[Cite as *Perez v. Wagner*, 2026-Ohio-4640.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MAHONING COUNTY

BRANDY KAY PEREZ,

Relator,

v.

THE HONORABLE CLEMENTE WAGNER, MAGISTRATE et al.,

Respondents.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Case No. 26 MA 0084

Writ of Prohibition

BEFORE:
Carol Ann Robb, Mark A. Hanni, Katelyn Dickey, Judges.

JUDGMENT:
Dismissed.

Brandy Kay Perez, Pro Se, Relator and

Atty. Lynn A. Maro, Mahoning County Prosecutor, and *Atty. Kathi McNabb Welsh*, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Civil Division, for Respondents.

Dated: November 19, 2026

PER CURIAM.

{¶1} Relator Brandy Kay Perez, proceeding pro se, filed a verified complaint for a writ of prohibition against Respondents, a magistrate and a judge of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, and an unnamed judge or magistrate of the Juvenile Division of that court. The complaint alleges that the Juvenile Division lacks jurisdiction to determine the custody of Relator's three minor grandchildren because a civil protection order issued in the Domestic Relations Division made the children wards of that division, and that a Domestic Relations magistrate lacked authority to act on, and to decline to entertain, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that Relator filed there. Relator asks this Court to prohibit further custody proceedings, to vacate a July 13, 2026 juvenile court order and the magistrate's July 24, 2026 rulings, to declare the July 8, 2026 protection order the controlling custody determination, and to order the children returned to her.

{¶2} Several matters are pending. Respondents have moved to dismiss the complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Relator has twice sought an emergency stay of the trial court proceedings, first in the complaint and again in a motion directed at a hearing set for September 9, 2026, and her opposition to the motion to dismiss asks this Court to stay this action pending an original action she states she is preparing to file in the Supreme Court of Ohio. Respondents have moved to strike Relator's opposition and stay motion and for sanctions under Loc.R. 44.1. For the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss is granted and the complaint is dismissed. The requests for a stay of the trial court proceedings are overruled as moot, the request to stay this action is denied, the motion to strike and for sanctions is denied, and the request to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee is denied.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

{¶3} Relator filed the complaint on July 29, 2026, together with an affidavit of indigency. The complaint is captioned in Relator's own name and names three Respondents: the Honorable Clemente Wagner, a magistrate of the Domestic Relations Division; the Honorable Beth Smith, a judge of that division; and "The Judge or Magistrate" of the Juvenile Division. (Complaint at 1-2.) It incorporates an "Emergency Motion for Immediate Stay" asking this Court to stay all proceedings in both divisions related to the underlying domestic violence case, including a full civil protection order

hearing scheduled for July 30, 2026. (Complaint at ¶ 18.) The clerk issued a summons the same day, and the docket reflects that each of the three Respondents was served on July 31, 2026.

{¶4} Counsel for Respondents entered an appearance on July 30, 2026 and, on August 25, 2026, moved to dismiss the complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The motion attaches, as Exhibit A, a magistrate's order in the underlying case that was electronically filed on July 28, 2026, and asks this Court to take judicial notice of it. Relator filed an opposition on September 4, 2026. In addition to opposing dismissal, the opposition asks this Court to stay this action pending disposition of an original action Relator states she "is preparing" to file in the Supreme Court of Ohio, and to "retain jurisdiction" over the writ. (Opposition at 9-10.) The opposition's caption names four respondents, adding a second magistrate and the judge of the Juvenile Division by name; no motion to amend the complaint was filed.

{¶5} On September 8, 2026, Relator filed an emergency motion for an immediate stay of a "Civil Protection Order (CPO) Full Hearing" scheduled for the following morning, September 9, 2026, before a visiting judge assigned to the underlying cases. The same document was filed a second time that evening. Relator also filed a "Notice of Statutory Expiration of Ex Parte Orders and Lack of Trial Court Jurisdiction," which asserts that both ex parte protection orders in the underlying cases expired by operation of R.C. 3113.31(D)(2)(a) and again asks for an emergency stay. These filings restyle the caption as "State ex rel. Brandy Kay Perez" and list three Juvenile Division case numbers that appear nowhere in the complaint. No order of this Court issued before the September 9 hearing.

