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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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Eastlawn Properties, L.L.C. v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.
| C-240277 | INSURANCE — SUMMARY JUDGMENT — LIMITATIONS PERIOD — CONTRACTS — WAIVER— BAD FAITH — BREACH OF CONTRACT — PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL — NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION — FRAUD — MOTION TO DISMISS — EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL: Where insured’s claim for breach of contract was barred by the two-year suit-limitation period in the insurance policy, and where insurer did not waive the limitation provision, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to insurer on the claim. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to insurer on insured’s claim for bad faith in the handling and processing of insured’s claim under the policy where the record contained genuine issues of material fact as to whether there was a reasonable justification for the insurer’s repeated failure to respond to the insured, its delay in issuing payment, and its request for additional documentation regarding code upgrades to the insured property. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to insurer on insured’s claim that insurer had breached the contract it had with insured’s restoration company where the record established that no contract was formed between insurer and the restoration company. Where insurer never promised to pay insured’s restoration company a specific amount for supplemental repairs, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to insurer on the claim for promissory estoppel. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to insurer on claims for negligent misrepresentation and fraud where insurer did not provide false and misleading information or omit any material facts that insured relied on and that resulted in injury or pecuniary loss to insured. Because the doctrines of waiver and estoppel are not available to extend the terms of an insurance policy, the trial court did not err in dismissing insured’s claim for estoppel/waiver of the insurance policy’s code upgrade coverage limitation. | Crouse | Hamilton |
4/25/2025
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4/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1475 |
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State v. Donovan
| C-240437 | SELF-DEFENSE – MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE: The trial court’s finding that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence because defendant did not have a bona fide belief of imminent death or great bodily harm and he chose to reengage with the victim, creating the situation that led to the affray. The trial court did not improperly consider evidence that defendant was safe within his home before he chose to reengage with the victim, as it demonstrated who was at fault in creating the situation. | Nestor | Hamilton |
4/25/2025
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4/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1476 |
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State v. Marshall
| C-230594, C-230595 | JUDICIAL RELEASE — COMMUNITY CONTROL: The trial court did not err under R.C. 2929.20(K) in revoking defendant’s community control sanctions and reimposing the remainder of defendant’s original prison term following judicial release when, at the time of judicial release, the trial court expressly reserved the right to reimpose a prison term upon defendant if he violated community control. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
4/23/2025
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4/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1426 |
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Ho v. Co
| C-240338 | CONTEMPT — POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST — SERVICE — VEXATIOUS LITIGATOR: In a divorce case, any deficiency in service of the trial court’s entry clarifying appellee-father’s interest award did not render that order void, and the deficiency was harmless where the order failed to set a deadline for payment of an interest award. In a divorce case, the trial court did not err when its interest award included interest that accrued while matters were stayed during the pendency of an appeal. In a divorce case, appellant-mother’s vexatious-litigator status did not make the proceedings on appellee-father’s motions for postjudgment interest and contempt fundamentally unfair because that status did not impede her ability to oppose those motions in responsive filings. In a divorce case, appellant-mother’s failure to file transcripts of hearings on appellee-father’s motions to clarify his interest award and for contempt prevented the appeals court from reaching the merits of appellant-mother’s substantive arguments. [But see DISSENT: The appeal is moot based on appellant-mother’s voluntary satisfaction of the purge condition during the pendency of the appeal.] | Bock | Hamilton |
4/23/2025
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4/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1427 |
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Zhang v. Zheng
| C-240430 | CONTRACTS – FRAUD – SUMMARY JUDGMENT: The trial court did not err in granting defendants’ summary judgment motion on plaintiff’s claim for fraud in the execution of a document, which transferred plaintiff’s interest in defendant limited liability company to defendant member of the limited liability company, where plaintiff, by his own deposition testimony, could not prove any fraud with respect to the execution of the document or the transfer of his interest. | Bock | Hamilton |
4/23/2025
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4/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1428 |
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In re A.B.
