to further or promote his employer’s business, the trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment on the issue of slander. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment where the plaintiffs-appellants failed to show that their landlord had notice that construction materials were placed on their tenant’s property. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment where genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the landlord was notified about a damaged branch in the common areas and whether the landlord or his employee removed the tenant’s back steps and door without replacing them. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
4/17/2025
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4/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1368 |
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Sanders v. Renaissance Restoration, Ltd.
| 114320 | Final, appealable order; stay; substantial right; due process; guardian. Appeal dismissed for lack of final, appealable order where judgment appealed from merely stayed the litigation pending guardianship proceedings in the probate court. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/17/2025
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4/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1369 |
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Robinson v. Progressive Ins., Corp.
| 114348 | Final appealable order; motion for summary judgment; res judicata; claim preclusion. Judgment affirmed. After the defendant moved for summary judgment, the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence to rebut the defendant’s argument that action was barred by res judicata. We find that the plaintiff is bound by the consequences of the voluntary dismissal of a prior lawsuit with prejudice because it involved the same parties, facts, and claims as the instant action. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because the doctrine of res judicata — specifically, claim preclusion — applies and no exception is warranted. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/17/2025
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4/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1370 |
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In re D.B.
| 114404 | Failure to file transcript; App.R. 9; presume regularity; court not obligated to address case law about undisputed issue; Civ.R. 53; magistrate’s decision; additional evidence; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; error must be separately argued; award of past-care support; R.C. 3111.13. The trial court did not err in declining to specifically address the case law raised by appellants or the affidavits presented in support of their objections to the magistrate’s decision. The court further did not err in finding that appellant had not demonstrated that he was entitled to past-care support. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/17/2025
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4/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1371 |
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D.S.K. v. T.J.K.
| 114444 | Marital property; custody; best interest of the child; transcript; presume regularity. Trial court’s awards of marital property, child custody, and child support are affirmed where Husband failed to file either a transcript of the trial court proceedings or an App.R. 9(C) statement of the evidence, and appellate court must presume regularity. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/17/2025
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4/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1372 |
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In re N.A.
| 114472 | Parental rights; permanent custody; motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody. - Judgment granting permanent custody to Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS") is affirmed. The record contains sufficient evidence supporting the juvenile court’s determination that custody to CCDCFS was in the best interest of the child. Further, the caseworker’s testimony was properly admitted and considered by the trial court based on the totality of the record before us. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/17/2025
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4/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1373 |
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State v. Bender-Adams
| 113366 | App.R. 26(B); application to reopen; ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; ineffective assistance of trial counsel; aggravated murder; perjured evidence; failure to investigate; manifest weight of the evidence. The court denied an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen based on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Perjury is not shown by unsworn statements. Appellate counsel forcefully argued manifest weight of the evidence. The argument that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate relied on too much speculation. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2025
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4/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1364 |
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State ex rel. Hernandez v. Kennedy
| 114848 | Procedendo; issue ruling on pending motion; moot. The complaint for a writ of procedendo to compel the trial court judge to render a ruling, regarding a motion to withdraw plea of guilty, is moot. The trial court judge denied the relator’s motion. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/15/2025
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4/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1374 |
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State v. Haynik
| 111769 | App.R. 26(B) application for reopening; App.R. 26(B)(2)(b) 90-day period to file timely application; untimely filed; failure to establish good cause for untimely filing of application; good cause not applied for an indefinite period of time. The applicant has filed an App.R. 26(B) application for reopening beyond the 90-day period for filing a timely application per App.R. 26(B)(2)(b). The applicant has failed to establish good cause for the untimely filing of the application for reopening. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/14/2025
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4/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1363 |
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Goodykoontz v. Moore
| 114784 | Procedendo; R.C. 2969.25(A) and (C); vain act. Relator seeks a writ of procedendo in order to require the respondent judge to render rulings with regard to pending motions for leave to file motions for new trial. Initially, we find that the relator has failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of R.C. 2969.25(A) and (C). In addition, a review of the docket, in the relator’s two criminal cases, fails to disclose that any motions for leave to file motions for new trial were docketed. Finally, this court will not issue a writ of procedendo to compel a vain act. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/11/2025
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4/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1340 |
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State v. F.S.