{¶6} On September 11, 2026, Respondents moved to strike the opposition and the September 8 stay motion and, under Loc.R. 44.1, for sanctions in the form of dismissal of the action or a financial sanction. The motion was served on Relator by regular mail the same day. Relator has not responded, and the time to do so has expired. App.R. 15(A); App.R. 14(C).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

{¶7} Because the motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint, the material factual allegations of the verified complaint are presumed true for purposes of this decision. The Court also takes judicial notice of the journalized entries of the

Domestic Relations Division in the two underlying cases, Nos. 2026 DV 00407 and 2026 DV 00447, insofar as they show events that bear on whether the relief Relator requests has become moot. An event that causes a case to become moot may be proved by extrinsic evidence outside the record without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. *State ex rel. Evans v. Mohr*, 2018-Ohio-5089, ¶ 6; *State ex rel. Nelson v. Russo*, 89 Ohio St.3d 227, 228 (2000).

{¶8} Relator is the maternal grandmother of three minor children. Their mother, Kaylee Arkwright, is Relator's daughter. (Opposition at 6; Sept. 8, 2026 Motion at 2.) On July 8, 2026, on Relator's petition, the Domestic Relations Division issued an ex parte domestic violence civil protection order against Arkwright in case No. 2026 DV 00407. According to the complaint, that order allocated temporary parental rights over the children to Relator, and it is the order from which every claim in this action proceeds: Relator's position is that the allocation made the children wards of the Domestic Relations Division. (Complaint at ¶ 4, 8, 11, 15.) Relator alleges that on July 13, 2026, the Juvenile Division issued a temporary custody order placing the children with two men she describes as unadjudicated putative fathers, and that neither had standing to seek custody. (Complaint at ¶ 9.) The juvenile court's order is not in the record.

{¶9} On July 24, 2026, Relator filed in the Domestic Relations Division what she styled an emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus to enforce the July 8 order. (Complaint at ¶ 10.) The petition went to the division that had issued the July 8 order rather than to the Juvenile Division, and the complaint faults the officer who received it rather than the forum: it alleges that court staff routed the petition to Magistrate Wagner, that Relator challenged the magistrate's authority on the record, and that under R.C. 2725.02 only a judge, not a magistrate, may hear or grant a writ of habeas corpus. (Complaint at ¶ 10-11, 16.) The matter came before the magistrate that day. By an order electronically filed July 28, 2026, the magistrate found that Juvenile Division cases concerning custody of the children were pending, stated that under *McCue v. Marlin*, 2010-Ohio-1298 (7th Dist.), the Domestic Relations Division "no longer has jurisdiction to enter orders with regards to custody and visitation," directed that "[a]ll matters regarding custody and visitation must be filed with Mahoning County Juvenile Court," and denied the emergency motion. (Motion to Dismiss, Ex. A.) The same order set the full hearing on Relator's protection-order petition, the hearing that follows an ex parte order under

R.C. 3113.31(D)(2)(a), for July 30, 2026. The order carries the notice required by Civ.R. 53(D)(2)(b) that a motion to set it aside could be filed within ten days. The complaint characterizes the magistrate's ruling as a verbal declaration that the matter was "being transferred to the Juvenile Division," an act it says she had no authority to take. (Complaint at ¶ 11-12, 16.)

{¶10} Relator also alleges that Arkwright obtained a competing ex parte protection order against Relator in case No. 2026 DV 00447 on allegations Relator describes as false. (Complaint at ¶ 11.) The docket of that case shows that it was opened on July 24, 2026, on Arkwright's petition and that an ex parte order issued the same day. Relator's later filings allege that the magistrate's son is employed in the Domestic Relations clerk's office, that court records were altered, that the competing order was "manufactured," that court personnel are withholding audio recordings of hearings, and that Relator has been subjected to surveillance and intimidation. (Opposition at 2-8; Sept. 8, 2026 Motion at 2.)

