Supreme Court of Ohio Clerk of Court - Filed August 15, 2017 - Case No. 2017-0752

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

In the Matter of the Application Seeking Approval of Ohio Power Company's Proposal to Enter into an Affiliate Power Purchase Agreement for Inclusion in the Power Purchase Agreement Rider.	)))))	Case No. 17-0752 On Appeal from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
In the Matter of the Application of Ohio Power Company for Approval of Certain Accounting Authority.	)))	Case No. 14-1693-EL-RDR, 14-1694-EL-AAM

APPENDIX TO THE MERIT BRIEF OF APPELLANT THE OFFICE OF THE OHIO CONSUMERS' COUNSEL VOLUME II

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BEFORE

THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

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The Commission finds:

(1) Ohio Power Company d/b/a AEP Ohio (AEP Ohio or the Company)[1] is a public utility as defined in R.C. 4905.02, and, as such, is subject to the jurisdiction of this Commission.

(2) On December 20, 2013, AEP Ohio filed an application for a standard service offer (SSO), in the form of an electric security plan (ESP), pursuant to R.C. 4928.143.

(3) On February 25, 2015, the Commission issued its Opinion and Order, approving AEP Ohio's proposed ESP, with certain modifications (ESP 3 Order).

(4) R.C. 4903.10 states that any party who has entered an appearance in a Commission proceeding may apply for a rehearing with respect to any matters determined therein by filing an application within 30 days after the entry of the order upon the Commission's journal.

(5) On March 26, 2015, the Ohio Hospital Association filed an application for rehearing of the ESP 3 Order. On March 27, 2015, applications for rehearing were filed by Ohio Partners for Affordable Energy (OPAE) and Appalachian Peace and Justice Network (APJN) (jointly, OPAE/APJN); Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU-Ohio); Interstate Gas Supply, Inc. (IGS); Ohio Manufacturers' Association Energy Group (OMAEG); Constellation NewEnergy, Inc. and Exelon Generation, LLC (jointly, Constellation); AEP Ohio; Ohio Consumers' Counsel (OCC); Environmental Law & Policy Center, Ohio Environmental Council, and Environmental Defense Fund (collectively, Environmental Advocates); and Retail Energy Supply Association (RESA). Memoranda contra the various applications for rehearing were filed by Direct Energy Services, LLC and Direct Energy Business, LLC (jointly, Direct Energy), OPAE/APJN, Environmental Advocates, IEU-Ohio, Ohio Energy Group (OEG), OMAEG,

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[1] On March 7, 2012, the Commission approved and confirmed the merger of Columbus Southern Power Company (CSP) into Ohio Power Company (OP). *In re Ohio Power Co. and Columbus Southern Power Co.*, Case No. 10-2376-EL-UNC, Entry (Mar. 7, 2012).

FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., IGS, OCC, AEP Ohio, RESA, and Constellation on April 6, 2015.

(6) By Entry on Rehearing dated April 22, 2015, the Commission granted rehearing for further consideration of the matters specified in the applications for rehearing.

(7) The Commission has reviewed and considered all of the arguments raised in the applications for rehearing, with the exception of arguments pertaining to the power purchase agreement (PPA) rider, which, as discussed further below, will be addressed by subsequent entry. Any argument unrelated to the PPA rider that was raised on rehearing and that is not specifically discussed herein has been thoroughly and adequately considered by the Commission and should be denied.

I. POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENT RIDER

(8) In the ESP 3 Order, the Commission concluded that a PPA met the requirements of R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d) to be included in an ESP and authorized the establishment of the PPA rider mechanism, as a zero placeholder rider. However, after thoroughly considering the record evidence, the Commission found the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation (OVEC) PPA would not provide a sufficiently beneficial financial hedge, or other commensurate benefits, to AEP Ohio's customers to justify approval of the OVEC PPA. Further, the Commission offered factors that the Commission will consider, but not be bound by, in its evaluation of future requests for a PPA. ESP 3 Order at 22-27.

(9) Several parties filed applications for rehearing requesting reconsideration of the ESP 3 Order regarding the PPA. In consideration of the PPA, the Commission acknowledged the considerable uncertainty with respect to pending PJM Interconnection, LLC (PJM) market reform proposals, environmental regulations, and federal litigation. ESP 3 Order at 24. Thus, the Commission acknowledges the potential impact of these matters on the financial needs of generating plants and on grid reliability. The Commission

will continue to closely monitor developments in these matters.

PJM's Capacity Performance filing is currently pending before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in Docket ER15-623 (Capacity Performance Docket). On April 24, 2015, in FERC Docket ER15-1470, FERC approved PJM's request for waiver to delay the 2015 base residual auction until 30 to 75 days after the FERC issues its order on the merits of the Capacity Performance proposal, but by no later than the week of August 10-14, 2015.[2] Additionally, PJM proposes to conduct voluntary Capacity Performance Transitional Incremental Auctions (Transitional Incremental Auctions) for existing Generation Capacity Resources to convert to Capacity Performance resources for the 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 delivery years. *PJM Interconnection, LLC,* Capacity Performance Docket (Dec. 12, 2014) at 27-31. The requested PPA overlaps with the delivery years of the proposed Transitional Incremental Auctions. Additionally, we hereby take administrative notice of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's pending Clean Power Plan. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,829 (June 18, 2014). As proposed, the rule would limit carbon dioxide emissions from generating units. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is expected to release its final rule in the summer of 2015.

(10) As noted above, on April 22, 2015, the Commission granted rehearing for further consideration of all assignments of error, including those relating to the PPA. This Commission will defer ruling on the assignments of error related to the PPA at this time. However, while the Commission does not in this Second Entry on Rehearing rule on the arguments related to the PPA, our acknowledgement of pending PJM reform proposals and environmental regulations should not be construed as placing a limitation upon the timing of or the factors to be considered in the Commission's final resolution of the PPA. Given that R.C. 4903.10 and

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2 The Commission takes administrative notice of FERC Dockets ER15-623 and ER15-1470.

4903.11 permit any party to file an application for rehearing of any order and appeal the order of the Commission within 60 days, no party's right to appeal will be adversely affected by our decision to defer ruling on these assignments of error. *In re Columbus S. Power Co.*, 128 Ohio St.3d 402, 2011-Ohio-958, 945 N.E.2d 501; *Senior Citizens Coalition v. Pub. Util. Comm.*, 40 Ohio St.3d 329, 533 N.E.2d 353 (1988). Finally, we note that we may revisit our decision to defer ruling on these assignments of error.

II. COMPETITIVE BID PROCUREMENT PROCESS

(11) In its application for rehearing, Constellation argues that it was unjust and unreasonable for the Commission to order AEP Ohio to conduct two SSO auctions prior to June 2015. Specifically, Constellation asserts that, from a practical perspective, there is simply not enough time remaining before May 31, 2015, for two auctions to take place and that one auction would be much more reasonable. Constellation adds that the occurrence of two auctions in such a short period of time would impose significant administrative costs and impact the operational efficiencies of the auction participants, without any offsetting benefit that would justify the costs.

(12) AEP Ohio responds that the Commission's directive that two auctions occur before June 1, 2015, is not unlawful or unreasonable. AEP Ohio notes that it is well underway in making preparations for the two auctions to ensure their success and that any work completed up until this point would be a wasted effort, even assuming that the Commission's decision on rehearing is issued prior to the auctions. AEP Ohio further notes that the first two auctions have already been scheduled and that it would be unreasonable to change the auction structure or schedule at this point.

(13) The Commission finds that Constellation's request for rehearing on this issue should be denied. In the ESP 3 Order, the Commission directed that AEP Ohio's first and second auctions should occur sufficiently far in advance of the end of the current ESP term on May 31, 2015, with

delivery to commence on June 1, 2015. ESP 3 Order at 31. The ESP 3 Order was issued on February 25, 2015, providing AEP Ohio with approximately three months in which to schedule and plan for the first two auctions, which the Company confirms has already occurred. In any event, we note that Constellation's argument is moot at this point, given that the first two auctions have already occurred and AEP Ohio has been directed to file final tariffs reflecting the results of the auctions. *In re Ohio Power Co.*, Case No. 15-792-EL-UNC, Finding and Order (Apr. 29, 2015), Finding and Order (May 13, 2015).

III. VARIABLE PRICE TARIFFS

(14) In its application for rehearing, AEP Ohio asserts that the Commission should clarify that it did not intend, in the ESP 3 Order, to eliminate the existing provisions of the interruptible power-discretionary rider (IRP-D) tariff that require customers to contract for not less than 1 megawatt (MW) of interruptible capacity and that cap the total interruptible power contract capacity for all customers served under the IRP-D at 525 MW (specifically, 75 MW in the CSP rate zone and 450 MW in the OP rate zone). AEP Ohio points out that the 1 MW per customer minimum interruptible load commitment and the 525 MW aggregate cap for all customers remain appropriate in order to provide a reasonable limit on the costs associated with the IRP-D credit.

(15) OCC agrees with AEP Ohio that the current tariff provisions are appropriate and serve as a limit on the amount of IRP-D costs that other customers pay, while still achieving the objective of providing interruptible capacity resources. IEU-Ohio responds, however, that the Commission should reject AEP Ohio's proposed aggregate load cap of 525 MW on interruptible load. IEU-Ohio contends that the ESP 3 Order did not impose such a limitation and, in light of the expansion of the IRP-D program to include shopping customers, as well as the recognized value of interruptible service, limiting available load to 525 MW is unreasonable.

(16) IEU-Ohio, in its application for rehearing, requests clarification on a number of issues regarding the Commission's modification of the IRP-D. Specifically, IEU-Ohio requests clarification that the Commission has not expanded the conditions under which AEP Ohio may interrupt for purposes of an emergency; has not authorized the Company to retain the current provision for discretionary interruptions; and has directed the Company to remove the current load limitation, in light of the expansion of the IRP-D to new shopping and non-shopping customers. IEU-Ohio recommends that, if the Commission determines that AEP Ohio may limit the load available under the IRP-D, the Commission should both ensure that existing customers benefit from a grandfather clause and provide for a fair means of assigning any remaining available load to customers seeking to expand their current load and customers seeking to contract for load under the IRP-D.

(17) AEP Ohio replies that, with respect to IEU-Ohio's first and second requests for clarification, clarification is not necessary, given that emergency interruptions will be handled in the same manner as currently occurs under the IRP-D, while discretionary interruptions will no longer be required on a going-forward basis. Regarding IEU-Ohio's third request for clarification, AEP Ohio argues that the 525 MW aggregate cap, which equates to approximately $52.5 million in interruptible credit payments per year, should be maintained, in order to prevent an unreasonable and excessive cost burden on firm customers. According to AEP Ohio, clarification is not necessary regarding IEU-Ohio's fourth request regarding allocation of available load, because existing customers will continue to receive service to the extent of the existing interruptible load that they previously committed under the IRP-D program. AEP Ohio points out that, with regard to additional load that customers seek to commit to the program, the Company has always applied the IRP-D cap to new requests for service on a first come, first served basis, and will continue to do so in the future.

(18) In the ESP 3 Order, the Commission denied AEP Ohio's request to eliminate the IRP-D, noting that it offers numerous benefits and furthers state policy. With respect to our modifications to the IRP-D, we expanded the $8.21/kilowatt-month credit to new and existing shopping and non-shopping customers. ESP 3 Order at 39-40. However, upon review of the record in these proceedings and taking into consideration the parties' concerns regarding the potential for increased costs, which are discussed further below, we find that the IRP-D program should be continued only for customers that are currently participating in the program and should not be expanded to new customers.

Also, the Commission clarifies that, consistent with OEG's proposal, which AEP Ohio accepted in its briefs, it was our intention to modify the IRP-D to provide for unlimited emergency interruptions only. ESP 3 Order at 37-38, 40. No other modifications to the IRP-D were addressed in the ESP 3 Order and, therefore, the Commission did not intend to make other modifications to the IRP-D. However, in response to AEP Ohio's and IEU-Ohio's requests for elaboration on the IRP-D, the Commission clarifies that, to the extent necessary given our decision to limit the IRP-D program to existing customers, the 1 MW per customer minimum interruptible load commitment and the 525 MW aggregate cap for all customers should be retained, as we agree with the Company and OCC that they provide a reasonable limit on the costs associated with the IRP-D credit. With respect to interruptions under the IRP-D, the program will now consist exclusively of unlimited emergency interruptions; thus, discretionary interruptions will no longer be required. Finally, regarding allocation of the available load, existing customers should continue to receive service to the extent of the existing interruptible load that they previously committed under the IRP-D program, while requests from current customers to include additional load in the program should continue to be handled by AEP Ohio on a first come, first served basis, consistent with its current practice.

(19) AEP Ohio also argues that the Commission should modify the method through which the Company recovers its actual costs of providing the IRP-D credit from the energy efficiency and peak demand reduction (EE/PDR) rider to the economic development rider (EDR). According to AEP Ohio, reliance on the EE/PDR rider as a cost recovery mechanism will create an unreasonable and unlawful burden for customers paying the costs of the IRP-D credit, whereas recovery of the costs through the EDR is consistent with the substantial economic development purpose of the IRP-D. AEP Ohio claims that mercantile customers, some of whom participate in the IRP-D program and benefit from the credit, have the ability to opt out of payment of the EE/PDR rider, which will inequitably shift IRP-D costs to the non-mercantile customers that must pay the EE/PDR rider.

(20) Additionally, AEP Ohio requests that the Commission confirm that the Company is entitled to fully recover the costs associated with the IRP-D credit. AEP Ohio notes that the ESP 3 Order directed that the Company should continue to apply for recovery of the costs associated with the IRP-D through the EE/PDR rider until otherwise ordered by the Commission. AEP Ohio, therefore, seeks clarification that, by using the word "apply," the Commission did not intend to leave open the possibility that the Company would not be permitted to recover its actual costs of providing the IRP-D credit.

(21) Like AEP Ohio, OMAEG argues that the Commission erred in determining that the costs associated with the IRP-D should continue to be recovered through the Company's EE/PDR rider rather than be collected through the EDR. OMAEG contends that the ESP 3 Order is contrary to recent precedent in which the Commission stated its intent to remove interruptible program costs from the EE/PDR riders of the electric distribution companies in their upcoming ESP proceedings, in favor of requiring that such costs be collected through more appropriate riders. *In re Amendment of Chapters 4901:1-10 and 4901:1-21, Ohio Administrative Code,* Case No. 14-1411-EL-ORD, Finding and Order (Dec. 17, 2014) at 20. OMAEG adds that, if IRP-D costs continue to be

collected through the EE/PDR rider, there may be a disproportionate adverse impact on small and medium size commercial customers, given that more mercantile customers may elect to utilize the mercantile self-direct exemption mechanism available under the EE/PDR rider, in order to forgo paying the additional costs of the expanded IRP-D program, which will then be collected from a reduced pool of customers.

(22) Environmental Advocates also maintain that the ESP 3 Order is unreasonable and unlawful, because AEP Ohio was authorized to recover the IRP-D costs through the EE/PDR rider, which may negatively affect the Company's energy efficiency programs. According to Environmental Advocates, the IRP-D is an economic development measure and, therefore, the Commission should require AEP Ohio to collect the IRP-D costs through the EDR. Like OMAEG, Environmental Advocates note that greater numbers of industrial customers may elect to opt out of the EE/PDR rider, resulting in higher costs for the remaining customers.

(23) OEG agrees with AEP Ohio, OMAEG, and Environmental Advocates that it would be reasonable for the Company to recover the costs associated with the IRP-D credit through the EDR, given the economic development objectives served by continuing the IRP-D program during the ESP term. OCC also agrees that the IRP-D costs should be collected through the EDR, given that mercantile customers may opt out of the EE/PDR rider and pay nothing for the benefit of the IRP-D credit.

(24) IEU-Ohio argues that the proposal to recover the costs of the IRP-D credit through the EDR would constitute an untimely amendment of AEP Ohio's current EE/PDR portfolio plan that is barred by Substitute Senate Bill 310 (SB 310). IEU-Ohio adds that, if the Commission nevertheless authorizes an untimely amendment to the portfolio plan by granting rehearing on this issue, the Commission should also direct that customers may exercise the streamlined opt out of the benefits and costs of the amended plan that would have been available under SB 310, as if AEP Ohio had timely sought an amendment.

(25) The Commission finds that the requests for rehearing of AEP Ohio, OMAEG, and Environmental Advocates should be denied. In the ESP 3 Order, we directed AEP Ohio, consistent with its current practice, to continue to apply for recovery of the costs associated with the IRP-D through the EE/PDR rider, until otherwise ordered by the Commission. ESP 3 Order at 40. As the Commission has previously noted, the IRP-D reduces AEP Ohio's peak demand and encourages energy efficiency and, therefore, it is appropriate that the costs of the program are recovered through the EE/PDR rider. *In re Columbus Southern Power Co. and Ohio Power Co.*, Case No. 11-346-EL-SSO, et al. (*ESP 2 Case*), Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 26. We again affirm our finding that the costs of the IRP-D should be recovered through the EE/PDR rider, until otherwise ordered by the Commission. The Commission appreciates the concerns raised by several of the parties with respect to the costs associated with the IRP-D credit, and we will continue to monitor the impact of the credit on customers' EE/PDR rates. However, in light of our decision above to limit the IRP-D program to existing customers, we do not expect that the costs related to the IRP-D credit will significantly increase. Further, regarding AEP Ohio's request for clarification, the Commission finds that it is appropriate for the Company to recover its actual costs of providing the IRP-D credit and, therefore, it was not the Commission's intention to suggest otherwise.

(26) Next, AEP Ohio asserts that the Commission should modify its directive that the Company bid the capacity resources associated with the IRP-D program into PJM's capacity auctions and credit the revenues received against the costs of the IRP-D credit, because the directive is infeasible and, thus, unreasonable and unlawful. AEP Ohio notes that PJM has already conducted the base residual auctions into which such capacity resources may be bid for each of the years that span the three-year term of the ESP and, as a result, the Company will not be able to realize revenues from the sale of the capacity resources. AEP Ohio further notes that it is highly likely that existing IRP-D customers have already bid, either through contractual arrangements or on an individual basis, their IRP-D related capacity into PJM's base residual

auctions for the three delivery years of the ESP. In light of these issues, AEP Ohio recommends that, as a condition of participation, all IRP-D customers be required to certify to the Company that they have bid, or will bid in the next auction, their interruptible capacity resources into the PJM capacity market. AEP Ohio then proposes to offset against, and reduce the amount of, the interruptible credit provided to each IRP-D customer by the gross amount of capacity revenues, which would be calculated based on the weighted average auction clearing price and the amount of any emergency energy payments during events. Finally, AEP Ohio proposes that it would then recover from all customers, through the rider used to recover the costs associated with the IRP-D credit, the net amount of the IRP-D credit minus the gross amount of revenues realized from the sale of the IRP-D customers' interruptible capacity and emergency energy into the PJM market. According to AEP Ohio, its recommended approach would accomplish the Commission's objectives, enable IRP-D customers to participate in Economic and Ancillary Service Demand Response programs, and eliminate any uncertainty regarding auction participation that may exist at the end of the ESP term.

(27) OCC agrees with AEP Ohio that the directive in the ESP 3 Order is infeasible, as the auctions that coincide with the term of the ESP have already taken place. OCC states that it supports an alternative approach similar to what AEP Ohio has proposed. Specifically, OCC recommends that, when calculating any adjusted IRP-D payment, the actual PJM base residual auction clearing price for each individual delivery year be subtracted from the monthly credit, instead of AEP Ohio's proposed weighted average auction clearing price. OCC asserts that its approach would work to ensure that customers are not charged twice for the same capacity resource, as well as reduce the overall IRP-D costs paid by AEP Ohio's customers.

(28) According to IEU-Ohio, the Commission should grant AEP Ohio's request for rehearing with respect to the Company's bidding of demand resources into PJM's base residual

auctions during the ESP term, but should reject the Company's alternative approach of requiring customers to bid into future auctions. IEU-Ohio agrees with AEP Ohio's assertion that PJM has already conducted all of the base residual auctions for delivery years that coincide with the ESP term. IEU-Ohio argues, however, that AEP Ohio's proposed solution is unworkable, because it attempts to match out-of-period revenue to the current period charges. Specifically, IEU-Ohio points out that, although a customer that bids and clears its demand response capabilities into the upcoming base residual auctions would not receive any revenue from PJM until after the ESP term ends, given that the auctions occur three years in advance of the delivery year, such customer would have its IRP-D credit reduced by any revenue that the customer may receive when the delivery year begins. IEU-Ohio also points out that, as a result of a federal court decision, there is currently uncertainty regarding the role and compensation of demand response resources in future PJM auctions.

(29) OMAEG responds that the Commission should clarify that, although AEP Ohio was directed to bid the capacity resources associated with the IRP-D into PJM's base residual auctions, which have already occurred for the years that span the term of the ESP, the Company should instead bid the capacity resources into PJM's incremental capacity auctions held during the ESP term. OMAEG notes that, although bidding the capacity resources associated with the IRP-D into PJM's incremental capacity auctions may not yield as much revenue, it would at least partially offset some of the costs attributable to the IRP-D credit.

(30) In the ESP 3 Order, the Commission directed AEP Ohio to bid the additional capacity resources associated with the IRP-D into PJM's base residual auctions held during the ESP term, with any resulting revenues credited back to customers through the EE/PDR rider. ESP 3 Order at 40. However, as AEP Ohio and certain intervenors note, the Commission's directive raises a timing issue, given that PJM's base residual auctions have already occurred for the three delivery years of the ESP 3 term and, therefore, no

revenues from the sale of the IRP-D capacity resources will be realized during the term. As a means to ensure that customers receive the intended benefit during the ESP period, the Commission agrees with OMAEG that AEP Ohio should bid the IRP-D related capacity resources into PJM's incremental capacity auctions held during the ESP term, to the extent that such capacity resources have not already been bid by the customer into any of PJM's auctions for the three delivery years of the ESP 3 term. The resulting revenues should be credited back to customers through the EE/PDR rider. However, in order to ensure no disruption to customers that may have already bid their interruptible resources into PJM's auctions for the delivery years of the ESP 3 term, whether directly or through a curtailment service provider, existing IRP-D customers may retain the resulting benefits without any reduction in their IRP-D credit for imputed revenue. Although the Commission expresses no opinion on whether the IRP-D will be extended beyond ESP 3, in the event that it is, in fact, extended, for PJM delivery years after May 31, 2018, current IRP-D customers should be required to agree, as a condition of service under the IRP-D tariff, to allow AEP Ohio to bid their interruptible resources into PJM's auctions, with resulting revenues credited back to customers through the EE/PDR rider. With this clarification, we find it unnecessary to adopt AEP Ohio's proposed imputed revenue offset provision. Accordingly, we find that AEP Ohio's request for rehearing on this issue should be granted, in part, and denied, in part.

