Seal of the State of Ohio. Click here to return to the Supreme Court home page. The Supreme Court of Ohio & The Ohio Judicial System. Click here to return to the Supreme Court home page. Line Drawing of the Ohio Judicial Center. Click here to return to the Supreme Court home page.
Spacer image

The Supreme Court of Ohio & The Ohio Judicial System

Opinion Search Filter Settings
Use standard search logic for the Opinion Text Search (full-text search). To search the entire web site click here
Opinion Text Search:   What is Opinion Text Search?
Source:    What is a Source?
Year Decided From:
Year Decided To:    What is Year Decided?
Year Decided Range Warning:
County:    What is County?
Case Number:    What is Case Number?
Author:    What is Author?
Topics and Issues:    What are Topics and Issues?
WebCite No: -Ohio-    What is a Web Cite No.? WebCite and Citation are unique document searches. If a value is entered in the WebCite or Citation field, all other search filters are ignored. If values are entered in both the WebCite and Citation fields, only the WebCite search filter is applied.
Citation:    What is Citation?
This search returned 43 rows. Rows per page: 
Case CaptionCase No.Topics and IssuesAuthorCitation / CountyDecidedPostedWebCite
State v. Jackson 110462Motion to suppress; mixed standard of review; Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14, of the Ohio Constitution guarantee; searches and seizures; police-citizen contact; consensual encounter; Terry stop; arrest; and sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a mixed standard of review. In a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate witness credibility. As the reviewing court, we must accept the trial court’s findings of fact in ruling on a motion to suppress if the findings are supported by competent, credible evidence. With respect to the trial court’s conclusion of law, the reviewing court applies a de novo standard of review and decides whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution guarantee “the right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” However, these guarantees are not implicated with every police-citizen contact. Instead, the individual rights are balanced against the type and extent of the intrusion and the other interests involved, such as crime prevention. In balancing these interests, the United States Supreme Court has developed three categories of police-citizen contact — none intended to be used in a bright-line fashion — namely: (1) the consensual encounter, (2) Terry stop, and (3) arrest. Appellant, state of Ohio, contends that the officer’s initial encounter with appellee was consensual up until the first time Jackson attempted to put his key in the ignition. Appellant also contends that the officer “first observed the extremely strong odor of marijuana by ‘plain smell’ when he initially approached the vehicle, barely entering appellee’s property to do so.” Upon review, we find nothing in the record to indicate that the police encounter with appellee was consensual. We also find nothing to suggest that the officers possessed sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion to perform a Terry or investigative stop and to subsequently detain appellee. As such, the trial court properly granted appellee’s motion to suppress.GrovesCuyahoga 1/27/2022 1/27/2022 2022-Ohio-187
State v. Whaley 110486Crim.R. 11; knowingly; intelligently; voluntarily; maximum penalty; prejudice; guilty; plea; felony. Defendant was not prejudiced by the court’s inconsistent advisement of the maximum penalties he faced by entering guilty pleas to the felony offenses. Defendant’s decision to enter pleas of guilty was predicated on his desire to accept the terms of a favorable plea agreement and not his alleged misunderstanding of the applicable penalties. E.T. GallagherCuyahoga 1/27/2022 1/27/2022 2022-Ohio-188
State v. Majid 110560Postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21(A)(1); de novo; motion to correct; sentence; void; voidable; jurisdiction. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant’s untimely petition for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21(A)(1). Under the Ohio Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence, any sentencing error would be voidable, not void; and defendant was limited to challenging his sentence via a direct appeal. Therefore, the trial court did not err by summarily denying defendant’s motion to correct sentence.S. GallagherCuyahoga 1/27/2022 1/27/2022 2022-Ohio-189
In re O.C. 110568Permanent custody; guardian ad litem; legal custody; R.C. 2151.414; best interest; clear and convincing evidence. Judgment granting GAL’s motion for permanent custody, opposed by CCDCFS and Mother, was not supported by competent and credible evidence. The trial court’s findings reiterated testimony from various GALs, some of which was factually inaccurate, and largely ignored the overwhelming balance of evidence in the form of testimony from agency employees and support professionals. The court abused its discretion in denying Mother’s motion for legal custody because it was supported by a preponderance of the evidence.KilbaneCuyahoga 1/27/2022 1/27/2022 2022-Ohio-190
