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SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-4231

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL *v.* ROBERTSON.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as *Disciplinary Counsel v. Robertson*, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-4231.]

Attorneys—Misconduct—Misrepresentation in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Conditionally stayed one-year suspension.

(No. 2026-0725—Submitted June 30, 2026—Decided October 29, 2026.)

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme Court, No. 2025-028.

The per curiam opinion below was joined by DEWINE, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ. KENNEDY, C.J., concurred in part and dissented in part and would impose a conditionally stayed 18-month suspension on the authority of *Disciplinary Counsel v. Mollica*, 2025-Ohio-5372, and *Disciplinary Counsel v. Collins*, 2025-Ohio-5393. FISCHER, J., concurred in part and dissented in part and would stay only six months of the suspension. BRUNNER, J., did not participate.

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Deanna Robertson, of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0056168, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1991.

{¶ 2} In a November 12, 2025 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, alleged that Robertson engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation by overbilling in court-appointed cases in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. Specifically, the complaint alleged that she (1) failed to properly track and record her time, (2) double billed for time spent downloading evidence while she simultaneously performed other client work, and (3) improperly billed for tasks performed by her support staff. Robertson waived a probable-cause determination.

{¶ 3} The parties entered into stipulations of fact, misconduct, and aggravating and mitigating factors. They also submitted 18 stipulated exhibits and agreed that an 18-month suspension, stayed in its entirety, is the appropriate sanction for Robertson's misconduct.

{¶ 4} Robertson and three character witnesses testified at a hearing before a three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct. After the hearing, the panel issued a report in which it accepted the parties' stipulation that Robertson had committed the charged misconduct. The panel accepted the parties' stipulated aggravating and mitigating factors and their proposed sanction. The board adopted the panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law but recommended that Robertson be suspended for one year, with the suspension stayed in its entirety. The parties have jointly waived objections.

{¶ 5} After independently reviewing the board's report and recommendation, the record, and our applicable precedent, we adopt the board's finding of misconduct and recommended sanction. We suspend Robertson from

the practice of law for one year and stay that suspension in its entirety on the condition that she engage in no further misconduct.

MISCONDUCT

{¶ 6} From 2018 through 2023, approximately 97 percent of Robertson's practice consisted of representing indigent criminal defendants as court-appointed counsel in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. The remainder of her practice consisted of private criminal-defense work.

{¶ 7} To receive payment for her court-appointed work, Robertson was required to submit the Ohio Public Defender's ("OPD's") standard fee-application form, titled *Motion, Entry and Certification for Appointed Counsel Fees*. Among other things, the form required appointed counsel to identify the client, the case number, the charged offense(s), the judge assigned to the case, the total number of out-of-court and in-court hours worked on the case, and the total fees requested. The form also provided space for the attorney to itemize the dates and hours worked in six-minute increments.

{¶ 8} The form bore the following motion and certification:

> The undersigned having been appointed counsel for the party represented moves the Court for an order approving payment of fees and expenses as indicated in the itemized attachment herein. I certify that I have received no compensation in connection with providing representation in this case other than that described in this motion or which has been approved by the Court in a previous motion, nor have any fees and expenses in this motion been duplicated on any other motion. I, or an attorney under my supervision, have performed all legal services itemized in this motion.

{¶ 9} Robertson was required to sign her name below that certification on each fee application and to provide her address and attorney-registration number. As part of the itemized fee statement, Robertson also was required to certify that the time itemized on the form "was expended in representation of the defendant/party represented."

{¶ 10} Under R.C. 120.33, Ohio counties may pay court-appointed counsel fees that have been approved by the court and then are permitted to seek reimbursement of those fees from OPD. In 2023, OPD audited fee applications that Cuyahoga County submitted for reimbursement during OPD's 2022 fiscal year, which ran from July 1, 2022, to June 30, 2023. We note that the audit encompassed fee applications that Robertson submitted to the county between March 2021 and April 2023. The audit therefore included fee applications that Robertson submitted during three separate fiscal years—2020, 2021, and 2022.