(31) RESA argues that it was unjust and unreasonable to expect competitive retail electric service (CRES) providers to begin offering time-of-use and other dynamic products without taking the necessary steps to ensure that the interval data needed for such products is made available to CRES providers in a meaningful manner. RESA proposes that access to historical interval data be made available for download through AEP Ohio's new portal; be timely provided and in bill-quality form; and be sent via electronic data interchange. RESA also asserts that the Commission should resolve the open issue regarding the means by which

customer authorization for accessing the interval data may be provided to the electric distribution utility.

(32) AEP Ohio replies that RESA's request for access to interval data is beyond the scope of issues under review in these proceedings and, while there is a time and place for a discussion regarding interval data, RESA's attempt to incorporate the issue into the rehearing process is improper and should be denied.

(33) The Commission finds that RESA's request for rehearing on this issue should be denied, as it is beyond the scope of these proceedings, and given that interval data is a matter being addressed through the Market Development Working Group (MDWG). *In re Comm. Investigation of Ohio's Retail Elec. Serv. Market*, Case No. 12-3151-EL-COI (*CRES Market Case*), Finding and Order (Mar. 26, 2014) at 35-38.

IV. DISTRIBUTION INVESTMENT RIDER

(34) In these proceedings, the Commission approved AEP Ohio's request to continue the distribution investment rider (DIR), with certain modifications. As approved in the ESP 3 Order, the modified DIR cap levels are $124 million for 2015, $146.2 million for 2016, $170 million for 2017, and $103 for January through May 2018. The Commission further modified the DIR to permit the balance of each category of plant to incur an applicable associated carrying charge, as proposed by AEP Ohio; revised the property tax calculation, as proposed by OCC; and to incorporate the six recommendations proposed by Staff regarding the submission of detailed account information, jurisdictional allocations and accrual rates, reconciliation between functional ledgers and FERC form filings, to require the submission of DIR revenue collected by month, direct that the Company notify, highlight, and quantify any proposed DIR capitalization policy amendments, and to require the filing of an updated depreciation study by November 2016. ESP 3 Order at 46-47.

(35) In its application for rehearing, AEP Ohio requests that, to the extent that the Commission does not issue a full rehearing decision within the 30-day timeframe set forth in

R.C. 4903.10, the Commission issue an expedited rehearing decision on the DIR, due to the immediate and substantial impact on the Company's capital commitments and investment in Ohio. AEP Ohio states that a prompt decision regarding the DIR annual revenue caps would enable the Company to continue to make improvements to its distribution infrastructure without significant disruption in the field in the short term, while also avoiding impairment of the Company's capabilities to continue to make improvements in an efficient manner over the long term.

(36) OMAEG argues that AEP Ohio's request for an expedited rehearing decision on the DIR issues is unreasonable and should be denied. OMAEG submits that the confusion that may result from an ad hoc approach to the rehearing process outweighs the alleged urgency for Commission action regarding the DIR. OCC also contends that the Commission should not address the DIR issues on rehearing on an expedited basis apart from the other issues raised by the parties. Noting that the Commission lacks statutory authority in this respect, OCC asserts that, if AEP Ohio's request is approved, the Commission will establish a dangerous precedent in which certain issues receive special treatment over others. Additionally, OCC asserts that it is always AEP Ohio's obligation to spend whatever capital is necessary to provide appropriate service reliability. OCC further asserts that the existence of the DIR does not preclude AEP Ohio from seeking recovery of distribution related investments through a distribution rate case, which would afford the Commission the opportunity to ensure that customers have actually received the service reliability improvements and efficiencies claimed by the Company.

(37) The Commission finds AEP Ohio's request for an expedited decision, while not prohibited under the rehearing process set forth in R.C. 4903.10, to be moot.

(38) In its application for rehearing, AEP Ohio contends that the Commission's modifications to the Company's DIR proposal are unreasonable and should be changed or clarified on rehearing. AEP Ohio, therefore, requests that the Commission adopt one or more of a number of options to

better align the Company's and customers' reliability expectations and interests, consistent with R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h). First, AEP Ohio asserts that the Commission should reconsider its decision to reduce the Company-proposed DIR annual revenue caps and its denial of the Company's proposal to include general plant within the DIR. AEP Ohio points out that neither intervenors nor Staff recommended specific reductions to the annual revenue caps and, consequently, there is no evidence in the record regarding the resulting impacts from the reductions adopted by the Commission in the ESP 3 Order. AEP Ohio requests that the Commission reinstate the Company's proposed annual revenue caps or, alternatively, grant rehearing and receive further testimony to better gauge and understand the actual impacts of various levels of DIR revenue cap reductions on the Company's incremental reliability infrastructure investments. In support of its request, AEP Ohio notes that a static revenue cap as between 2014 and 2015, at the level of $124 million, will have significant implications for capital reliability spend, while it will be logistically difficult and harmful to customers if the Company must abruptly pull back on pending capital projects that are already in progress. AEP Ohio explains that, due to the timing of the Commission's issuance of the ESP 3 Order, the Company was required to estimate the DIR revenue cap for 2015, establish its capital budget, and make contractual commitments to implement projects, and did so with the presumption that some additional revenue growth would be provided in 2015. With respect to AEP Ohio's proposal to include general plant in the DIR, the Company requests that the Commission grant rehearing and approve the expansion of the DIR to include infrastructure characterized by the Company as targeted general plant, most of which relates to the Company's service centers and radio communications system.

(39) In its memorandum contra, OMAEG responds that the Commission's decision not to include general plant in the DIR was reasonable, because, as noted by the Commission, the types of general plant expenses that AEP Ohio seeks to include in the DIR do not directly relate to the reliability of

the distribution system. OMAEG also argues that the Commission should not adopt AEP Ohio's proposed annual revenue caps for the DIR on rehearing, given that the Company failed to present any analysis to support its claims that service reliability will deteriorate without the DIR, while the Company's proposed caps are excessive as compared with those currently in place, are unsupported by the evidence, and, in significant part, do not directly relate to distribution service reliability.

(40) OCC, in its memorandum contra, asserts that the Commission correctly rejected the inclusion of general plant in the DIR as beyond the intent of the statute. OCC notes that AEP Ohio had ample opportunity to present evidence in support of its claim that general plant has a direct impact on customer service and reliability, but nevertheless failed to meet its burden of proof on this issue.

(41) Alternatively, AEP Ohio requests that the Commission correct what the Company believes are mistaken DIR annual revenue caps. AEP Ohio points out that, in the ESP 3 Order, the Commission stated its intention to establish the annual revenue caps based on the level of growth of three to four percent as permitted for the DIR in the *ESP 2 Case*. AEP Ohio notes that the annual revenue caps approved by the Commission result in a zero percent growth in distribution revenue for 2015, followed by a more reasonable 2.9 percent growth in 2016 and 3 percent growth in 2017. According to AEP Ohio, if left unchanged, this situation will require the Company to pull back on capital investment in Ohio, which not only involves a reduced investment and potential reliability impacts but also could mean loss of contractor jobs currently sustained by the DIR funding. AEP Ohio states that, if the Commission elects to adopt DIR annual revenue caps at the lower end of its stated intention, meaning 3 percent, the annual caps would be $147 million in 2015, $171 million in 2016, $195 million in 2017, and $92 million for the first five months in 2018.

(42) OCC replies that AEP Ohio offers no evidence or documentation that indicates that the Commission erred in setting the DIR annual revenue caps. OCC maintains that

the Commission's decision is consistent with the *ESP 2 Case*, while there is nothing in the ESP 3 Order to support AEP Ohio's assumption that the Commission intended to increase the DIR revenue cap from 2014 to 2015 by two to three percent. OCC argues that AEP Ohio's contention that there should be two to three percent growth from 2014 to 2015 requires the DIR program to be viewed as a single continuous six-year program instead of two distinct three-year programs that were proposed, considered, and approved in two separate ESP proceedings.

(43) Next, AEP Ohio asserts that another option to partially offset the adverse effects of the annual revenue cap reductions would be for the Commission to clarify its intention in the *ESP 2 Case* regarding the annual revenue cap for 2012. AEP Ohio maintains that it is not clear whether the Commission intended to prorate the $86 million revenue cap for 2012, based on an effective date of August 2012, such that the actual revenue cap for 2012 could either be $86 million as stated in the *ESP 2 Case* or $35.8 million (5/12 of $86 million). AEP Ohio notes that, as a result, the cumulative underspend that carries over to 2015 and beyond could be either $77.1 million or $26.9 million. AEP Ohio concludes that, if the Commission clarifies on rehearing that its intention in the *ESP 2 Case* was to adopt an $86 million revenue cap for 2012 without proration, it will produce a significant carryover amount that would help to alleviate the current problem for 2015 and beyond.

(44) IEU-Ohio responds, in its memorandum contra, that the Commission should reject AEP Ohio's request for clarification. IEU-Ohio notes that, because AEP Ohio failed to seek rehearing in the *ESP 2 Case* concerning the calculation of the annual revenue caps, the Company waived review of that provision of the Commission's decision in the *ESP 2 Case*. IEU-Ohio further notes that AEP Ohio did not seek rehearing of the revenue calculations that the Commission reviewed during the audit of the DIR for 2012 in Case No. 13-419-EL-RDR, which confirmed that a revenue cap of $86 million for 2012 was used to determine the carryover amount and, thus, there is no reasonable basis for

the Commission to allow the Company to further increase its cap for 2015. IEU-Ohio concludes that AEP Ohio's request for clarification constitutes an untimely request for rehearing of the *ESP 2 Case*, is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and, if granted, would result in unlawful retroactive ratemaking.

(45) OCC also argues that AEP Ohio's request for clarification regarding the DIR revenue cap for 2012 constitutes an unlawful attempt by the Company to relitigate aspects of the *ESP 2 Case* that are not at issue in the present proceedings. OCC requests that the Commission reject AEP Ohio's untimely effort to seek rehearing of the *ESP 2 Case*. OCC adds that there is nothing in the record or in the ESP 3 Order to support AEP Ohio's request that the cumulative underspend from the *ESP 2 Case* be permitted to carry over to 2015 and beyond.

(46) In their memorandum contra, OPAE/APJN contend that AEP Ohio's request for clarification regarding the DIR cap for 2012 should be considered an unlawful request for retroactive ratemaking. OPAE/APJN also point out that the level of DIR funding authorized by the Commission for the ESP 3 term is in addition to any carryover amounts. OPAE/APJN believe that the fact that AEP Ohio's DIR spending was below the DIR annual revenue caps established in the *ESP 2 Case* explains the level of the caps approved by the Commission for the ESP 3 term. Finally, OPAE/APJN assert that distribution service charges should be considered in the context of a distribution rate case and that the Commission appropriately encouraged AEP Ohio to seek base rate recovery of its distribution investments.

(47) In its application for rehearing, OMAEG argues that the Commission erred in allowing AEP Ohio to recover $543.2 million through the DIR over the course of the ESP, as recovery of distribution investments of that order of magnitude is not supported by record evidence and recovery of such costs is more appropriately addressed in the context of a base distribution rate case. Specifically, OMAEG maintains that nothing in the record indicates that the caps approved by the Commission represent a necessary

level of recovery under the DIR for AEP Ohio to be able to continue to provide customers with reliable service. OMAEG, therefore, requests that the Commission revisit the caps established in the ESP 3 Order. OMAEG also requests that the Commission reverse its decision to relieve AEP Ohio of its responsibility to work with Staff to develop a DIR plan throughout the ESP term, particularly given that the Company did not file testimony or other documentation demonstrating any service reliability improvements related to specific distribution investments, in connection with the proposed ESP.

(48) In response, AEP Ohio points out that OMAEG's arguments are related to the statutory basis of riders and standards pertaining to the DIR result that are not found in statute. AEP Ohio contends that, contrary to OMAEG's claim, there is no requirement that the Company demonstrate the benefit of each yearly DIR. AEP Ohio further contends that OMAEG's concerns regarding the reporting and quantification of reliability improvements have been resolved by the Commission in prior cases. With respect to OMAEG's request that AEP Ohio be required to continue to develop a DIR work plan with the assistance of Staff each year, the Company states that, while a formal requirement is no longer necessary, the Company intends to continue to obtain Staff's input and understand Staff's expectations when finalizing the DIR plan.

(49) OPAE/APJN assert that the Commission acted unreasonably and unlawfully when it approved the continuation of the DIR and maintained the rider's current cost allocation. OPAE/APJN claim that AEP Ohio's request to continue the DIR should have been rejected, because the Company did not consider the affordability of the DIR and did not demonstrate any quantifiable reliability benefits from the rider. OPAE/APJN contend that distribution related charges should be considered in distribution rate case proceedings and that riders should be limited to recovery of costs that are large, volatile, and outside of the utility's control, which, according to OPAE/APJN, AEP Ohio has not shown is the case for the DIR.

(50) AEP Ohio replies that the Commission has the authority to approve recovery of distribution related costs through riders and has often done so through ESP proceedings pursuant to R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h). AEP Ohio believes that the time for a policy debate on whether riders should be included in an ESP filing has passed. Regarding the affordability of the DIR, AEP Ohio responds that its testimony reflects that, considering the impact of the entire ESP proposal, residential customers with typical usage are expected to see a monthly rate decrease beginning in June 2015.

(51) In the ESP 3 Order, the Commission denied AEP Ohio's request to increase the amount to be recovered via the DIR, at the level proposed in the Company's application, as well as the Company's request to include general plant in the DIR. The Commission found that the evidence of record does not support an expansion of the DIR to the extent proposed by AEP Ohio and that the Company's distribution investments, at the level requested in these proceedings, would be better considered and reviewed in the context of a distribution rate case. ESP 3 Order at 46. The Commission further found that, because AEP Ohio is performing at or above its established reliability standards and its reliability expectations appear to be aligned with its customers, it is no longer necessary for the Company to work with Staff to develop a DIR plan, as long as the Company continues to perform at or above its reliability standards. ESP 3 Order at 47. Finally, in order to facilitate AEP Ohio's continued proactive investment in its aging distribution infrastructure, the Commission approved the Company's request to continue the DIR at $124 million for 2015, $146.2 million for 2016, $170 million for 2017, and $103 million for January through May 2018. The Commission stated that the annual DIR revenue caps are based on a level of growth of three to four percent, consistent with the *ESP 2 Case*, and are intended to enable AEP Ohio to continue to replace aging distribution infrastructure as a means to maintain and improve service reliability over the course of the ESP. ESP 3 Order at 47.

Upon review of AEP Ohio's grounds for rehearing with respect to the DIR, the Commission finds that the DIR annual revenue caps should be modified, as it was not the Commission's intent to provide for no growth in the annual cap from 2014 to 2015. We, therefore, find that the DIR annual revenue caps should be set at $145 million for 2015 (including amounts previously authorized in the *ESP 2 Case*), $165 million for 2016, $185 million for 2017, and $86 million for January through May 2018. We find that the adjusted caps shall reflect annual growth in the DIR, as a percentage of customer base distribution charges, of three to four percent, which was our objective in modifying the DIR annual revenue caps proposed by AEP Ohio for the ESP 3 term so that they more closely track the progression from the *ESP 2 Case*. Accordingly, the Commission grants rehearing with respect to AEP Ohio's request that the DIR annual revenue caps established in the ESP 3 Order be adjusted, in order to enable the Company to continue to implement the DIR plan that is already underway for 2015. We find no merit in AEP Ohio's remaining grounds for rehearing regarding the DIR, which should, thus, be denied.

(52) Further, the Commission finds no merit in the alleged grounds for rehearing raised by OMAEG and OPAE/APJN with respect to the DIR. We find that the arguments raised by OMAEG and OPAE/APJN have already been thoroughly considered and rejected. ESP 3 Order at 43-45, 95. Regarding OMAEG's request that AEP Ohio be required to continue to work with Staff to develop an annual DIR work plan, we affirm our finding that it is no longer necessary to impose such a requirement, given the Commission's finding that the Company's reliability expectations appear to be aligned with its customers, as well as the fact that the Company has been meeting or exceeding its reliability standards. ESP 3 Order at 47. Additionally, as AEP Ohio acknowledges, the Company intends to continue to coordinate with Staff in the process of finalizing each annual DIR plan, which the Commission believes is a reasonable approach that should be implemented throughout the ESP term. For these reasons, OMAEG's and OPAE/APJN's

applications for rehearing regarding the DIR should be denied.

V. ENHANCED SERVICE RELIABILITY RIDER

(53) OPAE/APJN submit that the ESP 3 Order is unreasonable to the extent that it approved the enhanced service reliability rider (ESRR) and DIR cost recovery allocation, outside the context of a distribution rate case and contrary to sound ratemaking practices. Further, OPAE/APJN argue the riders do not incentivize the utility to control costs and should be limited to instances where the costs are large, volatile, and outside of the utility's control. AEP Ohio did not, according to OPAE/APJN, demonstrate that the ESRR or the DIR meet these criteria or that the financial integrity of the Company would be compromised if such costs were considered in the context of a distribution rate case. Further, OPAE /APJN argue ESRR and DIR costs to be recovered should be allocated to the customer classes consistent with cost causation principles and AEP Ohio's most recent cost of service studies as opposed to contribution to distribution revenues.

(54) AEP Ohio replies that this issue was raised by the intervenors and rejected by the Commission in the ESP 3 Order. Further, AEP Ohio notes the Commission resolved the recovery of incremental distribution investments in these cases in precisely the same manner as in other recent cases where the issue was considered. *In re Ohio Edison Co., The Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., and The Toledo Edison Co.*, Case No. 12-1230-EL-SSO, Opinion and Order (July 18, 2012) at 56. AEP Ohio submits that the Commission has the authority to approve recovery of distribution related costs through riders in ESP proceedings pursuant to R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h). Accordingly, AEP Ohio requests that OPAE/APJN's request for rehearing be denied.

(55) The Commission finds that OPAE/APJN's arguments on the continuation of the distribution riders and the cost allocation method for the DIR and ESRR were raised, thoroughly considered, and rejected in the ESP 3 Order. ESP 3 Order at 49, 95. Intervenors assert no new arguments that persuade

the Commission that the riders and the cost recovery allocation method should be revised on rehearing. The DIR and ESRR relate to the provision of distribution service and it is reasonable to allocate the cost of such riders on the basis of distribution revenues. In this ESP, the Commission continues the cost recovery allocation method previously adopted by the Commission in AEP Ohio's prior ESP proceedings. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 43-44, 77. Therefore, OPAE/APJN's request for rehearing should be denied.

VI. NERC COMPLIANCE AND CYBERSECURITY RIDER

(56) In the ESP 3 Order, the Commission denied AEP Ohio's proposal to implement a new, non-bypassable mechanism, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) compliance and cybersecurity rider (NCCR). Acknowledging the importance of NERC compliance and cybersecurity, the Commission found that AEP Ohio failed to sustain its burden of proof for the Commission to authorize the establishment of a NCCR placeholder rider. ESP 3 Order at 59-62.

(57) AEP Ohio requests rehearing on this aspect of the ESP 3 Order on the basis that the decision was unreasonable and unlawful. AEP Ohio asserts, like prior zero placeholder riders approved as a component of an ESP, when the Company requests recovery of costs through the rider in a future proceeding, the costs are reviewed for prudency and appropriateness by the Commission before any costs are recovered. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 24-25; *In re Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.*, Case No. 08-920-EL-SSO, et al., Opinion and Order (Dec. 17, 2008) at 17; *In re Ohio Edison Co., The Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., and The Toledo Edison Co.*, Case No. 08-935-EL-SSO, et al., Second Opinion and Order (Mar. 25, 2009) at 15. In fact, AEP Ohio notes three such zero placeholder riders were approved in the ESP 3 Order, specifically the PPA rider, the bad debt rider (BDR), and the pilot demand response rider. ESP 3 Order at 25, 81, 86-87. AEP Ohio submits that the costs for which the Company may request recovery in the NCCR mechanism are no more speculative than those recovered through the

storm damage recovery rider and the EE/PDR rider. AEP Ohio argues that, while the Commission may not find it evident that the Company will incur costs for NERC compliance, it is clear that the Company will incur cybersecurity costs to address ever-increasing cybersecurity risk. In the alternative, AEP Ohio requests, if the Commission declines to grant rehearing and approve the establishment of the NCCR, that the Commission grant the Company accounting authority to create a deferral for NERC compliance and cybersecurity costs incurred during the term of this ESP, to permit the Company to seek Commission approval for recovery in a future proceeding.

(58) OCC, OMAEG, and IEU-Ohio oppose AEP Ohio's application for rehearing on the NCCR. IEU-Ohio submits AEP Ohio fails to offer any basis for the Commission to reverse its decision on rehearing. OCC, IEU-Ohio, and OMAEG insist that AEP Ohio failed to sustain its burden to demonstrate the lawfulness and reasonableness of the NCCR mechanism, as the Commission determined, and to offer into evidence the types of investments, identifiable costs, and how costs would be allocated. For that reason, OMAEG avows establishment of the NCCR entirely too speculative to be reasonable. Further, OCC notes that, while AEP Ohio claims the NCCR decision is unlawful, the Company fails to cite any specific law violated. Accordingly, OCC, OMAEG, and IEU-Ohio request that the Commission deny AEP Ohio's request for rehearing on the NCCR.

(59) As OCC notes, while AEP Ohio alleges that the ESP 3 Order is unlawful in its denial to establish the NCCR, the Company fails to explain how the ESP 3 Order is unlawful. Thus, the Commission has no basis on which to consider that aspect of AEP Ohio's claim on rehearing. Further, AEP Ohio has failed to present any persuasive argument, not previously considered by the Commission, which justifies reversal of the ESP 3 Order. For the same reasons the Commission refused to establish the NCCR, it was our intent to also deny AEP Ohio's request to permit the creation of a deferral account for NERC compliance and cybersecurity costs so that the Company may request recovery at some point in the

future during the term of this ESP. AEP Ohio failed to offer into evidence sufficient information for the Commission to determine the types or magnitude of investments for which the Company would seek recovery pursuant to the proposed NCCR or to demonstrate the allocation of any potential cost between generation, transmission, and distribution functions. Accordingly, the Commission affirms its decision on this aspect of the ESP 3 Order and denies AEP Ohio's request for rehearing.