{¶11} On July 31, 2026, Judge Smith journalized an entry in each of the underlying cases recusing herself from further proceedings because Relator had filed this action against her. The same day, by certificates of assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio, Visiting Judge Debra L. Boros was assigned to hear both cases.

{¶12} On September 9, 2026, the visiting judge held the full hearing in both cases. In case No. 2026 DV 00407, the court found that Relator, the petitioner, failed to appear, dismissed her petition, terminated the ex parte order, and dismissed all restrictions on the parties. In case No. 2026 DV 00447, on Arkwright's oral request made in open court, the court dismissed her petition, terminated the ex parte order, and dismissed all restrictions. Both entries were journalized the morning of September 9, 2026, and both cases are closed.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

{¶13} This Court has original jurisdiction in prohibition. Ohio Const., art. IV, § 3(B)(1)(d). To be entitled to the writ, Relator must establish that (1) Respondents are about to exercise or have exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denial of the writ would result in injury for which no adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. *State ex rel. Watkins v. McNamara*, 2025-Ohio-979, ¶ 10; *State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke*, 2022-Ohio-2427, ¶ 6. The third element

need not be met if the respondent patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction. *Watkins* at ¶ 10. Dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is proper if it appears beyond doubt, after presuming the truth of all material factual allegations of the complaint and making all reasonable inferences in Relator's favor, that she is not entitled to extraordinary relief in prohibition. *Jones* at ¶ 5.

{¶14} "Prohibition will generally lie only for an absence of subject-matter jurisdiction." *Jones* at ¶ 8, quoting *State ex rel. Nyamusevya v. Hawkins*, 2021-Ohio-1122, ¶ 16. Where a respondent has general subject-matter jurisdiction, any error is deemed an error in the exercise of jurisdiction, for which prohibition does not lie. *Id.*; *Watkins* at ¶ 14. "In the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal." *State ex rel. Furnas v. Monnin*, 2008-Ohio-5569, ¶ 12, quoting *State ex rel. Plant v. Cosgrove*, 2008-Ohio-3838, ¶ 5.

B. The Juvenile Division

{¶15} The claim against the Juvenile Division rests on a single premise. Because the July 8, 2026 ex parte protection order allocated temporary parental rights to Relator, she reasons, the children became "wards" of the Domestic Relations Division. R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) confers on the juvenile court exclusive original jurisdiction "to determine the custody of any child not a ward of another court of this state," so on Relator's reading the July 8 order withdrew the Juvenile Division's jurisdiction over them. (Complaint at ¶ 14-15.)

{¶16} The premise fails as a matter of law. A domestic violence civil protection order is not a custody proceeding. *McCue v. Marlin*, 2010-Ohio-1298, ¶ 26 (7th Dist.). Any rulings in such an order dealing with the custody of a minor child are temporary orders that last only until the custody matter is litigated in a domestic relations or juvenile court, and the court issuing the protection order can neither make a permanent allocation of parental rights nor modify an existing one. *Id.* Under R.C. 3113.31(E)(1)(d), the protection-order court may temporarily allocate parental rights only "if no other court has determined, or is determining, the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities for the minor children." *Id.* at ¶ 25 (quoting R.C. 3113.31(E)(1)(d)). When another court is

exercising that jurisdiction, the domestic relations court "has no authority to issue orders regarding parental rights or visitation." *Id.* at ¶ 27.

{¶17} Those principles dispose of Relator's premise. An allocation of parental rights in a protection order is temporary by statute and gives way once a domestic relations or juvenile court decides custody. An order that must yield to the juvenile court's custody determination cannot also be the thing that takes the juvenile court's jurisdiction away. Nor does a child become a ward of another court, within the meaning of R.C. 2151.23(A)(2), merely because another court has entered an order affecting the child's custody. *In re Poling*, 64 Ohio St.3d 211, 214-215 (1992). The complaint alleges no other basis on which the children could be wards of another court.