In re V.G. 110609Parental rights; permanent custody; clear and convincing evidence; best interest of child; foster parents. The juvenile court’s decision to terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to CCDCFS was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Mother failed to engage in the case plan designed to address her mental-health and substance-abuse issues. Father failed to appreciate the severity and the impact that Mother’s mental-health and substance-abuse issues would have on the infant child if Father continued to reside in the same home as Mother. Father never obtained independent housing in order to provide safe and appropriate housing for the child. It was in the child’s best interest to remain with the foster parents, where the child had been since her release from the hospital, 31 days after birth, afflicted with numerous serious medical conditions. The record established that the foster mother, a medical professional, was uniquely suited to address and care for a child with such severe medical needs.GrovesCuyahoga 1/27/2022 1/27/2022 2022-Ohio-191
Owens v. Giant Eagle, Inc. 110666Summary judgment, workers’ compensation, causal connection, arising out of employment. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of employer was in error where a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the causal connection of appellant’s injury to the employment.Laster MaysCuyahoga 1/27/2022 1/27/2022 2022-Ohio-192
Cleveland v. Gross 110669Speedy trial; dismiss; R.C. 2945.71(B)(2); R.C. 2945.71(C)(2); R.C. 2945.72; felony; misdemeanor. The trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds. Because only 54 days elapsed, the speedy-trial time limits under R.C. 2945.71(B)(2) or (C)(2) were not exceeded. The time between the dismissal of the original felony charge and Gross’s first appearance on the subsequent misdemeanor charge was not counted in the speedy-trial analysis.S. GallagherCuyahoga 1/27/2022 1/27/2022 2022-Ohio-193
In re Z.M. 110699Juvenile-offender registrant; terminate; modify; factors; abuse of discretion; tier II; classification. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by continuing the juvenile’s classification as a juvenile-offender registrant and a tier II sex offender.E.T. GallagherCuyahoga 1/27/2022 1/27/2022 2022-Ohio-194
Cleveland v. Davis 110708Constitutional right to the assistance of counsel; waiver of the right to counsel; knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; colloquy; and conceded error. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee that persons brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel before they can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment. When a defendant manages his or her own defense, they relinquish, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. Therefore, in order to represent themselves, defendants must “knowingly and intelligently” forgo those relinquished benefits. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing him to proceed to trial pro se without ensuring he had properly waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The City filed a notice of conceded error pursuant to Loc.App.R. 16(B). Our review of the record, including the colloquy, reveals that the trial court did not discuss with Davis the consequences of waiving counsel, the charges against him, or possible defenses. As such, the inquiry was insufficient to determine whether Davis was making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to the assistance of counsel.GrovesCuyahoga 1/27/2022 1/27/2022 2022-Ohio-195
Gangale v. Coyne 110772Motion to quash subpoena duces tecum; Civ.R. 45(C)(3); nonparty; tax returns; financial records; standing; scope of discovery; Civ.R. 26(B)(1). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying nonparty’s motion to quash subpoena duces tecum seeking production of nonparty’s tax returns and other financial documents and ordering production pursuant to protective order. Nonparty had standing to file motion to quash subpoena duces tecum served on his accountant based on his personal interest in the documents sought. Trial court did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily or unconscionably in determining that documents at issue were discoverable under Civ.R. 26(B)(1) and 45.E.A. GallagherCuyahoga 1/27/2022 1/27/2022 2022-Ohio-196
State v. Tolbert 110249Sufficiency of the evidence; R.C. 2929.14(C); consecutive sentences. Appellant contended that the state could not produce sufficient evidence to support a conviction for involuntary manslaughter. However, the court found that the state had produced sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction as a reasonable juror could have inferred that the victim suffered child abuse in the custody of appellant and the conduct that constituted child abuse also proximately caused the victim’s death. The court sustained appellant’s assignment of error with respect to consecutive sentences. The trial court neither expressly made the disproportionality findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C) nor made any statement showing that the court considered those factors using different language.E.A. GallagherCuyahoga 1/27/2022 1/27/2022 2022-Ohio-197
