| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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Harcourt v. Strassel Constr. Co.
| C-250145 | WORKERS’ COMPENSATION — AMENDING A CLAIM — FLOW THROUGH CONDITION — CREDIBILITY: The trial court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof to amend his previous workers’ compensation claim where defendant’s expert witness testified that plaintiff did not even have the alleged injury. | Nestor | Hamilton |
2/27/2026
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2/27/2026
| 2026-Ohio-675 |
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State v. Courtney
| C-250172 | HAVING WEAPONS UNDER A DISABILITY — SELF-DEFENSE ACTUAL POSSESSION — CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: Defendant’s conviction for having a weapon while under a disability was supported by sufficient evidence and not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where eyewitness testimony and statements to police describing defendant’s flight with “his” firearm after shooting the victim in self-defense, combined with the absence of anyone seeing the firearm at the scene before the shooting, created an inference that defendant possessed the firearm before using it in self-defense. | Bock | Hamilton |
2/27/2026
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2/27/2026
| 2026-Ohio-676 |
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Dove v. Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth.
| C-250296 | R.C. 2744.02 — POLITICAL-SUBDIVISION IMMUNITY — PHYSICAL DEFECT: The trial court did not err in denying defendant landlord political subdivision’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of immunity from a negligence claim where defendant approved plaintiff tenant’s accommodation request for a grab-bar in her shower due to plaintiff’s disability, and defendant’s failure to install a shower grab-bar constituted a physical defect in the property. | Moore | Hamilton |
2/27/2026
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2/27/2026
| 2026-Ohio-677 |
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Planned Parenthood SW Ohio Region v. Ohio Dept. of Health
| C-250163 | REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM AMENDMENT – SENATE BILL 27 – ABORTION – SEVERANCE: The trial court did not err in granting a judgment on the pleadings in favor of abortion providers who challenged a state law requiring fetal tissue from procedural abortions to be disposed of by cremation or interment, because Article I, Section 22 of the Ohio Constitution—the Reproductive Freedom Amendment—applies to laws regulating conduct occurring after an abortion. The trial court did not err in determining that provisions in a state law which cross-reference and give meaning to the unconstitutional requirement that fetal tissue from procedural abortion be disposed of by cremation or interment could not be severed. The trial court erred in failing to sever portions of a state law that added the terms “zygote” and “blastocyte” to preexisting abortion regulations from its injunction barring enforcement of the requirement that fetal tissue from procedural abortions be disposed of by cremation or interment, and the trial court’s judgment is modified to sever those provisions from the permanent injunction issued by the trial court. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
2/25/2026
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2/25/2026
| 2026-Ohio-639 |
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State v. Kirkland
| C-250142 | MURDER — WEAPON UNDER A DISABILITY — SUFFICIENCY — MANIFEST WEIGHT — OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE — PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT — GRUESOME PHOTOS —CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES — DUE PROCESS — POSTRELEASE CONTROL: Defendant’s murder conviction was supported by the evidence and not contrary to the weight of the evidence where the State established defendant had an altercation with his stepfather, had a key to the home where his stepfather was murdered, had gunshot residue on his sweatshirt, had a gunshot wound on his hand, left a trail of blood from the body to the back porch, the blood trail ended at the woods, and a video depicted defendant running out of the woods after the murder. The weapon-while-under-a-disability conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and not contrary to the weight of the evidence where the State proved that the loaded firearm contained defendant’s DNA and was operable, and DNA evidence linked defendant to the bullet fired from the unrecovered murder weapon. Assuming that the witness’s testimony that defendant had threatened her was other-acts testimony, defendant failed to establish he was prejudiced where the testimony was minor, the court instructed the jury to disregard it, the prosecution did not mention it in closing, and the remaining evidence was sufficient to overcome any prejudice. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct by eliciting the testimony where the witness volunteered the testimony, and the prosecutor asserted he was not trying to elicit the testimony, immediately ceased the questioning, did not object to the curative instruction, or mention the evidence in closing, and defendant failed to demonstrate any prejudice. The trial court did not err in admitting two photos from the crime scene because the probative value of the photos outweighed any prejudice where the photos depicted the crime scene, were relevant to show the position of the body and the blood drops, and illustrated the testimony of the forensic biologist who conducted DNA testing of the blood drops. The record supported consecutive sentences where the trial court considered defendant’s criminal history, which included a firearm conviction and prior incarceration, the victim’s relatives’ statements, the harm to the community from the offenses, the seriousness of the offenses, and the necessity of protecting the public. Defendant was not deprived of due process at the sentencing hearing where the court properly considered the principles and purposes of felony sentencing, the seriousness and recidivism factors, and the isolated religious reference did not affect the fundamental fairness of the sentencing. The trial court correctly informed defendant that postrelease control was not imposed on the murder conviction, but the cause must be remanded for the court to correct the sentencing entry nunc pro tunc to remove the imposition of postrelease control. | Zayas | Hamilton |