{¶ 11} The audit showed that Robertson certified and filed numerous fee-application forms seeking reimbursement for excessive hours on multiple days. For example, the audit showed that when Robertson's certified fee-application forms were considered together, she had billed more than 24 hours in a day on seven occasions, with her billable hours ranging from 30.1 to 31.6 on four of those days.

{¶ 12} The audit also revealed that Robertson had submitted certified fee-application forms that resulted in her billing between 20 and 24 hours in a day on 20 occasions and between 16 and 19.9 hours in a day on 46 occasions. Further illustrating the irregularities in Robertson's billing, the OPD audit showed that she billed an excessive number of hours over 13 multiday periods, ranging from 50.7[1] hours in a two-day (48-hour) period, to 95.4 hours in a five-day (120-hour) period. In addition to multiple billings of more than 24 hours in a day during those date ranges, Robertson certified on three occasions that she spent at least 10.5 hours and

1. Because of an apparent mathematical error, the stipulations and board report stated that Robertson billed a total of 46.5 hours (when she actually billed 50.7 hours) from October 25 through 26, 2021.

up to 12.1 hours in court on behalf of her clients. However, she stipulated that the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court is open to the public for only eight hours a day, 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday.

{¶ 13} Initially, Robertson was compensated for her court-appointed work at a rate of $50 or $60 an hour depending on whether her work was performed in or out of court. Effective July 1, 2022, the Cuyahoga County Council increased the compensation for court-appointed counsel to $75 an hour for services performed both in and out of court. OPD publishes a maximum allowable fee or "cap rate" for each case that varies depending on the nature of the case and the county in which the case is filed, though attorneys are permitted to file motions for extraordinary fees. *See* Office of the Ohio Public Defender, *County Rate / Cap Maps*, https://opd.ohio.gov/county-resources/county-rate-cap-maps (accessed Sept. 29, 2026) [perma.cc/56KR-FTYW]; Cuyahoga C.P., Gen.Div., Loc.R. 33.0, Part II. The evidence shows that during the period audited by OPD, Robertson filed motions for extraordinary fees in 18 court-appointed cases.

{¶ 14} In September 2023, OPD filed a grievance with relator based on Robertson's billing practices and enclosed copies of the relevant bills, along with a spreadsheet summarizing the results of an audit. Later that month, relator sent Robertson a letter of inquiry along with a copy of the grievance and supporting documentation.

{¶ 15} In her October 2023 response to the letter of inquiry, and in her stipulations and disciplinary-hearing testimony, Robertson stated that she tracked the time she worked on court-appointed cases by hand—instead of using case-management or timekeeping software—and recorded it at the end of every day. She used the court's online calendar or docket and a "personal scheduling journal" to track her in-court time. She also tracked her out-of-court time through notes on individual client folders that identified the task and the corresponding time

notations. At the conclusion of a case, Robertson used the information from those three sources to complete OPD's standard fee-application form.

{¶ 16} Robertson testified that she could not submit a fee application for her court-appointed work until the conclusion of the case—which often took a year or more. If she forgot to write down her in-court time, she would "look back and pretty much figure, just think about what [she had done] that day." Because she relied on the handwritten notes on her client files, her personal scheduling journals, and the court dockets themselves to complete her fee applications, there was no way for her to determine how many hours she billed on a particular day for all her clients.

{¶ 17} In her initial response to the grievance and in her testimony before the panel, Robertson admitted that she downloaded many hours of evidence files while simultaneously working on other matters and that she billed for both tasks. She also acknowledged that her fee applications included billing for work performed by her support staff—including time spent compiling evidence, scheduling meetings, and making telephone calls—even though she certified that all itemized legal services had been performed by herself or an attorney under her supervision.

{¶ 18} Robertson supplemented her response to the letter of inquiry in December 2023. There, she acknowledged that in 2022 she billed more than 24 hours on two days, more than 20 hours on 13 days, and "17+" hours on 33 days. She explained that when she billed more than 17 hours in a day, the billing included time for downloading body-camera videos. She also reiterated that she had been billing for her support staff's time.