| 113712, 113713, 113714 | Juvenile court; competency hearing; incompetency; competency assumed; ineffective assistance of counsel; sufficient indicia of competency; probable cause hearing; bindover hearing; amenability hearing; moot; abuse of discretion. Juvenile appellant has three cases in juvenile court that were bound over to adult court. In his first assignment of error appellant appeals his convictions arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to raise the issue of his competency in juvenile court prior to an amenability hearing. For his first two cases, there was not sufficient indicia of incompetency such that his counsel was not ineffective for not raising the issue in juvenile court. However, his counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue of competency in his third juvenile case since there was more than sufficient indicia of incompetency at that time such that counsel should have filed a motion in the juvenile court for a competency determination. This assignment of error is sustained in part, vacated in part and remanded in part. In appellant’s second assignment of error he argues the trial court abused its discretion by finding him not amenable to juvenile court and transferring his cases to adult court. We find, for his first two cases that the trial court did not abuse its discretion finding appellant was not amenable and properly transferred the two cases. For this third case we find the abuse-of-discretion determination to be moot, since the third case’s amenability finding was vacated and remanded in the prior assignment of error. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1251 |
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Surf City Investors, L.L.C. v. Lofti-Fard
| 113804 | Home equity line of credit, note, mortgage, foreclosure action, action on account, Civ.R. 60(B), relief from judgment, excusable neglect, abuse of discretion, business records, hearsay, relevance, prejudice, Evid.R. 401, 403, 801, 803(3), and 901, authentication. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err when it determined that the case was a foreclosure action. Although a home equity line of credit operates similarly to a credit card, it is secured by a mortgage on property, which gives the lender the ability to foreclose on the property when the debtor defaults. Therefore, the plaintiff-lender was only required to prove the amount of principal and interest due, not a complete payment history with a beginning balance of zero, as appellants contended. Further, the evidence establishing the amount of principal and interest due was properly admitted under the business records exception. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment finding excusable neglect. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1252 |
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Dueck v. Kerrigan
| 113865 | Motion for summary judgment; motion for reconsideration; res judicata; claim preclusion; issue preclusion. The trial court did not err in granting the defendants-appellees’ motions for summary judgment where the causes of action argued by the plaintiffs-appellants were barred by res judicata. The trial court did not err in denying the plaintiffs-appellants’ motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of Count 2 under its complaint. Pursuant to claim preclusion, Count 2 should have been litigated in a prior lawsuit that shared the same parties and arose from the same occurrence or transaction and, therefore, the claim was barred by res judicata. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1253 |
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State v. Anderson
| 113887 | Petition for postconviction relief; untimely petition; R.C. 2953.21; R.C. 2953.23; Brady material; ripeness. Trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s untimely petition for postconviction relief for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where the petition failed to establish entitlement to consideration as required by R.C. 2953.23(A). Appellant’s unsubstantiated and self-serving claim that he did not receive police reports was insufficient to establish that the State suppressed evidence, where the appellant argued in the alternative that he did not receive the police reports, or if he received them, he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to utilize them to impeach the State’s witnesses. Appellant’s argument challenging the State’s res judicata argument is not ripe for review because the trial court summarily denied the petition and did not reach the merits. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1254 |
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In re D.W.