2/20/2026
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2/20/2026
| 2026-Ohio-586 |
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State v. Starr
| C-250221 | DISORDERLY CONDUCT — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY: Defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct was not supported by sufficient evidence where the State did not establish that defendant uttered fighting words likely to provoke a violent response by insulting a police officer or that the officer was annoyed, inconvenienced or alarmed by the insults. | Zayas | Hamilton |
2/20/2026
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2/20/2026
| 2026-Ohio-587 |
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State v. Hughes
| C-250021 | POSTCONVICTION — DNA TESTING — OUTCOME DETERMINATIVE — COMPLICITY — R.C. 2953.74: The court of appeals could not say the trial court erred by failing to consider defendant’s October application for postconviction DNA testing when ruling on his November application, because the October application was never made part of the record; because the trial court did not deny the November application as second, successive, or res judicata; and because the State was not arguing for affirmance on such a ground. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that a result excluding defendant as a contributor of biological material deposited under the victim’s fingernails and on various items found on or around the victim’s body would not be outcome determinative under R.C. 2953.71(L) and R.C. 2953.74(C)(4) and (C)(5), where (1) defendant had been convicted on a complicity theory, (2) trial testimony did not clearly suggest defendant had touched the items at issue, (3) any unidentified DNA could plausibly have come from defendant’s accomplice or an innocuous contributor, (4) defendant had no other evidence corroborating the affidavit in which his accomplice averred that an alternative suspect was misidentified as defendant, (5) defendant’s original statement to police on which he originally relied was in tension with his alternative-suspect theory, and (6) four eyewitnesses familiar with the area and defendant’s face identified defendant as one of the assailants during his original trial. | Crouse | Hamilton |
2/18/2026
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2/18/2026
| 2026-Ohio-545 |
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In re L.D.
| C-250607 | R.C. 2151.414 – PARENTAL TERMINATION – BEST INTEREST: The juvenile court’s grant of permanent custody of Mother’s children to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services was supported by sufficient evidence and was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the record showed Mother failed to manage her bipolar disorder and failed to remedy the cause that prompted the children’s removal. | Moore | Hamilton |
2/18/2026
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2/18/2026
| 2026-Ohio-546 |
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State v. Ngaide
| C-240635 | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — SECOND AMENDMENT — GUNS — MOTION TO DISMISS — IMPROPERLY HANDLING FIREARMS IN A MOTOR VEHICLE — R.C. 2923.16 — QUALIFYING ADULTS — R.C. 2923.111 Where defendant was charged with improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B), and where defendant had not been a qualifying adult at the time of the offense due to a pending violent-misdemeanor charge, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss on Second Amendment grounds under this court’s precedents upholding other improper-handling prosecutions, see State v. Stonewall, 2025-Ohio-4974 (1st Dist.); State v. Baxter, 2025-Ohio-5722 (1st Dist.), and upholding a concealed-carry conviction of an individual disqualified based on a pending violent-misdemeanor charge, see State v. Hall, 2025-Ohio-1644 (1st Dist.). [See CONCURRENCE by KINSLEY, P.J.: If Hall and subsequent precedents did not control this case, the constitutionality of the R.C. 2923.16(B) charge would be suspect for the reasons set forth in the dissent in Stonewall.] [See CONCURRENCE by CROUSE, J.: Because the State may prohibit carrying concealed weapons, and because the purpose, history, and most frequent application of R.C. 2923.16(B) demonstrate that it functions as a prohibition on concealing usable firearms in motor vehicles, the State may constitutionally apply R.C. 2923.16(B) to individuals who, like defendant, have weapons actually concealed from outside view within their motor vehicle, although the State may not be able to apply it to individuals whose weapons are not, in fact, concealed.] [But see DISSENT: The trial court should have granted defendant’s motion to dismiss because this court has not resolved whether R.C. 2923.16(B) is constitutional as applied to an individual disqualified because of a pending violent-misdemeanor charge, and because the application of R.C. 2923.16(B) to such an individual is inconsistent with this court’s holdings in State v. Brown, 2025-Ohio-8 (1st Dist.), and State v. Barber, 2025 Ohio-1193 (1st Dist.).] | Per Curiam | Hamilton |
2/13/2026
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2/13/2026
| 2026-Ohio-478 |
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Hilty v. Donnellon McCarthy Ents., Inc.