Hecht v. Equity Trust Co. 110380 & 110650Abuse of discretion; Civ.R. 6(B); extension of time; Loc.R. 8(C); stipulated extension; breach of contract; de novo; Civ.R. 10(D)(1); agreement not attached to complaint; Civ.R. 12(E); motion for more definite statement; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); motion to dismiss; matters outside complaint; Civ.R. 56; convert motion to dismiss to motion for summary judgment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant’s request for extension of time to respond to the appellee’s motion to dismiss after the appellant missed both the initial deadline and the extended deadline. The appellant pleaded facts sufficient to meet elements of breach of contract. The appellant’s failure to attach the parties’ agreement to the complaint was not fatal. The proper remedy was for appellee to move for a more definite statement. The trial court erred in granting the appellee’s motion to dismiss based on matters outside the complaint without converting the appellee’s motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.BoyleCuyahoga 1/27/2022 1/27/2022 2022-Ohio-198
Olmsted Twp. v. Ritchie 110107, 110108Magistrate’s decision; objection; de novo; R.C. 2929.41(B)(1); R.C. 2929.24; R.C. 2929.25; R.C. 2929.25(A)(1)(a); R.C. 2929.25(D); misdemeanor; sentence; aggregate term; modify; suspend; maximum jail term; community control; violation; matter of law. Trial court’s order modifying the defendant’s misdemeanor sentence was modified to delete language indicating additional jail time remained available for sentencing, which was erroneous as a matter of law. The trial court sentenced the defendant pursuant to R.C. 2929.24(A) and 2929.25(A)(1)(a) to a jail term of 30 days for each misdemeanor count in combination with the direct imposition of five years of community control. Because the defendant was credited with the total jail time on the sentence that was imposed, he was not subject to any further jail time. R.C. 2929.25(D) could not be read to permit the trial court to modify the sentence beyond the maximum jail term initially imposed. S. GallagherCuyahoga 1/20/2022 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-124
State v. Lenhart 110226DNA testing; outcome determinative; res judicata. Trial court properly denied defendant’s application for DNA testing where the record shows the results of such testing would not be outcome determinative.E.T. GallagherCuyahoga 1/20/2022 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-125
Hudson & Keyse L.L.C. v. Sherrills 110366Dormant judgment; motion for revivor; objection; R.C. 2325.15; R.C. 2325.18; App.R. 12; challenge to validity of the judgment; collateral attack. The trial court did not err in granting the motion to revive dormant judgment. The collateral attacks on the judgment raised by appellant in her objection were appropriate for a motion for relief from judgment but could not be considered with regard to a motion for revivor.CelebrezzeCuyahoga 1/20/2022 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-126
State v. Browning 110555Felony sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); findings; R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(I); R.C. 2929.11; contrary to law; permissible range. We review felony sentences under the standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence, or vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing if it “clearly and convincingly finds” that the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(I), or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. Under R.C. 2929.11, a sentence imposed for a felony shall be “reasonably calculated” to achieve “three overriding purposes of felony sentencing” — (1) to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, (2) to punish the offender, and (3) to promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender — “using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources.” Appellant argues his two-year sentence was contrary to law because it failed to comport with the overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11. However, the two-year sentence for appellant’s conviction, a third-degree felony, was within the permissible range. In addition, the court’s judgment of conviction states that “[t]he court considered all required factors of the law” and “finds that prison is consistent with the purpose of R.C. 2929.11.” Further, although the trial court was not required to make findings on the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, the trial court discussed its reasoning at the sentencing hearing. As such, we refuse to find that appellant’s two-year prison sentence is contrary to law.GrovesCuyahoga 1/20/2022 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-127
Cleveland v. Bolger 110769Jail-time credit; medical isolation; community-control sanctions; maximum jail sentence served; R.C. 2929.24; trial court; journal entry; misdemeanor. The trial court erred when it denied defendant 20 days of jail-time credit for days spent in medical isolation within the county jail. The trial court also erred when it placed defendant on community-control sanctions after he had already served the maximum jail sentence for a misdemeanor.KilbaneCuyahoga 1/20/2022 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-128
Ridge-Pleasant Valley, Inc. v. Navin 109777Civ.R. 56, summary judgment, Civ.R. 12(F), strike pleadings. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellee. The trial court struck pleadings by appellant that failed to comply with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, and appellant did not resubmit filings that complied with the rules though warned to do so.Laster MaysCuyahoga 1/20/2022 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-130