VII. RESIDENTIAL DISTRIBUTION CREDIT RIDER

(60) In its ESP 3 application, AEP Ohio proposed to continue the residential distribution credit rider (RDCR) of $14,688,000. As requested by OPAE and APJN, the Commission modified AEP Ohio's ESP to direct the Company to contribute $1 million annually to fund the low-income bill payment assistance program, Neighbor-to-Neighbor. In their application for rehearing, OPAE/APJN again recommend AEP Ohio be required to add $1 million annually from shareholder funds to increase the Company's funding commitment, to a total of $2 million, as a means to ensure adequate funding for the Neighbor-to-Neighbor program, consistent with the state policy to ensure consumers adequate, reliable, safe, and efficient retail electric service at reasonable prices, and to protect at-risk populations. R.C. 4928.02(A) and (L). OPAE/APJN argue at-risk populations, Ohio households living at or below the federal poverty level, may need bill payment assistance to maintain or gain access to electric service. OPAE/APJN assert the Commission should have required the additional shareholder contribution, to ensure adequate funding and more closely approximate the amount ordered in AEP Ohio's first ESP cases. *In re Columbus Southern Power Co. and Ohio Power Co.*, Case No. 08-917-EL-SSO, et al. (*ESP 1 Case*), Opinion and Order (Mar. 18, 2009) at 48.

(61) AEP Ohio declares that the policy provisions listed in R.C. 4928.02 are goals that must be balanced and are not independent requirements for each component of an ESP. Further, AEP Ohio notes the benefits this ESP provides to all customers, including at-risk customers: the purchase of

receivables program (POR) to support CRES providers' pursuit of at-risk customers; distribution riders such as the DIR and ESRR that support investment in utility infrastructure and vegetation clearing, which prevent outages; and the Company's voluntary extension of the residential distribution credit. Accordingly, AEP Ohio reasons these provisions of the ESP, among other provisions, protect at-risk populations and ensure adequate, reliable, and safe electric service. For these reasons, AEP Ohio asks that OPAE/APJN's request for rehearing on this issue be denied.

(62) As referenced by OPAE/APJN, in the *ESP 1 Case*, the Commission ordered AEP Ohio's shareholders to endow the Partnership with Ohio fund at a minimum of $15 million, over the three-year ESP period, with all of the funds going to low-income, at-risk customer programs. *ESP 1 Case*, Opinion and Order (Mar. 18, 2009) at 48. The continuation of the RDCR, as amended in the ESP 3 Order, to include $1 million in funding from AEP Ohio equates to a total RDCR and Neighbor-to Neighbor program of $15.688 million. As a part of this modified ESP 3, all residential customers, including at-risk customers, continue to receive a credit on their bill. In addition, the Neighbor-to-Neighbor program is available to aid at-risk customers with bill payment assistance. The Commission finds that, through the residential distribution credit, an at-risk customer may be able to avoid the need for bill payment assistance. We also note that, since the Opinion and Order in the *ESP 1 Case* was issued in March 2009, the Commission has revised the Percentage of Income Payment Plan (PIPP) Plus for low-income, at-risk customers. Effective as of November 2010, the PIPP Plus program reduced participant payment percentage from 10 percent of household income to 6 percent, and the PIPP Plus participant was eligible to receive credits and other benefits for on-time payment. The Commission will continue to explore and focus on various means to ensure electric utility service is affordable for Ohio's residential customers, including at-risk populations. The Commission finds maintaining the Neighbor-to-Neighbor program contribution for AEP Ohio at $1 million,

in addition to the residential credit, to be a fair and balanced means of complying with the requirements of R.C. 4928.02. Accordingly, the Commission is not persuaded that this aspect of the ESP 3 Order is unreasonable and, therefore, OPAE/APJN's request for rehearing should be denied.

VIII. BASIC TRANSMISSION COST RIDER

(63) IEU-Ohio argues that the Commission's authorization of the basic transmission cost rider (BTCR) was unlawful and unreasonable, because the Commission has invaded a field of regulation within FERC's exclusive jurisdiction. Specifically, IEU-Ohio contends that the Commission is preempted from authorizing a transmission related rider that precludes customers eligible to secure transmission services from PJM, pursuant to the FERC-approved tariff, from doing so. IEU-Ohio believes that customers are now captive to AEP Ohio for transmission services at prices and terms and conditions that are different from those contained in the PJM tariff. According to IEU-Ohio, the BTCR will interfere with customers' ability to contract directly with PJM for transmission services and will not flow through the amounts assignable to customers in the same manner as occurs under the PJM tariff.

(64) Constellation and RESA respond that, pursuant to R.C. 4928.05(A)(2), approval of the BTCR is within the Commission's jurisdiction. AEP Ohio points out that there is no factual support in the record for IEU-Ohio's claims, which were raised for the first time on rehearing. AEP Ohio adds that it is irrelevant whether a customer can contract directly with PJM, because if the customer does so, the basic transmission charges will be billed back to the Company and allocated and billed through the BTCR, as the Commission ordered. Finally, AEP Ohio asserts that collateral estoppel precludes IEU-Ohio from advancing its preemption argument, because IEU-Ohio was a party to the proceedings in which the Commission approved comparable transmission riders for the other Ohio electric distribution utilities. AEP Ohio maintains that IEU-Ohio should not be permitted to relitigate the same issues that were raised by

IEU-Ohio and rejected by the Commission in the prior proceedings.

(65) In discussing the PPA rider in the ESP 3 Order, the Commission declined to address constitutional issues raised by the parties in these proceedings. ESP 3 Order at 26. The Commission likewise declines to address IEU-Ohio's preemption argument with respect to the BTCR, as constitutional issues are best reserved for judicial determination.

(66) IEU-Ohio also argues that the ESP 3 Order is unreasonable, because the BTCR reduces the options available to customers seeking to secure transmission services, in violation of R.C. 4928.02(B), and frustrates price signals that may assist in providing transmission system reliability, because AEP Ohio does not plan to use a demand-metered customer's individual contribution to the one coincident peak as the demand billing determinant. IEU-Ohio asserts that the Commission failed to address the reasonableness of the rate design and incorrectly noted that the BTCR is comparable to a similar transmission rider approved for The Dayton Power and Light Company.

(67) Constellation and RESA disagree with IEU-Ohio's position. According to Constellation and RESA, it is appropriate for AEP Ohio to collect non-market based transmission costs, which will enable CRES providers to base their offers on market related costs. Constellation argues that, as a result, retail customers will benefit from greater price transparency, given that they will be able to easily determine the exact amount of the non-market based costs. RESA contends that the Commission's approval of the BTCR will properly eliminate CRES providers' responsibility to collect non-market based transmission charges. AEP Ohio notes that the Commission has already fully considered and rejected IEU-Ohio's arguments.

(68) In the ESP 3 Order, the Commission approved AEP Ohio's proposal to eliminate the current transmission cost recovery rider (TCRR) and implement the BTCR, finding that the new rider is comparable to the transmission riders approved for

the other electric utilities. In approving the BTCR, the Commission also thoroughly considered and rejected the same arguments that IEU-Ohio has raised in its application for rehearing. ESP 3 Order at 66-68, 95. As IEU-Ohio has raised no new arguments for our consideration, its request for rehearing on this issue should be denied.

(69) Next, IEU-Ohio argues that the ESP 3 Order is unreasonable, as the Commission did not order the inclusion of affected customers in the resolution process to ensure that such customers do not pay twice for the same transmission related expenses. IEU-Ohio points out that neither AEP Ohio nor the CRES providers have any incentive to prevent double billing and, therefore, customer representatives should be part of the resolution process.

(70) Constellation replies that CRES providers have every incentive to ensure that their customers are properly billed. Constellation and RESA point out that nothing in the ESP 3 Order precludes customers from working directly with their CRES providers to verify that proper billing for transmission charges has occurred. Constellation and RESA add that other Ohio electric distribution utilities have implemented similar transmission riders and that these utilities and CRES providers worked together, without incident, to avoid any double billing of transmission charges. AEP Ohio points out that the Commission already addressed IEU-Ohio's concern, in noting in the ESP 3 Order that customers have existing means to address double-billing issues.

(71) The Commission finds that IEU-Ohio's request for rehearing on this issue should be denied. In the ESP 3 Order, we directed AEP Ohio, CRES providers, and, if necessary, Staff to work together to ensure that customers do not pay twice for the same transmission related expenses. ESP 3 Order at 68. As Constellation and RESA note, nothing precludes customers from taking steps to address double-billing issues, if they arise, with their CRES providers. Further, as we emphasized in the ESP 3 Order, affected customers have existing means to seek the Commission's assistance, either informally by contacting Staff or through the formal

complaint process set forth in R.C. 4905.26. ESP 3 Order at 68.

(72) Finally, IEU-Ohio claims that the ESP 3 Order is unlawful, because it presumed that the BTCR's rate design, as proposed by AEP Ohio, is reasonable and shifted the burden of demonstrating the unreasonableness of the proposed tariff to the intervenors, in violation of R.C. 4928.143(C)(1), which places the burden of proof on the Company. IEU-Ohio maintains that AEP Ohio did not provide any evidence regarding the effect of its proposed rate design on shopping customers, which the Commission nevertheless approved, while rejecting IEU-Ohio's alternative proposals. IEU-Ohio claims that its proposed rate design is presumptively reasonable, as it is consistent with PJM's billing determinants, which FERC has determined are just and reasonable.

(73) Constellation notes that, with respect to the BTCR, AEP Ohio put forth a proposal with supporting testimony, which was supported by some parties and opposed by others, including IEU-Ohio's recommended modifications to the rate design. Constellation asserts that, in adopting AEP Ohio's proposal, the Commission properly weighed the evidence and was simply not persuaded by IEU-Ohio's arguments or rate design recommendations. RESA also contends that the Commission properly evaluated all of the evidence and appropriately determined that IEU-Ohio's recommendations should not be adopted. For its part, AEP Ohio asserts that it provided ample evidence to support its BTCR proposal, including evidence that shows that the Company specifically designed the BTCR to be consistent with the current treatment of costs under the TCRR approved in the *ESP 2 Case*, as well as with the transmission riders of the other electric distribution utilities. AEP Ohio concludes that the Commission correctly found that the Company satisfied its burden of proof and that IEU-Ohio's proposed rate design was not supported by adequate analysis and would have an unknown impact on customer bills.

(74) In the ESP 3 Order, the Commission thoroughly considered and rejected IEU-Ohio's recommendations regarding the

rate design of the BTCR. As we noted, the impact of IEU-Ohio's proposals is unknown and, without any analysis, we determined that it would be inappropriate to modify the Company's cost allocation methodology, which is comparable to the treatment of costs under the TCRR. In adopting AEP Ohio's proposed BTCR, we cited the considerable evidence of record provided by the Company, as well as several other parties, that supports our decision to approve the rider. ESP 3 Order at 66-68. For these reasons, the Commission finds no merit in IEU-Ohio's contention that the burden of proof was shifted to the intervenors and, therefore, rehearing on this issue should be denied.

(75) RESA asserts that it was unjust and unreasonable to establish the new non-bypassable BTCR without first setting forth a specific process to ensure that bypassable transmission costs incurred prior to the beginning of the ESP 3 term are properly reconciled and excluded from the new rider. RESA adds that the Commission should establish a process to ensure that the BTCR is based on the correct costs at the beginning of the ESP 3 term.

(76) AEP Ohio points out, in response, that the Commission already has adequate safeguards in place to address RESA's concerns. AEP Ohio notes that, as the ESP 3 Order acknowledged, the TCRR will be reconciled in Case No. 14-1094-EL-RDR after it is eliminated effective June 1, 2015. AEP Ohio further notes that there is no need for the creation of a cost reconciliation process with respect to the BTCR, because Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4901:1-36 already provides such a process, with carrying charges applicable to any over- or under-recovery of costs.

(77) The Commission finds that RESA's request for rehearing is unnecessary and should be denied. As we specifically noted in the ESP 3 Order, any remaining over/under recovery balance associated with the TCRR, which will be eliminated effective June 1, 2015, will be addressed in Case No. 14-1094-EL-RDR, consistent with our recent decisions in that proceeding. ESP 3 Order at 68, citing *In re Ohio Power Co.*, Case No. 14-1094-EL-RDR, Finding and Order (Aug. 27, 2014) at 3, Finding and Order (Jan. 28, 2015) at 3. Further, as

AEP Ohio points out, Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4901:1-36 sets forth a process for the reconciliation of transmission costs.

IX. PURCHASE OF RECEIVABLES PROGRAM AND BAD DEBT RIDER

(78) AEP Ohio raises a number of arguments with respect to the Commission's modification of the Company's proposed POR program and BDR. First, AEP Ohio asserts that it was unreasonable for the Commission to defer several critical aspects of the POR program, which were already fully litigated in these proceedings, for further debate within the MDWG. AEP Ohio believes that there is no value in revisiting opposing positions through the MDWG. According to AEP Ohio, the Commission's modifications will raise costs, increase the risk of recovery for the Company, decrease operational efficiencies, and potentially increase customer frustration with inconsistent billing from year to year. AEP Ohio maintains that, because a POR program is not required under Ohio law and the Company will ultimately decide whether to implement the program, the Commission should approve the Company's program and BDR as proposed. Alternatively, AEP Ohio requests that the Commission direct that the Company be held harmless to any cost impact of the modified POR program and that the discussions of the MDWG not be subject to use against a party as an official position in the future.

(79) OPAE/APJN respond that, although the Commission should have simply rejected the proposed POR program and BDR, the Commission acted reasonably when it deferred resolution of the details of the approved POR program to another proceeding, as there are simply too many details to resolve in the present cases. OCC also asserts that it was reasonable and lawful for the Commission to defer the implementation details to a future proceeding, which, according to OCC, will provide the best opportunity for a collaborative resolution of the issues.

(80) In the ESP 3 Order, the Commission found that a POR program should be approved for AEP Ohio, with the implementation details to be discussed within the MDWG

and determined in a subsequent proceeding, following the filing of a detailed implementation plan by Staff no later than August 31, 2015. The Commission noted that the MDWG will provide an existing forum for discussion regarding the implementation of AEP Ohio's POR program and enable interested stakeholders to address matters such as the POR program rules, calculation of the discount rate, implementation and maintenance costs, collection rates and procedures, and the timing and other mechanics of the process by which the Company will purchase receivables from CRES providers. ESP 3 Order at 80-81. We find that our deferral of the implementation details to a future proceeding is a proper next step and well within the bounds of our discretion. As the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized, the Commission is vested with broad discretion to manage its dockets, including the discretion to decide how, in light of its internal organization and docket considerations, it may best proceed to manage and expedite the orderly flow of its business. *Duff v. Pub. Util. Comm.*, 56 Ohio St.2d 367, 384 N.E.2d 264 (1978); *Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy v. Pub. Util. Comm.*, 69 Ohio St.2d 559, 433 N.E.2d 212 (1982). We, therefore, find no error in our decision to address the implementation details in a future case and AEP Ohio's request for rehearing should be denied.

(81) Second, AEP Ohio argues that it was unreasonable for the Commission to include CRES providers' early termination fees as a commodity related charge subject to the POR program. AEP Ohio requests that the Commission clarify that commodity related charges includes only the charges related to the actual cost of generation and not other CRES related charges, including, but not limited to, early termination charges and charges for other services, such as weatherization, appliance control, and energy audits, that are provided by CRES providers.

(82) OCC agrees with AEP Ohio that CRES providers' early termination fees should not be considered commodity related charges. OCC argues that the inclusion of CRES providers' early termination fees in the POR program would constitute a barrier to reasonably priced service and harm

diversity and choice of supplier. RESA replies that an early termination fee should be considered a rate design component that seeks to capture a fixed cost that may otherwise not be collected. RESA also asserts that, if the Commission elects to provide clarification on this issue, it should determine that commodity costs include all cost components necessary to provide bundled energy service, including generation costs, transmission costs, capacity costs, ancillary services, labor, taxes, and administrative cost components necessary to bring physical power to the electric distribution service area.

(83) The Commission expressly stated, in the ESP 3 Order, that only commodity related charges may be included in AEP Ohio's POR program. ESP 3 Order at 80. To the extent that it is necessary to do so, the Commission clarifies that commodity related charges means charges that are directly tied to the actual cost of generation and does not include early termination fees, which are not a necessary component of generation service.

(84) As its third argument, AEP Ohio claims that it was unreasonable and unlawful for the Commission to allow CRES providers to determine which of its eligible customers should be included in the POR program. AEP Ohio contends that the Commission should require all CRES providers using consolidated billing to participate in the POR program. Alternatively, AEP Ohio requests that the Commission clarify that each CRES provider may decide whether it will participate in the POR program and, if it elects to do so, all of its eligible customers on consolidated billing must be included in the program.

(85) Similarly, in its fourth ground for rehearing with respect to the POR program, AEP Ohio maintains that it was unreasonable and unlawful for the Commission to modify the Company's proposed POR program to afford CRES providers on consolidated billing a yearly option to participate in the program. AEP Ohio asserts that, in allowing CRES providers to determine whether to participate in the POR program, the Company will be required to maintain two processes in its systems and call

centers with greater costs and decreased efficiencies, while shopping customers will be offered different payment plan options based on their CRES provider. AEP Ohio, therefore, reiterates its request that the POR program be mandatory for all CRES providers that use consolidated billing. In the alternative, AEP Ohio proposes that CRES providers should be required to participate on a five-year basis in order to provide recovery for programming and ensure consistency for customers. As another option, AEP Ohio notes that a consolidated billing charge for CRES providers that choose not to participate in the POR program could be imposed to recover the costs to maintain the necessary additional processes and systems that support the non-participating CRES providers.

(86) Direct Energy counters that CRES providers using consolidated billing should not be required to participate in a POR program that includes commodity only charges, as it would eliminate their option of having AEP Ohio bill and collect for non-commodity items, such as in-home warranty products. Direct Energy notes that the convenience of paying for related products and services on one bill is important to customers. Direct Energy further notes that CRES providers should not be precluded from offering demand response or energy efficiency types of products, air conditioner tune-ups, or any other energy related service that might improve a customer's demand side energy usage. According to Direct Energy, the Commission reasonably concluded that CRES providers should be permitted to continue to participate in consolidated billing, without also being required to participate in the POR program. Direct Energy asserts that AEP Ohio offers no legal support for its arguments and raises nothing new for the Commission's consideration, while the Company's newly proposed alternatives have no record support or vetting by the other parties.

(87) RESA asserts that CRES providers should have the maximum amount of flexibility when it comes to billing options, so that they are not limited in their product offerings. RESA, therefore, argues that the Commission

should clarify that, under the POR program, CRES providers may provide dual billing to certain customers and use consolidated billing for other customers. RESA believes that, for customers on consolidated billing, CRES providers should be required to include either all or none of such customers in the POR program.

(88) In the ESP 3 Order, the Commission directed that participation in the POR program by CRES providers that elect consolidated billing must not be mandatory. ESP 3 Order at 80. We, thus, concluded that CRES providers should maintain the flexibility to participate in consolidated billing, without being required to participate in the POR program. We clarify, however, that it was not our intention to enable CRES providers, if they elect to participate in the POR program, to include some customers but not others. With this clarification, AEP Ohio's third and fourth grounds for rehearing should be denied.

(89) In its fifth ground for rehearing, AEP Ohio argues that it was unreasonable and unlawful for the Commission to forego the creation of a mechanism for the recovery of the implementation and administrative costs of the dual-system POR program approved by the Commission, which will be more than the costs projected for the Company's proposed program. AEP Ohio claims that it is unclear whether the increased fee amount is a matter for the MDWG to determine or a compliance filing for the Company at a later date. AEP Ohio further claims that, if the administrative fee was not approved by the Commission, the ESP 3 Order unreasonably and unlawfully requires the Company to subsidize CRES providers, in violation of R.C. 4928.02(H). AEP Ohio, therefore, requests that the Commission approve the POR program and BDR as proposed or, in the alternative, clarify that the Company will be held harmless to all administrative and implementation costs. AEP Ohio adds that the Commission should validate the administrative fee creation for all CRES providers until the cost of implementation is recovered.

(90) The Commission finds that AEP Ohio's request for rehearing on this issue should be denied. In the ESP 3 Order, we

determined that the details of the POR program, including implementation and maintenance costs, should be discussed by interested stakeholders within the MDWG. ESP 3 Order at 81. We fully expect that such costs will be addressed in the detailed implementation plan to be developed by the MDWG and filed by Staff. We clarify, however, that AEP Ohio should be permitted to recover the implementation and maintenance costs associated with the POR program.

(91) Next, AEP Ohio asserts that it was unreasonable for the Commission to require plans for supplier consolidated billing and switching provisions in the implementation filing due on August 31, 2015. AEP Ohio requests that the Commission clarify that issues not related to the implementation of the POR program were not intended to be included in the plan for filing on August 31, 2015.

(92) Noting that the Commission has already approved rules regarding supplier consolidated billing, Direct Energy requests that the Commission affirm that supplier consolidated billing is a priority and direct that the MDWG create and file a plan to implement supplier consolidated billing in AEP Ohio's service territory no later than six months from the date of this Second Entry on Rehearing, in order to ensure that the issue is dealt with promptly by the MDWG, while still maintaining the Commission's ability to review the details before implementation.

(93) RESA believes that it is appropriate to resolve the mechanics of supplier consolidated billing in the MDWG, although RESA requests that a deadline be imposed on the group's resolution of this issue.

(94) In the ESP 3 Order, the Commission noted that the recommendations regarding supplier consolidated billing offered by Direct Energy and IGS and RESA's objections to the switching provisions in tariff sheets 103-20D and 103-41D should be further discussed within the MDWG. ESP 3 Order at 81. Although the Commission agrees that it is reasonable to include these issues among the other issues being addressed within the MDWG, it was not the Commission's intention that these issues be included within

the detailed implementation plan for the POR program or to establish a particular timeframe for their resolution. With this clarification, rehearing on this issue should be denied.