{¶ 19} At all times relevant to this proceeding, Section I(F)(1) of the *Standards and Guidelines for Appointed Counsel Reimbursement* promulgated by OPD has expressly stated, "Billing for time worked by the attorney's support staff . . . will not be reimbursed by the OPD." Office of the Ohio Public Defender,

Standards and Guidelines for Appointed Counsel Reimbursement, https://opd.ohio.gov/county-resources/reimbursement/01-standards-and-guidelines/01-standards-guidelines (accessed Sept. 30, 2026) (landing page provides links to January 2019, November 2019, September 2021, and April 2024 versions of standards and guidelines) [perma.cc/9F7Y-TYEU].

{¶ 20} Robertson stipulated that because she had billed for support-staff time, she falsely certified that either she or an attorney under her supervision had performed all the legal services itemized in her fee applications. During her disciplinary hearing, Robertson testified that she had included those services in her fee applications under the mistaken belief that she was permitted to bill for them. With respect to her having double billed, she explained that she had billed for the time it took to download the evidence files—which could take five or six hours—and for the other work that she and her support staff performed while the files were being downloaded to her computer.

{¶ 21} The panel found no reason to believe that Robertson had intentionally overbilled the county. The basis for the panel's finding was twofold. First, the panel found that Robertson had mistakenly believed that she was permitted to bill for the time it took to download evidence from the internet, for the services she performed while evidence was being downloaded, and for the services performed by her support-staff. Second, the panel found that Robertson's inefficient timekeeping and failure to use case-management or timekeeping software to track her billable hours contributed to her excessive daily totals.

{¶ 22} Robertson testified that once she received the public defender's grievance, she stopped including evidence-download and support-staff time on her fee applications. Robertson also testified that she now understands that it was improper to bill for evidence-download time and for support-staff time.

{¶ 23} Acknowledging that she had not been submitting her time properly, and consistent with the restitution approved by this court in *Disciplinary Counsel*

v. McCloskey, 2023-Ohio-3447, Robertson agreed to refund the county for any fees that she received in excess of 16 hours a day for fee applications during the audited period. *See also Disciplinary Counsel v. Paxton*, 2025-Ohio-5220; *Disciplinary Counsel v. Mollica*, 2025-5372; *Disciplinary Counsel v. Collins*, 2025-Ohio-5393.

{¶ 24} The parties and the panel determined that Robertson billed 282.4 hours in excess of 16 hours a day—242.8 hours for work purportedly worked between October 4, 2020, and June 30, 2022, and 39.6 hours for work purportedly performed between July 1, 2022, and September 24, 2022. Multiplying 242.8 by the average rate of $55 an hour for work performed before July 1, 2022, and 39.6 by the rate of $75 an hour for work performed after that date, the parties and the panel determined that Robertson owed Cuyahoga County $16,324 in restitution.

{¶ 25} On October 16, 2025, nearly a month before relator filed his complaint, Robertson provided a cashier's check for $16,324 to her counsel, who deposited the check into his client-trust account. And on December 3, Robertson's counsel sent a client-trust-account check for $16,324 to the Cuyahoga County Fiscal Office.

{¶ 26} In addition, the evidence shows that OPD now operates a free cloud-based billing platform—known as the Court Appointed Billing System or "CABS"—that allows appointed counsel to digitally enter case information, track time, and generate bills for court submission. In February 2026, Robertson completed OPD's one-hour CABS training webinar offered for appointed counsel. She now uses that system to track her time in all court-appointed cases and to generate the fee applications she submits for court approval.

{¶ 27} The parties stipulated and the panel found that Robertson's conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). The board adopted the panel's findings of fact and misconduct.

{¶ 28} We find that there is clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that Robertson violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) by certifying fee applications that were incorrect and inflated because of her inefficient and inaccurate timekeeping practices as well as her practice of billing for the time it took to download evidence from the internet and for time expended by her support staff. We therefore adopt the board's finding of misconduct.

