

IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

GALE JOY

Requester

v.

VILLAGE OF NEW LEBANON

Respondent

Case No. 2025-00616PQ

Judge David E. Cain

DECISION AND ENTRY

{¶1} In this public-records case, Requester Gale Joy, a self-represented litigant, objects to the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation. The Court overrules Requester’s written objections and adopts the Report and Recommendation for reasons discussed below.

I. Background and Procedural History

{¶2} On June 27, 2025, pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(D), Requester, a council member of the Village of New Lebanon, filed a Complaint, alleging that Respondent Village of New Lebanon denied him access to public records in violation of R.C. 149.43(B). The Court appointed a Special Master who did not refer the case to mediation. Rather, the Special Master issued an order directing the parties to file evidence for the Special Master to review in camera. On August 8, 2025, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), Respondent, through counsel, moved to dismiss Requester’s Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

{¶3} On August 21, 2025, the Special Master issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”). The Special Master notes in the Report and Recommendation: “There has been considerable conflict within the Village’s government, and Mr. Joy made public records requests for invoices and other materials compiled by the private attorney retained to serve as the Village’s acting Law Director. The Law Director produced copies of the invoices, redacted to obscure the descriptions of the work

performed....Mr. Joy filed this case to compel production of unredacted copies of the invoices. He also seeks damages and attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 149.43(C)(2) and (3).” (R&R, 1.) The Special Master recommends dismissal of Respondent’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion because it relies on matters beyond the Complaint. (R&R, 2.) The Special Master further recommends that the Court enter judgment for Respondent and that the Court require Requester to bear the costs of this case. (R&R, 4.)

{¶4} Respondent has not filed timely objections to the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation. Requester, however, filed timely written objections to the Report and Recommendation on August 28, 2025. After the Court reviewed Requester’s filing, the Court determined that Requester’s written objections were not properly served and the Court sua sponte granted leave to Requester to file proof of completed service of his filing in the manner required by R.C. 2743.75(F)(2) on or before September 9, 2025. The Court cautioned Requester that if he failed to file proof of completed service of his filing of August 28, 2025, in the manner required by R.C. 2743.75(F)(2) on or before September 9, 2025, then Requester’s filing of August 28, 2025, would not be considered by the Court. On September 3, 2025, Requester filed a Certificate of Service in which Requester has certified that he served a copy of his written objections on Respondent’s counsel by certified mail without requesting a return receipt. See R.C. 2743.75(F)(2) (statutory requirements for serving objections to a report and recommendation).¹

{¶5} Respondent has not filed a timely written response to Requester’s objections, as permitted by R.C. 2743.75(F)(2). See R.C. 2743.75(F)(2) (“[i]f either party timely objects, the other party may file with the clerk a response within seven business days after receiving the objection and send a copy of the response to the objecting party by certified mail, return receipt requested”). Requester’s written objections are therefore before the Court for a final order. See *id.* (“[t]he court, within seven business days after

¹ According to R.C. 2743.75(F)(2), either party may object to a report and recommendation within seven business days after receiving the report and recommendation by filing a written objection with the clerk and sending a copy to the other party by certified mail, return receipt requested. The Court finds that, in this instance, Requester has substantially complied with R.C. 2743.75(F)(2)’s service requirements by serving his written objections by certified mail. See *De Hart v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.*, 69 Ohio St.2d 189, 192 (1982) (“it is a fundamental tenet of judicial review in Ohio that courts should decide cases on the merits”); *State ex rel. Wilcox v. Seidner*, 76 Ohio St.3d 412, 414 (1996) (denying request to strike the appellants’ briefs given the relatively minor violation of the a Rule of Practice of the Ohio Supreme Court and the fundamental tenet of judicial review in Ohio that courts should decide cases on their merits).

the response to the objection is filed, shall issue a final order that adopts, modifies, or rejects the report and recommendation”).