(95) AEP Ohio also contends that it was unreasonable and unlawful for the Commission to approve a BDR to recover generation related costs above the amount already being recovered through base rates, because the record does not contain the amount in base rates related to CRES receivables and generation related uncollectible expense. AEP Ohio asserts that it is unreasonable to compare the generation portion of the bill to the entire $12.2 million baseline from the Company's most recent distribution rate case proceedings, which includes generation, transmission, and distribution related bad debt, because the impact of the Commission's modification will be to lower the amount of recovery approved in base rates without any opportunity or record justifying the decrease. *In re Columbus Southern Power Co. and Ohio Power Co.*, Case No. 11-351-EL-AIR, et al. (*Distribution Rate Case*), Opinion and Order (Dec. 14, 2011). AEP Ohio requests that the Commission approve the BDR, as proposed by the Company, or, alternatively, allow the Company to provide new evidence regarding the comparable baseline level of generation related bad debt as a subset of the baseline established in the *Distribution Rate Case*.

(96) The Commission determined, in the ESP 3 Order, that the BDR should be limited to CRES receivables and generation related uncollectible expenses above the amount already being recovered through base distribution rates and, given that the implementation details of the POR program will be resolved in another docket, should initially be established as a placeholder rider set at zero. We also noted that, as proposed by AEP Ohio, the BDR would flow the bad debt of both shopping and non-shopping customers, whether generation or distribution related, through a single rider, which may cause an anticompetitive subsidy under R.C. 4928.02(H), and is contrary to the practice of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. (Duke), which maintains separate uncollectible expense riders for generation and distribution related bad

debt. ESP 3 Order at 81. We clarify that it was our intention to limit the BDR to CRES receivables and generation related uncollectible expenses above the generation related amount that is already being recovered through base distribution rates. Following implementation of the POR program, AEP Ohio may seek recovery of CRES receivables and generation related uncollectible expenses through the BDR, providing, among other information in support of its application for recovery, the appropriate baseline level of generation related bad debt as a portion of the $12.2 million baseline that was established in the *Distribution Rate Case*. With this clarification, AEP Ohio's request for rehearing should be denied.

(97) Additionally, AEP Ohio argues that it was unreasonable for the Commission to order the Company to implement a modified POR program that does not allow the Company to disconnect customers for non-payment of CRES charges. AEP Ohio contends that the Commission's denial of the requested waiver of Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-18-10(D), as contrary to R.C. 4928.10(D)(3), is inconsistent with the Commission's current practice of allowing for the disconnection of service for non-payment of CRES receivables in both the gas and electric industries. AEP Ohio asserts that, if the Commission clarifies that CRES receivables purchased by the Company become a regulated debt of the Company, as other surrounding deregulated markets have done, the waiver is not necessary and the Company may then disconnect for non-payment of its regulated costs under the POR program.

(98) Noting that R.C. 4928.10(D)(3) prohibits disconnection of non-competitive service for non-payment of a competitive service, OPAE/APJN assert that AEP Ohio cannot invent a way around the law by dubbing a charge for a competitive service as a charge for non-competitive service. OCC argues that customers should not be subject to collection practices that include the threat of disconnection for the non-payment of unregulated services, including CRES charges, and should not lose their ability to return to SSO service due to disconnection for non-payment of such charges.

(99) The Commission finds that AEP Ohio's request for rehearing on this issue should be denied. In the ESP 3 Order, we denied AEP Ohio's request for a waiver of Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-18-10(D), noting that it was counter to the prohibition on disconnection for non-payment of CRES-related charges, as set forth in R.C. 4928.10(D)(3), and that the Commission cannot grant a rule waiver that is inconsistent with the statute. As we noted, R.C. 4928.10(D)(3) requires the Commission to adopt rules regarding a number of specific consumer protections, including, with respect to disconnection and service termination, a prohibition against blocking, or authorizing the blocking of, customer access to a non-competitive retail electric service when a customer is delinquent in payments to the electric utility or electric services company for a competitive retail electric service. ESP 3 Order at 82. We find that the consumer protections afforded by the statute would be defeated if CRES receivables are simply reclassified as a non-competitive retail service under the POR program.

(100) Finally, AEP Ohio maintains that it was unreasonable that the Commission created a greater liability on the Company by denying the right to disconnect customers for non-payment of receivables, but did not approve the Company's proposed late payment fee to encourage timely payment, despite the fact that other Ohio utilities already impose a late payment fee of 1.5 percent for residential customers.

(101) OCC responds that AEP Ohio cites no statute, rule, or precedent that would require the Commission to consider the proposed late payment fee in the present proceedings as opposed to a future distribution rate case. OCC adds that, by reviewing this issue in a distribution rate case, the Commission would be able to more thoroughly evaluate the impact of the proposed late payment fee on the affordability of service.

(102) The Commission reasonably determined, in the ESP 3 Order, that the merits of a late payment charge for residential customers would be more appropriately addressed in a distribution rate case. ESP 3 Order at 81-82. We find that our determination to more closely consider this issue was

reasonable and, accordingly, AEP Ohio's request for rehearing should be denied.

(103) OPAE/APJN argue that the Commission acted unreasonably and unlawfully when it found that a POR program would provide significant customer benefits, including the likelihood of increased numbers of active CRES providers and product offerings, and approved the establishment of the BDR. Specifically, OPAE/APJN contend that the POR program will impose significant costs on customers without any quantifiable benefits; there is no evidence that additional CRES providers will enter the market as a result of the program; and there is no need to encourage competition in AEP Ohio's service territory, given the large number of CRES providers that are already competing for customers. Regarding the Commission's approval of the BDR, OPAE/APJN assert that the Commission unlawfully shifted the collection risk from CRES providers to all distribution customers, in violation of R.C. 4928.02(H). OPAE/APJN claim that the BDR is unlawful, as it will collect generation related charges through distribution rates.

(104) According to AEP Ohio, the Commission relied upon the record in finding that a POR program will provide customer benefits and increase competition. AEP Ohio asserts that the record evidence thoroughly supports the Commission's findings and that OPAE/APJN's arguments to the contrary are without merit. Regarding the BDR, AEP Ohio contends that it was appropriate for the Commission to approve the BDR in these proceedings as opposed to a base rate case and that the POR program was authorized for the benefit of shopping and non-shopping customers and, therefore, there is no unlawful subsidy or violation of R.C. 4928.02(H), contrary to OPAE/APJN's claims.

(105) In the ESP 3 Order, the Commission found, based on the evidence of record, that a POR program will result in significant customer benefits, such as the likelihood of increased numbers of active CRES providers and product offerings in AEP Ohio's service territory, which occurred following the implementation of a POR program in Duke's

service territory. We also modified AEP Ohio's proposed BDR, limiting the rider to incremental CRES receivables and generation-related uncollectible expenses, in order to avoid the type of anticompetitive subsidy prohibited under R.C. 4928.02(H). In reaching these decisions, we thoroughly considered and rejected the arguments raised again by OPAE/APJN on rehearing. ESP 3 Order at 76, 81, 95. Accordingly, we find that OPAE/APJN's request for rehearing should be denied.

(106) RESA contends that it was unjust and unreasonable to require an industry review of the POR program through the MDWG, given that the POR program only impacts AEP Ohio and its customers. RESA asserts that the industry-wide MDWG, which already has a number of issues to debate, is not the appropriate forum for a discussion of the implementation details of AEP Ohio's POR program. RESA points out that not all members of the MDWG have an interest in AEP Ohio's POR program and that it is more reasonable for interested stakeholders to meet separately to discuss the implementation details. RESA believes that a better approach is to direct that AEP Ohio submit, within 60 days, a POR program plan that meets the requirements set forth by the Commission in the ESP 3 Order.

(107) In response, AEP Ohio notes that, like RESA, the Company has concerns with the Commission's delegation of issues to the MDWG. AEP Ohio believes, however, that RESA fails to recognize that the Company will not implement a POR program that harms the Company, which will change the focus of the MDWG. AEP Ohio asserts that, if the Commission sustains its modifications to the POR program proposed by the Company, the MDWG's efforts will consist of stakeholders attempting to create a POR program that results in no harm to the Company. AEP Ohio concludes that the Commission should deny RESA's request for rehearing on this issue and instead adopt the POR program proposed by the Company in its application and testimony.

(108) The Commission recognizes that some participants in the MDWG may not be concerned with the implementation details of AEP Ohio's POR program. In the ESP 3 Order, we

specifically directed that interested stakeholders should participate in the MDWG's process of developing a detailed implementation plan to be filed by Staff. ESP 3 Order at 81. The Commission believes that it is reasonable for a subset of the MDWG to address implementation of AEP Ohio's POR program. RESA's request for rehearing on this issue should, therefore, be denied.

(109) RESA argues that it was unjust and unreasonable to require that supplier consolidated billing and certain tariff language issues be discussed by the MDWG, without first establishing any parameters for such discussions. RESA, therefore, recommends that the Commission direct that Staff file a report by August 2015 that identifies how supplier consolidated billing should be provided and addresses RESA's concerns regarding tariff sheets 103-20D and 103-41D.

(110) AEP Ohio claims that RESA's proposal is aggressive and contrary to RESA's belief that the MDWG already has enough to debate. AEP Ohio asserts that RESA's request for rehearing should be denied, as there is nothing in the record to elevate the issue of supplier consolidated billing to priority treatment through a quick report by Staff and an accelerated process ahead of all of the other issues that the MDWG is currently discussing.

(111) The Commission finds that RESA's request for rehearing should be denied. As stated in the ESP 3 Order, the Commission believes that the recommendations regarding supplier consolidated billing offered by Direct Energy and IGS and RESA's objections to the switching provisions in tariff sheets 103-20D and 103-41D are appropriate for further discussion within the MDWG. ESP 3 Order at 81. However, as mentioned above, it was not the Commission's intention to establish a particular timeframe for the MDWG's discussions regarding these issues. The MDWG was established as a forum facilitated by Staff, in which issues related to the development of the competitive market are discussed by interested stakeholders. *CRES Market Case*, Finding and Order (Mar. 26, 2014) at 23. The Commission recognizes that a number of issues have already been

assigned to the MDWG for consideration, including the recent addition of the detailed implementation plan for AEP Ohio's POR program, and we intend to address the MDWG's priority of current tasks by subsequent entry in another proceeding.

X. CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND COST OF CAPITAL

(112) OCC maintains that a return on equity (ROE) of 10.2 percent is excessive, because it does not recognize that AEP Ohio is now a distribution only utility, without the greater risk associated with a generation business, and that the Company collects virtually all of its revenues from customers through numerous riders. OCC adds that, since AEP Ohio's ROE of 10.2 percent was approved in the *Distribution Rate Case*, interest rates and other costs of capital have declined. OCC argues that the Commission's decision to adopt the ROE approved in the *Distribution Rate Case* is not based upon the facts of record, in violation of R.C. 4903.09.

(113) AEP Ohio responds that the Commission considered the evidence in the record in making its determination regarding the ROE. AEP Ohio notes that the record contains a range of ROE recommendations from 9 to 11 percent and that the 10.2 percent ROE adopted by the Commission is within that range.

(114) In the ESP 3 Order, the Commission noted that the record reflects a range in ROE recommendations, from OCC's proposed ROE of 9.00 percent up to AEP Ohio's requested ROE of 10.65 percent. We further noted that OCC's recommended ROE is insufficient to enable AEP Ohio to maintain its financial integrity and protect its ability to attract capital, while the Company's proposed ROE failed to adequately account for its reduced exposure to risk from regulatory lag in light of the DIR and numerous other riders. For these reasons, the Commission found that it was appropriate to maintain the ROE of 10.2 percent authorized for AEP Ohio in the *Distribution Rate Case*, which we specifically determined was just and reasonable, as well as supported by the evidence of record in the present

proceedings. ESP 3 Order at 84. OCC's arguments in favor of a lower ROE have already been thoroughly considered and rejected by the Commission. ESP 3 Order at 83-84. We affirm our finding that, based on the record before us, 10.2 percent is an appropriate ROE and, accordingly, find that rehearing on this issue should be denied.

(115) Additionally, OCC contends that the Commission should have considered other factors that merit a reduction to AEP Ohio's ROE, such as provider of last resort (POLR), retail stability, and capacity charges authorized in prior ESPs.

(116) In response, AEP Ohio argues that OCC's attempt to incorporate issues related to the Company's POLR, rate stability, and capacity charges from prior unrelated proceedings is improper and should be rejected. AEP Ohio contends that OCC should not be permitted to use the rehearing process to relitigate its disagreement with how the Commission resolved those issues in the prior cases. AEP Ohio also points out that, if past or present decisions result in the Company's collection of significantly excessive earnings, the Commission will have the ability to remedy such overearnings in the manner set forth in R.C. 4928.143(F).

(117) The Commission finds no merit in OCC's contention that charges authorized in prior ESP proceedings should have been considered in the course of establishing AEP Ohio's ROE in the present cases. As discussed above, the ROE that we approved for AEP Ohio is properly based on the record before us. We find that OCC's request for rehearing is an attempt to reverse prior Commission orders and, therefore, it should be denied.

(118) IEU-Ohio argues that the ESP 3 Order is unlawful and unreasonable, because the Commission approved an ROE of 10.2 percent based on the terms of the stipulation and recommendation (stipulation) adopted in the *Distribution Rate Case*, which expressly provides that it has no precedential effect. IEU-Ohio notes that, in another proceeding, the Commission determined that the stipulated ROE from the *Distribution Rate Case* could not be relied upon

by Staff to support its litigation position. *In re Ohio Power Co. and Columbus Southern Power Co.*, Case No. 10-2929-EL-UNC, Opinion and Order (July 2, 2012) at 34. IEU-Ohio contends, however, that the Commission, in the ESP 3 Order, has sent a clear message that any party that may seek to resolve contested issues through a settlement package must assume that the Commission will selectively extract one aspect of the settlement package and use it procedurally and substantively to resolve the contested issues in another proceeding.

(119) OCC also claims that the Commission unreasonably approved an ROE that was agreed to as part of the comprehensive settlement in the *Distribution Rate Case*, which should only be considered reasonable in the context of the entire stipulation and should not be used as precedent in these proceedings, consistent with the terms of the stipulation.

(120) Regarding the fact that the 10.2 percent ROE is consistent with the recommended and adopted ROE from the stipulation in the *Distribution Rate Case*, AEP Ohio points out that, although the Commission acknowledged this fact in the ESP 3 Order, the Commission based its decision on the record. AEP Ohio adds that the Commission's recognition in the ESP 3 Order of the stipulation in the *Distribution Rate Case* is not inconsistent with the term of the stipulation prohibiting it from being cited as precedent.

(121) In the ESP 3 Order, we acknowledged that an ROE of 10.2 percent was approved in the *Distribution Rate Case*, pursuant to a stipulation submitted by the parties in those proceedings, which was intended to have no precedential effect. However, we noted that, although the parties may agree that the provisions contained within a settlement agreement should not be used as precedent in other proceedings, such limitations do not extend to the Commission. ESP 3 Order at 84, citing *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 10. Further, as discussed above, the Commission determined that, based on the evidence of record in the present cases, it was appropriate to maintain AEP Ohio's ROE of 10.2 percent, given that it fell within the

range of recommendations put forth by AEP Ohio and the intervenors, and would enable the Company to maintain its financial integrity and ability to attract capital, as well as account for the Company's reduced exposure to regulatory lag in light of the DIR and other riders. ESP 3 Order at 84. Accordingly, we find no merit in the arguments raised by IEU-Ohio and OCC and their requests for rehearing should, thus, be denied.

XI. STATUTORY TEST

(122) AEP Ohio requests that the Commission clarify its determination that the proposed ESP, as modified, is more favorable in the aggregate than a market rate offer (MRO). Specifically, AEP Ohio asserts that the modified ESP provides $53,064,000 in quantifiable benefits that would not be possible under an MRO, as opposed to the $44,064,000 related to the Company's voluntary extension of the RDCR. AEP Ohio notes that the Commission modified the Company's RDCR proposal to continue to include $1 million annually, or $3 million over the ESP term, to fund the Neighbor-to-Neighbor bill payment assistance program to support at-risk and low-income customers in the Company's service area. AEP Ohio further notes that the Commission directed the Company to continue the Ohio Growth Fund by contributing $2 million annually, or $6 million over the ESP term. AEP Ohio, therefore, contends that the Commission should include, in its analysis of the MRO/ESP statutory test, the additional $9 million in quantifiable benefits that the modified ESP provides, resulting in a total of $53,064,000 in quantifiable benefits over the ESP term that would not be possible under an MRO.

(123) OMAEG replies that, although the Commission's modification of the ESP to include $1 million in annual funding for the Neighbor-to-Neighbor program over the term of the ESP will provide bill payment assistance for at-risk customers, it does nothing to alleviate the disparate treatment of customer classes when considering any potential quantitative benefits of the ESP. With respect to the $2 million annual funding for the Ohio Growth Fund over the term of the ESP, OMAEG asserts that, although

such funding may provide some economic benefit for non-residential customers, the ratio of residential to non-residential quantitative benefits is still considerably skewed and, therefore, the Commission should find that the ESP does not provide more customer benefits than would be available under an MRO.

(124) OCC disputes AEP Ohio's assertion that the annual funding of the Neighbor-to-Neighbor program and the Ohio Growth Fund should be counted as quantitative benefits of the ESP. OCC argues that the funding for the Neighbor-to-Neighbor program cannot be included in the statutory test, because the funding does not fit within any of the items specified in R.C. 4928.143(B)(2). OCC also points out that the funding for the Neighbor-to-Neighbor program would be available under an MRO, in conjunction with a distribution rate case, and, therefore, the funding should be considered a wash, consistent with the Commission's method of performing the MRO/ESP analysis. With respect to the funding of the Ohio Growth Fund, OCC notes that the Commission directed that shareholders contribute $2 million per year, or portion thereof, during the term of the ESP. OCC claims that the funding is, therefore, indeterminate and cannot be quantified as a benefit of the ESP. OCC also points out that the funding of the Ohio Growth Fund was not quantified by the Commission as part of the MRO/ESP analysis in AEP Ohio's prior ESP proceedings.

(125) In the ESP 3 Order, the Commission determined that the ESP, including its pricing and all other terms and conditions, including any deferrals and any future recovery of deferrals, as modified by the Commission in the ESP 3 Order, is more favorable in the aggregate as compared to the expected results that would otherwise apply under R.C. 4928.142. With respect to quantitative benefits of the ESP, the Commission found that the modified ESP is better in the aggregate than an MRO by $44,064,000, which is the amount associated with AEP Ohio's voluntary commitment to continue the residential distribution credit over the course of the ESP term. ESP 3 Order at 94-95. We agree with AEP Ohio that the funding for the Neighbor-to-Neighbor

program and the Ohio Growth Fund provides a known quantifiable benefit under the ESP. Contrary to OCC's assertion, there is no guarantee that such funding would be the outcome under an MRO, in conjunction with a distribution rate case. In response to OMAEG, we note that the MRO/ESP test set forth in R.C. 4928.143(C)(1) does not require that the quantifiable benefits of an ESP apply to all customer classes or that we undertake a class-by-class analysis in our evaluation of the ESP. Rather, the statute requires consideration of whether the ESP is more favorable in the aggregate than an MRO. As we stated in the ESP 3 Order, the Commission must ensure that the modified ESP as a total package is considered. ESP 3 Order at 94. Accounting for the additional benefits of the Neighbor-to-Neighbor program and the Ohio Growth Fund, we find that the ESP, as modified, results in a total of $53,064,000 in quantifiable benefits over the ESP term that would not be possible under an MRO. Accordingly, AEP Ohio's request for clarification on this issue should be granted.

(126) In its application for rehearing, OCC contends that the Commission unreasonably and unlawfully found that the ESP, as modified, is more favorable in the aggregate to customers than an MRO, and that the Commission exceeded its authority in performing the statutory test. Specifically, OCC claims that the $44,064,000 attributable to the residential distribution credit should not be considered a quantitative benefit of the ESP, because the credit was already recognized as a benefit of the prior ESP. OCC believes that the continuation of the credit is merely a mechanism to mitigate excess revenue collection under the DIR and is, therefore, not a benefit afforded by the new ESP. With respect to the placeholder PPA rider, OCC argues that, if costs are expected to be recovered during the ESP term, a determination cannot be made as to whether the ESP is more favorable than an MRO, because AEP Ohio has failed to sustain its burden of proof on this issue. Next, OCC maintains that the Commission failed to recognize the costs associated with the DIR in its analysis of the statutory test. OCC maintains that the statutory test does not allow the Commission to account for the results of a distribution rate

case in its analysis and, even if it does, the Commission must compare the additional revenues collected under the DIR to the revenues that would be collected by means of a distribution rate case. Finally, according to OCC, qualitative benefits should not be included and considered as part of the statutory test and, in any event, consumers do not benefit from any of the qualitative factors identified by the Commission. In particular, OCC claims that the Commission erred in identifying, as qualitative benefits of the ESP, AEP Ohio's prior commitment to implement fully market-based rates; improved system reliability through the DIR and other distribution riders, with no recognition of the accelerated cost recovery; and the furtherance of state policy objectives set forth in R.C. 4928.02, without adequate explanation in violation of R.C. 4903.09. OCC adds that, while the Commission must review an ESP to ensure that its provisions do not violate state policy, only those items expressly listed in R.C. 4928.143(B) can be considered a part of the ESP for purposes of the test performed under R.C. 4928.143(C)(1).

(127) OMAEG also argues that the Commission erred in determining that AEP Ohio's proposed ESP, as modified, is more favorable in the aggregate than an MRO. Specifically, OMAEG asserts that the Commission's determination that the ESP is quantitatively more favorable in the aggregate than an MRO over the term of the ESP, by $44,064,000, is misleading, as the $44,064,000 will benefit only the residential ratepayers. OMAEG further asserts that it is unclear as to whether the qualitative benefits associated with continuation of the DIR and other distribution related riders will come to fruition without the imposition of additional distribution costs on ratepayers during the term of the ESP. Next, OMAEG contends that, if moving more quickly to market-based pricing than would be expected under an MRO represents a qualitative benefit of the ESP, as the Commission claims, then establishing the PPA rider as a financial limitation on shopping that would purportedly alleviate the risk associated with market-based pricing represents a step in the opposite direction and is not a benefit of the ESP. Finally, OMAEG maintains that,

although the PPA rider and BDR have been set at zero as placeholder riders, the Commission must nevertheless consider the effect that the establishment of those riders in an ESP will have on customers, including AEP Ohio's future recovery of costs, as compared to the expected results that would otherwise apply under an MRO.