| C-240478, C-240479, C-240480, C-240481, C-240482, C-240483, C-240484, C-240485, C-240486, C-240487, C-240488, C-240489 | ALLIED OFFENSES — INDUCING PANIC: The juvenile court did not err by imposing separate sentences for the juvenile’s 12 adjudications for inducing panic where the offenses were not allied offenses of similar import because each offense targeted a different victim: although the juvenile intended to carry out his murderous plan at one public place, his admitted intent was to kill, rape, or kidnap only the 12 named individuals on his “hit list,” and those individuals were treated as victims by the parties and the court throughout the proceedings. | Moore | Hamilton |
4/23/2025
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4/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1429 |
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In re J. Children
| C-250027, C-250053 | PERMANENT CUSTODY — BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD: The juvenile court’s award of permanent custody of three children to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where mother and father had not been consistent in their progress with case-plan services, nor did parents demonstrate an ability to provide a legally-secure permanent placement that would enable the children to safely return to their care, particularly with regard to substance abuse, domestic violence, stable income, and housing. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
4/23/2025
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4/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1430 |
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State v. Grubbs
| C-240165 | EVID.R. 404 — MURDER — SELF-DEFENSE — COUNSEL — PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT — EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT: While the admission of the still shot of a Facebook video portraying defendant and codefendant holding guns was admissible for impeachment purposes, the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the still shot to be published to the jury bearing a caption containing both violent and racially pejorative language, however, the admission of the still shot was harmless error as defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by its admission and, if it were excised, overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt remained to support defendant’s conviction. The trial court did not plainly err by admitting evidence of other guns and drugs where defendant cannot show, if the evidence were excised, the outcome of his trial would have been different. Defendant received the effective assistance of counsel as he cannot show that, had counsel objected to the evidence of other guns and drugs, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different. While counsel’s statements regarding defendant’s initial burden of production were unnecessary since it is the trial court’s duty to instruct the jury on self-defense, it did not amount to a deficient performance nor was it so prejudicial to defendant as to constitute the ineffective assistance of counsel; further, counsel did not misstate the law as to a defendant’s initial burden of proof. The State’s calling defendant a “liar” on the record did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct where the statement was made based on defendant’s inconsistent testimony, and there was no prosecutorial misconduct where the State did not mischaracterize the forensic expert’s testimony that the decedent was not holding his gun when defendant used deadly force against him. Defendant’s conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the State’s evidence to refute defendant’s self-defense claim showed that defendant did not have a reasonable belief of imminent danger of which the only means of escape was the use of deadly force, and expert testimony refuted defendant’s claim that he shot the decedent after seeing the decedent draw his gun. | Moore | Hamilton |
4/18/2025
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4/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1384 |
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Wood v. Kroger Co.
| C-240322 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT – PREMISES LIABILITY – NEGLIGENCE – NO-DUTY WINTER RULE – UNNATURAL ACCUMULATION: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment against plaintiff on her claim for negligence against defendant premises owner after plaintiff fell on a patch of ice while pumping gas, where competing evidence created a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether a hole in a roof canopy created an unnatural accumulation of ice at the covered gas pump and as to whether the premises owner had superior knowledge of a substantially more dangerous condition than an invitee would appreciate, given the lack of winter precipitation on the ground. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
4/18/2025
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4/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1385 |
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Ilboudo v. Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth.
| C-240454 | CIV.R. 12(B)(6) — DISMISSAL — FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM — PREJUDICE: The trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s amended complaint because it failed to identify a legal claim, but because her claim can be pleaded in another way, the complaint should have instead been dismissed without prejudice. | Nestor | Hamilton |
4/18/2025
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4/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1386 |
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State v. Thomas
| C-240151 | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL — BRADY — COUNSEL — MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL — DISCOVERY VIOLATION — EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT — IDENTITY: Defendant’s due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 337 U.S. 83 (1963), were not violated by the State’s disclosure of exculpatory evidence during closing arguments of defendant’s bench trial because the new evidence was disclosed during trial, the trial court granted a three-month continuance for the parties to investigate the newly disclosed evidence, and defendant was able to admit the evidence and effectively use it; while defendant argued on appeal that he would have presented a different alternate-suspect theory of the case had he known about the exculpatory report prior to trial, defendant was not denied a fair trial given that defendant had suggested an alternate suspect might have been the shooter at trial. Defendant cannot show that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel’s failure to pursue DNA testing and investigate potential alternate suspects as the results of these potential investigations were not in the record and accordingly defendant could not show prejudice in his direct appeal; defendant’s further argument that his counsel was ineffective for failing to maintain a request for a mistrial failed because defendant’s argument amounted to a disagreement with his trial counsel’s trial strategy. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial where the State’s nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence was not willful and the trial court’s three-month continuance and allowing defendant to introduce the withheld evidence was a reasonable method of mitigating any prejudice that defendant suffered from the late disclosure. Defendant’s convictions stemming from a shooting were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where, although an eyewitness’s statements to police the night of the shooting were inconsistent with her trial testimony, these inconsistencies were noted at trial and the remaining evidence was undisputed that defendant engaged in a heated argument with the eyewitness, drove away in a maroon car, and the eyewitness was shot at by someone in that maroon Ford a few hours later. | Bock | Hamilton |
4/16/2025
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4/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1343 |
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White v. Epps