| 113994 & 113995 | Juvenile court; delinquency; amenability; discretionary transfer; bindover; R.C. 2152.12; abuse of discretion. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State’s motion for a discretionary transfer where the court considered the relevant statutory factors in favor of and against transfer and the record reflects a rational basis for the court’s findings. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in not permitting the detective to testify at the amenability hearing. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1255 |
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State v. Sanchez
| 114005 & 114011 | Sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C); life sentence; clearly and convincingly; necessary. Judgment affirmed. A sentence of life with the possibility of parole after the statutory time period does not make it unnecessary or prohibit a trial court from ordering consecutive sentences for multiple crimes. Appellant pled guilty to felony murder with a three-year firearm specification in one case and attempted felonious assault and robbery in a second case. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. Appellant’s consecutive sentence is necessary to protect the public and to punish the appellant and is not disproportionate to the harm caused by appellant and the danger he poses to the public. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1256 |
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State v. Wacasey
| 114144 | Sufficiency; manifest weight; assault; R.C. 2903.13; attempt; physical harm. Affirmed. For the purposes of R.C. 2903.13(A) committed against a law enforcement officer, the State need not prove that the defendant actually harmed the officer or that the defendant purposefully or intentionally kicked the officer in an attempt to cause harm. Further, based on the evidence that the defendant intentionally bit an officer during a lawful arrest, the State has proven the crime of assault beyond a reasonable doubt. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1257 |
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In re T.P.
| 114169 | Juvenile court; discretionary bindover; probable cause; grand theft; aggravated robbery; robbery. - Juvenile court erred in finding no probable cause on certain counts of the complaint. The State presented credible evidence to establish probable cause to believe that the then-juvenile committed grand theft, aggravated robbery, and robbery because the then-juvenile refused to return the victim’s property after the victim revoked his consent and fled the scene with the property after another individual shot the victim. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1258 |
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In re L.H.
| 114187 | Plain error; Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iv); adjudication; disposition; R.C. 2151.35(A)(1); R.C. 2151.353(A)(2)(a); temporary custody. Judgment affirmed. Mother waived any arguments regarding the juvenile court’s dependency finding and fails to argue that the juvenile court plainly erred in adjudicating L.H. dependent on appeal. Accordingly, her challenge to the juvenile court’s adjudication of L.H. is overruled. Moreover, Mother did not object to the magistrate’s decision recommending temporary custody be granted to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) and does not argue on appeal that the juvenile court’s adoption of that recommendation amounted to plain error. However, even if Mother’s challenge to the trial court’s temporary custody determination were properly raised, we decline to find that the trial court plainly erred in granting temporary custody to CCDCFS. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1259 |
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State v. Baldwin
| 114247 | Postconviction-relief petition; R.C. 2953.21(H); findings of fact and conclusions of law; apprise; appellate review. - Trial court erred in failing to set forth sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(H) to apprise the appellant of the basis for the trial court’s denial of his timely postconviction-relief petition and to facilitate appellate review. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1260 |
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State v. Burgos
| 114258 | Appellate review; maximum sentence. Appellant claimed that the eight-year prison sentences imposed on his convictions for attempted kidnapping and attempted rape were not supported by the record. This court is without authority to review whether a sentence is supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1261 |
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State v. Holliman
| 114286 | Improper discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises; postrelease control; manifest weight of the evidence; offense of violence. - Judgment affirmed. The jury’s verdict finding defendant guilty of a single violation of improper discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in imposing postrelease control because this court has previously found that R.C. 2923.162(A)(3) qualifies as an offense of violence that allows for the imposition of postrelease control. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1262 |
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Cumberland Lakefront B., L.L.C. v. Blackwing, L.L.C.
| 114311 | Summary judgment; commercial lease; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; Civ.R. 52; Civ.R. 56; declaratory judgment; breach of contract; tenant improvement allowance. Judgment affirmed. This court declines to address assignments of error in which appellants failed to follow the appellate rules and in which have been rendered moot by prior judgments and orders. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord on the tenant’s counterclaims because the tenant was unable to show that it was entitled to tenant improvement funds when the tenant never submitted receipts or invoices for improvements made to the business. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1263 |
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In re C.D.
| 114329 | Termination of parental rights; permanent custody; dispositional hearing; R.C. 2151.35; 90 days after filing of complaint; dismiss with prejudice; plain error; hearing must commence; ineffective assistance of counsel; deficiency prejudiced defense; failure to seek writ of procedendo; R.C. 2151.414; statutory timeframe for resolution of motion for permanent custody. The trial court did not err in declining to dismiss the case because it did not violate the statutory timeframe. The dispositional hearing was commenced within 90 days of the refiled complaint. Further, Mother’s counsel did not demonstrate that her counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a writ of procedendo with regard to the motion for permanent custody. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1264 |
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