(128) AEP Ohio replies that the continuation of the residential distribution credit will provide a substantial quantitative benefit during the ESP term, because, absent the Company's voluntary commitment to continue the credit, residential rates would increase on June 1, 2015, by the amount of the credit. AEP Ohio adds that there is no basis for OCC's contention that the credit is a mechanism to mitigate excess revenue collection under the DIR. In response to OMAEG, AEP Ohio points out that there is no requirement that the quantifiable benefits of an ESP must apply to all customer classes in order to be counted for purposes of the statutory test. AEP Ohio also asserts that the $2 million annual funding required by the Commission for the Ohio Growth Fund provides quantifiable benefits for all customers. Next, AEP Ohio argues that the incremental costs of the DIR, ESRR, and other distribution riders are properly excluded from the MRO/ESP analysis. AEP Ohio points out that, despite OCC's position to the contrary, nothing in the language of R.C. 4928.143(C)(1) or any rule of statutory construction requires the Commission to ignore the results of the inevitable distribution rate cases that would occur during the period of the alternative MRO, in order to enable the electric distribution utility to maintain and improve the quality and reliability of its distribution services. With respect to the placeholder BDR and PPA rider, AEP Ohio notes that, where the future costs of placeholder riders are unknown or speculative, the Commission has properly declined to include any estimates of such riders' costs in the MRO/ESP analysis. AEP Ohio asserts that there is no better estimate of the projected cost impact of both riders than zero. Regarding non-quantifiable benefits, AEP Ohio contends that the statutory test does not require the Commission to ignore the non-quantifiable provisions of an ESP that provide significant benefits when determining

whether the ESP is more favorable in the aggregate compared to the expected results that an MRO would provide. AEP Ohio also maintains that OCC mistakenly conflates the provisions of the ESP with the benefits that those provisions provide. In response to OCC's argument that the more rapid implementation of market based rates is not a qualitative benefit of the ESP, AEP Ohio emphasizes that, if the Company had substituted an MRO for its proposed ESP, the progress towards completion of the transition to competition would have become much more uncertain, with adverse repercussions for all stakeholders. Next, AEP Oho contends that it is appropriate for the Commission to take into account, when evaluating whether and to what extent an ESP is more favorable than an MRO, instances where the provisions of the ESP provide benefits by promoting the state policies enumerated in R.C. 4928.02 in ways that the MRO may not be able to do. AEP Ohio believes that OCC's criticism again confuses the restriction that an ESP may only include items listed in R.C. 4928.143(B) with the need to evaluate the benefits, quantitative and qualitative, that those items provide in performing the MRO/ESP analysis required by the statute. AEP Ohio also notes that the Commission, throughout the ESP 3 Order, specifically identified how particular ESP provisions promote specific aspects of state policy. Finally, AEP Ohio responds to the arguments of OCC and OMAEG that the fact that there is not an absolute commitment from the Company not to file a distribution rate case during the ESP term does not diminish the conclusion that the DIR, ESRR, and other distribution related riders will mitigate the potential need for such a rate case and the associated time and expense.

(129) The Commission finds that OCC's and OMAEG's requests for rehearing should be denied. Initially, we affirm our finding that the ESP, as modified, is more favorable in the aggregate than the expected results under R.C. 4928.142. ESP 3 Order at 94-95. In response to OCC's claims regarding the residential distribution credit, we again note that AEP Ohio has voluntarily agreed to extend the credit, which would otherwise expire on May 31, 2015, and, therefore, it is a quantifiable benefit in the amount of $44,064,000 over the

three-year term of the ESP. ESP 3 Order at 94. There is no evidence in the record that indicates that the residential distribution credit is necessary to mitigate excess revenue collection under the DIR, as OCC claims, and there is no requirement to perform a class-by-class analysis, contrary to OMAEG's position. Further, we affirm our finding that it is not necessary to attempt to quantify the impact of the PPA rider or BDR in the MRO/ESP analysis, given that both placeholder riders have been set at zero, and any future costs associated with these riders are unknown and subject to future proceedings. *ESP 2 Case*, Entry on Rehearing (Jan. 30, 2013) at 9; ESP Order at 94. We also affirm that it was unnecessary to consider the revenue requirements associated with the DIR, ESRR, and other approved distribution related riders, because the results should be considered the same whether incremental distribution investments and expenses are recovered through the ESP or through a distribution rate case, in conjunction with an MRO. *In re Ohio Edison Co., The Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., and The Toledo Edison Co.,* Case No. 12-1230-EL-SSO, Opinion and Order (July 18, 2012) at 55-56; ESP 3 Order at 94.

(130) Turning to OCC's and OMAEG's arguments related to the qualitative benefits of the ESP, the Commission again finds that that there are indeed qualitative benefits that make the ESP, as modified by the Commission, more favorable in the aggregate than the expected results under R.C. 4928.142. We previously determined that the ESP furthers the state policy found in R.C. 4928.02; enables AEP Ohio to implement fully market based prices as of June 1, 2015; and should enable the Company to hold base distribution rates constant over the ESP period, while making significant investments in distribution infrastructure and improving service reliability. As noted in the ESP 3 Order, the evidence of record reflects that these are additional benefits that will occur as a result of the ESP. ESP Order at 95. We, therefore, do not agree with OMAEG's assertion that these benefits are not likely to come to fruition. We also disagree with OCC's contention that the non-quantifiable provisions of an ESP may not be considered in conducting the MRO/ESP analysis. R.C.

4928.143(C)(1) specifically requires the Commission to determine whether the ESP, including not only pricing but also all other terms and conditions, is more favorable in the aggregate than an MRO. We agree with AEP Ohio that OCC wrongly conflates the restriction that an ESP may only include items listed in R.C. 4928.143(B) with the need to weigh the quantitative and qualitative benefits that those items provide, in performing the MRO/ESP test. Finally, we thoroughly explained and relied upon the evidence of record in enumerating specific qualitative benefits of the ESP. ESP 3 Order at 95. Regarding the more rapid implementation of market based pricing afforded by the ESP, we agree with AEP Ohio that, if the Company had proposed an MRO instead of an ESP, the completion of the transition to such pricing would have been more uncertain. We also believe that it was appropriate to note that the ESP promotes the state policies enumerated in R.C. 4928.02, in a manner that may not be possible under an MRO, and we explained throughout the ESP 3 Order how specific provisions of the ESP promote state policy, contrary to OCC's claims. Finally, we find that, although AEP Ohio has not committed to refrain from initiating a distribution rate case during the ESP term, the fact remains that the DIR, ESRR, and other distribution related riders should enable the Company to hold base distribution rates constant over the term of the ESP, while continuing to invest in distribution infrastructure and improve service reliability.

It is, therefore,

ORDERED, That the applications for rehearing of the Commission's February 25, 2015 Opinion and Order be denied, in part, and granted, in part, as set forth herein. It is, further,

ORDERED, That a copy of this Second Entry on Rehearing be served on all parties of record.

THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO



Andre T. Porter, Chairman



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

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Entered in the Journal
MAY 28 2015

Barcy F. McNeal
Secretary

BEFORE

THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

In the Matter of the Application of Ohio Power Company for Authority to Establish a Standard Service Offer Pursuant to R.C. 4928.143, in the Form of an Electric Security Plan.	)))))	Case No. 13-2385-EL-SSO
In the Matter of the Application of Ohio Power Company for Approval of Certain Accounting Authority.	)))	Case No. 13-2386-EL-AAM

OPINION AND ORDER

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The Commission, having considered the above-entitled application, and the record in these proceedings, hereby issues its Opinion and Order in these matters.

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Kevin R. Schmidt, 88 East Broad Street, Suite 1770, Columbus, Ohio 43215, on behalf of Energy Professionals of Ohio.

OPINION:

I. HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Ohio Power Company d/b/a AEP Ohio (AEP Ohio or the Company)[1] is a public utility as defined in R.C. 4905.02 and an electric utility as defined in R.C. 4928.01(A)(11), and, as such, is subject to the jurisdiction of this Commission.

On December 20, 2013, AEP Ohio filed an application for a standard service offer (SSO) pursuant to R.C. 4928.141. The application is for approval of an electric security plan (ESP) in accordance with R.C. 4928.143. As proposed, AEP Ohio's ESP would commence on June 1, 2015, and continue through May 31, 2018, and will be referred to herein as ESP 3. According to the application, for all customer classes, customers are expected to experience average annual rate changes ranging from -27 percent to 6 percent during the ESP period. The application proposes the recovery of other costs through various riders during the term of the ESP. In addition, the application contains provisions addressing distribution service, economic development, alternative energy resource requirements, and energy efficiency requirements.

By Entry issued on December 27, 2013, a technical conference regarding AEP Ohio's application was scheduled, which occurred on January 8, 2014. By Entry issued on January 24, 2014, the procedural schedule in these matters was established. A prehearing conference was held on May 27, 2014, and the evidentiary hearing commenced on June 3, 2014, and concluded on June 30, 2014. The Commission also scheduled five local public hearings throughout AEP Ohio's service territory. AEP Ohio filed proof of publication of notice of the local public hearings on June 4, 2014.

The following parties were granted intervention by Entries dated April 21, 2014, and May 21, 2014: Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU-Ohio); Ohio Consumers' Counsel (OCC); Ohio Energy Group (OEG); Dominion Retail, Inc. d/b/a Dominion Energy Solutions (Dominion); Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. (Duke); Ohio Hospital Association (OHA); Duke Energy Retail Sales, LLC (DERS); Duke Energy Commercial Asset Management, Inc. (DECAM); Interstate Gas Supply, Inc. (IGS); Ohio Manufacturers' Association Energy Group (OMAEG); FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. (FES); Ohio Partners for Affordable Energy (OPAE); The Kroger Company (Kroger); The Dayton Power and Light Company (DP&L); Environmental Defense Fund (EDF); Ohio Environmental Council (OEC); Direct Energy Services, LLC and Direct Energy Business, LLC (jointly, Direct Energy); Appalachian Peace and Justice Network (APJN); Retail Energy Supply Association (RESA); Constellation

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[1] On March 7, 2012, the Commission approved and confirmed the merger of Columbus Southern Power Company (CSP) into Ohio Power Company (OP). *In re Ohio Power Company and Columbus Southern Power Company*, Case No. 10-2376-EL-UNC, Entry (Mar. 7, 2012).

NewEnergy, Inc. and Exelon Generation Company, LLC (*jointly, Constellation*); Environmental Law & Policy Center (ELPC); Wal-Mart Stores East, LP and Sam's East, Inc. (jointly, Walmart); Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC); Border Energy Electric Services, Inc. (Border Energy); EnerNOC, Inc. (EnerNOC); Paulding Wind Farm II LLC (Paulding II); and Energy Professionals of Ohio (EPO). On October 3, 2014, Border Energy filed a notice of withdrawal from these proceedings.

At the evidentiary hearing, AEP Ohio offered the direct testimony of 12 witnesses in support of the Company's application, while 2 witnesses offered rebuttal testimony on behalf of the Company. Additionally, 21 witnesses testified on behalf of various intervenors and 13 witnesses testified on behalf of Staff. At the local public hearings held in these matters, a total of 11 witnesses testified. Briefs and reply briefs were filed on July 23, 2014, and August 15, 2014, respectively. At AEP Ohio's request, an oral argument regarding the Company's proposed power purchase agreement (PPA) rider was held before the Commission on December 17, 2014.

A. Summary of the Local Public Hearings

Five local public hearings were held in order to allow AEP Ohio's customers the opportunity to express their opinions regarding the issues in these proceedings. Four evening hearings were held in Columbus, Lima, Canton, and Marietta. An afternoon hearing was also held in Columbus. At these hearings, public testimony was heard from individuals on behalf of the Discovery District Civic Association; Allen Economic Development Group; Lima/Allen County Chamber of Commerce; Sprinkler Fitters Local Union 669 and the Lima Building and Construction Trades Council; Columbus/Central Ohio Building and Construction Trades Council; United Way of Central Ohio; YWCA Columbus; Timken Company (Timken); Parkersburg-Marietta Building and Construction Trades Council; Appalachian Partnership for Economic Growth; and Lawrence County Emergency Management Agency. In addition to the public testimony, numerous letters were filed by customers raising concerns in response to AEP Ohio's ESP application, most of which convey opposition to the Company's proposed PPA rider, although a few of the letters address the Company's recent storm damage recovery rider (SDRR) proceeding. *In re Ohio Power Company*, Case No. 12-3255-EL-RDR (*Storm Damage Case*), Opinion and Order (Apr. 2, 2014).

At each of the local public hearings, witnesses testified in support of AEP Ohio's ESP application. In particular, witnesses testified on behalf of various non-profit organizations and community groups that value AEP Ohio's charitable support of their organizations. These witnesses emphasized that AEP Ohio maintains a positive corporate presence in the local community and promotes economic development endeavors throughout the Company's service territory. Members of local unions and building and construction trades councils also testified in support of AEP Ohio's proposed ESP,

explaining that it would not only allow the Company to retain jobs, but also create new jobs as the Company continues to expand its infrastructure throughout the region. Finally, Timken's representative expressed support for certain aspects of AEP Ohio's ESP application and opposition to others, consistent with OEG's position in these proceedings, and concluded by urging the Commission to consider the impact of the proposed ESP on large energy-consuming customers such as Timken.

B. Procedural Matters

On May 6, 2014, OCC and IEU-Ohio filed motions for protective order with respect to the confidential versions of the direct testimony of James F. Wilson (OCC Ex. 15) and Kevin M. Murray (IEU-Ohio Ex. 1A), respectively. On May 8, 2014, OEG filed a confidential version of Exhibit AST-2, as an exhibit to the testimony of Alan S. Taylor (OEG Ex. 3A). On May 9, 2014, AEP Ohio filed a motion for protective order seeking protection of the confidential versions of the direct testimony of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Murray, as well as Mr. Taylor's Exhibit AST-2. AEP Ohio contends that the redacted testimony and exhibit constitute competitively sensitive and proprietary trade secret information. Specifically, AEP Ohio notes that the redactions pertain to the Company's cost and earnings forecast related to its ownership interest in the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation (OVEC) and the projected future performance of the assets. AEP Ohio asserts that the information is the product of original research and development, has been kept confidential, and, as a result, retains substantial economic value to the Company by being kept confidential. According to AEP Ohio, public disclosure would enable third parties to gain information about the costs and operations of the OVEC assets that may impair the Company's ability to sell their output at the best price and weaken the benefits of the proposed PPA rider, thereby harming the Company and its customers.

Following a review of the documents filed under seal, the attorney examiners requested, at the outset of the evidentiary hearing, that AEP Ohio coordinate with OCC, IEU-Ohio, and OEG to redact only the confidential trade secret information in the testimony and supporting exhibits and to file the revised documents by June 6, 2014. Consistent with the attorney examiners' ruling, revised public versions of the testimony of OCC witness Wilson and IEU-Ohio witness Murray were filed on June 6, 2014. On June 18, 2014, a revised public version of OEG witness Taylor's Exhibit AST-2 was filed.

On October 14, 2014, AEP Ohio filed a second motion for protective order, seeking to protect Company Exhibits 8A and 10, OCC Exhibits 4 and 16, IEU-Ohio Exhibit 8, and OMAEG Exhibit 3, which were admitted into the record during the evidentiary hearing; the confidential portions of the hearing transcripts (Volume III); and, again, the confidential portions of the direct testimony of OCC witness Wilson, IEU-Ohio witness Murray, and OEG witness Taylor. AEP Ohio explains that most of the confidential information constitutes market price projections and unit-specific cost estimates that are

used to model unit dispatch scenarios, while other confidential information relates to the Company's existing coal contracts. AEP Ohio asserts that public disclosure of the confidential information would disadvantage the Company and its generation affiliates, because it would enable competitors and potential suppliers to learn the structure and sources of the Company's market price projections, unit-specific cost expectations, and proprietary coal contract terms. AEP Ohio also notes that it has provided redacted public versions of the confidential hearing transcripts and exhibits. No memoranda contra were filed with respect to any of the motions for protective order.

The Commission finds that the information that is the subject of the motions for protective order filed by AEP Ohio, OCC, and IEU-Ohio constitutes confidential and proprietary trade secret information. We, therefore, find that the motions for protective order filed by AEP Ohio, OCC, and IEU-Ohio are reasonable and should be granted. Pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 4901-1-24(F), AEP Ohio Exhibits 8A and 10, OCC Exhibits 4 and 16, IEU-Ohio Exhibit 8, and OMAEG Exhibit 3; the confidential portions of the hearing transcripts (Volume III); and the confidential versions of the direct testimony of OCC witness Wilson, IEU-Ohio witness Murray, and OEG witness Taylor shall be granted protective treatment for 24 months from the date of this Opinion and Order. Any request to extend the protective order must be filed at least 45 days in advance of the expiration date.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law

R.C. Chapter 4928 provides an integrated system of regulation in which specific provisions were designed to advance state policies of ensuring access to adequate, reliable, and reasonably priced electric service in the context of significant economic and environmental challenges. In reviewing AEP Ohio's application, the Commission is cognizant of the challenges facing Ohioans and the electric industry and is guided by the policies of the state as established by the General Assembly in R.C. 4928.02, as amended by Amended Substitute Senate Bill 221 (SB 221).

In addition, SB 221 enacted R.C. 4928.141, which provides that, beginning on January 1, 2009, electric utilities must provide consumers with an SSO, consisting of either a market rate offer (MRO) or an ESP. The SSO is to serve as the electric utility's default service. R.C. 4928.143 sets out the requirements for an ESP. Pursuant to R.C. 4928.143(B)(1), an ESP must include provisions relating to the supply and pricing of generation service. The ESP, according to R.C. 4928.143(B)(2), may also provide for the automatic recovery of certain costs, a reasonable allowance for certain construction work in progress, an unavoidable surcharge for the cost of certain new generation facilities, charges relating to certain subjects that have the effect of stabilizing or providing certainty

regarding retail electric service, automatic increases or decreases in components of the SSO price, provisions to allow securitization of any phase-in of the SSO price, provisions relating to transmission-related costs, provisions related to distribution service, and provisions regarding economic development. R.C. 4928.143(C)(1) provides that the Commission is required to approve, or modify and approve, the ESP, if the ESP, including its pricing and all other terms and conditions, including deferrals and future recovery of deferrals, is more favorable in the aggregate as compared to the expected results that would otherwise apply under R.C. 4928.142.

B. Analysis of the Application

1. Power Purchase Agreement Rider

(a) AEP Ohio

In this ESP, AEP Ohio requests approval of a non-bypassable PPA rider to be used as a hedge against future market volatility, in order to stabilize customer rates. Initially, the proposed PPA rider would be based solely on AEP Ohio's OVEC contractual entitlement from the Kyger Creek and Clifty Creek generating stations, although the Company seeks to reserve the opportunity to include additional PPAs in the rider. As proposed, AEP Ohio's OVEC contractual entitlement, including energy, capacity, and ancillaries, would be sold into the PJM Interconnection, LLC (PJM) market and, after deducting all associated costs from the revenues, the proceeds from the OVEC contractual entitlement, whether a credit or a debit, would accrue to Ohio ratepayers. AEP Ohio submits that selling the OVEC entitlement into the PJM market eliminates any adverse impact on the SSO auctions and does not affect the opportunity of competitive retail electric service (CRES) providers to compete for customers. OVEC's costs, according to AEP Ohio witnesses Vegas and Allen, are relatively stable, in comparison to the wholesale power market, and rise and fall in a manner that is counter-cyclical to the market, thereby creating the PPA rider's hedging effect for ratepayers. AEP Ohio proposes that the PPA rider would be adjusted annually to reconcile projected expenses and revenues with actual data. AEP Ohio also notes, regarding the possible expansion of the PPA rider, that the Company is only considering the inclusion of future PPAs with its affiliates. (Co. Ex. 1 at 8; Co. Ex. 2 at 13; Co. Ex. 7 at 8-10; Co. Ex. 8B; Tr. I at 26, 110-111; Co. Br. at 22-24.)

AEP Ohio proposes to provide the projected expenses and revenues to be used to populate the PPA rider shortly after a Commission decision regarding this ESP or early in the first quarter of 2015. However, AEP Ohio also provided an estimated rate impact for the OVEC portion of the PPA rider during the course of the hearing. Initially, on cross-examination, AEP Ohio witness Vegas testified that $52 million was a reasonable estimate of the net cost of the PPA rider, over the three-year term of the ESP, based on the latest available OVEC cost data (OMAEG Ex. 3; Tr. I at 110; Tr. II at 498, 507-508). Later, during

his cross-examination, AEP Ohio witness Allen testified to an $8.4 million estimated net benefit, during the term of the ESP, based, in part, on achievement of cost reductions associated with OVEC's LEAN initiative (Tr. II at 484-486, 506; Co. Ex. 8B). Specifically, AEP Ohio estimates the PPA rider to be a $6.2 million cost in year one, a $2.8 million benefit in year two, and an $11.8 million benefit in year three, for a total PPA mechanism benefit of $8.4 million. According to AEP Ohio's estimate, the hedge would equate to an average credit of seven cents per megawatt-hour (MWh) over the term of the ESP. (Co. Ex. 33 at 9-10; Tr. II at 484-485, 508, 552, 569-570; Tr. XIII at 3257-3258.)

AEP Ohio explained that OVEC was originally formed in 1952 by investor-owned utilities, known as sponsoring companies, to provide electricity to a uranium enrichment facility located near Portsmouth, Ohio. AEP Ohio further explained that OVEC's contract with the federal government to supply electricity was terminated in 2003. Since the termination of the contract with the federal government, AEP Ohio, as a sponsoring company of the OVEC facilities, is entitled to 19.93 percent of OVEC's power participation benefits and requirements under the Amended and Restated Inter-Company Power Agreement (ICPA) executed by the sponsoring companies, effective August 11, 2011, through June 30, 2040. (Co. Ex. 7 at 8-10; Co. Br. at 22-24.)