SANCTION

{¶ 29} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. "We are ever mindful that the primary purpose of the disciplinary process is not to punish the offender but to protect the public from lawyers who are unworthy of the trust and confidence essential to the attorney-client relationship." *Columbus Bar Assn. v. Kiesling*, 2010-Ohio-1555, ¶ 44, citing *Disciplinary Counsel v. Agopian*, 2006-Ohio-6510, ¶ 10.

{¶ 30} The parties stipulated and the panel found that one aggravating factor is present in this case—Robertson engaged in a pattern of misconduct. *See* Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(3).

{¶ 31} As for mitigating factors, the parties stipulated and the panel found that Robertson had no prior discipline in her nearly 35 years of practice, made a timely, good-faith effort to make restitution and rectify the consequences of her misconduct, cooperated in the disciplinary proceedings, and presented evidence of her good character and reputation. *See* Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (3), (4), and (5).

{¶ 32} In support of her good character, Robertson submitted 14 letters, 11 from fellow attorneys, one from a retired judge, and two from sitting judges, including Judge Thomas F. O'Malley of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, who also testified on her behalf pursuant to a subpoena. Robertson also presented character testimony from retired Cuyahoga County

Common Pleas Court Judge Brian John Corrigan, and attorney Jacqueline Askew Johnson, a former federal public defender.

{¶ 33} Judge O'Malley testified that he had known Robertson for over 25 years. He noted that she had practiced in his courtroom and described her as "tenacious," "respected," and "feared by the prosecutors." He explained that Robertson would take any case—good or bad—and that she is not afraid to go to trial. Judge O'Malley did not believe that Robertson's misconduct was intentional, and he had no concerns about her ethics or her continuing to practice law. He also expressed his belief that suspending Robertson would be a disservice to the hundreds of people whom she represents.

{¶ 34} Retired Judge Corrigan testified that he had known Robertson since 1993 or 1994 and that she had handled every degree of felony in his courtroom. He recalled a rape case in which Robertson had recorded videos of the area where the alleged crime had taken place and credited her with "show[ing] the spunk and initiative to go the extra mile to represent her client." He explained, "There's only a few attorneys in Cuyahoga County that I'm aware of that are willing to go that extra mile. She [is] one of them." Judge Corrigan testified that he had never anticipated Robertson's "getting into a situation like this [disciplinary matter]," but that it did not change his opinion of her. He concluded by stating that he had no concerns with Robertson continuing to practice law.

{¶ 35} Attorney Johnson testified that she had known Robertson for more than 35 years and that she had mentored Robertson because she noticed that Robertson had a passion for criminal work. Johnson testified about the passion, care, and concern that she observed Robertson put into her work and described her as a "workaholic" who focuses more on her clients and "less on the actual business of the practice." Johnson stated that Robertson "has the highest reputation, and it's well deserved." She expressed no concerns about Robertson's ethics or her continuing to practice law, and she informed the panel, "I think it would be an

injustice to remove Deanna Robertson from the practice of law knowing that she does the difficult work many people choose not to do or are burnt out [on]."

{¶ 36} In determining the appropriate sanction for Robertson's misconduct, the panel recognized that in *Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh*, 1995-Ohio-261, we held, "When an attorney engages in a course of conduct that violates [an ethical rule prohibiting dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation], the attorney will be actually suspended from the practice of law for an appropriate period of time." *Id*. at syllabus. The panel further acknowledged that this court has "not hesitated to impose lesser sanctions in the presence of significant mitigating evidence," *see Disciplinary Counsel v. Proctor*, 2012-Ohio-684, ¶ 18, or "an abundance of mitigating evidence," *see Disciplinary Counsel v. Markijohn*, 2003-Ohio-4129, ¶ 8.

{¶ 37} The panel found that there was an abundance of mitigating evidence present in this case that weighed against the *Fowerbaugh* presumption of an actual suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the panel cited Robertson's full cooperation in the disciplinary proceedings, her prompt payment of restitution, and her implementation of protocols designed to prevent future overbilling. Finding that Robertson poses no risk to her clients and continues to provide competent legal representation, the panel determined that an actual suspension from the practice of law would be a disservice to the individuals in need of qualified counsel.

