

**IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO**

STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellant vs. DIAMOND KING Defendant-Appellee	: : : : :	NO. 2024-1608 On Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals, Eighth Appellate District Court of Appeals Case Number C.A. Case Nos. 114215 114317
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**MERIT BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE HAMILTON COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S
OFFICE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT STATE OF OHIO**

CONNIE PILLICH (69968P)
Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney

NORBERT WESSELS (00100290P)
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
230 East Ninth Street, Suite 4000
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
(513) 946-3109
Norbert.Wessels@hcpros.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae, Hamilton
County Prosecutor's Office

CULLEN SWEENEY (0077187)
Cuyahoga County Public Defender

FRANCIS CAVALLO (0073428)
Assistant Public Defender
c/o 310 Lakeside Avenue, 2nd Floor
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
jmartin@cuyahogacounty.us

Counsel for Appellee, Diamond King

MICHAEL C. O'MALLEY (0059592)
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor

DANIEL T. VAN (0084614)
MICHAEL R. WAJDA (0100356)
Assistant Cuyahoga County Prosecutors

The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
DVan@prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us

Counsel for Appellant, State of Ohio

Other counsel on certificate of service

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STATEMENT OF AMICUS INTEREST

The Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney's Office is dedicated to effectively representing the citizens of Hamilton County. Through its efforts on behalf of the citizens of Hamilton County, the office strives to limit the impact of violent crime by aggressively prosecuting violent criminals. It is a central goal of the Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney's Office to provide compassionate assistance to victims of crime. The Appellant's appeal implicates the reviewability of a trial court's decision to overturn a jury verdict of "guilty" pursuant to Crim. R. 29(C). This Court's decision will have a direct impact on the citizens of Hamilton County.

More specifically, the instant appeal directly impacts the appealability of the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court's judgement in *State of Ohio v. Damico Taylor*, Hamilton C.P. No. B-2401476, First District Court of Appeals No. C-250046. In that case, the Hamilton County Prosecutor's Office submitted a Motion in Support of Jurisdiction to this Court under case no. 2025-0439 after its appeal of an erroneous application of Crim. R. 29(C) was dismissed by the appellate court pursuant to *State ex rel. Yates v. Court of Appeals*, 32 Ohio St.3d 30 (1987) (Ex. A-1).

On April 4, 2024, Damico Taylor was indicted on multiple criminal counts including: Rape, Kidnapping, Abduction, Gross Sexual Imposition, Domestic Violence, two counts of Endangering Children, and Aggravated Menacing. On the night of March 23, 2024, M.T.—Taylor's ex-wife—went to pick up their two children from Taylor's residence.¹ After M.T. had placed the children in the vehicle, Taylor forced his way into the car and demanded M.T. drive

¹ Notwithstanding its appeal of the matter, the Hamilton County Prosecutor's office acknowledges that Taylor has been acquitted by the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas of all criminal behavior. For the purpose of expressing the allegations of the victim, Hamilton County reiterates the fact pattern presented by M.T. through her trial testimony, utilized by the jury in rendering a final verdict of "guilty."

him to an A.T.M. With the children in the back, Taylor—smelling of alcohol and in possession of a firearm—began to physically and sexually assault M.T., abandoning the idea of the A.T.M. and telling M.T. he wanted her to go back to his apartment to have sex with him. Fearful for her life and the lives of her children, M.T. drove the children to her parents' house. As she began to bring the children inside, Taylor threatened to kill her if she failed to return—demanding that she leave her phone in the vehicle. Once inside, M.T. called the police with her parents' phone. By the time police arrived, Taylor had fled, taking M.T.'s phone and abandoning it in a neighbor's backyard.