| C-240312 | CIV.R. 41 — INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sustained petitioners’ objections to the magistrate’s orders dismissing their petitions for civil-stalking-protection orders against respondent based on uncontested facts, and petitioners’ prompt objections to the orders dismissing their petitions were contrary to having abandoned their petitions. | Bock | Hamilton |
4/16/2025
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4/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1344 |
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State v. Williams
| C-240409, C-240410, C-240411 | GUILTY PLEA — COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL — STIPULATED REPORT — ARSON-OFFENDER REGISTRY — PLEA COLLOQUY — AGREED SENTENCE – DOUBLE JEOPARDY – ALLIED OFFENSES: The trial court did not err when it found defendant competent to stand trial and then accepted defendant’s guilty pleas because defendant stipulated to the psychologist’s competency report and the trial court based its competency determination on the stipulated report, which accounted for defendant’s history, mental-health issues, and concerning behavior and concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial. Defendant’s guilty pleas were not unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily entered despite the trial court’s misstatement regarding defendant’s duty to register as an arson offender for life where defendant failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s misstatement affected his decision to plead guilty. Where defendant forfeited the issue of allied offenses or double jeopardy when he failed to raise the issues to the trial court as it imposed the jointly-recommended sentences and defendant failed to argue plain error on appeal, defendant cannot show that his jointly-recommended sentences are not authorized by law. | Bock | Hamilton |
4/16/2025
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4/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1345 |
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State v. Rakhimov
| C-240460 | SENTENCING — R.C. 2953.09(A)(2) — R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(iv) — APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL: Where defendant was convicted of gross sexual imposition, a fourth-degree felony, sentenced to 16 months in prison, and did not seek leave to appeal his sentence, he had no right to appeal his sentence under R.C. 2953.08(A)(2) where the trial court sentenced him to a prison term after it found that he was convicted of a sex offense, and the presumption of community control for fourth-degree felonies does not apply to sex offenses under R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(iv). | Bock | Hamilton |
4/16/2025
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4/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1346 |
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Marshall v. Mercy Health-Anderson Hosp., L.L.C.
| C-240520 | RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR – VICARIOUS LIABILITY: Where plaintiff sued defendant hospital but not its employee nurse, the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of defendant because vicarious-liability exceptions pertaining to suits involving physicians and hospitals do not apply in cases involving a hospital and its nurse employee. | Nestor | Hamilton |
4/11/2025
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4/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1268 |
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State v. Scudder
| C-240343 | NO-CONTEST PLEA — Operating a Vehicle Impaired ("OVI") — WAIVER — R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(j)(ix) — EXPLANATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES – R.C. 2937.07: The trial court erred in finding defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a specific concentration of methamphetamine in his urine following a no-contest plea to R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(j)(ix) where the State’s explanation of circumstances did not identify the substance or its amount that was present in defendant’s system, either expressly or by implication. Defendant did not explicitly and clearly waive the explanation-of-circumstances requirement under R.C. 2937.07 by indicating that he did not want to hear the facts following his no-contest plea. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
4/11/2025
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4/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1267 |
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State v. Blanton
| C-240004, C-240070 | RAPE — GROSS SEXUAL IMPOSITION — ADMISSIBILITY — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE — PLAIN ERROR — SENTENCING — NEW TRIAL: The trial court did not commit plain error by admitting certain statements from defendant’s recorded police interview where defendant failed to object to the admission of the statements and failed to show how the statements prejudiced him in a way that would have changed the outcome of the trial. Defendant’s convictions for two counts of rape of a child and one count of gross sexual imposition were supported by sufficient evidence where the child testified to acts that demonstrated that defendant anally penetrated her and forcefully touched her buttocks and thighs with a toy, and where the child was diagnosed with the same sexually-transmitted disease as defendant. Defendant could not prevail on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim where he failed to demonstrate how defense counsel’s failure to object to the admission of his recorded statements to police prejudiced him. Defendant’s sentence of life without parole for each rape count was not unconstitutionally disproportionate for the rape of a child under ten. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a new trial because the alleged newly-discovered evidence did not create a strong probability that the result of a new trial would be different. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
4/4/2025
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4/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1192 |
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State v. Barber
| C-240239, C-240240 | CRIMINAL — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL — SECOND AMENDMENT — CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPONS — IMPROPER HANDLING OF FIREARMS IN A MOTOR VEHICLE — JUVENILE ADJUDICATION —WAIVER: The trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss his charges for carrying concealed weapons in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) and improper handling of firearms in a motor vehicle under R.C. 2923.16(B) where the State failed to carry its burden under the Second Amendment to show that the charges were consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulations, where the State does not impose restrictions on defendant’s ability to possess a concealed weapon for comparable reasons as historical analogues, and defendant’s juvenile adjudication for a nonviolent weapons charge failed to support a presumption that defendant was dangerous and subject to disarmament, and the juvenile adjudication was the sole reason the State argued to justify limiting defendant’s ability to carry a concealed weapon and to have a weapon accessible to him while in a motor vehicle. The trial court did not commit plain error in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss a carrying-concealed weapons charge, for which the State charged defendant while under indictment for defendant’s first weapons-related charges, as defendant failed to assert at the trial level that Ohio’s limiting his ability to carry a concealed weapon based on his being under indictment for a felony violated the Second Amendment. [But see DISSENT: Rather than addressing the cause on the merits for the first time, the cause should be remanded for the trial court to analyze whether the challenged statutes are constitutional by applying the test set forth in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024).] | Bock | Hamilton |
4/4/2025
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4/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1193 |
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In re M.S.