II. Law and Analysis

{¶6} The General Assembly, as the legislative branch of Ohio government, is the ultimate arbiter of policy considerations relevant to Ohio public-records laws. *Kish v. City of Akron*, 2006-Ohio-1244, ¶ 44. Through the enactment of R.C. 2743.75 the General Assembly created an alternative means to resolve public-records disputes. *Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor’s Office*, 2020-Ohio-5371, ¶ 11. See R.C. 2743.75(A).

{¶7} Under Ohio law a requester “must establish entitlement to relief in an action filed in the Court of Claims under R.C. 2743.75 by clear and convincing evidence.” *Viola v. Cuyahoga Cty. Prosecutor’s Office*, 2021-Ohio-4210, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), citing *Hurt v. Liberty Twp.*, 2017-Ohio-7820, ¶ 27-30 (5th Dist.). See *Welsh-Huggins* at ¶ 32. It is a requester’s burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the requested records exist and are public records maintained by a respondent. See *State ex rel. Cordell v. Paden*, 2019-Ohio-1216, ¶ 8. See also *Cross v. Ledford*, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954) (paragraph three of the syllabus) (“[c]lear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established”); *State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Deters*, 2016-Ohio-8195, ¶ 19, quoting *State ex rel. McCaffrey v. Mahoning Cty. Prosecutor’s Office*, 2012-Ohio-4246, ¶ 16 (“[a]lthough the Public Records Act is accorded liberal construction in favor of access to public records, ‘the relator must still establish entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief by clear and convincing evidence’”).

{¶8} A public-records custodian has the burden to establish the applicability of an exception to disclosure of a public record. *State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley*, 2008-Ohio-1770, paragraph two of the syllabus. In *Jones-Kelley*, the Supreme Court of Ohio held:

Exceptions to disclosure under the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, are strictly construed against the public-records custodian, and the custodian

has the burden to establish the applicability of an exception. A custodian does not meet this burden if it has not proven that the requested records fall squarely within the exception. (*State ex rel. Carr v. Akron*, 112 Ohio St.3d 351, 2006-Ohio-6714, 859 N.E.2d 948, ¶ 30, followed.)

Kelley at paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶9} Under R.C. 2743.75(F)(2) a party's objections to the Special Master's Report and Recommendation are required to be "specific and state with particularity all grounds for the objection." Requester presents three objections for the Court's determination:

I. Objection to the Recommendation that Judgment be Entered for Respondent.

II. Objection to Finding that the Public Records Act is not the Right Tool for Obtaining Needed Information.

III. Objection to Finding Requester Should Bear Costs of the Case.

By the objections, Requester asks the Court to:

1. Clarify that the Public Records Act requires disclosure of all non-privileged invoice data with narrowly tailored redactions only;
2. Require the Respondent to produce a privilege log identifying each redaction with sufficient detail for judicial review, and permit in camera review;
3. Decline to tax costs to Requester; and
4. Grant all other relief the Court deems just and proper.

A. Requester's First Objection is overruled.

{¶10} Requester asserts in his first Objection that he "is not a third-party bystander, or simply a constituent—he is a client under the attorney-client relationship as defined in this context." Requester further asserts, "Denying him full access to these records perverts the privilege into a tool for secrecy rather than a protection for governance." And Requester asserts, "He is entitled to the full, unredacted documentation—both as a council member and as a direct client of the law director. Anything less is a clear subversion of accountability and a misuse of the attorney-client privilege."

{¶11} Public records that are subject to attorney-client privilege are not required to be released under Ohio public-records law. The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained:

R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v) excepts “[r]ecords the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law” from the definition of “public record.” “The attorney-client privilege, which covers records of communications between attorneys and their government clients pertaining to the attorneys’ legal advice, is a state law prohibiting release of these records.” *State ex rel. Besser v. Ohio State Univ.* (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 535, 542, 2000-Ohio-475, 721 N.E.2d 1044; *State ex rel. Nix. v. Cleveland* (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 379, 383, 1998-Ohio-290, 700 N.E.2d 12.