{¶ 38} The panel factually distinguished this case from five others in which we required attorneys to serve actual time away from the practice of law for overbilling for court-appointed services. Specifically, the panel noted that the other cases involved multiple rule violations—compared to a single rule violation in this case—and that two of the cases involved much greater restitution. *See Disciplinary Counsel v. Holland*, 2005-Ohio-5322 (imposing a one-year suspension on an attorney who violated three ethical rules by inflating his fees by billing each client for the aggregate time he had spent in court for all his clients on a given day

regardless of the time spent on each client's case); *Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson*, 2005-Ohio-5323 (imposing a one-year suspension with six months conditionally stayed on an inexperienced associate for the same misconduct at issue in *Holland*); *Toledo Bar Assn. v. Stahlbush*, 2010-Ohio-3823 (imposing a two-year suspension with one year conditionally stayed for four ethical violations arising from an attorney's failing to keep adequate time records, deceptively inflating fee requests, and merely guessing at the time she had spent on a case); *Dayton Bar Assn. v. Swift*, 2014-Ohio-4835 (imposing a two-year suspension with one year conditionally stayed for five ethical violations arising from an attorney's failing to maintain any contemporaneous time records and billing in half-hour increments, which resulted in a $50,000 restitution order); *Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Robinson*, 2021-Ohio-2123 (imposing a two-year suspension with one year conditionally stayed and a $79,319 restitution order for six ethical violations arising from the attorney's knowingly overbilling for court-appointed work to cover her own medical expenses).

{¶ 39} Instead, the panel determined that four of our more recent decisions—namely *McCloskey*, 2023-Ohio-3447; *Paxton*, 2025-Ohio-5220 (adopting the parties' consent-to-discipline agreement by entry); *Mollica*, 2025-Ohio-5372; and *Collins*, 2025-Ohio-5393—demonstrate that this court will dispense with an actual suspension from the practice of law in appointed-counsel overbilling cases in the presence of significant mitigating evidence. As in this case, the irregular billing in each of those cases was discovered during OPD audits of the attorney's court-appointed-counsel billing and resulted in single violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c). *McCloskey* at ¶ 11-14, 22; *Paxton* board report at ¶ 17-22, 28 (the *Paxton* board report was filed Oct. 6, 2025, in case No. 2025-1318); *Mollica* at ¶ 10-11, 14; *Collins* at ¶ 9-12, 18.

{¶ 40} McCloskey, Paxton, and Collins failed to maintain any contemporaneous records of the time they had spent on any given case. *McCloskey* at ¶ 9; *Paxton* board report at ¶ 14; *Collins* at ¶ 8. When it came time to prepare

their fee applications, they used the case dockets and other documents such as their notes, emails, telephone records, and text messages, to estimate the time they had spent on a particular case. *McCloskey* at ¶ 9-10; *Paxton* board report at ¶ 15; *Collins* at ¶ 8. Mollica used a software program to record his time, though like the others, he sometimes had to estimate the time he had spent working for each client by reviewing records such as case dockets or emails to estimate the time he had spent on a task. *Mollica* at ¶ 5. His bills had also been inaccurate because the software program he had used to track his time automatically inserted the date that the data was entered and Mollica had sometimes forgotten to manually change it to the correct date. *Id*. at ¶ 6.

{¶ 41} McCloskey, Mollica, and Collins also billed the same amount of "in-court" time for many clients regardless of the actual time that they were in court on a specific client's behalf—a practice that was not employed in this case. *McCloskey* at ¶ 13; *Mollica* at ¶ 11; *Collins* at ¶ 9. The overbilling at issue in *McCloskey*, *Paxton*, *Mollica*, and *Collins* was found to have been the result of sloppy recordkeeping rather than an intent to deceive the court. *McCloskey* at ¶ 18; *Paxton* board report at ¶ 25; *Mollica* at ¶ 12; *Collins* at ¶ 13. In this case, Robertson's overbilling also arose from her mistaken belief that her billing practices were permissible.