| C-240418 | DEFAMATION PER SE – TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE – BREACH OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT – QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE – ACTUAL MALICE – JURY INSTRUCTIONS – DERIVATIVE CLAIMS – NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL: Where plaintiff former employee sued his former employer for defamation, the trial court erred in finding that the former employer’s statements were protected under qualified privilege where the court improperly determined that the privilege applied based on the employer-employee relationship and did not fully consider the remaining elements of the qualified-privilege standard, and the court erred in instructing the jury that it had to find actual malice in order to find in favor of plaintiff on his defamation claim. The trial court erred in determining that plaintiff former employee’s breach-of-contract claim against his former employer was derivative of his defamation claim where the contract claim fell under a separate settlement contract between the parties. Where plaintiffs’ witness lacked firsthand knowledge of the statements about which he sought to testify, he lacked the personal knowledge required by Evid.R. 602. Where plaintiff could not definitively identify the caller, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence about a phone call. Where defendant-appellee failed to file a notice of cross-appeal but sought to assert a cross-assignment of error to change the trial court’s judgment, the cross-assignment of error must be dismissed. | Per Curiam | Hamilton |
2/11/2026
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2/11/2026
| 2026-Ohio-434 |
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State v. Higgins
| C-250149 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS — MIRANDA WARNINGS — CUSTODY—JURY WAIVER — BENCH TRIAL – JURISDICTION: The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress statements she made to a police officer when placed in a store’s loss-prevention room after being accused of theft where defendant was not in custody under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), because defendant was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained, the door to the loss-prevention room was unlocked and open, and the officer made no threatening or coercive actions. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to hold a bench trial on defendant’s misdemeanor theft charge where defendant previously filed a jury demand and the trial court never obtained a written jury waiver from defendant. | Bock | Hamilton |
2/11/2026
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2/11/2026
| 2026-Ohio-435 |
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Ungerbuehler v. Kelly
| C-250201 | JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS — CIV.R.12(C) — COMMON LAW WRONGFUL DISCHARGE — R.C. CH. 4112 — EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION — WORKERS’ COMPENSATION RETALIATION — R.C. 4123.90: The trial court erred when it dismissed plaintiff-employee’s common-law wrongful-discharge claim in violation of Ohio’s public policy against employment discrimination on the basis of a person’s disability based on plaintiff-employee’s failure to allege facts that would satisfy the statutory definition of an employer because R.C. Ch. 4112’s definitional section does not inform the basis of the public policy announced in R.C. 4112.02(A). The trial court erred when it dismissed plaintiff-employee’s statutory claim for workers’ compensation retaliation under R.C. 4123.90 based on the “coming and going” rule because a workers’ compensation retaliation claim does not depend on a workplace injury or successful workers’ compensation claim. The trial court erred when it dismissed plaintiff-employee’s common-law wrongful-discharge claim in violation of Ohio’s public policy against workers’ compensation retaliation under R.C. 4123.90, because such claims are available to plaintiffs-employees who were terminated before they filed for workers’ compensation and regardless of whether their workers’ compensation claims would have been successful. | Bock | Hamilton |
2/11/2026
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2/11/2026
| 2026-Ohio-436 |
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Paeonian Ents., L.L.C. v. Fitworks Holding, L.L.C.