State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Port Auth., 2009-Ohio-1767, ¶ 22.

{¶12} In *State ex rel. Leslie v. Ohio Hous. Fin. Agency*, 2005-Ohio-1508, ¶ 21, the Supreme Court of Ohio described attorney-client privilege, stating:

Under the attorney-client privilege, “(1) [w]here legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) unless the protection is waived” *Reed v. Baxter* (C.A.6, 1998), 134 F.3d 351, 355-356; *Perfection Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur.*, 153 Ohio App. 3d 28, 2003-Ohio-3358, 790 N.E.2d 817, ¶ 12.

See *Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr.*, 69 Ohio St.3d 638, 660-661 (1994) (describing history of attorney-client privilege).² And in *State ex rel. Lanham v. DeWine*, 2013-Ohio-

² In *Moskovitz* at 660-661, the Supreme Court of Ohio described the history of attorney-client privilege, stating:

The attorney-client privilege has ancient roots. The history of the privilege can be traced back at least as far as the reign of Elizabeth I, where the privilege was already well established. See 8 Wigmore, *Evidence* (McNaughton Rev.1961), Section 2290. See, also, *Spitzer v. Stillings* (1924), 109 Ohio St. 297, 142 N.E. 365. In the modern law, the privilege is founded on the premise that confidences shared in the attorney-client relationship are to remain confidential. Only in this manner can there be freedom from apprehension in the client’s consultation with his or her legal advisor. Wigmore, *supra*, at Section 2291. However, the privilege is not absolute. That is to say, the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality of all communications made between them. *Id.* at Section 2311. Moreover, it is beyond contradiction that the privilege does not attach in a situation where the advice sought by the client and conveyed by the attorney relates to some future unlawful or fraudulent transaction. Advice sought and rendered in this regard is not worthy of protection, and the principles upon which the attorney-client

199, ¶ 29 the Supreme Court of Ohio explained: “The attorney-client privilege does not require that the communication contain purely legal advice, but “if a communication between a lawyer and client would facilitate the rendition of legal services or advice, the communication is privileged.” [State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Port Auth., 2009-Ohio-1767, ¶ 27, quoting Dunn v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 927 F.2d 869, 875 (5th Cir. 1991)]. Subject to exceptions, only a client can waive attorney-client privilege. See Allen Cty. Bar Assn. v. Williams, 2002-Ohio-2006, ¶ 9-14 (required-by-law exception).

{¶13} In support of his first objection, Requester relies, in part, on *State ex rel. Armatas v. Plain Twp. Bd. of Trustees*, 2021-Ohio-1176. Requester asserts: “In *State ex rel. Armatas v. Plain Twp. Bd. of Trustees*, 2021-Ohio-1176, the court decisively held that invoices for legal services—particularly those funded by public money—relate to public duties and are therefore public records.”

{¶14} In *Armatas*, Steven A. Armatas, a self-represented litigant, sought a writ of mandamus in an Ohio court of appeals to order the Plain Township Board of Trustees to produce an invoice for legal services performed on the Township’s behalf. *State ex rel. Armatas* at ¶ 1. The Township declined to produce the invoice, because the attorneys who performed the services for the Township were hired and supervised by the claims administrator for the risk-management pool to which the Township belonged; the Township thus claimed that it did not possess the invoice and had no duty to provide it. *Id.* In *Armatas* the Supreme Court of Ohio determined that Armatas was entitled to a writ of mandamus under the quasi-agency test. *Armatas* at ¶ 14-22. Importantly, however, in *Armatas* the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that invoices for legal services that contain privileged communications require redaction, stating at ¶ 13: “Invoices for legal

privilege is founded do not dictate otherwise. See Wigmore, *supra*, at Section 2298. See, also, *Lemley v. Kaiser* (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 258, 6 OBR 324, 452 N.E.2d 1304, wherein Judge (now Justice) Alice Robie Resnick, writing for this court, found that the attorney-client privilege exists to aid in the administration of justice and must yield in circumstances where justice so requires. *Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr.*, 69 Ohio St.3d 638, 660-661 (1994).