{¶18} The Juvenile Division therefore possesses general subject-matter jurisdiction over the custody of these children under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2). Whether the July 8, 2026 order bears on the exercise of that jurisdiction, and whether the persons awarded temporary custody on July 13, 2026, had standing to seek it, are questions the juvenile court may decide in the first instance and that may be reviewed on appeal. *Furnas*, 2008-Ohio-5569, at ¶ 12; *Jones*, 2022-Ohio-2427, at ¶ 10. The standing argument in particular alleges, at most, an error in the exercise of jurisdiction, which does not support relief in prohibition. *Watkins*, 2025-Ohio-979, at ¶ 14. Because the Juvenile Division does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction, Relator must show the absence of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and she cannot: the errors she alleges, if they are errors, can be corrected on appeal. *Jones* at ¶ 10. The complaint fails to state a claim in prohibition against the Juvenile Division.

C. Magistrate Wagner and Judge Smith

{¶19} The claim against the Domestic Relations Respondents has two strands. First, Relator contends that under R.C. 2725.02 only a judge may grant a writ of habeas corpus, so a magistrate was without authority to hear her petition. (Complaint at ¶ 10, 16.) R.C. 2725.02 provides that the writ "may be granted by the supreme court, court of appeals, court of common pleas, probate court, or by a judge of any such court." The magistrate neither granted nor denied a writ of habeas corpus. Acting on a reference governed by Civ.R. 53, she entered a magistrate's order that declined to entertain the custody matter, denied the emergency motion, and set the protection-order petition for full hearing, and the order itself advised the parties of their right to move the court to set

it aside within ten days. Civ.R. 53(D)(2)(b). Whether Civ.R. 53 permitted the reference, and whether the magistrate acted within it, are questions of compliance with a procedural rule, not questions of subject-matter jurisdiction. A failure to comply with Civ.R. 53 renders the resulting ruling voidable rather than void, and the remedy is the court's review of the magistrate's order and, if necessary, an appeal. *Jones* at ¶ 8-10.

{¶20} Second, Relator contends that the magistrate's ruling that custody matters had to be pursued in the Juvenile Division was a "transfer" she had no authority to make. (Complaint at ¶ 12, 16.) The statute Relator herself invokes answers the point. R.C. 2151.23(A)(3) confers on the juvenile court exclusive original jurisdiction "[t]o hear and determine any application for a writ of habeas corpus involving the custody of a child." That grant carves an exception to the general habeas corpus jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas under R.C. 2725.02, so that, as among a court of common pleas, a probate court, and a juvenile court, only the juvenile court may entertain such an application. *In re Black*, 36 Ohio St.2d 124, 126-127 (1973), paragraph one of the syllabus. When a domestic relations court declines to hear such an application and directs the applicant to the juvenile court, it does not exercise judicial power that the law withholds from it. It does the opposite: it declines an exercise of power the statute forbids.

{¶21} Relator's opposition argues that if the juvenile court's jurisdiction over such applications is exclusive, the magistrate could not "touch" the petition at all. (Opposition at 3.) A court possesses the authority to determine that a matter presented to it lies outside its jurisdiction, and an order declining to proceed on that ground is not an unauthorized exercise of judicial power. *State ex rel. Morgenstern v. Ford*, 67 Ohio St.2d 7, 8 (1981); *State ex rel. Torres v. Simmons*, 68 Ohio St.2d 118, 119 (1981); *see also Furnas*, 2008-Ohio-5569, at ¶ 12. To the extent Relator seeks review of the correctness of that ruling, prohibition is not the vehicle. *Jones*, 2022-Ohio-2427, at ¶ 9, quoting *State ex rel. Nalls v. Russo*, 2002-Ohio-4907, ¶ 28 ("[p]rohibition will not issue as a substitute for appeal to review mere errors in judgment"). The opposition adds that the statutory requirements for transferring a matter from the Domestic Relations Division to the Juvenile Division were never met, so that the Juvenile Division had not acquired jurisdiction when the magistrate ruled. (Opposition at 3-4.) That argument rests on the premise rejected in Part III.B, that the July 8, 2026 order made the children wards of the

Domestic Relations Division, and it otherwise alleges, at most, an error in the exercise of jurisdiction. *Watkins*, 2025-Ohio-979, at ¶ 14.