AEP Ohio acknowledges that the Commission approved, in Case No. 12-1126-EL-UNC and Case No. 11-346-EL-SSO, et al., the Company's corporate separation plan, which authorized the transfer of the Company's generation assets to AEP Generation Resources, Inc. (AEP Genco). *In re Ohio Power Company*, Case No. 12-1126-EL-UNC (*Corporate Separation Case*), Finding and Order (Oct. 17, 2012), Entry on Rehearing (Apr. 24, 2013); *In re Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company*, Case No. 11-346-EL-SSO, et al. (*ESP 2 Case*), Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 59-60, Entry on Rehearing (Jan. 30, 2013) at 61-65. Under the ICPA, AEP Ohio states that consent must be obtained from all of the other sponsoring companies before the Company can transfer its OVEC contractual entitlement to AEP Genco in a manner that would relieve the Company from ongoing liabilities. Despite a guaranty from AEP Ohio's parent corporation, the sponsoring companies did not give their consent and, therefore, the Company filed an application with the Commission for approval to amend its corporate separation plan to permit the Company to continue to hold its interest in OVEC. The Commission granted AEP Ohio's application to amend its corporate separation plan, subject to certain conditions. *Corporate Separation Case*, Finding and Order (Dec. 4, 2013) at 9, Entry on Rehearing (Jan. 29, 2014). Thus, AEP Ohio reasons that the Company is exempted from transferring its OVEC entitlement. Furthermore, AEP Ohio offers that the sponsoring companies withheld their consent for the transfer because AEP Genco's credit rating is lower than the Company's. Since the credit rating comparison continues to be true, AEP Ohio has not again attempted to secure the consent of the sponsoring companies. AEP Ohio witness Vegas also noted that the Commission indicated that it would consider any rate related implications of the

transfer of the OVEC contractual entitlement in a future ESP proceeding. (Tr. I at 23-25; Co. Br. at 24-25.)

AEP Ohio argues that R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(a) and (B)(2)(d) permit the Commission to approve the PPA rider as a provision of the ESP. AEP Ohio points out that R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d) permits the Commission to adopt, as a component of an ESP, terms, conditions, or charges that relate to default service or address bypassability or non-bypassability, as the statute is not expressly limited to non-shopping customers. AEP Ohio avers that its analysis of R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d) is consistent with the *ESP 2 Case*. *ESP 2 Case*, Entry on Rehearing (Jan. 30, 2013) at 14-16. Furthermore, AEP Ohio reasons that the PPA rider may also be considered a limitation on customer shopping, given that, as proposed by the Company, the rider would provide a generation hedge for shopping customers. Similarly, AEP Ohio notes that R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(a) is not limited to SSO service and specifically permits the Commission to approve an ESP that includes affiliate PPAs.[2] AEP Ohio reasons that R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d) could be invoked, if necessary, in conjunction with R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(a), to approve a non-bypassable PPA rider. AEP Ohio also finds support for its proposal in R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(e), which permits automatic increases or decreases in any component of the SSO price, and R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(i), which permits economic development, job retention, and energy efficiency programs as a component of an ESP. (Co. Br. at 27-30; Co. Reply Br. at 21-23.)

AEP Ohio notes that the Commission has previously held that the OVEC costs were prudent. *In re Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company*, Case No. 08-917-EL-SSO, et al. (*ESP 1 Case*), Opinion and Order (Mar. 18, 2009) at 14-15, 51-52. As such, AEP Ohio submits that there is no need to review the prudence of the OVEC contract's terms and conditions. Noting that the OVEC contractual entitlement extends through 2040, AEP Ohio requests that the Commission make two assurances regarding the PPA mechanism. First, AEP Ohio requests that the Commission reiterate and confirm, in these proceedings, a commitment to be bound by the prudence of the OVEC contract for the full term of the contract through 2040. With the Commission's commitment in place, AEP Ohio's intention would be to continue to include the OVEC contract in the PPA rider beyond the term of the ESP to the same extent that the Commission commits, up-front, to the hedging arrangement. Second, AEP Ohio requests that the Commission assure that any future PPA to be included in the PPA rider is subject to a one-time, up-front prudence review for the full term of the PPA. (Tr. I at 121, 150-151, 264; Co. Br. at 30-33.)

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2 AEP Ohio considers OVEC an affiliate in this context since the Company has an ownership interest, and OVEC and the Company share corporate resources.

(b) Intervenors and Staff

OEG, the only intervenor to endorse the adoption of a PPA mechanism, supports the proposed PPA rider in concept and recommends certain modifications to protect customers and increase the value of the hedge. OEG interprets R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d) to permit the adoption of the PPA rider as a financial limitation on customer shopping that has the effect of stabilizing or providing certainty regarding retail electric service. To improve the projected benefit of the PPA rider, OEG recommends that the PPA mechanism be effective for 9.5 years, June 2015 through December 2024, and subject to an annual true-up, with the last true-up to occur during 2024 based on end of year expenses and revenues for 2023. Based on OEG's projections of market prices and OVEC costs, OEG estimates that the modified PPA mechanism's net benefit would be $70 million. Further, OEG recommends that AEP Ohio retain 10 percent of the PPA rider, in order to ensure that the Company's interests are aligned with the interests of its customers, and to incent the Company to keep OVEC's costs as low and its revenues as high as possible. The balance, 90 percent of the PPA credit or charge, would accrue to AEP Ohio's customers. OEG also recommends that the PPA rider incorporate a levelization mechanism to bring the rider more in line with a market-neutral hedge for the 9.5 year period. Finally, OEG proposes that large, business-savvy customers, with more than 10 megawatts (MW) of load per single site, be permitted to opt out of the PPA rider and self-insure. (OEG Ex. 3 at 16-20; Tr. XI at 2557, 2603-2604; OEG Br. at 4-5, 13-17.)

OEG offers several grounds for endorsing the PPA mechanism. OEG reasons that, with its recommendations, the PPA rider would supplement the staggering and laddering auction process preferred by Staff for non-shopping customers as well as provide a measure of protection for shopping customers. While acknowledging that there is no certainty whether the PPA rider would be a credit or a charge, OEG asserts that the most reliable and recent evidence indicates that the PPA rider would be a credit, particularly over a period longer than three years. While severe weather increases electricity prices, OEG submits that the converse is not true, to the same extent, when weather is mild. Accordingly, OEG reasons that the benefits of the PPA rider would increase when severe weather affects the market, while there would be no corresponding risk that the PPA rider would prevent customers from experiencing low electricity prices when the weather is mild. Further, OEG predicts that the retirement of generation capacity in the PJM region will increase price volatility in the market in the short- and long-term. According to OEG, Staff's philosophical opposition to the PPA rider is not good policy for the state. OEG explains that what are referred to as market based rates are really PJM-administered market prices and, by transitioning AEP Ohio to market prices for generation, the Commission's regulatory authority is relinquished to PJM and the Commission's ability to protect Ohio's electric consumers is limited. (Co. Ex. 33 at 10; Tr. II at 480; Tr. XI at 2539, 2557; OEG Br. at 4, 6, 12.)

The many remaining intervenors that take a position on the PPA rider oppose AEP Ohio's proposal for a variety of reasons. As noted by OEG, Staff contests AEP Ohio's PPA mechanism as a step backwards in the Commission's goal to transition the Company to a fully competitive market with market based pricing. Staff emphasizes that the transition to a fully competitive market was a significant, non-quantifiable benefit of the *ESP 2 Case*. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 76. Staff submits that the PPA proposal would provide AEP Ohio a guaranteed revenue stream for its generation assets, including a return on equity (ROE) for the Company and the other OVEC sponsoring companies. RESA asserts that the proposed PPA rider violates the state's electric restructuring paradigm as set forth in R.C. 4928.03, which limits the electric distribution utility to supplying only non-competitive utility service except where a customer is not supplied by a competitive supplier, and frustrates the Commission's intent to make AEP Ohio financially responsible for OVEC. (Staff Ex. 18 at 7-9; Tr. I at 29-30; Tr. II at 556; Tr. XIII at 3217; Staff Br. at 2-5; RESA Br. at 27-28.)

Staff's perspective, according to AEP Ohio, ignores the concept of rate stability and is not based on any rate impact analysis performed by Staff or projections of the market price under Staff's preferred auction approach. AEP Ohio argues that Staff's policy is in stark contrast to the ESP statute and hybrid regulatory approach adopted in SB 221. AEP Ohio interprets SB 221 to permit cost based rate adjustments as opposed to mandating market based prices. AEP Ohio advocates that the PPA rider can co-exist with the competitive bid procurement (CBP) based SSO process. (Tr. XII at 2907, 2947; Co. Reply Br. at 33-35.)

OCC submits that AEP Ohio has not met its burden of proof to demonstrate that it could not transfer its interest in OVEC. OCC notes that, after the OVEC sponsoring companies denied AEP Ohio's request to transfer its share of OVEC to AEP Genco, the Company has not made any further attempts to transfer or divest its interest in OVEC, because, as Company witness Vegas recalls, the majority of sponsoring companies withheld their consent to transfer. Observing that the denial of the transfer of OVEC likely came from a number AEP Ohio's affiliates, OCC asks the Commission to consider the PPA rider in light of the Company's failure to continue to pursue the consent of the sponsoring companies or other means to transfer its OVEC interest and, therefore, reject the PPA rider proposal. (Tr. I at 22; OCC Br. at 39-42.)

OMAEG and Constellation assert that AEP Ohio incorrectly characterizes the Commission's decision, in the *Corporate Separation Case*, to allow the Company to retain its OVEC contractual entitlement (OMAEG Br. at 15; Constellation Br. at 28). OCC also interprets the conditions imposed on AEP Ohio to apply only while the Company holds the OVEC interest (OCC Br. at 38). AEP Ohio retorts that nothing in the *Corporate Separation Case* indicates that the authorization to retain the OVEC contractual entitlement is temporary or that the Company has a continuing duty to pursue transfer or divestiture.

OCC's interpretation, according to AEP Ohio, is inconsistent with the straightforward language in the *Corporate Separation Case*. (Co. Reply Br. at 16-21.)

Staff notes that, if the PPA rider is adopted, the Commission's oversight would be severely limited, if not non-existent. Staff reasons that the OVEC contract is subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and that the Commission would not have the ability to directly disallow any imprudent costs that may be assessed to AEP Ohio's customers, without first seeking relief at FERC. Staff emphasizes that, to challenge certain costs in the PPA rider, the Commission would need to file a complaint with FERC and sustain a heightened burden of proof to establish that the PPA costs were unreasonable. *NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Maine Pub. Util. Comm.*, 558 U.S. 165, 130 S. Ct. 693 (2010). (Staff Br. at 7-8.)

In response, AEP Ohio argues that the Commission would have the ability to review and approve the Company's decision to enter into the PPA, abundant data and visibility into the underlying costs related to the Company's implementation of the PPA, financial auditing rights relating to costs being passed through retail rates, and the authority to disallow costs caused by imprudent actions of the Company under the contract. Further, AEP Ohio notes that, while Staff admits that the Commission currently reviews the prudency of OVEC's costs under the fuel adjustment clause (FAC) mechanism, neither Staff nor any other intervenor has explained how the same OVEC costs would not be reviewable by the Commission if the costs are recoverable under the PPA rider. AEP Ohio implies that the Commission's review of OVEC costs via the PPA rider would be similar to its review of FERC-approved transmission costs through the transmission cost recovery rider (TCRR). However, AEP Ohio proceeds to reason that the Commission implicitly passed on the prudency of the OVEC contract when the Commission approved recovery of the OVEC costs as a component of SSO rates in the *ESP 1 Case*. *ESP 1 Case*, Opinion and Order (Mar. 18, 2009). AEP Ohio also argues that the Commission would not lose its authority to review the appropriateness of the Company's decisions and the rights available to the Company under the OVEC contract. *Pike County Light & Power Co. v. Penn. Pub. Util. Comm.*, 77 Pa Commw. 268, 465 A.2d 735 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983). Thus, AEP Ohio concludes that Staff is incorrect that the Commission's authority would be limited or non-existent if the PPA mechanism is approved. (Tr. I at 32-33; Co. Reply Br. at 39-49.)

IEU-Ohio asserts that the PPA mechanism is preempted by the Federal Power Act (FPA). IEU-Ohio reasons that the FPA preempts the Commission from the field of wholesale electric sales, including the price at which electricity is sold at wholesale. *PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian*, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014) (*Nazarian*); *PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v.*

Hanna, 977 F. Supp.2d 372 (D. N.J. 2013) (*Hanna*)[3]. (IEU-Ohio Br. at 20-24.) *Nazarian* and *Hanna*, as interpreted by AEP Ohio, concern the lack of authority of state utility commissions to regulate the wholesale price of power and to require local utilities to enter into wholesale arrangements. In contrast, AEP Ohio avers that it is the party that initiated these proceedings, proposed the PPA rider, and voluntarily entered into the contract with OVEC - a contract that has been regulated and approved by FERC for years. Accordingly, AEP Ohio reasons that the PPA rider is distinguishable from *Nazarian* and *Hanna* and that the PPA mechanism does not conflict with federal law. (Co. Reply Br. at 40, 53-54.)

IEU-Ohio also argues that approval of the PPA mechanism would exceed the Commission's jurisdiction. IEU-Ohio notes that the OVEC contractual entitlement will be offered, as the Commission ordered, into the PJM wholesale market and will not be used to provide energy or capacity to AEP Ohio's retail customers. *Corporate Separation Case*, Finding and Order (Dec. 4, 2013) at 8-9. To the extent that the PPA rider would adjust AEP Ohio's compensation for the OVEC contractual entitlement via the rider's charge or credit, IEU-Ohio argues that approval of the rider is beyond the Commission's jurisdiction, which does not extend to the adjustment of the Company's compensation for wholesale electric services. (IEU-Ohio Br. at 20.) Constellation also reasons that the proposed PPA rider violates FERC Order 697 regarding affiliate transactions (Constellation Br. at 6-9, citing *In re Edgar Electric Energy Co.*, 55 FERC ¶ 61,382). AEP Ohio responds that Constellation's claims ignore relevant FERC rulings and fail to recognize that OVEC submitted to and satisfied, to the extent applicable, FERC Order 697 (Co. Reply Br. at 40, 55-57).

A variety of intervenors, including IEU-Ohio, OEC, EDF, OHA, and OCC, claim that the PPA mechanism is not authorized under any provision of R.C. 4928.143(B)(1) or (B)(2). R.C. 4928.143(B)(1) permits an ESP to include provisions relating to the supply and pricing of electric generation service, while R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(a) permits an electric distribution utility to recover prudently incurred costs associated with purchased power supplied under the SSO, including purchased power from an affiliate. The intervenors argue that the OVEC generation will not be bid into the auctions to serve the SSO load of AEP Ohio's customers. Thus, the intervenors reason that the PPA rider does not meet the express requirements of R.C. 4928.143(B)(1) or (B)(2)(a). (Co. Ex. 7 at 10; IEU-Ohio Br. at 8-9; OCC Br. at 44-46; OEC/EDF Br. at 12-13; OHA Br. at 9-10.) OMAEG and EPO come to the same conclusion, focusing on R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(a). The intervenors emphasize that, as AEP Ohio acknowledges, the energy and capacity associated with the OVEC contractual entitlement will be bid into the PJM market, not supplied to SSO customers. (EPO Br. at 5; OMAEG Br. at 15-16.)

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[3] Following the hearing and submission of the parties' briefs in these ESP proceedings, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in *Hanna*. *PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon*, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014).

Evaluating the proposed PPA rider under the statutory requirements of R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(b) and (B)(2)(c), the intervenors conclude that the rider fails. R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(b) permits recovery of costs associated with the construction of an electric generating facility or environmental expenditures for such facility on or after January 1, 2009. R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(c) permits the recovery of costs through a non-bypassable surcharge for the life of an electric generating facility that is owned or operated by the electric distribution utility, sourced by a competitive bid process, and newly used and useful on or after January 1, 2009. IEU-Ohio, OEC, EDF, and ELPC address the failure of the OVEC generation and the associated PPA rider to comply with R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(b) and (B)(2)(c), because the OVEC facilities have been in service since the 1950s and were not sourced through a competitive bid process, and there has not been any demonstration of need by AEP Ohio. Accordingly, IEU-Ohio, OEC, EDF, and ELPC assert that the PPA rider does not comply with the requirements of R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(b) or (B)(2)(c) to be a provision of the ESP. (IEU-Ohio Br. at 9; OEC/EDF Br. at 13-16; ELPC Br. at 6-8, 15-17.)

R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d) authorizes the Commission to approve terms, conditions, or charges of an ESP that relate to limitations on customer shopping and default service, among other services, that have the effect of stabilizing or providing certainty regarding retail electric service. Several of the intervenors note that the PPA rider, by AEP Ohio's own admission, is not related to any limitation on customer shopping, standby service, supplemental power, or back-up power, as required by R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d). IEU-Ohio reasons that the PPA rider has no relation to bypassability of generation-related costs, as the rider is proposed to be non-bypassable, nor has any relation to carrying costs, amortization periods, accounting, or deferrals. As such, IEU-Ohio and OCC argue that the PPA rider is not related to any kind of service or accounting issues that may be authorized pursuant to the requirements of R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d). (OCC Ex. 15A at 29-32; Tr. II at 566-567; IEU-Ohio Br. at 9-11; OCC Br. at 45-46.)

In response, AEP Ohio asserts that the intervenors are incorrectly relating the delivery of electrons generated at OVEC with whether the proposed PPA rider is a generation service. AEP Ohio witness Allen specifically made the distinction, according to the Company, on cross-examination. AEP Ohio argues that the impact of the PPA rider is as a generation service that affects the SSO by stabilizing the SSO generation rate. AEP Ohio reasons that nothing in the language of R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d) requires a stability charge to be directly tied to the costs for the delivery of electricity, as is evident from the Commission's approval of the retail stability rider (RSR) in the *ESP 2 Case*. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 26-38, Entry on Rehearing (Jan. 30, 2013) 61-65. (Co. Ex. 7 at 9-11; Tr. I at 265; Tr. II at 747; Co. Reply Br. at 23-25.)

Further, OCC and IEU-Ohio offered testimony, with which several other intervenors agree, that the PPA rider is not likely to provide customers stability or

certainty. The intervenors challenge the likelihood that the PPA mechanism would stabilize customer rates, given the wide range of estimates offered into evidence. Staff notes that, by AEP Ohio's own admission, $52 million is a reasonable estimate of the net cost of the PPA rider, over the three-year term of the ESP, although, during the course of the hearing, the Company estimated a net benefit of $8.4 million for the ESP term. IEU-Ohio, however, estimates that the PPA rider would cost $82 million and OCC projects a cost of $116 million over the full term of the ESP. (Co. Ex. 33 at 9-10; IEU-Ohio Ex. 1B at 10-12; IEU-Ohio Ex. 8; OCC Ex. 15A at 7, 9, 25; OCC Ex. 17; Tr. I at 110.) OCC developed its calculation utilizing AEP Ohio's initial projection of a PPA cost of $52 million and adjusted the estimate to account for an increase in demand charges to be billed to the Company by OVEC and to eliminate the LEAN initiative cost reductions. Noting that AEP Ohio's estimated $52 million cost was based on forward market prices from September 2013, OCC also adjusted the analysis for forward market prices known through early May 2014, revised the OVEC pricing point, and adjusted OVEC generation output to be more in line with recent historical performance. OCC asserts that AEP Ohio's OVEC generation output was not highly correlated with the energy price and that there does not appear to be a basis for the Company's forecast of a significant increase in OVEC's generation in 2016 through 2018, in comparison to recent years or the expectations for 2015. For these reasons, OCC contends that its analysis of the PPA rider cost is likely conservative. (OCC Ex. 15A at 13-18, 21-23, 26, Attach. JFW-2; OCC Ex. 17; OCC Br. at 54-62, 64-65.) IEU-Ohio increased AEP Ohio's initial projection of $52 million to $82 million by eliminating the LEAN initiative cost reductions (IEU-Ohio Ex. 1B at 10-12). EPO submits that the customer benefit of the proposed PPA rider, whether by AEP Ohio or as amended by OEG, is uncertain, and EPO and OMAEG believe the benefit, at best, will be unnoticeable on customer bills (EPO Br. at 3, 5-8; OMAEG Br. at 17).

AEP Ohio and OEG argue that IEU-Ohio's forecast of the PPA cost is based on the most out-of-date information offered by the Company and eliminates the projected LEAN initiative cost savings. In response to OCC, AEP Ohio and OEG retort that OCC's projections are overstated, because they are not based on the most recent version of OVEC cost projections or market prices, use a single price for all generation, and arbitrarily reduce the projected output of the OVEC units. (Co. Ex. 33 at 6-10; IEU-Ohio Ex. 1B at 11-12; OCC Ex. 15A at 7; OCC Ex. 17; OEG Br. at 15; Co. Br. at 58-59.)

AEP Ohio also submits that the record evidence supports that the PPA mechanism would promote rate stability in four ways. First, AEP Ohio notes that the PPA rider would produce a credit or charge based on the differential between its market proceeds and OVEC costs, which would counteract market volatility. Second, during periods of extreme weather, AEP Ohio believes that the PPA rider credit would increase and help to offset price spikes by a factor of ten times more than the price decreases associated with mild weather. Third, AEP Ohio asserts that there would be a compounding effect of the PPA rider benefit when high market prices are sustained, because the OVEC units would be

dispatched more consistently. Finally, AEP Ohio reasons that, because OVEC is a long-term commitment by the Company, the PPA rider would provide long-term rate stability for customers, unlike any other rate stability option currently available. Acknowledging that the annual reconciliation component of the PPA rider may not be counter-cyclical to market prices, like the rider itself would be, AEP Ohio contends that customers would nevertheless receive the same benefit of the rider over time. If the annual reconciliation component of the PPA rider is a particular concern, AEP Ohio proposes that the Commission order more frequent updates of the rider or a levelization approach. (Co. Br. at 43-52; Co. Reply Br. at 25-26, 29-30.)

IEU-Ohio, Staff, and other intervenors argue that OVEC's generation costs are highly dependent on weather, output, economic conditions, and energy prices. Staff points out that the PPA rider would be greatly dependent on the stability of OVEC costs, which could increase significantly over the next few years as a result of additional capital expenditures, increases in coal prices, and environmental regulations. Numerous intervenors submit that, in light of the conflicting PPA estimates presented, and given that future costs are unknown, including OVEC costs, the Commission cannot reasonably conclude that the PPA mechanism would stabilize rates for AEP Ohio's customers. Noting that AEP Ohio's OVEC contractual entitlement represents approximately five to six percent of the Company's total connected load, Staff, RESA, OHA, IEU-Ohio, OCC, and Constellation, among other intervenors, surmise that the impact of the PPA rider credit, based on the Company's projected $8.4 million net benefit, would be *de minimis*, insignificant, and unnoticeable from the average customer's perspective. Furthermore, RESA points out that fixed price contract customers and customers with existing financial hedges do not need the rate stabilization allegedly offered by the PPA rider. (IEU-Ohio Ex. 1B at 9-11, Ex. KMM-3 at 2; OCC Ex. 15A at 13; Tr. I at 152-153; Tr. II at 480, 552; Staff Br. at 21-24; RESA Br. at 30-31; Constellation Br. at 15-16; OHA Br. at 8; IEU-Ohio Br. at 25, 28; OCC Br. at 55.)