During a trial in December of 2024, M.T. testified to the jury. The jury believed her. Taylor was found guilty by a jury on all above charges and attending firearm specifications. Thereafter, on December 7, 2024, Taylor filed a *Defendant's Motion for Rule 29(C) Judgment of Acquittal*. Taylor's Rule 29(C) motion focused exclusively on the credibility of M.T.'s testimony. The matter came before the trial court on January 13, 2025 for oral arguments on the motion. (Ex. A-2).

A Crim.R. 29(C) motion is typically a question of legal sufficiency. "On review for sufficiency, courts are to assess not whether the state's evidence is to be believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant would support a conviction." *State v. Thompson*, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390 (1997) (Cook, J., concurring). Despite referencing the deference paid to the State on a Crim.R. 29(A) motion made "mid-trial," the trial court seemed to believe that a Crim.R. 29(C) motion required a different standard of review. In contradiction to the well-settled law, the trial court applied the incorrect standard:

I was, quite frankly, stunned when they convicted him on all charges solely based on conflicting testimony from the victim. And if that's the case *and the scales aren't tipped in favor of the State*, you can't convict - - especially on crimes like this that will impose mandatory jail time.

(Ex. A-2 at 7) (emphasis added). The trial court showed no deference to the State's evidence, and refused to weigh that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. *State v. Jenks*, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 279, (1991). Instead, the trial court conducted its own *de novo* review of the evidence, finding—in direct conflict with the judgment of the jury—that the victim was not credible. On January 17, 2025, the trial court granted Taylor's motion and dismissed the charges against him, pursuant to Crim. R. 29(C). (Ex. A-3)

On January 30, 2025, the State filed a *Motion for Leave to Appeal* pursuant to App.R. 9(C) and R.C. 2945.67. On March 13, 2025, the First District entered an *Entry Denying State's Motion for Leave and Dismissing Appeal* holding that—pursuant to *Yates*—the court lacked discretion to grant the State's motion for leave. (Ex. A-1).

This case represents a stunning perversion of the goals of our justice system. A jury of Hamilton County citizens believed M.T. They found her credible and accordingly found Taylor guilty of threatening her, hitting her, and—ultimately—raping her, endangering her life and the lives of their two children. Why the trial court did not believe M.T. is unclear and—frankly—irrelevant. The law ordinarily does not permit a single individual's credibility determination to overthrow the judgement of the jury. Here, a single individual has. A common pleas judge has overstepped the bounds of her authority, supplanted herself as the trier-of-fact, and robbed M.T. of justice. Now—because of *Yates*—it does not matter how blatant this judicial overreach was. The grant of Taylor's Crim. R. 29(C) motion is unreviewable. That should not be the law in Ohio. This case presents this Court with the opportunity to correct this miscarriage of justice.

The Hamilton County Prosecutor stands with Appellant and the other Amicus Curiae: the application of *Yates* invites judicial unaccountability, public controversy, and injustice. The overturning of the verdict of a jury of citizens cannot be without review. Appellate review of

post-verdict judgements of acquittal under Crim.R. 29(B) and (C) vindicate the policy purpose of R.C. 2945.67 and restores, promotes, and preserves public confidence in the judicial system without violating constitutional protections against double jeopardy under U.S. Const., Amend. V and Ohio Const., Art. I §10.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

Hamilton County adopts by reference the statement of facts provided in Appellant State of Ohio's Merit Brief.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITIONS OF LAW

Proposition of Law No. 1: A trial court's judgment of acquittal entered pursuant to Crim. R. 29(B) following a jury's guilty verdict is not a "final verdict" within the meaning of R.C. 2945.67(A) and does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions

Hamilton County endorses and adopts by reference all arguments separately submitted by Appellant, the Ohio Attorney General, the Ohio Prosecuting Attorney's Association, and the Logan County Prosecutor's office. Hamilton County submits the following to be considered in tandem with those arguments.