See *Clark v. United States*, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (“[t]here is a privilege protecting communications between attorney and client. The privilege takes flight if the relation is abused”).

services provided to public offices are public records to the extent that they contain only nonprivileged information (privileged communications must be redacted).”

{¶15} Requester’s first objection (which challenges the correctness of the Special Master’s application of attorney-client privilege) raises an issue that is not squarely addressed in *Armatas*. *Armatas* is thus distinguishable from this case.

{¶16} Requester maintains in his first objection that he is a client of the Village’s Law Director. In support, Requester relies, in part, on Section 4.07 of the Village of New Lebanon’s Charter. See generally *City of N. Canton v. Osborne*, 2015-Ohio-2942, ¶ 13 (5th Dist.), citing *Calco v. Stow*, 1981 Ohio App. LEXIS 13700 at *4 (9th Dist. Apr. 29, 1981), citing *State ex rel. Pell v. Westlake*, 64 Ohio St.2d 360, 361 (1980) (“[a] municipal charter acts as the constitution of the municipality”).

{¶17} Section 4.07 of the Village of New Lebanon’s Charter pertains to the Village’s Law Director. It provides:

The Manager shall recommend a person to be appointed as Law Director for the Municipality. The Council shall appoint a Law Director and said Law Director shall be directly answerable to the Council and shall not be deemed to be a subordinate or employee of the Administrative Service. The Mayor or Vice Mayor shall act as liaison to the Law Director. The Law Director must be an attorney in good standing and need not be a resident of the municipality.

https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/newlebanon/latest/newlebanon_oh/0-0-0-18081#JD_Section4.07 (accessed September 15, 2025).

{¶18} Since, under Section 4.07, the Law Director is appointed by the Village’s Council and the Law Director is “directly answerable” to the Village’s Council, a straightforward reading of Section 4.07 suggests an implied agency relationship between the Village’s Council (principal) and the Law Director (agent). See *Cincinnati Golf Mgt. v. Testa*, 2012-Ohio-2846, ¶ 20, quoting *Evans v. Ohio State Univ.*, 112 Ohio App.3d 724, 744 (10th Dist.1996), quoting *Funk v. Hancock*, 26 Ohio App.3d 107 (12th Dist.1985), citing *Haluka v. Baker*, 66 Ohio App. 308, 312 (9th Dist.1941) (“[a]gency has been defined as ““a consensual fiduciary relationship between two persons where the agent has the power to bind the principal by his actions, and the principal has the right to control

the actions of the agent”); see also *Kevin Eye v. Sal’s Heating & Cooling, Inc.*, 2020-Ohio-6737, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), quoting *Master Consol. Corp. v. BancOhio Natl. Bank*, 61 Ohio St.3d 570, 574 (1991) (“[t]he creation of an agency relationship may be express or implied. ‘The relationship of principal and agent, and the resultant liability of the principal for the acts of the agent, may be created by the express grant of authority by the principal. Absent express agency, the relation may be one of implied or apparent agency’”).

{¶19} And since Section 4.07 requires the Law Director to be an attorney in good standing, an attorney-client relationship between the Law Director (agent) and the Village Council (principal) seemingly is intended by Section 4.07. See *Boddie v. Van Steyn*, 2014-Ohio-1069, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.), citing *Gaines Reporting Serv. v. Mack*, 4 Ohio App.3d 234 (6th Dist.1982) (“[i]t is well-settled that the relationship between an attorney and client is that of an agent and a principal”); see also Prof.Cond.R. 1.13(a) (“[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its constituents. A lawyer employed or retained by an organization owes allegiance to the organization and not to any constituent or other person connected with the organization. The constituents of an organization include its owners and its duly authorized officers, directors, trustees, and employees”); Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(b) (preference for a written agreement that specifies the nature and scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expense for the which the client will be responsible).