| C-240334 | LEGAL CUSTODY – BEST INTEREST – COMPETENT AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE – R.C. 2152.414(D)(1) – R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) – ABUSE OF DISCRETION: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded legal custody of appellant’s minor son to appellant’s adult daughter, given the presence of competent and credible evidence that the court considered the best-interest factors when it reached its determination. | Moore | Hamilton |
4/4/2025
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4/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1194 |
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State v. Terry
| C-240381 | OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS — AFFIRMATIVE ACT — PURPOSE — TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES — DUE PROCESS — JUDICIAL BIAS — SENTENCING — ALLOCUTION: Defendant’s conviction for obstructing official business was supported by sufficient evidence where defendant provided false identifying information to the officer who pulled her over and, despite the officer’s repeated orders to step out of the vehicle, defendant persisted in conditioning her compliance upon an explanation from the officer, argued with him, and pulled away when the officer grabbed her arm to remove her from the vehicle. While trial judge questioned the merits of the case with counsel in chambers, the record did not support that the judge harbored a high degree of antagonism or favoritism toward either party or their counsel where the judge permitted the parties to present evidence and arguments and, thereafter, the judge assessed the evidence, applied the legal precedent he deemed fit, and rendered his verdict accordingly. The trial court failed to afford the defendant her right of allocution at sentencing, requiring a new sentencing hearing. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
4/4/2025
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4/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1195 |
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In re A.R.
| C-240436 | RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY — POSSESSION — KNOWLEDGE — CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE — INFERENCES — SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT: The juvenile’s delinquency adjudication for receiving stolen property was supported by sufficient evidence, and not contrary to the weight of the evidence, where the State’s circumstantial evidence proved that the juvenile used the stolen car for transportation and aided and abetted the driver, including evidence that the juvenile fled alongside two other young men from both the crashed stolen vehicle on the side of an expressway and from bystanders offering assistance. The juvenile’s delinquency adjudication for receiving stolen property was supported by sufficient evidence, and not contrary to the weight of the evidence, where the State’s circumstantial evidence proved that the juvenile knew the car was stolen, including evidence that the stolen car’s steering column and rear window had been damaged, the lack of a key in the stolen car, and the juvenile’s flight from both the crashed stolen vehicle on the side of an expressway and from bystanders offering assistance. | Bock | Hamilton |
4/2/2025
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4/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1160 |
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State v. Duncan
| C-240190 | OVI — MOTION TO SUPPRESS — PROBABLE CAUSE — MOTION TO DISMISS — EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: The trial court did not err in overruling defendant’s motion to suppress where the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for operating a vehicle while impaired where defendant admitted to consuming alcohol, had an odor of alcohol on his breath, exhibited delayed speech patterns and disorientation, was unable to follow simple instructions, and performed poorly on the field-sobriety tests. The trial court did not err in overruling defendant’s motion to dismiss because there is a rational connection between the level of marihuana metabolites and impairment that furthers a legitimate governmental interest in highway safety, and therefore, the statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. | Zayas | Hamilton |
3/31/2025
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3/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1153 |
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State v. Flannery
| C-240419 | GRAND JURY — DISCLOSE OF TRANSCRIPTS — PARTICULARIZED NEED: The trial court abused its discretion in ordering full disclosure of grand jury transcripts to defense counsel where lesser remedies would adequately furnish the factual bases necessary for the trial court to decide the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment on allegations that the grand jury was biased due to the prosecution’s failure to present substantially exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
3/28/2025
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3/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1074 |
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State v. Poveda
| C-240496 | SENTENCING — R.C. 2953.08 — R.C. 2929.12 — IMMIGRATION STATUS: An appellate court cannot vacate or modify a sentence under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) based on its view that the imposed sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.12(B), the trial court properly considered whether the offender’s conduct constituted the worst form of the offense. Where the offender’s immigration status was one of many considerations that the trial court relied on when imposing a maximum sentence, the court did not err in considering the immigration status under R.C. 2929.12. | Crouse | Hamilton |
3/28/2025
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3/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1075 |
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Rick & Charles Invests., L.L.C. v. Liberty Mut. Group, Inc.