{¶22} The allegations Relator added after the complaint do not change the analysis. The opposition and the September 8, 2026 filings assert that the magistrate was disqualified by her son's employment in the clerk's office, that court records were altered, that the competing protection order was procured by fraud, and that the underlying record is "void ab initio." (Opposition at 2-8; Sept. 8, 2026 Motion at 2.) Allegations that a judicial officer acted fraudulently, or in concert with others, do not convert an exercise of jurisdiction into a lack of it; however the claim is articulated, such allegations take issue with how jurisdiction was exercised. *Watkins* at ¶ 14. The disqualification of a magistrate is within the discretion of the court and is sought by motion filed with the court, Civ.R. 53(D)(6), and any error in that ruling is reviewable on appeal. Nor are these allegations facts this Court could find in a prohibition action decided on the pleadings; they are, at a minimum, subject to reasonable dispute. *See Watkins* at ¶ 7-8. Relator's further assertion that no appeal could be adequate because the Domestic Relations Division is withholding audio recordings and altering transcripts (Opposition at 9) does not show that the ordinary remedy is unavailable; a party who contends that the record on appeal omits or misstates what occurred may have it corrected or supplemented under App.R. 9(E).

{¶23} Finally, the first element of the writ is now absent as to these Respondents. Prohibition is directed at an exercise of judicial power that is about to occur or has occurred without authority. The journalized entries of both underlying cases show that Judge Smith recused herself on July 31, 2026, that a visiting judge was assigned to hear both cases, and that both cases were dismissed on September 9, 2026. No proceeding is pending before either Respondent, and there is no ruling of either that the Court could vacate on a showing of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a showing Relator has not made in any event. The complaint fails to state a claim in prohibition against Magistrate Wagner and Judge Smith.

D. The Remaining Requests for Relief

{¶24} The complaint's remaining prayers seek relief a writ of prohibition does not afford. Prohibition may be used to correct the results of prior judicial action only where the court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to take it, *Furnas*, 2008-Ohio-

5569, at ¶ 11, and no such lack has been shown as to the July 13, 2026 juvenile court order or the magistrate's July 24, 2026 rulings. The requests that this Court "affirm" the July 8, 2026 protection order as "the sole controlling custody determination" and order the children returned to Relator seek, in substance, declaratory and custodial relief. The original jurisdiction of the courts of appeals is limited to the actions enumerated in Ohio Const., art. IV, § 3(B)(1), and does not extend to claims for declaratory judgment. *State ex rel. E. Cleveland v. Dailey*, 2020-Ohio-3079, ¶ 4; *State ex rel. Ministerial Day Care Assn. v. Zelman*, 2003-Ohio-6447, ¶ 22. A request that this Court itself determine the custody of the children is not a request to prohibit an unauthorized exercise of judicial power. *See State ex rel. Katsigianis v. Dellick*, 2026-Ohio-2894, ¶ 23 (7th Dist.). Those requests are denied.

E. The Requests for a Stay

{¶25} Relator has asked three times for a stay of the trial court proceedings: in the complaint, as to the hearing set for July 30, 2026; in the September 8, 2026 motion, as to the hearing set for September 9, 2026; and in the notice filed the same day. Each request is moot. The July 30, 2026 hearing date passed the day after the complaint was filed, the September 9, 2026 hearing was held, and the proceedings the motions sought to stay have ended with the dismissal of both underlying cases. There is no longer any trial court proceeding for this Court to stay. *Katsigianis* at ¶ 26.