Staff prefers the practice of staggering and laddering SSO auctions as a more successful means of addressing market volatility for SSO customers, and asserts that shopping customers have market based options to address volatility, including fixed price contracts with CRES providers. Staff notes that, as AEP Ohio admits, very few large customers buy electric service on an index tied to PJM's market price, as such large customers are likely sufficiently sophisticated to secure hedges or call options to mitigate market volatility. Staff also argues that, despite any implications to the contrary, the PPA rider would not address electric reliability concerns. According to Staff, the Commission has better tools than the proposed PPA rider to address potential electric reliability concerns, such as the authority to approve a non-bypassable rider to fund the construction of a new generating facility. (Staff Ex. 18 at 7; Tr. XII at 2853; Tr. XIII at 3084; Staff Br. at 5-6, 9-10.)

R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(e) permits the ESP to include automatic increases or decreases in any component of the SSO price. IEU-Ohio reasons that, by the very design of the PPA rider, as proposed by AEP Ohio or OEG, the rider does not automatically increase or decrease any component of the SSO price. For that reason, IEU-Ohio concludes that R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(e) cannot be a basis for approving the PPA rider. (IEU-Ohio Br. at 11-12; IEU-Ohio Reply Br. at 7-11.)

Further, several intervenors, including IEU-Ohio, OCC, IGS, ELPC, RESA, and Constellation, contend that the proposed PPA rider would impede the state policy expressed in R.C. 4928.02(H), violate R.C. 4928.17, and constitute an anticompetitive subsidy, particularly given that AEP Ohio's customers would be ensuring recovery of the cost of generation with a return on and of the Company's investment in OVEC. *Elyria Foundry Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm.*, 114 Ohio St.3d 305, 2007-Ohio-4164, 871 N.E.2d 1176. Constellation also contends that the PPA rider would skew the competitive wholesale market for power. (IEU-Ohio Br. at 9, 13-15; OEC/EDF Br. at 13-16; Constellation Br. at 6-8; IGS Br. at 17; ELPC Br. at 6-8, 15-17; RESA Br. at 29-30; OCC Br. at 46, 53, 70.)

AEP Ohio states that the intervenors' arguments are based on the flawed premise that the PPA rider would be a distribution charge. AEP Ohio declares that the PPA rider would not be a distribution charge, because it does not involve distribution service. The PPA rider would be, according to AEP Ohio, a generation-related charge and, therefore, there is no support for the intervenors' arguments that the PPA rider would violate R.C. 4928.02(H). AEP Ohio notes that Constellation witness Campbell agreed that the PPA rider would be a generation-related rider that would recover generation-related costs. (Tr. VII at 1623-1624; Co. Reply Br. at 35-37.)

Kroger and IEU-Ohio contend that the PPA rider would permit AEP Ohio to recover the Company's generation costs for OVEC after the permissible period for transition cost recovery has ended, as resolved by the Commission in Case No. 99-1729-EL-ETP, et al. *In re Columbus Southern Power and Ohio Power Company*, Case No. 99-1729-EL-ETP, et al., Opinion and Order (Sept. 28, 2000) at 10-18. Further, OMAEG, IEU-Ohio, and OCC argue that approving AEP Ohio's request for a PPA rider would violate R.C. 4928.38. (OMAEG Br. at 16; Kroger Br. at 3; IEU-Ohio Br. at 15-18; OCC Br. at 53.)

In its reply brief, AEP Ohio avers that the view that the proposed PPA rider violates R.C. 4928.38 or is an untimely attempt to collect transition revenues is misguided. In sum, AEP Ohio submits that stranded generation costs under R.C. 4928.38 were measured based on a long-term view of the cost over the life of the unit. AEP Ohio argues that, in these proceedings, the only evidence of record regarding the long-term costs and benefits of the OVEC units demonstrates a long-term benefit. Further, AEP Ohio notes that the Commission rejected similar arguments regarding transition costs in the *ESP 2 Case* and requests that the Commission again reject such arguments. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order

(Aug. 8, 2012) at 32. (OMAEG Ex. 3; OEG Ex. 3 at 16, Ex. AST-2; Tr. II at 506-507; Tr. XI at 2557, 2604; Co. Reply Br. at 38-39.)

OEC, EDF, EPO, Constellation, IGS, ELPC, RESA, and IEU-Ohio opine that the PPA rider is an attempt by AEP Ohio to increase customers' electric bills to pay for aging coal plants and to insulate the Company's shareholders from the risks of the competitive market and the costs of future carbon restraints and environmental regulations on electric generating units (IGS Ex. 1 at 5-6; OEC/EDF Br. at 16; EPO Br. at 2; Constellation Br. at 12-13; IGS Br. at 16; ELPC Br. at 11-12; RESA Br. at 30; IEU-Ohio Br. at 33). Constellation adds that the competitive retail market in Ohio offers electric customers another less expensive way to stabilize electric rates - a fixed price contract (Constellation Ex. 2; Constellation Br. at 10, 16). AEP Ohio responds that, based on data from the Commission's Apples to Apples website, CRES providers are not offering long-term contracts to residential customers, as the majority of the available offers are for 12 months or less. AEP Ohio opines that there is volatility for customers as they transition from one fixed price contract to the next. For that reason, AEP Ohio concludes that the PPA mechanism would benefit shopping customers as well as SSO customers. Noting that Staff's policy of staggering and laddering auctions follows the market, AEP Ohio argues that the PPA rider would grant to customers 100 percent of the differential between OVEC costs and market prices, without an additional premium or upcharge. AEP Ohio concludes that relying on the SSO auctions and fixed price offers from CRES providers, as the sole means to mitigate market volatility, would impose artificial, unjustified, and unreasonable limitations on the Commission's available tools to promote price stability. (Co. Ex. 33 at Ex. WAA-R3 and WAA-R4; Co. Reply Br. at 29.)

(c) Conclusion

The Commission has given thorough consideration to AEP Ohio's request for approval of the PPA rider, which, as proposed by the Company, would flow through to customers, on a non-bypassable basis, the net benefit or cost from the Company's sale of its OVEC contractual entitlement into the PJM market less all associated costs. AEP Ohio also seeks approval of its plan to petition the Commission, during the ESP term, to include the net benefit or cost of additional PPAs or similar products in the PPA rider.[4] The primary purpose of the PPA rider, according to AEP Ohio, would be to provide a financial hedge against market volatility, as a type of insurance that would allow customers to take advantage of market opportunities while providing added price stability. AEP Ohio also asserts that the PPA rider would afford the state of Ohio considerable flexibility in formulating a strategy for complying with forthcoming federal environmental regulations, as well as enable the Company to continue to provide, on an annual basis, over $40 million

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[4] On October 3, 2014, in Case No. 14-1693-EL-RDR, et al., AEP Ohio filed an application to include an affiliate PPA with AEP Genco in the PPA rider.

in economic benefits to OVEC's six-county region and over $100 million in economic benefits to the state. (Co. Ex. 1 at 8; Co. Ex. 2 at 13; Co. Ex. 7 at 8-11; Tr. I at 127.) In reviewing AEP Ohio's proposed PPA rider and the considerable evidence of record offered by the Company, Staff, and intervenors with regard to the proposal, the Commission has been guided by two key considerations, specifically whether the PPA rider may be authorized under R.C. 4928.143(B)(1) or (B)(2) and, if so, whether the Company's proposal would provide the purported benefits or otherwise further the policy of the state.

Initially, the Commission must determine whether the proposed PPA mechanism may be considered a permissible provision of an ESP, in accordance with R.C. 4928.143(B)(1) or (B)(2). The Commission has the authority to approve, as a component of an ESP, only items that are expressly listed in the statute. *In re Columbus S. Power Co.*, 128 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-1788, 947 N.E.2d 655. AEP Ohio focuses primarily on R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d) as its statutory basis for the PPA mechanism, but the Company also offers R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(a), (B)(2)(e), and (B)(2)(i) as justification for approval of the rider.

Under R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d), the Commission can approve, as a component of an ESP, terms, conditions, or charges relating to limitations on customer shopping for retail electric generation service, bypassability, standby, back-up, or supplemental power service, default service, carrying costs, amortization periods, and accounting or deferrals, including future recovery of such deferrals, as would have the effect of stabilizing or providing certainty regarding retail electric service. Thus, considering the plain language of the statute, we find that there are three criteria with which the PPA mechanism must comply. Specifically, an ESP component approved under R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d) must first be a term, condition, or charge; next, relate to one of the enumerated types of terms, conditions, and charges; and, finally, have the effect of stabilizing or providing certainty regarding retail electric service. *See, e.g., ESP 2 Case*, Entry on Rehearing (Jan. 30, 2013) at 15-16; *In re Dayton Power and Light Company*, Case No. 12-426-EL-SSO, et al. (*DP&L ESP Case*), Opinion and Order (Sept. 4, 2013) at 21-22.

The Commission finds that the first requirement of R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d) is met, as the PPA rider would consist of a charge incurred by customers under the ESP. The PPA rider, as proposed by AEP Ohio, would appear as a charge on customer bills, and there is no dispute among the parties on this point. Although AEP Ohio projects that the PPA rider would provide a net credit over the course of the ESP term, the Company estimates that the rider would result in a net charge to customers in the first year of the ESP (Co. Ex. 8B). Thus, the record indicates that the PPA rider would, at times, consist of a charge to customers.

Taking the requirements of R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d) somewhat out of turn, the Commission will next address the third criterion, which is whether the PPA charge would

have the effect of stabilizing or providing certainty regarding retail electric service. We find that the PPA rider, as a financial hedging mechanism, is proposed to have the effect of stabilizing or providing certainty regarding retail electric service. AEP Ohio witness Vegas explained that the PPA rider would smooth out fluctuations in market prices, because the rider would rise or fall in a way that is opposite of the wholesale market. Specifically, because AEP Ohio claims that OVEC's mostly fixed costs are relatively stable in comparison to market based costs, the PPA rider would produce a credit when OVEC's costs are below wholesale market prices, while the rider would produce a charge when OVEC's costs are above wholesale market prices. The PPA rider, therefore, is intended to mitigate, by design, the effects of market volatility, providing customers with more stable pricing and a measure of protection against substantial increases in market prices.

AEP Ohio acknowledges that, as proposed, the PPA rider would have a reconciliation component to true up actual historical costs and revenues and that the one-year lag associated with the true-up process may mean that the reconciliation component does not always operate in the opposite direction of current market prices. AEP Ohio points out, however, that the regulatory lag inherent in the annual true-up process would not alter the fundamental operation of the PPA rider. At its core, the PPA rider is expected to move in the opposite direction of wholesale market prices, causing a rate stabilization effect. As AEP Ohio witness Allen explained, the PPA rider, including only the OVEC contractual entitlement, would mitigate \$0.35/MWh of a \$5.00/MWh change in market prices, or 7 percent of that change. (Co. Ex. 1 at 8; Co. Ex. 2 at 13; Co. Ex. 7 at 9-11; Co. Ex. 33 at 3, Ex. WAA-R2; OEG Ex. 3 at 13-14; Tr. I at 28, 173, 265; Tr. II at 517-518, 567, 658; Tr. III at 747; Tr. XI at 2451-2452, 2573.) Although several intervenors dispute the value of the proposed hedging mechanism and its use as a means to promote rate stability, there is no question that the PPA rider would produce a credit or charge based on the difference between wholesale market prices and OVEC's costs, offsetting, to some extent, the volatility in the wholesale market. The impact of the PPA rider would be reflected as a charge or credit for a generation-related hedging service that stabilizes retail electric service, by smoothing out the market based rates paid by shopping customers to their CRES providers, as well as the market based rates paid by SSO customers, which are determined by a series of auctions that reflect the prevailing wholesale prices for energy and capacity in the PJM markets. Because AEP Ohio has demonstrated that the proposed PPA rider would, in theory, have the effect of stabilizing or providing certainty regarding retail electric service, the Commission finds that the third criterion of R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d) has been met.

Finally, to meet the second requirement of R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d), the proposed PPA charge must relate to at least one of the following: limitations on customer shopping for retail electric generation service, bypassability, standby, back-up, or supplemental power service, default service, carrying costs, amortization periods, and accounting or deferrals. AEP Ohio concedes that the PPA mechanism has no connection to standby, back-up, or

supplemental power service, carrying costs, amortization, and accounting or deferrals. AEP Ohio argues, however, that the PPA mechanism relates to default service, addresses bypassability, and may be considered a limitation on customer shopping. (Co. Br. at 27-30; Co. Reply Br. at 21-23.)

The Commission finds that R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d) authorizes electric utilities to include, in an ESP, terms related to "bypassability" of charges to the extent that such charges have the effect of stabilizing or providing certainty regarding retail electric service. *DP&L ESP Case*, Opinion and Order (Sept. 4, 2013) at 21. As discussed above, both shopping and SSO customers may benefit from the PPA rider because it would have a stabilizing effect on the price of retail electric service, irrespective of whether the customer is served by a CRES provider or the SSO. Therefore, the Commission agrees with AEP Ohio that the proposed PPA rider, if approved, should be non-bypassable, as authorized by the second criterion of R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d). However, we also agree with Staff that, since nearly any charge may be bypassable or non-bypassable, "bypassability" alone is insufficient to fully meet the second criterion of R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d).

Nonetheless, the Commission agrees with AEP Ohio and OEG that the proposed PPA rider is a financial limitation on customer shopping for retail electric generation service. Although the proposed PPA rider would impose no physical constraints on shopping, the rider does constitute, as OEG witness Taylor explained, a financial limitation on shopping that would help to stabilize rates (Tr. XI at 2539, 2559). Under AEP Ohio's PPA rider proposal, shopping customers will still purchase all of their physical generation supply from the market through a CRES provider. Although the proposed PPA rider would have no impact on customers' physical generation supply, the effect of the PPA rider is that the bills of all customers would reflect a price for retail electric generation service that is approximately 5 percent based on the cost of service of the OVEC units and 95 percent based on the retail market. Effectively, then, the proposed PPA rider would function as a financial restraint on complete reliance on the retail market for the pricing of retail electric generation service. As several of the intervenors note, AEP Ohio witness Allen did, at one point, testify that he believes that the PPA rider, as proposed, is not a limitation on customer shopping (Tr. II at 566). It is not clear from Mr. Allen's testimony, however, whether he specifically considered whether the PPA rider constitutes a financial, rather than physical, limitation on customer shopping and, in any event, the Commission is not bound to rely on his testimony. We are persuaded by OEG witness Taylor's testimony that the PPA rider constitutes a financial limitation on customer shopping that is intended to stabilize rates (Tr. XI at 2539, 2559). Further, we note that, in light of our determination that the PPA rider is a financial limitation on customer shopping pursuant to R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d), it is unnecessary to reach the argument related to "default service." Accordingly, we find that the second criterion of R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d) is satisfied.

Having determined that R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d) provides the requisite statutory authority, we next consider, based on the record evidence, whether AEP Ohio's PPA rider proposal is reasonable and whether customers would, in fact, sufficiently benefit from the rider's financial hedging mechanism. At the outset, the Commission notes again that the power generated by the OVEC units will not be used to supply electricity to AEP Ohio's SSO customers. AEP Ohio repeatedly emphasized, consistent with the Commission's directives in the *Corporate Separation Case*, that the OVEC facilities will not be used to provide any generation service to the Company's customers (Co. Ex. 1 at 8; Co. Ex. 2 at 13; Co. Ex. 7 at 10; Tr. II at 540, 567). Rather than provide a physical hedge (i.e., providing generation), the OVEC units, in conjunction with the PPA rider, are intended to function purely as a financial hedge against market price volatility. Although AEP Ohio and OEG argue that the PPA rider would protect customers from price volatility in the wholesale market, there is no question that the rider would impact customers' rates through the imposition of a new charge on their bills. What is unclear, based on the record evidence, is how much the proposed PPA rider would cost customers and whether customers would even benefit from the financial hedge.

During the course of the hearing, the Commission was presented with several different PPA rider scenarios based on differing data inputs and assumptions. Initially, AEP Ohio provided three separate projections to the parties during discovery (OMAEG Ex. 3), all of which are reasonable estimates, according to Company witness Vegas, including an estimated $52 million net cost for the three-year term of the ESP (Tr. I at 110). AEP Ohio witness Allen explained that the primary difference in the Company's initial projections is the vintage of the forecast data used in each analysis. During his cross-examination, Mr. Allen further explained that he updated the most current of the three projections to incorporate the latest data available at the time of the hearing, with the result being an estimated $8.4 million net credit over the ESP term. AEP Ohio, therefore, concludes that a net credit of $8.4 million is the best evidence of the projected rate impact of the PPA rider during the ESP term. (OMAEG Ex. 3; Co. Ex. 8B; Tr. I at 110, Tr. II at 484-486, 498, 506-508.) In currently projecting a net credit, AEP Ohio relied, in part, on LEAN initiative cost reductions and other projected savings, such as from a severance program, which the Company valued at $10 million in determining the OVEC demand charge component of its PPA rider estimate of $8.4 million (Co. Ex. 8B; IEU-Ohio Ex. 1B at 10-11, KMM-9; Tr. II at 501-502, 648). The intervenors, however, paint a much different picture, with IEU-Ohio and OCC estimating that the PPA rider would result in a net cost of $82 million and $116 million, respectively, over the ESP term (IEU-Ohio Ex. 1B at 11-12; OCC Ex. 15A at 7; OCC Ex. 17). Initially, OEG projected, with its recommended modifications to the PPA rider in place, that the rider would result in a net benefit of $49 million, but only over a more than nine-year period, which would extend well beyond the ESP term. Like AEP Ohio, OEG updated, at the time of the hearing, its estimated net benefit to $70 million for that same extended period of time. (OEG Ex. 3 at 16; Tr. XI at 2557, 2603-2604.)

It is undisputed that all of these projections are based on data assumptions that attempt to predict OVEC's costs and revenues, as well as PJM prices for energy and capacity, over the three-year period of the ESP and beyond. In light of the uncertainty and speculation inherent in the process of projecting the net impact of the proposed PPA rider, which is evident in AEP Ohio's own projections ranging from a $52 million net cost to an $8.4 million net benefit, the Commission is unable to reasonably determine the rate impact of the rider.

Although the magnitude of the impact of the proposed PPA rider cannot be known to any degree of certainty, the Commission agrees with OCC, IEU-Ohio, and other intervenors that the evidence of record reflects that the rider may result in a net cost to customers, with little offsetting benefit from the rider's intended purpose as a hedge against market volatility. On balance, the record reflects that, during the three-year period of the ESP, the PPA rider would, in all likelihood, result in a net cost to customers and that, only over a longer timeframe, would customers perhaps benefit from a credit under the rider. AEP Ohio, however, proposes a three-year ESP term and seeks to reserve the right to terminate the ESP after two years, as discussed further below. Although AEP Ohio witness Vegas testified, on cross-examination, that the Company would be willing to consider a PPA rider that extends beyond the ESP term, he acknowledged that the Company is not actually requesting that the Commission approve the rider for a period longer than the ESP term. Mr. Vegas also admitted that AEP Ohio maintains the discretion to determine whether to propose to continue any of its riders in a future ESP application. (Co. Ex. 1 at 1, 15; IEU-Ohio Ex. 1B at 11-12; OCC Ex. 15A at 7; OCC Ex. 17; OMAEG Ex. 3; OEG Ex. 3 at 16; Tr. I at 121, 150-152.) It is, therefore, evident from AEP Ohio's testimony that the Company has made no offer to ensure that customers receive the alleged long-term benefits of the PPA rider or even a commitment or any type of proposal to continue the rider in subsequent ESP proceedings.

The Commission must base our decision on the record before us. *Tongren v. Pub. Util. Comm.*, 85 Ohio St.3d 87, 706 N.E.2d 1255 (1999). With that in mind, we are not persuaded that the PPA rider proposal put forth by AEP Ohio in the present proceedings would, in fact, promote rate stability, as the Company claims, or that it is in the public interest. There is considerable uncertainty with respect to pending PJM market reform proposals, environmental regulations, and federal litigation, as AEP Ohio acknowledges, and, in light of this uncertainty, the Commission does not believe that it is appropriate to adopt the proposed PPA rider at this time. Also, as Staff and several intervenors point out, there are already existing means, such as the laddering and staggering of SSO auction products and the availability of fixed price contracts in the market, that provide a significant hedge against price volatility (Co. Ex. 33 at 2-3, WAA-R3; Staff Ex. 18 at 10-11; Tr. XII at 2933-2934; Tr. XIII at 3084, 3141, 3279-3280, 3284-3285).

In sum, the Commission is not persuaded, based on the evidence of record in these proceedings, that AEP Ohio's PPA rider proposal would provide customers with sufficient benefit from the rider's financial hedging mechanism or any other benefit that is commensurate with the rider's potential cost. We conclude that AEP Ohio has not demonstrated that its PPA rider proposal, as put forth in these proceedings, should be approved under R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d). Nevertheless, the Commission does believe that a PPA rider proposal, if properly conceived, has the potential to supplement the benefits derived from the staggering and laddering of the SSO auctions, and to protect customers from price volatility in the wholesale market. We recognize that there may be value for consumers in a reasonable PPA rider proposal that provides for a significant financial hedge that truly stabilizes rates, particularly during periods of extreme weather. (Co. Ex. 9; Co. Ex. 32 at 5-7; Staff Ex. 18 at 10; Tr. II at 518-519; Tr. III at 745-746.) As we have consistently emphasized in AEP Ohio's prior ESP proceedings, rate stability is an essential component of the ESP. *See, e.g., ESP 1 Case*, Opinion and Order (Mar. 18, 2009) at 72; *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 32, 77.