{¶20} Although Requester is a member of the Village’s Council, and notwithstanding that an organization acts through its constituents, Requester does constitute the entire Village Council, because, under the Village’s Charter, the Village Council is comprised of additional members. See Section 2.01 of the Charter of the Village of New Lebanon (https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/newlebanon/latest/newlebanon_oh/0-0-0-17979#JD_Section2.01) (accessed September 22, 2025) (“[a]ll legislative power shall be vested in a Mayor and six (6) council members”). Requester also does not constitute the Village, as the Village is a body politic. See *Black’s Law Dictionary* (12th Ed. 2024) (defining “body politic” as a “group of people regarded in a political (rather than private) sense and organized under a common governmental authority”); *Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities v. Professionals Guild of Ohio*, 46 Ohio St.3d 147,

150 (1989), citing *Uricich v. Kolesar*, 132 Ohio St. 115, 118 (1936); *Utah State Bldg. Comm. v. Great American Indemn. Co.*, 105 Utah 11 (1943) (“[a] body corporate and politic is a governmental body or public corporation having powers and duties of government”).

{¶21} Based on the Court’s independent review of the unredacted copies of the legal invoices submitted for in camera review, the legal invoices with their descriptions of services provided, at a minimum, facilitate the rendition of legal services or advice. The legal invoices are therefore privileged. See *State ex rel. Lanham v. DeWine*, 2013-Ohio-199 at ¶ 29. Compare *State ex rel. Pietrangelo v. City of Avon Lake*, 2016-Ohio-2974, ¶ 10 (narrative portions of itemized attorney-fee billing statements containing descriptions of legal services performed by counsel are protected by the attorney-client privilege, but other information on the billing statements—for example, the general title of the matter being handled, the dates the services were performed, and the hours, rate, and money charged for the services—is considered nonexempt and must be disclosed).

{¶22} Additionally, in this instance, it does not appear that the attorney-client privilege between the Law Director (agent) and the Village’s Council (principal) has been waived, or that, in this instance, any exceptions to attorney-client privilege apply. Moreover, even if the attorney-client privilege is between the Village itself and the Law Director, it also does not appear that the attorney-client privilege has been waived or that any exceptions to attorney-client privilege apply.

{¶23} Neither does it appear that, under the Village’s Charter, Requester, in his capacity as a council member, has authority to waive attorney-client privilege enjoyed by the Village’s Council or the Village because, under the Village’s Charter, an affirmative vote of a majority of the Village’s Council generally is required to take legislative action. See Section 2.10 of the Village of New Lebanon’s Charter (https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/newlebanon/latest/newlebanon_oh/0-0-0-18010) (accessed September 19, 2025) (“[t]he legislative action of the Council shall be by ordinance or resolution, introduced in written or printed form, each of which shall contain no more than one (1) subject, which subject shall be clearly expressed in the title. ... An affirmative vote of a majority of Council shall be required for the enactment of every

ordinance or resolution, unless a larger number be required by the provisions of this Charter”).

{¶24} In sum, and notwithstanding Requester’s first objection and arguments in support thereof, the Court determines that Requester has not established an entitlement to unredacted copies of the disputed legal invoices by clear and convincing evidence. The Court further determines that the Special Master’s finding that the redactions at issue were supported by attorney-client privilege is not an error. Requester’s first objection is OVERRULED.

B. Requester’s Second Objection is overruled.

{¶25} In Requester’s second objection, Requester urges that the Ohio Public Records Act is the right tool for obtaining needed information. Requester’s objection is unpersuasive.