Ohio Bar Liab. Ins. Co. v. Wallace 110038Judgment on the pleadings; Civ.R. 12(C); de novo review; insurance policy; contract interpretation; coverage; exclusion; duty to defend; claim for attorney fees; statute designed to deter frivolous conduct; IDEA; 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3). There was no coverage for appellants’ claims under the policy because the claims against appellants in the subject suits were brought under IDEA’s fee-shifting provision, which is a statute that was designed to deter frivolous conduct by attorneys engaged in litigation. The trial court did not err in granting judgment on the pleadings on OBLIC’s complaint in favor of OBLIC and denying appellants’ corresponding motion. The trial court further did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of OBLIC on appellants’ counterclaim for bad faith.CelebrezzeCuyahoga 1/20/2022 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-131
State v. Branch 110050Maximum sentence, findings of fact, R.C. 2929.141, abuse of discretion, psychological evaluation. A trial court is not required to place findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record when imposing a maximum sentence where the trial court on the record and in its journal entry notes that it considered the required factors. The mere fact that the trial court emphasized certain facts and did not mention others, does not mean the trial court failed to consider relevant factors. Appellate court may only review the record before it. Where the record is silent as to an issue argued by appellant, the court is unable to review it. Finally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it fails to order a second psychological evaluation when the first psychological evaluation suggests appellant is malingering and appellant’s multiple pro se filings and colloquy with the court display appellant’s understanding of the proceedings and his ability to assist his attorney.GrovesCuyahoga 1/20/2022 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-132
In re D.P. 110729Due process; manifest weight of the evidence; permanent custody; R.C. 2151.353; R.C. 2151.414; R.C. 2151.419.Laster MaysCuyahoga 1/20/2022 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-135
State ex rel. Davis v. Gallagher 111179Mandamus, procedendo, pending motion, Civ.R. 12(B)(6), hybrid representation, duty of trial court to rule on pro se motion. Relator seeks a writ of procedendo/mandamus in order to compel the trial court to issue rulings with regard to pending pro se motions. The relator does not possess the right to representation by counsel and pro se representation, often know as hybrid representation. When a criminal defendant is represented by counsel, a trial court is prohibited from ruling on a pro se motion unless counsel joins in the pro se motion. Herein, the relator filed numerous pro se motions without the assistance or approval of counsel. Because the relator was represented by counsel, the trial court possesses no duty to issue rulings with regard to any pro se motion. The complaint for procedendo/mandamus fails to state a claim and is subject to a sua sponte dismissal.BoyleCuyahoga 1/14/2022 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-129
State v. Lewis 110448Crim.R. 32.1; motion to withdraw guilty plea; abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea because Crim.R. 32.1 did not vest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider the appellant’s motion after an appeal and affirmance by the appellate court.Laster MaysCuyahoga 1/13/2022 1/13/2022 2022-Ohio-70
Woodmere v. Workman 110449Disorderly conduct; R.C. 2917.11(A); noise ordinance; free speech; First Amendment; selective prosecution. Defendant’s convictions for disorderly conduct under R.C. 2917.11(A) and a violation of a local noise control ordinance were impermissibly based on the defendant’s speech in violation of the First Amendment of the federal Constitution, and therefore, the convictions are vacated.S. GallagherCuyahoga 1/13/2022 1/13/2022 2022-Ohio-71
State v. Angel 110456Third-degree felony; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; 30-month prison term. - Defendant’s sentence of 30 months in prison was not contrary to law because it was within the statutory range for third-degree felonies and the trial court properly considered the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12 when it imposed the sentence. Appellate court could not consider defendant’s argument that the record did not support the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 because nothing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to independently weigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court regarding R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.KeoughCuyahoga 1/13/2022 1/13/2022 2022-Ohio-72
State v. Hagler 110523Pro se litigant; Crim.R. 32(B); final appealable order; judgment of conviction. The trial court’s denials of defendant’s motions for a final order are affirmed. Defendant’s argument that the judgments of conviction in multiple cases be condensed to one document is unsupported by law.ForbesCuyahoga 1/13/2022 1/13/2022 2022-Ohio-73
State v. Cisco 110687Notice of consequences of violation of community control sanction; final judgment. On July 15, 2021, one month after it journalized a community control sanction as sentence for a felony offense, the trial court journalized an entry containing notice of a potential prison sentence it could impose for a violation of the community control sanction. Because the trial court did not have authority to amend the final judgment of sentence, the case is remanded to the trial court to vacate the July 15, 2021 journal entry.SheehanCuyahoga 1/13/2022 1/13/2022 2022-Ohio-74