| C-250058 | COMMERCIAL LITIGATION — BREACH OF CONTRACT — BREACH OF LEASE — LANDLORD TENANT — SUMMARY JUDGMENT — DISCOVERY — ABUSE OF DISCRETION: The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to a landlord leasing a commercial gym space where no genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the tenant’s breach of the lease by failing to pay rent for several months. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the landlord’s request to reopen discovery for 90 days and in affording leave for the landlord to file dispositive motions despite the fact that the tenant’s motion for summary judgment was timely filed and already fully briefed. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
2/6/2026
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2/6/2026
| 2026-Ohio-379 |
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State v. Henderson
| C-250243 | PROCEDURE/CRIMINAL — CRIM.R. 47 — MOTION TO SUPPRESS — ABUSE OF DISCRETION — NOTICE — FOURTH AMENDMENT: Where defendant’s supplemental motion to suppress focused almost exclusively on the stop of a vehicle and did not allege that the search of that vehicle had been conducted without a warrant, and where the State’s bill of particulars had alleged that defendant had admitted to possessing contraband prior to the search, defendant’s supplemental motion to suppress failed to provide the State with adequate notice that defendant challenged the allegedly unconstitutional search and so did not adequately raise that issue under Crim.R. 47. Where defendant’s supplemental motion to suppress failed to provide the State with adequate prehearing notice of defendant’s challenge to the warrantless search, and where the State, in reliance on its understanding of the motion’s scope, offered no witnesses to testify about the search’s legality, and where the State was given no opportunity to call those necessary officers as witnesses after it learned that defendant sought to challenge the search, the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant’s motion to suppress on the ground that the State had not met its burden to justify the warrantless search. | Crouse | Hamilton |
2/6/2026
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2/6/2026
| 2026-Ohio-380 |
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State v. Harrell
| C-250344 | SENTENCING — R.C. 2929.13(B) — COMPLICITY —AIDING OR ABETTING — THEFT: Defendant’s 12-month prison sentence for a nonviolent fifth-degree felony is not contrary to law because defendant violated the terms of her bond when she failed to appear at a pretrial hearing and that violation triggered the trial court’s discretionary authority under R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(iii) to sentence defendant to a prison term. Defendant’s conviction for aiding or abetting a retail theft was supported by sufficient evidence and not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the record shows that defendant drove the principal actors to the retail store, brought merchandise to the principal actors in the store, and reconvened with the principal actors following the theft. | Bock | Hamilton |
2/6/2026
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2/6/2026
| 2026-Ohio-381 |
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In re Q.R.
| C-250061 | ABUSE OF DISCRETION – ATTORNEY FEES – CONTEMPT – JUVENILE – SERVICE – WAIVER: Where Mother’s testimony indicated that she understood that the juvenile court’s shared parenting order required her to afford Father a 30-minute grace period when picking up the child for visitation, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding Mother in contempt for failing to wait the entire 30 minutes. Where Mother failed to assert her unclean hands argument in the juvenile court, she has waived the argument for appellate review. Where Mother failed to provide a transcript of the hearing where the juvenile court determined she did not perfect service of her objections, and the determination of the sufficiency of service is within the juvenile court’s discretion, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding Mother failed to perfect service. Where the juvenile court awarded Father $1,000 in attorney’s fees, which was less than the requested $4,025, the juvenile court’s award was not an abuse of discretion. | Nestor | Hamilton |
2/4/2026
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2/4/2026
| 2026-Ohio-341 |
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State v. Hammock
| C-250233 | NORWOOD Cod.Ord. 1331.10 — SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE: Testimony from a code official that he intended for the placard posted by the Board of Health to remain on defendant’s property and that no person, other than the code official, was to remove the placard, was sufficient to establish that defendant did not have permission to remove the placard and to support a conviction for a violation of Norwood Cod.Ord. 1331.10(c), which prohibits the removal of a placard posted by an official responsible for enforcing the Norwood Property Maintenance Code. | Crouse | Hamilton |
2/4/2026
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2/4/2026
| 2026-Ohio-342 |
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Ragouzis v. Madison House Condominium Owners Assn.
| C-240624 | DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE – FAILURE TO FOLLOW COURT ORDERS – CONTEMPT – SANCTIONS – CIV.R. 41(B)(1): The trial court did not abuse its discretion is dismissing plaintiff's complaint against condominium owners' association and other defendants in which plaintiff claimed defendants failed to properly maintain and repair condominiums in a 175-unit high-rise building. Defendants counterclaimed, claiming plaintiff interfered with the association's vendors and contractors, breached a restrictive covenant, and had a well-documented history of harassing and wrongfully interfering with vendor and contractor work in the building. Trial court correctly found that plaintiff had engaged in persistent, flagrant, and substantial disregard for the trial court's multiple rules and orders not to interfere with repair work. The dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against the defendants with prejudice was within the trial court's discretion under Civ. R. 41(B)(1), and the court was not required – as plaintiff claimed – to first apply progressive disciplinary procedures before dismissal, or to consider plaintiff's status as a pro se party. Plaintiff's due process rights also were not violated by the trial court's failure to wait 14 days after the filing of a show cause order to allow plaintiff to file a response since plaintiff failed to raise the issue before the trial court and was present and had the opportunity to present a defense during the show cause hearing. | M. Powell | Hamilton |
1/30/2026
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1/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-290 |
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State v. Williams
| C-250182 | POSTCONVICTION — R.C. 2953.21 — FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW — PROCEDURE — AMENDMENT OF PETITIONS The trial court erred by denying petitioner’s timely, amended first petition for postconviction relief without making findings of fact and conclusions of law, as required by R.C. 2953.21(D) and (H). | Crouse | Hamilton |
1/30/2026
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1/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-291 |
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In re T.C.