Stare Decisis, Marsy's Law, and the Rights of Victims

The doctrine of stare decisis is designed to provide continuity and predictability in our legal system. We adhere to stare decisis as a means of thwarting the arbitrary administration of justice as well as providing a clear rule of law by which the citizenry can organize their affairs. *Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd.* 43 Ohio St.3d 1, 4-5 (1989). "However, a supreme court not only has the right, but is entrusted with the duty to examine its former decisions and, when reconciliation is impossible, to discard its former errors." *Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis*, 2003-Ohio-5849, ¶ 43. Thus, in Ohio, a prior decision of the Supreme Court may be overruled where (1) the decision was wrongly decided at that time, or *changes in circumstances no longer justify*

continued adherence to the decision, (2) the decision defies practical workability, and (3) abandoning the precedent would not create an undue hardship for those who have relied upon it. *Id.* at ¶ 48 (emphasis added).

To the extent that Appellant challenges and requests that this Court overrule *Yates*, Hamilton County joins Appellant and the supporting Amicus Curiae. *Yates* was wrongly decided, defies practical workability, and abandoning *Yates* would not create an undue hardship for those who have relied upon it. Specifically, Hamilton County wishes to highlight a significant change in circumstances that undercuts reliance on *Yates*: the amendment of the Ohio Constitution and adoption of Marsy’s Law.

Article I, §10a of the Ohio Constitution, as amended by “Marsy’s Law” in 2017, provides for the constitutional rights of victims: “To secure for victims justice and due process throughout the criminal and juvenile justice systems, a victim shall have the following rights, which shall be protected in a manner no less vigorous than the rights afforded to the accused.” As noted by this Court, the express purpose of the amendment—adopted by Ohio voters—was to secure for victims “due process, respect, fairness, and justice” in the criminal-justice system. See *State v. Fisk*, 2022-Ohio-4435, ¶ 7. Given the constitutional enshrinement of these protected rights, unquestioning reliance on *Yates* would amount to a denial of the right to due process, fairness, and justice for victims. Undoubtedly, direct consideration of the *defendant’s* constitutional rights was fundamental to the holding in *Yates*, 32 Ohio St.3d 30 (1987). Missing from that analysis, though, was any consideration of the rights of victims impacted by the decision.

Since *Yates*, the legal rights of victims in Ohio has changed. Beyond the other enumerated rights, Ohio Const. Art. I §10a(B) now specifically provides victims with the right to “petition the court of appeals” in any criminal case “in which the victim’s rights are implicated”

where relief for the violation of constitutional rights is sought and denied. See *Fisk*, *supra*; R.C. 2930.19 (codification of victim right to appeal). Additionally, Ohio law anticipates the extension of victim rights throughout and following a successful appeal process. R.C. 2930.15. Accordingly, this Court's decision on appellate reviewability, as it relates to the grant of a Crim.R. 29(B) or (C) motion, will directly impact Ohio victims under the protection of Marsy's law. For that reason, general principles of stare decisis support review of *Yates*.

Consider, for example, the Alaskan Supreme Court's reconsideration of their *ab initio* doctrine espoused in *Hartwell v. State*, 423 P.2d 282, 283 (Alaska 1967) in the case of *State v. Carlin*, 249 P.3d 752 (Alaska 2011). In conducting a review of the principals of stare decisis, the Alaskan Supreme Court noted that, in 1994, Alaska's voters overwhelmingly approved the Rights of Victims of Crime Amendment to the Alaska Constitution. *Id.* at 758; See Alaska Const. Art. I § 24. Considering the shifted legal landscape, the Alaskan Supreme Court held that "Alaska's statutes and its constitution now also require the criminal justice system to accommodate the rights of crime victims. The abatement of criminal convictions has important implications for these rights. Therefore, the expansion and codification of victims' rights since *Hartwell* provides the changed conditions needed to satisfy the first element of the test for overruling precedent." *Carlin* at 759.

The same result was reached in *Payton v. State*, 266 So.3d 630, 640 (Miss.2019), in which the Mississippi Supreme Court overturned *Gollott v. State*, 646 So. 2d 1297, 1299 (Miss. 1994), citing Mississippi's later adoption of Miss. Const., Art. 3 §26A and the 1998 Mississippi Crime Victim's Bill of Rights. *Payton* at 634.