{¶26} The requests would fail in any event. The stay authority the Appellate Rules confer on this Court is authority to stay a trial court's judgment or order "pending appeal," App.R. 7(A), and this Court has held that authority is available only when an appeal is pending. *In re J.D.*, 2018-Ohio-2789, ¶ 5 (7th Dist.); *Katsigianis* at ¶ 4. No appeal is pending here, and Relator identifies no other source of authority for a stay of the protection-order proceedings while her complaint remained undecided. The notice's theory, that both ex parte orders "expired" because full hearings were not held within the period R.C. 3113.31(D)(2)(a) prescribes, asserts an error in the trial court's exercise of its jurisdiction over the protection-order petitions, which prohibition does not reach. *Watkins*, 2025-Ohio-979, at ¶ 14. The request in the complaint, the September 8, 2026 motion in both of its submissions, and the request in the September 8, 2026 notice are overruled as moot.

{¶27} Relator's opposition also asks this Court to stay this action, and to "retain jurisdiction," pending an original action in the Supreme Court of Ohio. The opposition states that Relator "is preparing" such an action; it identifies no case that has been filed, and nothing in the record shows one. A request to hold this action in abeyance for a proceeding that does not exist is denied.

F. The Motion to Strike and for Sanctions

{¶28} Respondents move to strike Relator's opposition and her September 8, 2026 stay motion on the ground that they contain unsupported and disparaging accusations, and they ask, under Loc.R. 44.1, that the action be dismissed or that a financial sanction be imposed. Loc.R. 44.1 authorizes sanctions where the Court determines that an original action or motion "is frivolous or is prosecuted for delay, harassment, or any other improper purpose," and provides that an original action is frivolous if it "is not reasonably well-grounded in fact, or warranted by existing law, or by a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." Loc.R. 44.1.

{¶29} The motion to strike is denied. The Court has considered the opposition and the stay motion and has found that neither entitles Relator to relief; striking them from the record would serve no purpose the disposition does not already serve. The Court also declines, on this record, to deem the action frivolous or to impose sanctions. The complaint identified a recognized function of the writ, a challenge to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction over a custody matter, and rested it on a statute and on an order of the Domestic Relations Division, even though the argument fails under settled law. *See Katsigianis*, 2026-Ohio-2894, at ¶ 29 (7th Dist.).

{¶30} Relator is cautioned, however, that the accusations in her later filings against judicial officers, court personnel, counsel, and other individuals are unsupported by anything in this record, and that Loc.R. 44.1 authorizes sanctions for filings that are not reasonably well-grounded in fact or that are prosecuted for harassment or another improper purpose, including an award of reasonable expenses, reasonable attorney fees, and costs or double costs. The rule further authorizes this Court, sua sponte or on motion, to find a party who "habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause engages in frivolous conduct" to be a vexatious litigator and to impose filing restrictions. Loc.R. 44.1; *Katsigianis* at ¶ 30.

G. Indigency and Costs

{¶31} Relator filed an affidavit of indigency with her complaint, asking to proceed without prepayment of costs or fees. A party unable to pay the filing fee must instead file a Financial Disclosure Form simultaneously with the original action. Loc.R. 3.4. Relator did not file that form, and nothing else in the record takes its place. Her request to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee is therefore denied. The Court assesses costs at the conclusion of the case, and the filing of the form would not have prevented their assessment. Loc.R. 3.5.

IV. CONCLUSION

{¶32} Presuming the truth of the complaint's material factual allegations, Relator cannot establish that the Juvenile Division, Magistrate Wagner, or Judge Smith patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction, or that she lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the errors she alleges. The complaint's remaining requests seek relief that prohibition does not provide, and every request for a stay of the underlying proceedings is moot.

{¶33} Respondents' motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the complaint for a writ of prohibition is DISMISSED. Relator's requests for a stay of the trial court proceedings, in the complaint and in the September 8, 2026 motion and notice, are OVERRULED as moot. Relator's request to stay this action pending an original action in the Supreme Court of Ohio is DENIED. Respondents' motion to strike and for sanctions is DENIED. Relator's request to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee is DENIED. Costs taxed against Relator. Loc.R. 3.5. Final order. The clerk of courts is directed to serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. Civ.R. 58(B).

JUDGE CAROL ANN ROBB

JUDGE MARK A. HANNI

JUDGE KATELYN DICKEY