| C-240456 | INSURANCE — VACANCY — CUSTOMARY OPERATIONS — BAD FAITH — SUMMARY JUDGMENT: Where the customary operations of the insured property were those of a church or synagogue, and where the property was not being used for those purposes, but rather was used as a warehouse, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the insurer on a claim for breach of contract because the insurer properly denied coverage under a vacancy provision in the policy that required at least 31 percent of the property be used to conduct customary operations. Where the insurer had a reasonable justification to deny coverage, the insurer did not act in bad faith and the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the insurer on the insured’s claim for bad-faith denial of coverage. | Crouse | Hamilton |
3/26/2025
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3/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1035 |
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Harmon v. Walters
| C-240321 | MOTION TO WITHDRAW — INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff’s counsels’ motion to withdraw where the record reflects that plaintiff’s first attorney withdrew while plaintiff was still represented by two other attorneys from the same law firm, and where the record reflects that plaintiff attended a hearing on a motion to withdraw filed by the two remaining attorneys, who alleged that plaintiff had terminated their relationship, and plaintiff did not object to their withdrawal, and therefore, plaintiff waived any issue with regard to the withdrawal of his second and third attorneys. The trial court erred in sua sponte dismissing plaintiff’s case under Civ.R. 41(B)(1) for plaintiff’s failure to comply with a pretrial filing deadline where the trial court did not give plaintiff an opportunity to explain noncompliance with the pretrial filing deadline before dismissing plaintiff’s case. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
3/26/2025
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3/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1037 |
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State v. Walker
| C-240357, C-240358 | CRIM.R. 44 — WAIVER OF COUNSEL — VENUE — FELONIOUS ASSAULT — IMPROPERLY DISCHARGING A FIREARM AT OR INTO A HABITATION — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY: The trial court substantially complied with the requisite Crim.R. 44 colloquy during its extensive inquiry to determine whether defendant was intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waiving his right to counsel and appointed standby counsel who was present throughout the trial, and therefore, defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court did not err in entering convictions for two counts of felonious assault and one count of having weapons while under a disability where the State proved venue beyond a reasonable doubt through circumstantial and direct evidence. Defendant is discharged from his conviction for receiving stolen property where the State concedes the record is devoid of evidence that defendant knew the handgun used in the commission of the offenses was stolen. Defendant’s conviction for improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation was supported by sufficient evidence where defendant’s identity as a complicitor in the offenses was established by video evidence from surveillance cameras and witness testimony—one being a codefendant—and where defendant conceded on appeal that he made statements to encourage his codefendant to shoot the victim, who was standing in front of his home when the codefendant opened fire. | Moore | Hamilton |
3/21/2025
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3/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-975 |
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State v. Sherman
| C-240472 | JAIL-TIME CREDIT — MOOTNESS — POSTRELEASE CONTROL: Defendant’s appeal was not moot where, although his prison sentence was completed by the time his appeal was heard, he remained under postrelease control, which satisfies his burden of demonstrating an adverse legal consequence of his conviction. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for jail-time credit where the credit he sought was served pending a different, unrelated criminal conviction. | Moore | Hamilton |
3/21/2025
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3/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-976 |
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Tyra v. Griffith
| C-240189 | DOMESTIC RELATIONS — PARENTING TIME — R.C. 3109.051(D) MODIFICATION — DUE PROCESS — CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE — NOTICE — FORFEITURE: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant-mother’s motion to modify appellee-father’s parenting time because evidence in the record of Father’s progress in his relationship with his children supported the trial court’s determination that an increase in parenting time was in the children’s best interest under R.C. 3109.051. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it limited appellant-mother’s evidence to events that occurred after 2022 because evidence of appellee-father’s 2013 conviction was cumulative to the evidence of that conviction that was already in the record, and because the trial court’s temporal limitation was consistent with a 2022 agreed entry reinstating appellee-father’s parenting time that the parties submitted six months after appellee-father was charged with domestic violence. Appellant-mother forfeited her challenge to the admission of the Guardian Ad Litem ("GAL")’s testimony on appeal because she failed to object to the GAL’s testimony at the hearing and failed to argue that the admission of that testimony was plain error. | Bock | Hamilton |
3/19/2025
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3/19/2025
| 2025-Ohio-912 |
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In re Estate of Joseph
| C-240150 | PROBATE — LOST WILL — APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL — TRANSCRIPT: In a probate case, appellant failed to file a transcript of the hearing on his application to admit a lost will, and therefore, he cannot establish any error on the part of the probate court in denying the admission of the lost will to probate. | Bock | Hamilton |
3/14/2025
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3/14/2025
| 2025-Ohio-858 |
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State v. Lawson
| C-240325 | SPEEDY TRIAL – R.C. 2945.71 – PLEAS – WAIVER: Defendant’s voluntary guilty plea constituted a waiver of his statutory speedy-trial rights under R.C. 2945.71. Defendant’s voluntary guilty plea constituted a waiver of his constitutional speedy-trial rights where the trial judge informed defendant that his plea would waive his constitutional right to a speedy trial. | Crouse | Hamilton |
3/12/2025
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3/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-818 |
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Wilson v. CSX Transp., Inc.