In the decades since *Gollott* departed from established precedent, our Constitution and state law were amended to recognize victims' rights. The landscape has changed to protect victims from being traumatized again. Since our Constitution was amended and the Crime Victims' Bill of Rights was enacted, we have not had

the opportunity to address a motion for abatement *ab initio*. Good cause exists today to do so.

* * *

Because of the increased recognition of crime victims in both our Constitution and statutory law, we find that departure from the abatement *ab initio* doctrine is necessary to avoid the perpetuation of pernicious error. The abatement *ab initio* doctrine tramples upon victims' rights by denying victims fairness, respect and dignity. Moreover, we find that the policies undergirding stare decisis—consistency and definiteness in the law—are not served by continued application of the abatement *ab initio* doctrine.

Id. at 637-640 (internal citations omitted). In both cases, the Supreme Courts of Alaska and Mississippi recognized the adoption of constitutional and statutory rights for victims as fundamental to the examination of stare decisis. In deciding whether to overturn previous decisions, the enshrined rights of victims could not be ignored. The same result should be reached here. As in these cases, the constitutional and statutory rights for victims places the *King* case in a substantially different legal landscape than in *Yates*.

Stare decisis is not an “inexorable command.” *Payne v. Tennessee*, 501 U.S. 808, 828, (1991). Our Constitution is founded on the fundamental principle that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people.” Ohio Const. Art. I § 2. To that end, the people have spoken: victim rights *must* be safeguarded as vicariously as those of the defendant. The *Yates* court provided no consideration for victim rights, because, at the time, they were not constitutionally protected. Marsy’s Law, therefore, represents a change in circumstances, such that Ohio can no longer tolerate continued adherence to *Yates*. This appeal provides the Court with an opportunity to consider the impact of the *Yates* decision on victim rights, and—in accordance with those rights—reverse course.

CONCLUSION

The Hamilton County Prosecutor's office stands firm in its support for the victims of Ohio's crimes. Current interpretation under *State ex rel. Yates v. Court of Appeals*, 32 Ohio St. 3d (1987) prohibits review of post-verdict Crim. R. 29(B) and (C) motions. Its holding creates an absurd result whereby prosecutors and victims are unable to seek justice for the erroneous decision of a trial court overturning the verdict of a jury. As long as *Yates* stands, victims like M.T. must accept that such decisions are destined to stand, to be used to shield their abusers from accountability, and to deny them justice. The justices on this Court are charged with guarding this state's constitution. "Because our Constitution balances the rights of the accused with the rights of the victim, we—as guardians of the Constitution—can do no less." *Payton*, 266 So.3d 630, 641 (Miss.2019).

The jury's verdict is the final verdict. Appellate review of a Crim. R. 29(B) or (C) rulings—regardless of the outcome—ensures fairness for both parties and promotes public trust in the judicial system. Accordingly, the Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney joins the Appellant in asking the Court to overrule *Yates*.

Respectfully,

Connie Pillich, 69968P
Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney

_____/s/Norbert Wessels_____
Norbert Wessels, 00100290P
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
230 East Ninth Street, Suite 4000
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
Phone: (513) 946-3109
Norbert.Wessels@hcpros.org

Attorney for Amicus Curiae, Hamilton
County Prosecutor's Office

PROOF OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on this day April 10, 2025, I have sent a copy of the foregoing by email to the following counsel of record:

Francis Cavallo – FCavallo@CuyahogaCounty.us
Counsel for Appellee Diamond King

Daniel Van – Dvan@prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us
Counsel for Appellant State of Ohio

T. Elliot Gaiser – Thomas.Gaiser@OhioAGO.gov
Counsel for Amicus Curiae, Ohio General Dave Yost

Steven L. Taylor – Taylor@Ohiopa.org
Counsel for Amicus Curiae, Ohio Prosecuting Attorney Assn.