{¶26} A request for information is not a proper public-records request. *State ex rel. Morgan v. City of New Lexington*, 2006-Ohio-6365, ¶ 30. In *State ex rel. Morgan* at ¶ 30, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated,

Requests for information and requests that require the records custodian to create a new record by searching for selected information are improper requests under R.C. 149.43. *State ex rel. Lanham v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth.* (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 425, 427, 1997 Ohio 104, 687 N.E.2d 283 (claim for certain information, i.e., qualifications of agency members, rather than for specific records); *State ex rel. Kerner v. State Teachers Retirement Bd.* (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 273, 274, 1998 Ohio 242, 695 N.E.2d 256 (no duty to create new record by searching for and compiling information from existing records).

See *State ex rel. Griffin v. Sehlmeier*, 2021-Ohio-1419, ¶ 12, quoting *State ex rel. Morgan* at ¶ 30. In *State ex rel. Morabito v. City of Cleveland*, 2012-Ohio-6012, the Eighth District Court of Appeals explained:

Under the public records statute, the government has the duty to supply records, not information, and the government has no duty to create records to meet a requester’s demand. *State ex rel. Lanham v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth.*, 80 Ohio St.3d 425, 1997-Ohio-104, 687 N.E.2d 283; *State ex rel.*

Mayrides v. Whitehall, 62 Ohio St.3d 203, 580 N.E.2d 1089 (1991); *State ex rel. Warren v. Warner*, 84 Ohio St.3d 432, 1999-Ohio-475, 704 N.E.2d 1228; and *State ex rel. Fant v. Tober*, 8th Dist. No. 63737, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2591. Nor is there a duty to provide records that no longer exist. [*State ex rel. Chatfield v. Gammill*, 2012-Ohio-1862].

State ex rel. Morabito at ¶ 14.

And in *Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor's Office*, 2020-Ohio-5371, ¶ 33, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted that “the complainant’s ‘burden of production’ is to plead and prove facts showing that the requester sought an identifiable public record pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B)(1) and that the public office or records custodian did not make the record available.”

{¶27} Requester’s second objection is OVERRULED.

C. Requester’s Third Objection is overruled.

{¶28} In Requester’s third objection Requester maintains that the Special Master’s recommendation to assess costs against him “is legally unfounded and procedurally unjust,” as well as “punitive.” Requester further maintains, “R.C. 2743.75—the controlling statute for expedited public records proceedings—contains no provision authorizing cost-shifting against unsuccessful requesters.” Requester’s challenge to the Special Master’s recommendation for the assessment of costs against Requester is not well taken.

{¶29} In *Strattman v. Studt*, 20 Ohio St.2d 95, 103 (1969), the Ohio Supreme Court stated, “By being involved in court proceedings, any litigant, by implied contract, becomes liable for the payment of court costs if taxed as a part of the court’s judgment.” See *Studt* at paragraph six of the syllabus (holding that the “duty to pay court costs is a civil obligation arising from an implied contract”). Here, Requester sought relief in this forum and, consequently, Requester became liable for payment of court costs by implied contract. The Special Master’s recommendation to assess court costs against Requester is based on the ordinary application of statutory law and case law as they existed at the time of the filing of Requester’s Complaint. See R.C. 2743.75(F)(1) (requiring a special master to submit a report and recommendation based on the ordinary application of statutory law and case law as they existed at the time of the filing of a complaint).

{¶30} Requester's contentions that the Special Master's recommendation to assess court costs against him is "legally unfounded," is "procedurally unjust," is "punitive," and is tantamount to cost shifting fail to persuade. Requester's third objection is **OVERRULED**.

III. Disposition

{¶31} For reasons set forth above, the Court **OVERRULES** Requester's Objections and **ADOPTS** the Special Master's Report and Recommendation. The Court **DENIES** Respondent's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion filed on August 8, 2025. Judgment is rendered in Respondent's favor. Court costs are assessed against Requester. The Clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.

DAVID E. CAIN
Judge

Filed September 24, 2025
Sent to S.C. Reporter 10/20/25