| C-240284 | FEDERAL EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ACT – NEGLIGENCE – RAILROADS – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – CIV.R. 56 – CAUSATION: Disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on plaintiff employee’s Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”) claim where plaintiff testified in his deposition that defendant railroad had failed to repair the nonfunctioning crane on his work truck, where he testified that failure to repair required plaintiff to repeatedly lift abnormally heavy objects into his truck, and where plaintiff introduced expert affidavits attesting that “excessive physical labor at the railroad” caused plaintiff’s knee and back injuries. Plaintiff did not provide evidence of railroad negligence under FELA where plaintiff introduced evidence that defendant railroad had failed to perform certain assessments and offer certain trainings, but provided no evidence of what those assessments would have disclosed or what those trainings would have taught. Expert doctors’ affidavits attesting that “excessive physical labor at the railroad” caused plaintiff’s degenerative injuries did not provide adequate evidence to show that plaintiff’s trip-and-fall on a particular date played a part in those degenerative injuries. Plaintiff failed to show that defendant railroad breached its duty of care | Crouse | Hamilton |
3/12/2025
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3/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-819 |
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In re T.C.
| C-240145 | SEXUAL IMPOSITION — CORROBORATION — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — JUVENILE SEX OFFENDER CLASSIFICATION: The juvenile’s adjudication for sexual imposition was supported by corroborating evidence where the victim immediately disclosed the offense to multiple individuals, and the juvenile repeatedly apologized and made admissions via text messages. Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to file objections to the magistrate’s decision because the State provided sufficient corroborating evidence, the juvenile’s assertion that the juvenile court would have made different credibility determinations is speculative, and counsel’s admission that the juvenile engaged in offensive sexual contact occurred after his adjudication, and therefore, did not prejudice the juvenile. The trial court did not err in classifying the juvenile as a sex offender because the offense involved offensive sexual contact, which, by definition, is not consensual. | Zayas | Hamilton |
3/12/2025
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3/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-820 |
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In re S/F Children
| C-240651, C-240676 | PERMANENT CUSTODY – PARENTAL TERMINATION – BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: The juvenile court’s award of permanent custody to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where domestic violence was the basis for removing the children from the home, where that domestic violence persisted throughout the proceedings, and where the trial court reasonably determined that mother and father continued to be “intertwined in each other’s lives.” The juvenile court did not plainly err in not rejecting the magistrate’s decision because of the alleged ineffective assistance of the children’s appointed counsel. | Crouse | Hamilton |
3/12/2025
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3/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-822 |
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GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Falah
| C-240332 | CIV.R. 60(B) — MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT — AFFIDAVIT — EXCUSABLE NEGLECT — ABUSE OF DISCRETION: Where defendant submitted an affidavit in support of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, there was evidence in the record to support the trial court’s entry granting the motion. Where the record contained evidence in support of a motion for relief from judgment in the form of an affidavit, and where the party opposing the motion failed to respond, failed to raise a challenge to the credibility of the statements in the affidavit, and failed to request the opportunity to present its own evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to take additional evidence before ruling on the motion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to issue findings of fact in support of its ruling on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, particularly where no such request was made by a party pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure. Where defendant admitted receiving service of the complaint, contacted counsel for plaintiff to tell counsel that defendant had not been involved in the automobile accident that was the subject of the complaint, failed to receive a response from plaintiff’s counsel, and failed to respond to the complaint based on a belief that it was a scam, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the presence of excusable neglect and in granting defendant’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. | Crouse | Hamilton |
3/7/2025
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3/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-755 |
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Brock v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals
| C-240133 | APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL — ADMINISTRATIVE — ZONING — R.C. 2506.04 — APP.R. 16: In an administrative zoning appeal, it is the appellant’s burden to set forth arguments in compliance with App.R. 16(A)(7) that demonstrate error by the court of common pleas that is reviewable by the appellate court under R.C. 2506.04. The record does not show that the trial court failed to conduct an independent review of the evidence where the trial court expressly stated that it reviewed the administrative transcript and the additional evidence filed by the appellants, and there is nothing contradictory in the record. The appellants failed to demonstrate error in the trial court’s decision where they failed to cite to the record in support of their argument. The appellants failed to establish an improper administrative search where they failed to cite to the record in support of their argument, and did not identify the precise incident from which they claimed an improper search. The appellants failed to establish a “misapplication of the zoning laws” where they failed to identify any zoning provision that was misapplied. The appellants failed to establish error in the trial court’s decision where they argue noncompliance with a zoning provision that is inapplicable to the cause before the court. | Zayas | Hamilton |
3/5/2025
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3/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-717 |
