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In re D.R.
| 116197 | Service of process; juvenile court; certified mail service; ordinary mail service; residence; motion to vacate; void judgment; presumption of proper service; rebuttable presumption; abuse of discretion; personal jurisdiction; due process; R.C. 2151.29; Juv.R. 16(A); Civ.R. 4.1(A)(1)(a); Civ.R. 4.6(D). Judgment reversed and case remanded. The juvenile court abused its discretion in denying father’s motion to vacate previous juvenile court judgments for lack of service. Father effectively rebutted presumption of proper service via an uncontested affidavit, and the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services did not establish that father actually resided at the service address. The juvenile court therefore lacked personal jurisdiction to enter the contested judgments against him. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
9/17/2026
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9/17/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3642 |
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State v. Brown
| 115806 | Joinder; simple and direct; character evidence; identity; Evid.R. 404(B); abuse of discretion; manifest weight; complicity; aggravated robbery. Trial court properly joined two indictments for trial where the evidence presented in each case was simple and direct and evidence from one case would have been admissible under Evid.R. 404(B) to prove identity. Defendant’s aggravated-robbery conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victim testified that the defendant was complicit in the aggravated robbery and the defendant was in possession of the victim’s property at the time of his arrest. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/17/2026
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9/17/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3632 |
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State v. Allen
| 115768 | Motion to withdraw guilty plea; presentence motion; guilty plea; complete admission of guilt; plea colloquy; abuse of discretion; coercion; package plea deal; claim of innocence; Crim.R. 11; Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b); Crim.R. 32.1; App.R. 12(A); App.R. 16(A). Judgment affirmed. The trial court explicitly informed appellant that his guilty plea constituted a complete admission of guilt, and appellant indicated he understood. The trial court therefore did not err by not placing the factual basis for the plea on the record. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Appellant’s criticisms of counsel were unsupported by the record, the Crim.R. 11 process for accepting plea deals countered any coercive risk associated with the package plea deal, and appellant’s remaining coercion arguments simply reflected the reality of the uncertainty associated with going to trial versus accepting a plea offer. Appellant’s argument that he was completely innocent contradicted his admissions of guilt during the Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy, and he did not offer any specific defense or fact suggesting innocence or any response to the State’s summary of evidence, including video footage, tying appellant to the crimes. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
9/17/2026
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9/17/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3631 |
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Clarke v. Am. Family Ins. Co.
| 115988 | Pro se litigant; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); negligent entrustment; ownership; possession and control of the vehicle; motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; insurance company; tortfeasor; third-party beneficiary; damages; independent causes of action; App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16(A)(7); and discovery motions. The trial court correctly granted appellees’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss based upon negligent entrustment because appellees were not the owner of the vehicle and no case law was introduced to demonstrate that the payment of insurance premiums constitutes possession and control of a vehicle. The trial court correctly granted the insurance company’s Civ.R. 56 motion for summary judgment because a third-party beneficiary needs to first file suit against the alleged tortfeasor and obtain a judgment before filing suit directly against the tortfeasor’s insurance company seeking declaratory judgment, bad faith, and negligence. The trial court’s dismissal of appellant’s causes of action under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and granting a motion for summary judgment extinguished her ability to recover damages. Pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2) and 16(A)(7), this court was permitted to disregard an assignment of error because the appellant failed to cite to any legal authority in support of the claimed error. The trial court was permitted to grant a judgment entry that simultaneously granted a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion and a Civ.R. 56 summary-judgment motion and denied outstanding discovery motions. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
9/17/2026
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9/17/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3639 |
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Salvo-Hill v. Univ. Hosp. Geauga Med. Ctr.
| 115735 | Motion for summary judgment; Civ.R 56; genuine issues of material fact; H.B. 606; immunity; COVID-19; ordinary negligence; medical claim; healthcare services; common knowledge exception. Judgment reversed and remanded. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment was improper where plaintiff’s claim were ones of ordinary negligence and the immunity set forth in H.B. 606 did not apply to defendants. Plaintiff’s mother was a patient at defendant-hospital during the COVID-19 pandemic. Following the patient’s discharge, patient was transported to her daughter’s car by wheelchair. The patient fell as defendant attempted to place the patient into the car. Falls can either be medical claims or general negligence claims, depending upon the factual circumstances. When a person falls because of the negligent use of medical equipment during a medical procedure, it is a medical claim. However, where the fall does not arise out of medical diagnosis, care, or treatment, the fall gives rise to a general negligence claim. Based on the facts of this case, the patient’s fall gave rise to a negligence claim. Therefore, the immunity for healthcare services as defined in H.B. 606 did not apply. When reviewing the evidence in the record, genuine issues of material fact exist because of the inconsistencies in the testimony regarding how many of defendant’s employees assisted the patient out of her hospital bed with only one employee assisting the patient to the car and whether an ambulance transport was offered as an option to bring the patient home. At this stage in the proceedings, the trial court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or choose among reasonable inferences. Rather, the court must evaluate the evidence, taking all permissible inferences and resolving questions of credibility in favor of the nonmoving party. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
9/17/2026
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9/17/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3629 |
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