| C-250010 | PARENTAL VISITATION — R.C. 3109.05 — BEST INTEREST: The juvenile court’s judgment awarding father limited supervised visitation with his son was not an abuse of discretion where the juvenile court’s factual findings are supported by competent credible evidence in the record and father’s conduct directed towards mother supported the juvenile court’s conclusion that father would struggle to coparent with mother. | Bock | Hamilton |
1/28/2026
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1/28/2026
| 2026-Ohio-240 |
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State v. Dunn
| C-250257 | RESTITUTION — MARSY’S LAW — R.C. 2929.28 — ECONOMIC LOSS — ABILITY TO PAY : The trial court erred in denying victims-appellants’ restitution request based on defendant’s inability to pay where the trial court lacked any evidence of defendant’s inability to pay and victims have a right to restitution under the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2929.28. | Bock | Hamilton |
1/28/2026
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1/28/2026
| 2026-Ohio-241 |
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Albers v. Lyon
| C-250017 | AMENDMENT – DISCOVERY – MEDIATION – PRIVILEGE – PROTECTIVE ORDER – R.C. 2710.04 – R.C. 2710.05 – WAIVER: The trial court’s refusal to allow plaintiffs-appellants to amend their complaint was not an abuse of discretion because the motion to amend was not timely, and the information plaintiffs-appellants sought to amend was information that the trial judge relied on in granting a protective order. Where the fact that an informal mediation had occurred was a pleaded to and admitted fact, and where plaintiffs did not sufficiently preserve their open court argument for appellate review, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a protective order on the grounds that the mediation privilege protected certain statements from discovery. The trial court did not err in finding that defendants-appellees did not waive the mediation privilege where defendants-appellees did not expressly waive the privilege. | Nestor | Hamilton |
1/23/2026
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1/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-209 |
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Boggs v. Durrani
| C-250068, C-250072, C-250275 | CIV.R. 50(B) — JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT — CIV.R. 59(A) — MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL — CONSOLIDATED TRIALS — CIV.R. 42 — COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW OR FACT — EXPERT TESTIMONY — EVID.R. 601 — EVID.R. 1102(Y) — HEARSAY — EVID.R. 702 — HARMLESS ERROR — JURY INSTRUCTIONS — FUTURE MEDICAL DAMAGES — SETOFF — PREJUDGMENT INTEREST: The trial court did not abuse its discretion under Civ.R. 42 by joining plaintiffs’ medical claims for trial where plaintiffs proceeded under similar legal theories, underwent similar surgeries by defendant doctor, and presented identical expert witnesses, thus creating common questions of law and fact. [See CONCURRENCE: Concurring in the majority’s opinion on this issue but adding a postjudgment assessment of prejudice from the joinder of trials that reveals no reversible error.] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ experts to testify about prior surgeries performed on each plaintiff by defendant doctor, even though those prior surgeries were not at issue in the cases, because the testimony was in line with the court’s limiting instruction and any deviation from that instruction was harmless error. While the trial court erred by admitting hearsay expert testimony, the error was harmless where if the challenged testimony was excised the record still supported the jury’s verdicts. The trial court did not err in admitting testimonial evidence from plaintiffs’ experts as defendants’ various challenges concerning whether an expert was qualified to provide testimony under Evid.R 601, whether an expert’s testimony was admissible under Evid.R. 702, and alleged irrelevant evidence were meritless. The trial court did not err when it denied defendants’ motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because defendants failed to demonstrate that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s future-damages awards. The trial court erred in denying defendants’ request for a setoff where this court held that intentional tortfeasors are entitled to a setoff under R.C. 2307.28(A). The trial court did not err when it awarded plaintiffs prejudgment interest, and the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that defendants had failed to make a good-faith effort to settle the cases. | Moore | Hamilton |
1/23/2026
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1/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-210 |
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State v. Lee
| C-250197 | CHILD ENDANGERING — R.C. 2919.22(B)(1) — RECKLESSNESS — SUFFICIENCY: Defendant’s conviction for child endangering was not supported by sufficient evidence where the State failed to put forth any evidence that defendant acted recklessly; the State failed to show that there was a strong possibility that a child would be harmed as a result of defendant’s conduct. | Moore | Hamilton |
1/21/2026
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1/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-173 |
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Dotson v. Durrani