DiCarlo v. Fairview Hosp. 110766Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; negligence; duty; breach; hazard; notice; slip and fall; premises liability; invitee. The trial court properly granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Appellant failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment in defendants’ favor. Appellant did not present any Civ.R. 56(C) evidence demonstrating that a hazard existed and that the hazard caused her to slip and fall. Accordingly, appellant’s negligence claim fails as a matter of law.CelebrezzeCuyahoga 1/13/2022 1/13/2022 2022-Ohio-75
State v. Yates 109821Sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence; Evid.R. 801; hearsay; Evid.R. 803(2); excited utterance; Evid.R. 803(3); present sense impression; ineffective assistance of counsel; jury irregularities; R.C. 2945.71; speedy trial. Appellant’s convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Reviewed for plain error, the witness’s statement to the victim’s mother made immediately after the shooting qualified as an excited utterance and present sense impression to the hearsay rule. Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails where the errors complained of were found to lack merit.Laster MaysCuyahoga 1/13/2022 1/13/2022 2022-Ohio-76
MetroHealth Sys. v. Khandelwal 109913Preliminary injunction; modification; noncompete agreement; doctor; specialized; abuse of discretion; likelihood of success on the merits; irreparable injury; unjustifiable harm to third parties; public interest; reasonable; legitimate business interest; undue hardship; injury to the public. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it modified the noncompete agreement between appellant and appellee. Appellant did not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its breach-of-contract claim against the appellee with the noncompete agreement as written, however it did have a substantial likelihood of success under the trial court’s modified noncompete agreement. As modified by the court, the noncompete agreement protected appellant’s legitimate business interests, did not impose and undue burden on the appellee, and did not injure the public. Further, the modified noncompete agreement would not cause the appellant to suffer irreparable injury. Finally, third parties would be harmed, and the public interest would not be served by enforcing the noncompete agreement as written by appellant. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it modified the noncompete agreement between the parties.ForbesCuyahoga 1/13/2022 1/13/2022 2022-Ohio-77
State v. Johnson 110205Postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21; R.C. 2953.23; untimely; exception; unavoidably prevented from discovering; witness testimony; de novo. The trial court did not err by denying appellant’s petition for postconviction relief because it was untimely pursuant to R.C. 2953.21. Additionally, appellant did not qualify for an exception to the timeliness requirement pursuant to R.C. 2953.23 because he did not demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which he relies, nor did he establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty but for the alleged constitutional error. Accordingly, the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain appellant’s petition.ForbesCuyahoga 1/13/2022 1/13/2022 2022-Ohio-78
Metron Nutraceuticals, L.L.C. v. Thomas 110280Motion to show cause; contempt; sanction; manifest weight of the evidence; abuse of discretion; attorney fees. - Trial court’s judgment granting motion to show cause and finding defendant in contempt was neither against the manifest weight of the evidence nor an abuse of discretion where the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing on the motion was undisputed that defendant had not complied with the agreed judgment entry; plaintiff’s request for attorney fees was properly submitted with its post-hearing brief; trial court’s decision granting attorney fees without an evidentiary hearing did not violate defendant’s due process rights because defendant offered no evidence challenging plaintiff’s entitlement to attorney fees nor the reasonableness of the fees and never requested a hearing.KeoughCuyahoga 1/13/2022 1/13/2022 2022-Ohio-79
Myers v. John A. Hudec Cleveland Dental Ctr., Inc. 110328Summary judgment; expert testimony; Loc.R. 21.1; Civ.R. 26(B)(7). The trial court did not err in granting the appellees’ summary judgment motion because the appellant failed to provide expert testimony in compliance with Loc.R. 21.1 and Civ.R. 26(B)(7).Laster MaysCuyahoga 1/13/2022 1/13/2022 2022-Ohio-80
State v. Johnson 110347Petition for postconviction relief; recantation; successive; untimely; abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s successive and untimely petition for postconviction relief, based on an alleged recantation of witness testimony, because appellant was unable to show that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the recantation and unable to establish a constitutional error.KilbaneCuyahoga 1/13/2022 1/13/2022 2022-Ohio-81
State v. Robinson 110358Guilty plea; immigration consequences of a guilty plea; findings of fact and conclusions of law; ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant failed to timely appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw the guilty plea because there is no authority allowing the 30-day appeal time from a judgment denying a Crim.R. 32.1 motion to be tolled by a motion for factual findings and conclusions of law. Even if the appeal had been filed timely, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea predicated on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. The totality of circumstances did not establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s allegedly deficient performance, appellant would have chosen to go to trial.SheehanCuyahoga 1/13/2022 1/13/2022 2022-Ohio-82
