

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CLARK COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO

Appellee

V.

RAYMOND SCOTT

Appellant

C.A. No. 2025-CA-83

Trial Court Case Nos. 25-CR-119; 25-CR-121; 25-CR-260

(Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)

FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & OPINION

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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on August 21, 2026, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately send a copy of the court's ruling to each party and note that action on the docket. Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

Michy L. Tuck

MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE

LEWIS, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.

OPINION
CLARK C.A. No. 2025-CA-83

STEVEN H. ECKSTEIN, Attorney for Appellant
JOHN M. LINTZ, Attorney for Appellee

TUCKER, J.

{¶ 1} Raymond Scott appeals from his conviction in three cases following a negotiated guilty plea to charges of aggravated murder, kidnapping, and domestic violence.

{¶ 2} Scott claims ineffective assistance of counsel invalidated his plea. He asserts that it was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, because his attorney failed to consult with him or file any motions.

{¶ 3} Finding no support in the record for Scott's ineffective-assistance allegations, we affirm the trial court's judgment in each of the three cases.

I. Background

{¶ 4} Grand juries indicted Scott on numerous charges in six cases, including the three at issue in this appeal, Clark C.P. Nos. 25-CR-119, 25-CR-121, and 25-CR-260. The trial court appointed a public defender for him in the first two cases. He subsequently retained an attorney, who was substituted for appointed counsel. The same retained counsel also entered an appearance in the third case. Retained counsel later moved to withdraw from representation, citing a disagreement with Scott regarding his defense. The trial court sustained the motion and reappointed the original public defender to represent Scott in the three cases. Scott ultimately pleaded guilty to kidnapping in Case No. 25-CR-119, domestic violence in Case No. 25-CR-121, and aggravated murder in Case No. 25-CR-260. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss all other counts in those cases. It also agreed to dismiss three other cases. The parties additionally agreed to an aggregate prison term of

31.5 years to life, as well as Scott's designation as a Tier III sex offender and his inclusion in the violent-offender database. The trial court accepted Scott's plea, entered a finding of guilt, and sentenced him consistently with the agreed terms. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

{¶ 5} Scott's sole assignment of error states:

THE PLEA OF GUILTY WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY, AND INTELLIGENTLY ENTERED AS THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FAILED TO RECEIVE THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL.

{¶ 6} Scott challenges the validity of his plea under Crim.R. 11. He correctly recognizes that a guilty plea waives ineffective assistance of counsel unless an attorney's deficient performance impaired the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of a plea. *State v. Davis*, 2026-Ohio-52, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). Scott argues that his reappointed public defender provided ineffective assistance and invalidated his guilty plea by "fail[ing] to consult" with him or "file any pretrial motions."

{¶ 7} We review alleged instances of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-part analysis found in *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which the Ohio Supreme Court adopted in *State v. Bradley*, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989). To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, a defendant must show that trial counsel rendered deficient performance and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. *Strickland* at 687; *Bradley* at paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶ 8} We see no ineffective assistance here. Regarding a lack of consultation, Scott cannot establish deficient performance because the record does not reveal the nature or extent of counsel's consultation with him. Moreover, his bare allegation of a "fail[ure] to consult" does not identify anything his attorney failed to do or say that prejudiced him and

affected the validity of his plea. During the plea hearing, Scott told the trial court that he was satisfied with counsel's representation and that he had been given sufficient time to speak with counsel.

{¶ 9} As for failing to file motions, Scott does not identify a specific motion or attempt to show how an omitted motion prejudiced him or affected the validity of his plea. An appellant "cannot establish deficient performance simply by making a blanket assertion that counsel failed to file unspecified motions." *In re A.W.*, 2025-Ohio-5657, ¶ 91 (2d Dist.). On the record before us, we see no indication that ineffective assistance of counsel invalidated Scott's guilty plea. Accordingly, his assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 10} The judgments of the Clark County Common Pleas Court are affirmed in Case Nos. 25-CR-119, 25-CR-121, and 25-CR-260.

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LEWIS, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.