| C-250205 | R.C. 2505.02(B)(3) — FINAL, APPEALABLE ORDER — AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT — CIV.R. 10(D) — DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE — JURISDICTION — CIV.R. 54(B) — MOOT — APP.R. 12: Where the order appealed from vacated a prior final judgment issued by the trial court, it was a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02(B)(3). Where the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice divested the trial court of jurisdiction over the case, the trial court erred in sua sponte vacating that judgment and granting plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint. An appellate court will not rule on assignments of error that are rendered moot by another decision rendered by the court in the appeal. | Crouse | Hamilton |
1/21/2026
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1/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-174 |
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In re C/W Children
| C-240553 | JUVENILE COURT — ADJUDICATION — NEGLECT — DEPENDENCY — REMOVAL — CLEAR AND CONVINCING — MENTAL HEALTH — SUICIDE HOTLINE: The juvenile court’s adjudication of Mother’s newborn twins as neglected was not supported by clear and convincing evidence because Mother’s phone call to a suicide hotline after the twins were removed from her custody and her subsequent short-term hospitalization for a psychological evaluation did not establish that Mother abandoned the babies, that they lacked adequate parental care due to her faults or habits, or that Mother refused to provide subsistence, education, or medical treatment to them. The juvenile court’s adjudication of Mother’s six children as dependent was not supported by clear and convincing evidence where that determination was based on a neglect finding involving Mother’s twins that was also unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
1/16/2026
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1/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-138 |
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State v. Hoskins
| C-240634 | CRIM.R. 44 – CONCEALED CARRY – DANGEROUS ORDNANCE – SUFFICIENCY – WAIVER OF COUNSEL – WEAPONS UNDER DISABILITY – R.C. 2923.12 – R.C. 2923.13 – R.C. 2923.17: The trial court erred by failing to ensure that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, despite defendant’s apparent unwillingness to engage in any good-faith discussion regarding his representation. Where the State charged defendant under the improper subsection of R.C. 2923.12, there was insufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for carrying concealed weapons: defendant’s weapon was a dangerous ordnance, and therefore, the evidence was insufficient to convict him under R.C. 2913.12(A)(2) of carrying a firearm other than a dangerous ordnance. | Nestor | Hamilton |
1/14/2026
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1/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-100 |
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State v. Cooper
| C-250088 | INVITED ERROR — CRIM.R. 48(B): The State invited error where it informed the trial court that it believed it would be unable to meet its burden of proof at trial based on the State’s reading of precedent and requested the trial court to dismiss the complaint under Crim.R. 48(B), and the trial court complied with the State’s request by dismissing the complaint under Crim.R. 48(B). | Bock | Hamilton |
1/14/2026
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1/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-101 |
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State v. Garrett
| C-240463 | SECOND AMENDMENT — OHIO CONSTITUTION — FIREARMS — HAVING WEAPONS WHILE UNDER DISABILITY — R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) — MURDER — DISCOVERY SANCTIONS — CRIM.R. 16 — BRADY OBLIGATIONS — HEARSAY — EVID.R. 801(C) — VENUE — JUDICIAL NOTICE — BENCH VIEW — MANIFEST WEIGHT: The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution did not bar the State from prosecuting defendant for having a weapon while under a disability, where that disability under R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) was based on a prior conviction for aggravated assault involving a firearm. The trial court did not err in rejecting defendant’s motion to dismiss his weapons-under-disability charges under the Ohio Constitution, because defendant developed no argument as to why the statute was not “a reasonable regulation, promoting the welfare and safety of the people,” as that phrase was used in Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 48 (1993). Where the State failed to disclose police interview recordings until shortly before the trial was to begin, but where the trial court determined that this nondisclosure was not the result of willful or bad-faith conduct, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Crim.R. 16 by denying defendant’s motion to compel police to disclose their file to prosecutors, and then to compel prosecutors to review that file and certify that they had provided defendant with all the materials to which defendant was entitled. Where a police officer testified that, after interviewing an eyewitness, he suspected that defendant had shot the victim, but where the officer did not actually describe the statements that the eyewitness made, the police officer’s testimony did not contain hearsay