Nathan L. Yohey – Nathan.Yohey@logancountyohio.gov
Counsel for Amicus Curiae, Logan County Prosecutor's Office

_____/s/Norbert Wessels
Norbert Wessels, 00100290P
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney

EXHIBIT

A-1

ENTERED
MAR 13 2025

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

: APPEAL NO. C-250046
: TRIAL NO. B-2401476

V.

DAMICO TAYLOR,
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

: ENTRY DENYING
: STATE'S MOTION FOR LEAVE
: AND DISMISSING APPEAL

This case is before the Court on the State of Ohio's motion for leave to file an appeal, filed on January 30, 2025. Defendant-appellee timely filed a response on March 3, 2025.

Citing App.R. 5(C) and R.C. 2945.67, the State seeks leave to appeal the trial court's decision granting defendant-appellee Taylor's Crim.R. 29(C) post-verdict motion for acquittal on eight criminal counts. In *State ex rel. Yates v. Court of Appeals*, 32 Ohio St.3d 30 (1987), the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that "a judgment of acquittal by a trial judge pursuant to Crim. R. 29(C) is a final verdict within the meaning of R.C. 2945.67(A), and is not appealable by the state as a matter of right or by leave to appeal pursuant to that statute." *Id.* at 33. In view of this binding precedent, we have no discretion to grant the State's motion for leave. The motion is denied and the appeal is dismissed. Costs taxed in accordance with App.R. 24.

ZAYAS, P.J., BOCK and MOORE, JJ.

To the clerk:

Enter upon the journal of the court on MAR 13 2025.


By: Ginger S. Bock
Judge

(Copies sent to all counsel)



D144238045

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO



STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

DAMICO TAYLOR,
Defendant.

CASE NO. B2401476
APPEAL NO. C2500046
VOLUME 4 of 4

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FOR PURPOSES OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES:

Elizabeth Polston, Esq.

On behalf of the State

Brian Goldberg, Esq.

On behalf of the Defendant

BE IT REMEMBERED that upon the
hearing of this cause on Monday, January 13,
2025, before the Honorable Leslie Ghiz, a judge
of the said court, the following proceedings
were had, to wit:

1 PROCEEDINGS, Monday, January 13, 2025

2 - - -

3 THE COURT: State of Ohio versus
4 Damico Taylor, Case Number B2401476.
5 Mr. Taylor is present. He is represented
6 by Mr. Goldberg, and Ms. Polston is here
7 on behalf of the State of Ohio.

8 This was a case that was tried to a
9 jury probably about six weeks ago, maybe
10 eight weeks ago, and the jury found
11 Mr. Taylor guilty on all counts that were
12 in front of them.

13 I asked for a PSI. I had asked for
14 a victim's impact before I sentenced
15 Mr. Taylor, and in the meantime
16 Mr. Goldberg filed a Motion for a
17 Rule 29(C) judgment of acquittal. And
18 today is the day we set to, at least, at
19 a minimum, hear that motion.

20 So since it's your motion.
21 Mr. Goldberg, you can go ahead.

22 MR. GOLDBERG: Thank you.

23 I did file a motion. I will be
24 brief because all of my points, I
25 believe, are highlighted in the motion.

1 But I think the Court heard the
2 testimony in this case, and, as the Court
3 knows, if he is sent to prison, he is
4 convicted of these, the Court has to
5 impose a minimum of six years in prison,
6 which I think really would be a complete
7 travesty, honestly.

8 The Court heard the evidence. In
9 my opinion, there was not even close to
10 proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
11 Damico Taylor committed these offenses.

12 It was based off of the testimony
13 of one single witness who had material
14 inconsistencies in her testimony. Her
15 testimony was very much different from
16 the 911 call that she made on the night
17 in question.

