

**IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO**

STATE OF OHIO,	:	APPEAL NO.	C-250686
		TRIAL NOS.	25/CRB/11520/A
Plaintiff-Appellee,	:		25/CRB/11520/B
vs.	:		
CHARETTA PRIDE,	:	<i>JUDGMENT ENTRY</i>	
Defendant-Appellant.	:		

This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs.

For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24.

The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.

To the clerk:

Enter upon the journal of the court on 8/26/2026.

Pursuant to App.R. 30, the clerk is directed to send all parties, or their counsel if represented, a copy of the court's judgment and note such action on the docket.

By: _____
Administrative Judge

**IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO**

STATE OF OHIO,	:	APPEAL NO.	C-250686
	:	TRIAL NOS.	25/CRB/11520/A
Plaintiff-Appellee,	:		25/CRB/11520/B
vs.	:		
CHARETTA PRIDE,	:	<i>O P I N I O N</i>	
Defendant-Appellant.	:		

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 26, 2026

Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, *Susan M. Zurface*, Chief Prosecuting Attorney, and *Robert E. Rickey*, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Angela W. Chang, Hamilton County Public Defender, and *Christine Y. Jones*, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.

NESTOR, Judge.

{¶1} This case involves two competing accounts of an argument that left an apartment in shambles. According to Brittany Reynolds, Charetta Pride began tearing up Reynolds’s apartment without provocation. According to Charetta Pride, Brittany Reynolds started an argument at a bar because she thought Pride was flirting with another woman.

{¶2} However the dispute began, it ended with Reynolds’s apartment in disarray, and two criminal charges filed against Pride. Following a bench trial, the court found Pride guilty of criminal damaging and disorderly conduct. She now appeals her convictions, challenging the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶3} Because we hold that Pride’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I. Factual and Procedural History

{¶4} Defendant-appellant Charetta Pride was charged with one count of assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.13, and criminal damaging, in violation of R.C. 2909.06. The matter proceeded to a bench trial, where the trial court found Pride guilty of criminal damaging. On the assault charge, the trial court found Pride guilty of the lesser-included offense of disorderly conduct, in violation of R.C. 2917.11.

{¶5} The conduct giving rise to Pride’s charges occurred on the evening of July 8, 2025, when Pride became involved in an argument with Brittany Reynolds. Both Reynolds and Pride testified at trial. The two provided different versions of the evening’s events.

{¶6} Reynolds testified that she knew Pride from work. According to

Reynolds, Pride came over to her house on July 8 “[j]ust to hang out.” She alleged that Pride had had a few drinks. The two were going to watch a movie, when Pride “start[ed] going crazy . . . fighting, arguing, tearing up [Reynolds’s] house.” Reynolds testified that she did not know what started the argument.

{¶7} Reynolds described the damage that Pride caused to her apartment. She alleged that Pride broke her television, ripped a shelf off of the wall, and dumped out her medication that Reynolds was taking for a bariatric stomach procedure she recently underwent. She also stated that Pride dumped perfume on the floor and threw her clothes everywhere. Reynolds testified that she did not give Pride permission for any of the above-described destruction. The State admitted photos of Reynolds’s apartment depicting the damage into evidence.

{¶8} Reynolds testified that she asked Pride to leave. Pride refused and, knowing that Reynolds was recovering from surgery, punched her in the stomach. Reynolds then called the police in order to get Pride to stop. Pride left after Reynolds called 9-1-1. An audio recording of the 9-1-1 call was admitted into evidence.

{¶9} On cross-examination, Reynolds admitted that she and Pride were in a relationship.

{¶10} Pride offered a different version of events. In her testimony, she stated that the two were in a relationship and visited a few bars together on July 8. Pride alleged that Reynolds became angry with her because Reynolds thought that Pride was “flirting with some lady.” Pride stated that both Reynolds and Pride had been drinking that night and were both intoxicated.

{¶11} Pride testified that once the two returned to the apartment, she began to collect her things. Pride stated that while she “still had her place in Amelia,” she was “basically living” at Reynolds’s apartment.

{¶12} Pride insisted that she did not intentionally damage Reynolds’s property. She explained that the shelf was knocked off the wall by accident, and that Reynolds threw a water bottle at her, which missed, and damaged the television.

{¶13} The trial court found Pride guilty of criminal damaging and disorderly conduct. Pride appeals her convictions.

II. Analysis

{¶14} In her first assignment of error, Pride alleges that her conviction for criminal damaging was based on insufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Pride’s second assignment of error challenges the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence supporting her disorderly conduct conviction.

{¶15} A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence requires appellate courts to “review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” *State v. Murphy*, 2023-Ohio-2853, ¶ 5 (1st Dist.), citing *State v. Sims*, 2015-Ohio-4996, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.). “Whether the evidence is sufficient for a conviction is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.” *Id.*, citing *State v. Ellison*, 2008-Ohio-5282, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.). Sufficiency tests whether the State met its burden of production. *State v. Stenson*, 2026-Ohio-2280, ¶ 54 (1st Dist.), citing *State v. Hicks*, 2023-Ohio-2209, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.).

{¶16} In contrast, “a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge looks to whether the State met its burden of persuasion.” *State v. Reillo*, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 24, citing *State v. Messenger*, 2021-Ohio-2044, ¶ 44-45 (10th Dist.). The manifest weight of the evidence standard refers to whether there is a “*greater amount of credible evidence . . . to support one side of the issue rather than the other.*” (Emphasis added in *Thompkins*.) *Id.* at ¶ 25, quoting *State v. Thompkins*,

78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). When deciding whether a judgment entered by the trial court is against the manifest weight of evidence, the appellate court “must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” *Id.* at ¶ 28, quoting *Eastley v. Volkman*, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 21. This is an exceptional remedy that we reserve for cases where “the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” *State v. Cook*, 2024-Ohio-4771, ¶ 27 (1st Dist.), citing *Thompkins* at 387.