under Evid.R. 801(C) and State v. Smith, 2022 Ohio 2592 (1st Dist.), and therefore, that testimony was not barred by Evid.R. 802. Evidence supporting venue for defendant’s prosecution in Hamilton County was sufficient where witness testimony established that a nearby apartment complex was in Hamilton County, and where the trial judge, sitting without a jury, had visited the site of the murder as part of a bench view and thereafter took “judicial notice that the entire action took place in Hamilton County, Ohio. ”Defendant’s conviction for murder was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where an eyewitness testified she saw a man she identified as defendant shoot the victim, and where that testimony was circumstantially corroborated by the coroner’s testimony, by surrounding surveillance video, and by the testimony of defendant’s romantic partner who saw defendant fleeing the scene. Defendant’s conviction for having a weapon while under a disability was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant’s conviction for murder was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, where it was undisputed that the murder was committed with a firearm, and where defendant conceded the existence of his prior conviction for a felony offense of violence giving rise to a disability under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). | Crouse | Hamilton |
1/9/2026
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1/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-49 |
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Vandemark v. Reder
| C-250029 | CIV.R. 12(B)(6) — AGENCY — SIGNATURES — CORPORATIONS — CONTRACTS — FRAUD — THEFT — R.C. 2307.60 — UNJUST ENRICHMENT: The trial court did not err in dismissing appellants’ breach-of-contract claim against appellees where appellees’ letter of engagement unambiguously manifested an intent to bind only appellees’ corporate principal, where the corporation was not a party defendant, and where the complaint furnished no basis for holding appellees liable for the corporation’s debts. The trial court erred by dismissing appellants’ claims for fraudulent inducement to contract and civil theft because the complaint alleged that appellees falsely represented to appellants that they intended to perform under the contract, because that false representation reasonably and foreseeably induced appellants to retain appellees’ corporation to appellants’ detriment, and because the legal duties breached in doing so existed independent of and prior to the appellants’ contract with appellees’ corporate principal. The trial court erred by dismissing appellants’ claim for restitution on a theory of unjust enrichment because, even though the subject matter was covered by an express contract, appellants alleged that appellees were enriched by means of fraud, illegality, or bad faith. | Crouse | Hamilton |
1/9/2026
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1/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-50 |
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State v. Walker
| C-250511 | SENTENCING — MULTIPLE SENTENCES — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES — MISDEMEANOR AND FELONY SENTENCES: The trial court abused its discretion in ordering a 180-day jail term imposed on defendant in the instant misdemeanor case to run consecutively to a 30-month prison term imposed against defendant in a related felony case because the consecutive nature of the misdemeanor sentence was not authorized under R.C. 2929.41(B). | Bock | Hamilton |
1/9/2026
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1/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-51 |
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Preterm-Cleveland v. Yost
| C-240668 | CIV.R. 12(C) — INJUNCTIONS — SEVERABILITY — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — ABUSE OF DISCRETION: Where plaintiffs’ complaint sought to enjoin all provisions enacted or amended by S.B. 23, but where the complaint alleged that only one provision of S.B. 23 was substantively unconstitutional, the trial court did not commit reversible error by addressing the severability of those provisions of S.B. 23 not alleged to be unconstitutional when entering judgment on the pleadings, despite plaintiffs’ failure to substantively address the issue of severability in their initial Civ.R. 12(C) motion. The trial court abused its discretion by enjoining enforcement of provisions whose constitutionality had not been challenged, on the grounds that those provisions were substantively unconstitutional; the trial court should have presumed those provisions’ constitutionality and asked only if they were severable from the challenged provision. | Crouse | Hamilton |
1/7/2026
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1/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-23 |
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State v. Kyambadde
| C-250006 | EVIDENCE — BIAS — EVID.R. 616 — HARMLESS ERROR — DOMESTIC VIOLENCE — REASONABLE PARENTAL DISCIPLINE: The trial court’s erroneous exclusion of evidence admissible to prove witnesses’ biases and motivations to lie under Evid.R. 616 was harmless where the jury saw photographic evidence of the victim’s injuries that proved defendant’s parental discipline was unreasonable. | Bock | Hamilton |
1/7/2026
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1/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-24 |