18 There were two children who were in
19 the car when this entire incident
20 occurred. They were not interviewed by
21 law enforcement. They were not taken to
22 the Mayerson Center.

23 There was no investigation done by
24 law enforcement whatsoever. I'm not
25 going to point fingers or place blame on

1 anybody, but this was initially just
2 investigated by a road officer from
3 Springfield Township.

4 I think he had talked about how he
5 was maybe going to send it to a
6 detective. The detective did not take it
7 on, do any sort of further investigation.

8 But, really, I think it's a
9 miscarriage of justice for Mr. Taylor to
10 be sitting here convicted of these
11 charges.

12 The Court heard the evidence. If
13 there ever was a time for a Rule 29(C)
14 motion to be granted it's right here.

15 Mr. Taylor does not deserve to be
16 convicted of these offenses. The
17 evidence simply was not there.

18 I know there were two or three
19 court observers who were here who worked
20 for Judge Sanders; and, quite frankly,
21 didn't see the entire trial, but they
22 heard most of it. They were shocked to
23 hear he was convicted of this. They
24 thought it would be a very quick not
25 guilty verdict.

1 So, as we sit here today, I believe
2 the Court should grant the Rule 29(C)
3 motion for acquittal. The evidence
4 wasn't there, and I think the Court
5 hopefully agrees with me based on the
6 testimony we heard; one witness, very
7 inconsistent testimony, just not
8 sufficient evidence.

9 We believe the Court should grant
10 my motion on all counts.

11 THE COURT: Thank you.

12 Ms. Polston, in response.

13 MS. POLSTON: Judge, this Court
14 gave the jury the instruction that if you
15 believe the testimony of one witness
16 that's enough to find beyond a reasonable
17 doubt.

18 As you know, these crimes are
19 intimate crimes. They don't happen in
20 front of a bunch of people. Megan Taylor
21 was the witness who was in the best
22 position to explain to the Court what she
23 felt in the car ride that day; that she
24 knew that he had penetrated her vagina
25 and she knew that he was grabbing her

1 breasts.

2 She was also in the best position
3 to be able to tell the Court that a gun
4 was pointed at her.

5 I think that the jury heard her
6 testimony, and I think that they believed
7 her.

8 Mr. Goldberg had an opportunity to
9 cross-examine her and bring out
10 inconsistencies, and at the end of the
11 day they found Mr. Taylor guilty of
12 everything.

13 I think that this case was tried to
14 the jury, and the jury's verdict should
15 stand.

16 THE COURT: Okay.

17 Anything further, Mr. Goldberg?

18 MR. GOLDBERG: No.

19 THE COURT: So this one has kept me
20 up for -- since trial for the exact
21 reasons Mr. Goldberg stated. I watched
22 all the evidence at the same time that
23 the jury did.

24 And I always give the Rule 29
25 benefit to the State, obviously, to let

1 them proceed -- when that is asked mid
2 trial -- to let them proceed with
3 presenting their case.

4 The State needs to prove to the
5 jurors, as well as the Court, beyond a
6 reasonable doubt that the charges are
7 valid and a guilty verdict is necessary.

8 For whatever reason, I feel in my
9 opinion based on what I saw -- in 12
10 years of doing this it's the first time
11 it's happened -- the jury lost its way.

12 I was, quite frankly, stunned when
13 they convicted him on all charges solely
14 based on conflicting testimony from the
15 victim.

16 And if that's the case and the
17 scales aren't tipped in favor of the
18 State you can't convict -- especially on
19 crimes like this that will impose
20 mandatory jail time to a defendant.

21 So I'm going to grant the
22 defendant's motion for Rule 29(C). I'm
23 going to acquit the defendant of all
24 charges and just say I'm as stunned as
25 everybody else is that it affected me

1 this way, but I sat here and watched all
2 of it the same as the jury did, and how
3 they came to the conclusion they did I
4 have no idea. I didn't speak with them
5 about the case so I don't really know
6 what they were thinking.