A. Criminal Damaging

{¶17} To convict Pride of criminal damaging, the State was required to prove that Pride “knowingly” created “a substantial risk of physical harm” to Reynolds’s property without Reynolds’s consent. R.C. 2909.06(A). Physical harm to property is defined as “any tangible or intangible damage to property that . . . results in loss to its value or interferes with its use or enjoyment.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(4).

{¶18} In attacking the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her criminal damaging conviction, Pride first argues that the residence was a “shared living space,” and therefore, she had consent to use the property. This argument fails. Reynolds’s testimony established that the residence was hers, and that she did not give Pride consent to damage her property. Further, Reynolds called 9-1-1 and immediately reported the damage. When a property owner “immediately reports damage to the police and testifies that [they] did not consent to the damage, the state proves lack of consent.” *State v. Robinson*, 2023-Ohio-2312, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.), citing *State v. Baldwin*, 2011-Ohio-4988, ¶ 17-18 (9th Dist.).

{¶19} Pride next argues that the evidence failed to show that she acted knowingly. “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result.” R.C. 2901.22(B). However, “[c]ulpable mental states are frequently demonstrated through

circumstantial evidence.” *State v. Thomas*, 2025-Ohio-1767, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.), quoting *State v. Hypes*, 2019-Ohio-4096, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.). “A defendant’s state of mind may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.” *Id.*, citing *State v. Murphy*, 2018-Ohio-3506, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.).

{¶20} The totality of the circumstances here supports the trial court’s finding that Pride acted knowingly. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, Reynolds’s testimony coupled with the photographs of the apartment indicate that Pride was aware that her conduct would cause damage.

{¶21} Therefore, we hold that Pride’s criminal damaging conviction was supported by sufficient evidence.

{¶22} Pride also challenges the manifest weight of the evidence supporting her conviction. She argues that Reynolds was not a credible witness because she was “evasive” in her testimony regarding the status of their relationship.

{¶23} We disagree. Reynolds’s characterization of her relationship with Pride does not demolish her credibility. The trial court, in its role as the fact finder, believed Reynolds’s version of events over Pride’s. Being “mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact,” we defer to that finding. *Reillo*, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2701, at ¶ 28, quoting *Eastley*, 2012-Ohio-2179, at ¶ 21.

{¶24} This is not an exceptional case where “the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” *See Cook*, 2024-Ohio-4771, at ¶ 27 (1st Dist.). Pride’s criminal damaging conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶25} Having found that Pride’s criminal damaging conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we overrule the first assignment of error.

B. Disorderly Conduct

{¶26} Pride’s second assignment of error challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting her disorderly conduct conviction. Pride was initially charged with assault. Following the bench trial, Pride was found guilty of disorderly conduct, which is a lesser-included offense of assault.

{¶27} To support a disorderly conduct conviction, the State had to prove that Pride “recklessly cause[d] inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to another by . . . [e]ngaging in fighting, in threatening harm to persons or property, or in violent or turbulent behavior.” R.C. 2917.11(A).

{¶28} Pride was convicted of disorderly conduct for allegedly punching Reynolds in the stomach. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Pride argues that the State failed to show that the alleged punch caused “inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.”

{¶29} Pride cites *City of Chardon v. Patterson*, 2007-Ohio-1769 (11th Dist.), for the proposition that “[a]nnoyance and alarm are each mental states and, therefore, are not part of the concept of physical harm.” *Id.* at ¶ 41, quoting *State v. Neal*, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4149, *19 (10th Dist. Sept. 1, 1998). Therefore, she argues, Reynolds’s testimony was insufficient to show that the punch caused her annoyance and alarm.

{¶30} But the *Chardon* court went on to state that “inconvenience may also have ‘physical elements.’” *Id.* In *Chardon*, the defendant shoved the plaintiff at a gas station. *Id.* at ¶ 3. At trial, when asked if the shove caused him to fall, the plaintiff testified that he “went backward a little bit,” but ultimately did not fall. *Id.* at ¶ 33-36. The *Chardon* court held that because the State failed to elicit any testimony that the shove caused “inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm,” as required by the statute, the

evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant’s disorderly conduct conviction. *Id.* at 39, 42.

{¶31} The facts are different here. Here, Reynolds testified that the punch hurt. Because “inconvenience may also have ‘physical elements,’” we hold that this testimony is sufficient to support Pride’s disorderly conduct conviction. *See id.* at ¶ 41.

{¶32} Finally, Pride challenges the manifest weight of the evidence supporting her disorderly conduct conviction. Pride raises similar arguments as she did to her criminal damaging conviction. She, again, asks us to believe her version of events over Reynolds’s version.

{¶33} As explained above, we will not do so. A “conviction [i]s not against the manifest weight of the evidence merely because the [factfinder] chose to believe the state’s witnesses over the defense’s witnesses.” *State v. Jackson*, 2024-Ohio-2728, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.), citing *State v. Robinson*, 2019-Ohio-3144, ¶ 30 (12th Dist.). This is not one of those cases where the trial court clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice.

{¶34} The second assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶35} Having overruled Pride’s assignments of error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Judgments affirmed.

BOCK, P.J., and MOORE, J., concur.