Mundy v. Golightly 110382Partition; Civ.R. 12(C); pleading requirements. In an action for partition of property acquired during cohabitation, judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) was properly granted where plaintiff did not allege any fact other than cohabitation to establish that defendant had an ownership interest in the property because Ohio law precludes an action for partition of personal property acquired solely on account of cohabitation.SheehanCuyahoga 1/13/2022 1/13/2022 2022-Ohio-83
State v. Lucas 110421Postrelease-control sanctions; jail-time credit. The trial court erred by failing to reduce the postrelease-control sanction because the sanction should have been reduced by the prison term that was imposed by the parole board. The trial court did not err by not awarding the appellant jail-time credit because the court’s calculation shall not include the number of days, if any, that the appellant served in the custody of the department of rehabilitation and correction arising out of any prior offense for which the appellant was convicted and sentenced.Laster MaysCuyahoga 1/13/2022 1/13/2022 2022-Ohio-84
State v. Stewart 109867 & 109868Fourth Amendment; seizure; search; warrantless; traffic stop; concealed carry violation; plain view; immediately apparent; inadvertent. Trial court erred in granting motion to suppress evidence where traffic stop was constitutionally valid and police observed contraband in plain view.E.T. GallagherCuyahoga 1/13/2022 1/27/2022 2022-Ohio-199
COD Properties Ohio, L.L.C. v. Black Tie Title, L.L.C. 109714 & 109833Attorney disqualification; Prof.Cond.R. 3.7; necessary witness; unobtainable testimony; crime-fraud exception; attorney-client privilege. Attorney disqualification is a drastic measure that should not be taken unless absolutely necessary. Trial court erred in disqualifying attorney where there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the attorney’s testimony was unobtainable by any other source and therefore necessary.GrovesCuyahoga 1/6/2022 1/6/2022 2022-Ohio-17
Kingsbury v. Cornerstone Family Office, L.L.C. 109886Motion to enforce settlement agreement; attorney fees. The trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement between the parties. The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding to enforce the agreement. The trial court did not base its decision on a misconstruction of law or an erroneous standard.Laster MaysCuyahoga 1/6/2022 1/6/2022 2022-Ohio-18
Broadway Concrete Invests., L.L.C. v. Masonry Contracting Corp. 110420Prompt Payment Act; R.C. 4113.61; interest; attorney fees; breach of contract; mechanic’s lien bond. - Trial court’s judgment finding that appellant had violated Ohio’s Prompt Payment Act set forth in R.C. 4113.61 and awarding interest and attorney fees for the violation reversed because the trial court improperly found that appellant was prepaid for appellee’s work and that the statute therefore required appellant to pay the appellee within ten days of receipt of appellee’s invoices, rather than ten days after payment from the upper tier contractor; trial court’s judgment that appellant breached the contract between appellant and appellee reversed because the trial court based its judgment on terms that were not part of the contract; trial court’s judgment that surety company was liable on a surety bond for any part of the judgment rendered against the subcontractor was affirmed because neither the surety company nor the subcontractor challenged the underlying mechanic’s lien at trial, thereby waiving any challenge on appeal.KeoughCuyahoga 1/6/2022 1/6/2022 2022-Ohio-19
Estate of Wiedemer v. Cleveland Yachting Club, Inc. 110432; 110681Motion to quash subpoena; Civ.R. 45; motion for protective order; Civ.R. 26(C); final appealable order; provisional remedy; R.C. 2505.02(B)(4); abuse of discretion; privileged or otherwise protected material; tax returns; financial records; undue burden; damages. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants’ motion to quash subpoena and motion for protective order. Due to the nature of the damages sought by appellants, the benefit of the disclosure of the records outweighs their privacy interests. In addition, appellants failed to demonstrate that compliance with the subpoena constituted an undue burden. Finally, because appellant Hinkley Lighting only sought to prevent disclosure of the financial records beyond the instant suit, the trial court erred in denying Hinkley Lighting’s motion for protective order.CelebrezzeCuyahoga 1/6/2022 1/6/2022 2022-Ohio-20
State v. Gray 110539Crim.R. 36; nunc pro tunc entry; Crim.R. 32(C) sentencing entry. Defendant’s 1989 sentencing entry did not comply with Crim.R. 32(C). After defendant filed motions to vacate sentence, the trial court’s denial of motions to vacate his sentence was not error and the trial court properly issued a nunc pro tunc entry that conformed with Crim.R. 32(C). The original sentencing entry was not void, and the nunc pro tunc entry did not create any new right of appeal.SheehanCuyahoga 1/6/2022 1/6/2022 2022-Ohio-21