{¶ 42} The aggravating and mitigating factors in each of those four cases were nearly identical to those present here, with the most significant differences being the number of character letters submitted (here, letters from two judges, one former judge, and 11 attorneys)—and the fact that Robertson also had three character witnesses testify on her behalf. *McCloskey* at ¶ 24 (letters from three judges, one former judge, and two attorneys); *Paxton* board report at ¶ 31-32 (letters from 12 attorneys and three laypersons); *Mollica* at ¶ 16 (letters from one judge, one magistrate, 36 attorneys, and one layperson); *Collins* at ¶ 20 (letters from three attorneys and one judge).

{¶ 43} To aid in comparing the facts of this case to those of *McCloskey*, *Paxton*, *Mollica*, and *Collins*, the details of each attorney's overbilling, the restitution paid, and the sanction imposed for each attorney's misconduct are set forth in the table below:

Case	**Days over 24 hours**	**Days between 20-24 hours**	**Days between 16-19.9 hours**	**Total hours over 16**	**Restitution Total**	**Sanction**
McCloskey[2]	3	13	22	128.6 (over 2 audited years)	$6,430	One year, stayed
Paxton[3]	2	8	18	93.6 (over 1 audited year)	$4,212	One year, stayed
Mollica[4]	10	8	24	185.4 (over 1 audited year)	$10,197	One year, stayed

2. *McCloskey* at ¶ 11, 16, 19, 38.

3. *Paxton* board report at ¶ 18, 19, 26; *Paxton*, 2025-Ohio-5220.

4. *Mollica* at ¶ 10, 13, 25.

Collins[5]	4	34	110	365 (over 2 audited years)	$22,810[6]	Two years, stayed
Robertson	7	20	46	282.4 (over 2+ audited years)	$16,324	TBD

{¶ 44} Robertson's overbilling and the restitution she paid as a consequence of that misconduct falls between that of Mollica on the lower end and Collins on the higher end, with Robertson having the second highest numbers in each category. While Mollica owed just $6,127 less in restitution than Robertson, all his overbilling occurred during a single audited billing year rather than the two years at issue in this case and *Collins*. *Mollica* at ¶ 10, 13. Moreover, Robertson had more than twice as many days on which she billed 20 to 24 hours as Mollica had. *Mollica* at ¶ 10. But when compared to Robertson, Collins had more than twice as many days on which he billed between 16 and 19.9 hours and 1.7 times as many days on which he billed 20 to 24 hours. Further, Collins owed roughly 40 percent more restitution than Robertson.

{¶ 45} After conducting a numerical analysis of *McCloskey*, *Paxton*, *Mollica*, and *Collins*, and considering the distinctive aspects of Robertson's billing practices, the panel accepted the parties' stipulated sanction and recommended that we impose an 18-month stayed suspension for Robertson's misconduct. The panel found that that sanction appropriately aligned with the sanction continuum

5. *Collins* at ¶ 9, 11, 15-16, 31.

6. The amount of restitution paid by Collins represented a compromise between the $19,695.50 calculated by OPD and the $25,925 calculated by the relator. *Collins* at ¶ 15-16.

established in recent court-appointed-billing matters—falling halfway between the one-year stayed suspension we imposed in *McCloskey*, *Paxton*, and *Mollica* and the two-year stayed suspension we imposed in *Collins*.

{¶ 46} The board, however, emphasized the evidence of Robertson's good character and reputation, her timely payment of restitution, and the low probability that Robertson would repeat her misconduct to support its recommendation that Robertson be suspended for one year and that the suspension be stayed in its entirety.

{¶ 47} Based on the foregoing, we adopt the board's recommended sanction and find that a fully stayed one-year suspension is sufficient to protect the public from further misconduct.

CONCLUSION

{¶ 48} Accordingly, Deanna Robertson is hereby suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one year, with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that she engage in no further misconduct. If Robertson fails to comply with the condition of the stay, the stay will be revoked and she will serve the entire one-year suspension. Costs are taxed to Robertson.

Judgment accordingly.

Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Michelle A. Hall, Chief Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.

Amundsen Davis, L.L.C., Larry H. James, and Marissa R. Borschke, for respondent.