7 So that's where we are. That's my
8 decision. I will get a written statement
9 or entry out as soon as possible.

10 MR. GOLDBERG: Thank you. May he
11 be released off of electronic monitoring?

12 THE COURT: Yes, he can get off of
13 EMD.

14 Mr. Taylor, I would suggest that
15 you figure out a way with regard to your
16 children to setting up any kind of
17 visitation outside their mother.

18 I would maybe have your folks --
19 your parents are here, maybe have your
20 parents -- because you're just asking for
21 an issue if not.

22 MR. GOLDBERG: Thank you, Judge.

23 - - -

CERTIFICATE


I, Gina M. Zaffiro, RMR, the undersigned, an Official Court Reporter for the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, do hereby certify that at the same time and place stated herein, I recorded in stenotype from audio recording and thereafter transcribed pages 403-416 that the foregoing Transcript of Proceedings is a true, complete, and accurate transcript of my said stenotype notes.


Gina M. Zaffiro
Gina M. Zaffiro, RMR
Official Court Reporter
Court of Common Pleas
Hamilton County, Ohio



THE STATE OF OHIO, HAMILTON COUNTY
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

date: 01/13/2025
code: GEG2
judge: 269




Judge: LESLIE GHIZ

NO: B 2401476

STATE OF OHIO
VS.
DAMICO TAYLOR

ENTRY GRANTING MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL AS
TO CRIMINAL RULE 29

This cause came on this day to be heard and at the conclusion of the State's case, defendant moved for a Judgment of Acquittal of the offense of
count 6: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 2919-25A/ORCN, M1

count 9: AGGRAVATED MENACING, 2903-21A/ORCN, M1

count 3: ABDUCTION (DISMISS SPEC #1, #2), 2905-02B1/ORCN, F3



count 1: RAPE (DISMISS SPEC #1, #2), 2907-02A2/ORCN, F1

count 4: GROSS SEXUAL IMPOSITION (DISMISS SPEC #1, #2), 2907-05A1/ORCN, F4

count 2: KIDNAPPING (DISMISS SPEC #1, #2), 2905-01A4/ORCN, F1

count 5: ROBBERY (DISMISS SPEC #1, #2), 2911-02A1/ORCN, F2

count 7: ENDANGERING CHILDREN, 2919-22A/ORCN, M1

count 8: ENDANGERING CHILDREN, 2919-22A/ORCN, M1
of the Indictment, and the Court upon consideration thereof, finds that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense and accordingly the motion is granted.

WHEREFORE, THE COURT ORDERS that the Defendant is acquitted of the offense of
count 6: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 2919-25A/ORCN, M1

count 9: AGGRAVATED MENACING, 2903-21A/ORCN, M1

count 3: ABDUCTION (DISMISS SPEC #1, #2), 2905-02B1/ORCN, F3

count 1: RAPE (DISMISS SPEC #1, #2), 2907-02A2/ORCN, F1

count 4: GROSS SEXUAL IMPOSITION (DISMISS SPEC #1, #2), 2907-05A1/ORCN, F4

**THE STATE OF OHIO, HAMILTON COUNTY
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS**

date: 01/13/2025
code: GEG2
judge: 269

Judge: **LESLIE GHIZ**

NO: B 2401476

**STATE OF OHIO
VS.
DAMICO TAYLOR**

**ENTRY GRANTING MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL AS
TO CRIMINAL RULE 29**

count 2: KIDNAPPING (DISMISS SPEC #1, #2), 2905-01A4/ORCN, F1

count 5: ROBBERY (DISMISS SPEC #1, #2), 2911-02A1/ORCN, F2

count 7: ENDANGERING CHILDREN, 2919-22A/ORCN, M1

**count 8: ENDANGERING CHILDREN, 2919-22A/ORCN, M1
of the Indictment.**

Criminal Rule 29 (A)