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State v. Sexton
| C-240274 | FELONIOUS ASSAULT — SELF-DEFENSE — DEADLY FORCE — ALLIED OFFENSES: Defendant’s convictions for felonious assault were not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence on defendant’s claim of self-defense where the record credibly supports that defendant acted as the first aggressor by striking the victim with a landscaping machete when the victim attempted to remove his wayward dog from defendant’s open truck and credible evidence negated that defendant truly believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and his only means of escape was in the use of deadly force against the victim, who was older, smaller, and noticeably more frail than defendant. The trial court’s imposition of concurrent prison terms in lieu of merging two counts of felonious assault was contrary to law as the offenses constituted allied offenses of similar import, and therefore, the cause must be remanded for resentencing. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
3/5/2025
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3/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-718 |
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State v. Brand
| C-240376 | CRIM.R. 33(B) — UNAVOIDABLE PREVENTION: The common pleas court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s Crim.R. 33(B) motion for leave to file a new-trial motion based on irregularity in the proceedings and newly discovered evidence where defendant could not demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the grounds upon which he now relies to support his new-trial motion. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
2/28/2025
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2/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-669 |
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State v. Currie
| C-240273 | FOURTH AMENDMENT — SEARCH AND SEIZURE — REASONABLE GROUNDS — PROBATION — ANONYMOUS TIP — SENTENCING — MINIMUM SENTENCE: Defendant-probationer’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when probation officers searched defendant-probationer and his apartment because defendant-probationer consented to being searched if there were reasonable grounds to believe defendant-probationer violated the terms of probation and an anonymous tip received by the probation officer, which included a photograph of defendant-probationer with a firearm that was verified by the probation officer as credible, established reasonable ground to believe that defendant-probationer was violating the terms of probation. The trial court did not err when it selected a three-year minimum sentence as part of defendant’s indefinite sentence for committing a second-degree felony because the sentencing statute requires a trial court to select a minimum sentence for a conviction of a second-degree felony, the three-year minimum falls within the range prescribed by the sentencing statute, and defendant’s attorney told the trial court that defendant was subject to a three-year minimum sentence. | Bock | Hamilton |
2/28/2025
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2/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-670 |
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In re Y.S.
| C-240256, C-240257, C-240258 | JUVENILE — PLEA AGREEMENT — JUDICIAL RELEASE: The juvenile court erred when it granted the juvenile judicial release where the juvenile was ineligible for judicial release under the terms of the plea agreement and where the juvenile court bound itself to the agreement when it signed the agreement, accepted the agreement in its dispositional entries, and made assurances at the plea hearing to the juvenile that he would not receive judicial release. [See CONCURRENCE IN JUDGMENT ONLY: The juvenile court erred in refusing to enforce the plea agreement because the plea agreement was a valid and enforceable contract between the juvenile and the State.] | Bock | Hamilton |
2/28/2025
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2/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-671 |
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State v. Wright
| C-240158 | OVI — R.C. 4511.01(HHH) —SUFFICIENCY— MANIFEST WEIGHT: In an OVI prosecution, the State presented sufficient evidence of operation under R.C. 4511.01(HHH), and defendant’s OVI conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where police found defendant unconscious in the driver’s seat of a vehicle parked at a gas station with drug paraphernalia in his hand, defendant admitted to driving the car from his parents’ home to the gas station 20 minutes prior to police contact, defendant stipulated that he was intoxicated when police found him, and the State introduced a toxicology report showing the presence of a number of chemical substances in defendant’s system. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
2/28/2025
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2/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-672 |
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Burd v. Artis
| C-240216 | DIVORCE — PROPERTY — OBJECTION — JUDICIAL NOTICE: In a divorce proceeding, the record does not demonstrate any error in the trial court’s failure to take judicial notice of records from the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles where defendant husband failed to file any objections to the magistrate’s decision and failed to file any transcript of proceedings, and the magistrate’s entry indicates that husband did not dispute at the hearing that the vehicle at issue was acquired during the marriage. | Zayas | Hamilton |
2/26/2025
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2/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-625 |
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Liles v. Sporing
| C-240439 | STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS — SAVINGS STATUTE — R.C. 2305.19 — VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL — OTHERWISE THAN UPON THE MERITS: The trial court erred in determining that Ohio’s savings statute, R.C. 2305.19, did not apply to plaintiff’s refiled complaint where plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his first complaint under Civ.R. 41(A)(1), which was a failure “otherwise than upon the merits” under the savings statute, despite the fact that the dismissal occurred after the expiration of the statute of limitations and after Civ.R. 3(A)’s one-year commencement period, as the plain language of the savings statute only asks whether a previous case failed otherwise than upon the merits and Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) expressly states that a plaintiff’s first voluntary dismissal is without prejudice and not on the merits. | Bock | Hamilton |
2/26/2025
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2/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-626 |
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In re G.R.B.
| C-240282 | VENUE — JUV.R. 11(B) — MANDATORY TRANSFER: The juvenile court erred in finding that transfer of the cause to another county was mandatory under Juv.R. 11(B) where no other action was pending at the time that the custody complaint was filed in Hamilton County. | Zayas | Hamilton |
2/21/2025
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2/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-556 |
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In re C.R.
| C-240347 | LEGAL CUSTODY — JUV.R. 40(D)(4)(d) — OBJECTION — INDEPENDENT REVIEW: The juvenile court’s decision must be reversed where it is unclear whether the juvenile court inappropriately applied appellate standards of review to the magistrate’s decision upon father’s objection rather than conducting the requisite independent review under Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d) as to the objected matter. | Zayas | Hamilton |
2/21/2025
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2/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-557 |
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In re B.W.
| C-240163 | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – DUE PROCESS – JUVENILE – SEX OFFENSES – R.C. 2152.83(A): R.C. 2152.83(A), which mandates that a 16- or 17-year-old juvenile who commits a sex offense be classified into a tier under Ohio’s version of the Adam Walsh Act as a juvenile-offender registrant at the initial classification hearing, does not violate the juvenile’s right to procedural due process. | Zayas | Hamilton |
2/14/2025
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2/14/2025
| 2025-Ohio-469 |
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State v. Harris
| C-240266 | OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS — RESISTING ARREST — SUFFICIENCY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE — R.C. 2945.10 — JURY — RIGHT TO BE PRESENT: Where officers had a reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances that defendant may have been armed and were justified in attempting to conduct a limited pat-down search of defendant, and where defendant’s resistance to that search was not privileged, defendant’s conviction for obstructing official business was supported by the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. Where officers had a reasonable belief that defendant committed the offense of obstructing official business, and where defendant struggled with the officers when they attempted to arrest him for that offense, defendant’s conviction for resisting arrest was supported by the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. Where defendant failed to establish that he suffered material prejudice or that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different, the trial court’s delay in instructing the jury after closing arguments in violation of R.C. 2945.10 was not reversible error. Where the record does not affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court communicated with the jury outside of defendant’s presence, defendant’s right to be present at all stages of the proceedings was not violated. | Crouse | Hamilton |
2/12/2025
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2/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-444 |
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State v. Turner
| C-240250 | NUNC PRO TUNC ENTRY — SUFFICIENCY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE — MURDER — HAVING A WEAPON WHILE UNDER DISABILITY — COMPLICITY — COUNSEL — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES — R.C. 2929.14: The trial court’s nunc pro tunc entry was invalid where it was used to make a substantive change to the judgment rather than reflect what actually occurred. Defendant’s convictions for murder and having a weapon while under disability were supported by the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence where defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the offenses was established by video evidence from surveillance cameras and an officer’s body-worn-camera footage and where defendant’s own statements placed him at the crime scene. Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance for failing to engage an expert to conduct an independent examination of the firearms and to enhance the video of the incident. The record did not clearly and convincingly fail to support the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). | Crouse | Hamilton |
2/7/2025
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2/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-386 |
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Cowherd v. McGuffey
| C-240642 | HABEAS CORPUS — BAIL — OHIO CONSTITUTION, SECTION 9, ARTICLE 1 — R.C. 2937.011 — PUBLIC SAFETY: Pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, Article 1, Section 9 and R.C. 2937.011, a trial court is permitted to consider public safety when determining the appropriate amount of bail to impose. Where the record contains no evidence that petitioner posed any additional risk to public safety, where petitioner has been employed at the same company since 2021 and has ties to the community, and where the trial court ignored petitioner’s financial resources and ability to pay, the $1,000,000 bail imposed by the trial court was excessive and the trial court erred in imposing it, and therefore, petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be granted. | Crouse | Hamilton |
2/7/2025
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2/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-387 |
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State v. Stanley
| C-240356 | CRIM.R. 11 — GUILTY PLEA: The trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 in accepting defendant’s guilty pleas where the record shows that the court informed defendant of each of the constitutional rights listed under the rule that defendant waived by pleading guilty. | Bock | Hamilton |
2/5/2025
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2/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-358 |
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