Accordingly, the Commission authorizes AEP Ohio to establish a placeholder PPA rider, at an initial rate of zero, for the term of the ESP. We note that the Commission has, on prior occasions, approved a zero placeholder rider within an ESP. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 24-25; *In re Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.*, Case No. 08-920-EL-SSO, et al., Opinion and Order (Dec. 17, 2008) at 17; *In re Ohio Edison Co., The Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., and The Toledo Edison Co.*, Case No. 08-935-EL-SSO, et al., Second Opinion and Order (Mar. 25, 2009) at 15. The Commission emphasizes that we are not authorizing, at this time, AEP Ohio's recovery of any costs through the placeholder PPA rider. Rather, AEP Ohio will be required, in a future filing, to justify any requested cost recovery. All of the implementation details with respect to the placeholder PPA rider will be determined by the Commission in that future proceeding. In its filing, AEP Ohio should, at a minimum, address the following factors, which the Commission will balance, but not be bound by, in deciding whether to approve the Company's request for cost recovery: financial need of the generating plant; necessity of the generating facility, in light of future reliability concerns, including supply diversity; description of how the generating plant is compliant with all pertinent environmental regulations and its plan for compliance with pending environmental regulations; and the impact that a closure of the generating plant would have on electric prices and the resulting effect on economic development within the state. The Commission also reserves the right to require a study by an independent third party, selected by the Commission, of reliability and pricing issues as they relate to the application. AEP Ohio must also, in its PPA rider proposal, provide for rigorous Commission oversight of the rider, including a proposed process for a periodic substantive review and audit; commit to full information sharing with the Commission and its Staff; and include an alternative plan to allocate the rider's financial risk between both the Company and its ratepayers. Finally, AEP Ohio must include a severability provision that recognizes that all other provisions of its ESP will continue, in the event that

the PPA rider is invalidated, in whole or in part at any point, by a court of competent jurisdiction.

The Commission finds that our adoption of a PPA rider, to the limited extent set forth herein, is consistent with the state policy specified in R.C. 4928.02 and, in particular, with our obligation under R.C. 4928.02(A) to ensure the availability to consumers of reasonably priced retail electric service. In response to the arguments raised by various intervenors that the PPA rider would violate R.C. 4928.02(H), which requires the Commission to ensure effective competition in the provision of retail electric service by avoiding anticompetitive subsidies, we find that, contrary to intervenors' claims, the rider would not permit the recovery of generation-related costs through distribution or transmission rates. As discussed above, the PPA rider, whether charge or credit, would be considered a generation rate. For that same reason, we do not find applicable the Commission's past decision to deny AEP Ohio's request for recovery of certain plant closure costs. *In re Ohio Power Company,* Case No. 10-1454-EL-RDR, Finding and Order (Jan. 11, 2012). In that case, AEP Ohio sought approval of a plant closure cost recovery rider, which the Company specifically classified as a non-bypassable distribution, not generation, rider that would have collected the generation-related costs associated with the closure of Sporn Unit 5. Neither do we agree with the assertion that the PPA rider would permit AEP Ohio to collect untimely transition costs in violation of R.C. 4928.38. As discussed above, the PPA rider constitutes a rate stability charge related to limitations on customer shopping for retail electric generation service and may, therefore, be authorized pursuant to R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(d), although, on other grounds, we do not find it reasonable to approve the PPA rider as proposed by AEP Ohio in these proceedings. Some of the parties have also raised the issue of federal preemption. The Commission declines to address constitutional issues raised by the parties in these proceedings, as, under the specific facts and circumstances of these cases, such issues are best reserved for judicial determination.

Finally, the Commission notes that our decision not to approve, at this time, AEP Ohio's recovery of any costs, including OVEC costs, through the PPA rider is based solely on the record in these proceedings, and does not preclude the Company from seeking recovery of its OVEC costs in a future filing. Further, despite AEP Ohio's contention to the contrary, it was not the Commission's intent, in the *Corporate Separation Case*, to exempt the Company from further pursuing the divestiture or transfer of the OVEC contractual entitlement. The Commission recognized that, given the sponsoring companies' denial of the proposed transfer to AEP Genco, AEP Ohio would likely continue to hold its ownership interest in OVEC beyond December 31, 2013, which was the expected completion date of the Company's corporate separation. In light of the need to facilitate the timely completion of the corporate separation, the Commission approved AEP Ohio's request to retain the OVEC contractual entitlement, until it could be transferred to AEP Genco or otherwise divested, or until otherwise ordered by the Commission. *Corporate*

Separation Case, Finding and Order (Dec. 4, 2013) at 9. To the extent that it is necessary to do so, the Commission clarifies that our intent in the *Corporate Separation Case* was not to direct or encourage AEP Ohio to forgo any further efforts to transfer or divest its OVEC interest. Accordingly, we direct AEP Ohio to continue to pursue transfer of the OVEC contractual entitlement to AEP Genco or to otherwise divest the OVEC asset. AEP Ohio should file a status report regarding the transfer of the OVEC asset, in the docket of the *Corporate Separation Case*, by June 30 of each year of the ESP, with the first such filing to occur by June 30, 2015.

2. Competitive Bid Procurement Process

AEP Ohio proposes to utilize full auction based pricing for its SSO customers beginning in June 2015 and continuing through the full term of the ESP. In its application, AEP Ohio notes that the delivery point for the auction is specified as the AEP Load Zone established in PJM, which is the point at which all load in the Company's service territory is priced. AEP Ohio further notes that, in the future, it may be appropriate to request that PJM establish an AEP Ohio Aggregate pricing point that would be used to settle the Company's load and serve as the new delivery point in the SSO agreement. According to AEP Ohio, in the event a new pricing point is established, the SSO agreement will be revised accordingly and potential bidders will be provided sufficient notice. (Co. Ex. 1 at 7.)

AEP Ohio witness LaCasse testified that, through the CBP process, the Company will procure full requirements service for its SSO customers, including energy, capacity, ancillary services, and certain transmission services. According to Dr. LaCasse, AEP Ohio will divide the SSO load into a number of tranches, each representing a fixed percentage of the SSO load requirements to be served by the wining bidders, which are referred to as SSO suppliers and will be paid, for each MWh of SSO load served, the auction clearing price times a seasonal factor. Dr. LaCasse explained that there will likely be 100 tranches, each representing one percent of the SSO load, although the auction manager, in agreement with Staff, can increase the tranche size if it is necessary to maintain bidder interest in the face of customer migration. In terms of the auction schedule, AEP Ohio proposes to procure approximately two-thirds of its SSO supply on a 12-month term basis and to procure the remainder on a 24-month term basis, with each contract synchronized to the PJM planning year, starting on June 1 and ending on May 31. In advance of the start of the supply period on June 1 of each year, AEP Ohio proposes to conduct two auctions, one in September and another in March, with each auction designed to procure the same products at two different points in time. Specifically, under AEP Ohio's proposal, the Company would hold six auctions over the term of the ESP, with the first two auctions offering both 12-month and 24-month products and the final four auctions offering a single 12-month product, in order to ensure that all of the SSO supply would terminate at the end of the ESP term. Dr. LaCasse explained that AEP Ohio's proposed auction

structure is consistent with the practice of other electric distribution utilities in Ohio, while also striking an appropriate balance between the risk of exposure to market conditions and the risk of decreasing bidder interest and increasing administrative cost. Dr. LaCasse added that the proposed clock auction format, which proceeds in a series of rounds, is consistent with the CBP rules adopted in Case No. 12-3254-EL-UNC and is broadly similar to the format used by the other electric distribution utilities in Ohio. (Co. Ex. 15 at 9-15, 18.)

AEP Ohio proposes a two business day window during which the Commission would review the auction results, which could be rejected if a specific CBP rule is violated in such a manner so as to invalidate the auction, or if any of the following criteria are not met: the auction was oversubscribed on the basis of the indicative offers received; there were four or more bidders; and no bidder won more than 80 percent of the tranches available at the start of the auction. In the event that there are unfilled tranches in an auction or there is a supplier default, AEP Ohio proposes to implement a contingency plan, which generally calls for procuring any needed supply through the next available auction under the CBP, or, if necessary, through PJM-administered markets. Dr. LaCasse provided a number of documents in support of AEP Ohio's CBP proposal, including the Master SSO Supply Agreement, Bidding Rules, Glossary, Communications Protocols, Alternate Guaranty Process, Part I Application, Part II Application, and Associated Bidder Rules and Protocols. (Co. Ex. 15 at 4-5, 29, 32, Ex. CL-2 to CL-9; Co. Ex. 15A.)

Staff recommends that AEP Ohio's proposed SSO auction structure be modified to reduce customers' exposure to uncertainty and potential rate volatility in 2017 and 2018, in light of the Company's plan to restrict its initial auctions to products that terminate on or before May 31, 2017, in conjunction with the Company's request to reserve the right to terminate the ESP after two years. Staff witness Strom testified that AEP Ohio's proposal has an inadequate amount of product blending and may expose customers to price spikes. As a means to provide more price stability for SSO customers, Mr. Strom recommends that the Commission reject AEP Ohio's early termination proposal; adopt Staff's alternative product mix in order to increase auction blending and eliminate 100 percent termination of auction products; and adopt a five-year ESP term. Mr. Strom further recommends that the Commission require AEP Ohio to propose its next SSO well in advance of the termination of ESP 3, which would enable the Company to blend its last procurements for ESP 3 with the initial procurements for the next SSO. In terms of AEP Ohio's proposed CBP process, Mr. Strom testified that the Commission's ability to reject the auction results should not be limited to the criteria identified by Company witness LaCasse. Staff recommends that the Commission clarify that it will ultimately determine the criteria used to determine whether the auction results should be rejected and that it retains the right to modify and alter the load cap or any other feature of the CBP process for future auctions. (Staff Ex. 16 at 2-6, Ex. RWS-1; Tr. IX at 2245-2250; Staff Br. at 63-67.) AEP Ohio replies that its

proposed criteria are reasonable, consistent with prior auctions, and intended to ensure certainty for bidders (Co. Reply Br. at 13-14).

Like Staff, OCC argues that AEP Ohio's proposal relies too much on one-year products, which may result in higher prices for consumers and greater rate volatility. OCC witness Kahal recommends that a 50/50 mix of one- and two-year products be offered in the fifth and sixth auctions. Alternatively, Mr. Kahal proposes that AEP Ohio be required to procure SSO supply through a 50/50 mix of one- and two-year products in each of the six auctions. (OCC Ex. 13 at 49-53; OCC Br. at 118-119; OCC Reply Br. at 104-106.) Constellation supports AEP Ohio's proposed CBP process and schedule, but notes that it is not opposed to amendment of the auction schedule to provide for some auctioned tranches of a three-year duration (Constellation Br. at 24-25).

In response to Staff's and OCC's concerns, AEP Ohio responds that there is no evidence that rate volatility will be materially increased by the Company's laddering proposal, which would reasonably provide for the termination of the auction products' terms at the end of its ESP. With respect to Staff witness Strom's proposal to extend the ESP term to five years, AEP Ohio points out that Mr. Strom did not take into account the impact of his proposal on any other aspect of the ESP, such as whether the distribution investment rider (DIR) should be continued for five years, and the fact that a prospective significantly excessive earnings test (SEET) review would be required under R.C. 4928.143(E) during the fourth year of the ESP. AEP Ohio adds that the proposal is unnecessary, given that Mr. Strom appeared to recognize that there are other mechanisms available to mitigate his concerns, such as through a requirement that the Company propose its next SSO sufficiently far in advance that the final procurements in this ESP can be blended with the initial procurements of the subsequent SSO. (Staff Ex. 16 at 4; Tr. IX at 2257, 2262-2263; Co. Br. at 12-14; Co. Reply Br. at 12-13.) Staff replies that the Commission has numerous available ways in which to modify AEP Ohio's proposed auction schedule to increase the laddering of auction products in order to reduce customers' exposure to rate volatility (Staff Reply Br. at 47-48).

IGS argues that AEP Ohio's SSO is not a non-discriminatory, comparable, and unbundled service, which is counter to R.C. 4928.02(A) and (B) and has harmed competition in Ohio to the detriment of customers. Specifically, IGS asserts that the SSO receives favored regulatory treatment and is subsidized by AEP Ohio's distribution ratepayers, because significant costs supporting the SSO are recovered through distribution rates. IGS adds that AEP Ohio's proposed wholesale auction process will not resolve problems with limited customer engagement and the failed development of a robust retail electric market for the residential class in particular. IGS, therefore, recommends that the Commission direct AEP Ohio to charge SSO suppliers a retail price adjustment (RPA) fee designed to recover the costs incurred to make the SSO available, which would then be returned to all distribution ratepayers. IGS asserts that the

Commission should establish a proceeding in which to determine the actual and avoided costs related to the SSO that would make up the RPA fee. Alternatively, IGS proposes that AEP Ohio be required to conduct a retail auction in which suppliers would bid for the right to serve SSO customers directly. IGS believes that a retail auction would generate significant revenues that should be used to offset AEP Ohio's deferrals. IGS concludes that either option would benefit customers, encourage customer engagement in the retail electric market, and further state policy by offering a non-discriminatory, comparable, and unbundled SSO price. (IGS Ex. 2 at 5-22; Tr. III at 909-912; Tr. VII at 1807-1808; IGS Br. at 3-15.)

AEP Ohio contends that the recommendations put forth by IGS are contrary to R.C. 4928.141, which requires the Company to provide an SSO to all consumers, while there is no statutory basis for the proposed RPA fee. AEP Ohio adds that IGS offered the same proposals in Case No. 12-3151-EL-COI, which were rejected by the Commission. *In re Comm. Investigation of Ohio's Retail Elec. Serv. Market,* Case No. 12-3151-EL-COI (*CRES Market Case*), Finding and Order (Mar. 26, 2014) at 19. AEP Ohio concludes that, because the Company's SSO is the default service for non-shopping customers, the recommendations of IGS should again be rejected. (Co. Br. at 14-15; Co. Reply Br. at 14-15.) OCC also urges the Commission to reject IGS' recommendations. Specifically, OCC contends that the recommendations are contrary to R.C. 4928.02 and 4928.141; are not supported by any evidence; and would erode the value of the SSO as a market based alternative and increase its price for consumers. (OCC Br. at 123-125; OCC Reply Br. at 80-81.) Like OCC, OPAE and APJN encourage the Commission to reject IGS' recommendations, which, according to OPAE and APJN, are an attempt to undermine the SSO as a competitive option (OPAE/APJN Br. at 48-50; OPAE/APJN Reply Br. at 27-29). IGS responds that its RPA and retail auction proposals are consistent with Ohio law; would lower costs for customers; and enable the retail electric market to continue to evolve following the significant changes that have occurred since AEP Ohio's prior ESP proceedings (IGS Reply Br. at 4-8).

In addition to its recommendations regarding the auction process and schedule, Staff recommends that an AEP Ohio settlement zone be established in PJM, as soon as practicable, for the purpose of pricing SSO load and that the Company be directed to work with Staff in the process. Staff notes that its modeling confirms that it would be less expensive for suppliers to deliver energy to an AEP Ohio zonal price point as compared to the AEP Load Zone. (Staff Ex. 9 at 2-3; Staff Br. at 70-71.) In response, AEP Ohio states that a thorough analysis of the benefits and costs should precede the decision to petition PJM for a change in the delivery point. Accordingly, AEP Ohio commits to conduct the necessary analysis and report back to Staff with the results in a timely manner. (Tr. V at 1319-1322; Co. Br. at 15-16; Co. Reply Br. at 15.) Staff replies that the Commission should direct AEP Ohio to complete its study prior to the independent auction administrator's dissemination of bidder information materials for the first auction in which the new load

zone is used as the auction delivery point. Further, Staff recommends that AEP Ohio be required to share the assumptions and results of the study with Staff. (Staff Reply Br. at 48.)

The Commission finds that AEP Ohio's proposal to implement full auction based pricing for its SSO customers for the ESP period beginning on June 1, 2015, and continuing through May 31, 2018, is reasonable and should be approved with modifications. The CBP process, including the products offered and the timing of the auctions, should be designed to minimize uncertainty and potential rate volatility for SSO customers. AEP Ohio's proposed auction schedule, however, places too much emphasis on 12-month products in the later auctions, which may have the adverse effect of higher prices and greater rate volatility. (Staff Ex. 16 at 2-4; OCC Ex. 13 at 49-53.) Accordingly, the Commission finds that AEP Ohio's proposed auction schedule should be modified. Specifically, the first and second auctions should occur sufficiently far in advance of the end of the current ESP term on May 31, 2015, and each offer a mix of 12-month (17 tranches), 24-month (17 tranches), and 36-month (16 tranches) products, with delivery to commence on June 1, 2015. The third and fourth auctions should occur in November 2015 and March 2016, respectively, and each offer a 24-month (17 tranches) product. Finally, the fifth and sixth auctions should occur in November 2016 and March 2017, respectively, and each offer a 12-month (17 tranches) product. Additionally, consistent with Staff's recommendation, AEP Ohio should propose its next SSO sufficiently far in advance of the conclusion of ESP 3, in order to blend the final procurements of ESP 3 with the initial procurements of the next SSO (Staff Ex. 16 at 4). AEP Ohio is, therefore, directed to file its next SSO application, pursuant to R.C. 4928.141, by June 1, 2017. If a subsequent SSO is not authorized by the Commission by April 1, 2018, AEP Ohio shall procure, through the CBP process, 100 tranches of a full requirements product for a term that is not less than quarterly or more than annually to be deliverable on June 1, 2018, until a subsequent SSO is authorized.

The Commission notes that we reserve the right to review and modify any feature of the CBP process, as the Commission deems necessary based upon our continuing oversight of the process, including any reports on the auctions provided to the Commission by the independent auction manager, AEP Ohio, Staff, or any consultant retained by the Commission. Although AEP Ohio's application addresses specific situations in which the Commission may reject the results of an auction, we note that this provision of the CBP proposal does not circumscribe the Commission's authority to oversee the CBP process.

With respect to Staff's recommendation regarding an AEP Ohio settlement zone in PJM, the Commission takes administrative notice of the fact that, on October 1, 2014,

American Electric Power (AEP) provided notice[5] to PJM of its intention to change the existing energy settlement area into four separate areas based on operating company, effective June 1, 2015. Given the expected benefits from the implementation of an AEP Ohio settlement zone (Staff Ex. 9 at 3), the new zone should be incorporated into the Company's CBP process as the delivery point for its SSO auctions, beginning on June 1, 2015. Finally, the Commission declines to adopt the recommendations of IGS regarding the implementation of retail auctions or an RPA fee. In the *CRES Market Case*, IGS recommended that the Commission eliminate the SSO or otherwise take immediate steps to transition beyond the current default rate structure. The Commission, however, concluded that the SSO should remain the default service for non-shopping customers at present, in light of the success of the SSO auctions, and the fact that elimination of the SSO could result in customer confusion. *CRES Market Case*, Finding and Order (Mar. 26, 2014) at 19-20. For the same reasons, we again decline to adopt IGS' recommendations.

3. Standard Service Offer Pricing

In the application, AEP Ohio states that the proposed ESP will provide transparency in SSO pricing through implementation of a generation energy (GENE) rider, generation capacity (GENC) rider, and auction cost reconciliation rider (ACRR), while the Company's current base generation charges, fixed cost rider, and auction phase-in rider (APIR) will be eliminated, in addition to the FAC mechanism, following a final true-up of all costs incurred through May 2015. AEP Ohio notes that its proposed generation service riders will give consumers a comparable price to be used when evaluating offers from CRES providers. According to AEP Ohio, the CBP auctions will result in a bundled price for energy and capacity, as well as certain market based transmission services, as discussed further below. AEP Ohio witness Roush explained that, because multiple auctions will be held for each delivery year, a tranche-weighted average auction price will be determined for each delivery year, which will consist of a capacity price and an energy price. Mr. Roush testified that the capacity price will be determined by using the PJM final zonal capacity price for the delivery year, while the energy price will be the remainder after deducting the capacity price from the tranche-weighted average auction price. Mr. Roush further testified that the GENC rider rates, which include a gross-up for taxes, will be determined based upon the contribution of each customer class to the PJM 5 Coincident Peaks (CP), computed as a rate per kilowatt hour (kWh), and updated annually to reflect the PJM final zonal capacity price for the delivery year. The GENE rider rates, according to Mr. Roush, will include a gross-up for taxes, be computed using the seasonal factor set forth in the auction rules and loss factors, and be updated annually to reflect the results of the competitive bid auctions for the delivery year. Mr. Roush testified that any over- or under-recoveries related to the GENE and GENC riders would be reconciled through the

[5] Notice of AEP's Intention to Change Existing Load Zone Energy Settlement Area, http://pjm.com/markets-and-operations/energy/lmp-model-info.aspx.

ACRR. AEP Ohio emphasizes that its proposed pricing methodology is consistent with the manner in which the Commission has approved the conversion of auction prices to customer rates for other Ohio utilities. (Co. Ex. 1 at 7; Co. Ex. 12 at 4-5, Ex. DMR-2; Co. Ex. 13 at 4, 8-9, 11.)

AEP Ohio witness Moore explained that the ACRR will enable the Company to reconcile any over/under recovery based on the amount billed to SSO customers versus the amount paid to auction winners for the procurement of power, as well as to recover all costs associated with the CBP process such as auction manager fees, incremental auction costs, and the costs associated with the contingency plan to procure replacement supply, as necessary. With respect to contingency plan costs in particular, AEP Ohio requests that such costs, if any, be deemed prudent and approved for recovery through retail rates. Ms. Moore testified that the ACRR would be collected on a per kWh basis and updated quarterly. (Co. Ex. 13 at 11, Ex. AEM-4; Co. Ex. 15 at 34.)

With respect to the ACRR, Staff witness Snider recommended that the Commission direct that AEP Ohio be allowed to collect only its prudently incurred CBP costs through the rider. Mr. Snider further recommended that the ACRR be subject to an annual audit by Staff and that AEP Ohio be directed to work with Staff regarding the details of the audit. Finally, Mr. Snider advised that the Commission should direct Staff to ensure that there is no overlap of costs recovered through the ACRR and the existing APIR, which will be replaced by the ACRR. (Staff Ex. 7 at 2-3; Staff Br. at 31-32.) AEP Ohio responds that it does not object to Staff's recommendations (Co. Br. at 19).

Staff witness Turkenton noted that, in Case No. 13-1530-EL-UNC, the Commission approved AEP Ohio's proposed rate mitigation plan for residential customers in the CSP rate zone, which phases in winter tail block capacity rates for a period that ends on May 31, 2015. *In re Comm. Review of Customer Rate Impacts from Ohio Power Company's Transition to Market Based Rates*, Case No. 13-1530-EL-UNC, Finding and Order (Mar. 19, 2014) at 8. Ms. Turkenton further noted that, because capacity costs are expected to decrease beginning on June 1, 2015, the impact from completely phasing in the winter tail block capacity rates on June 1, 2015, would result in moderate increases for residential customers in the CSP rate zone. Accordingly, Staff recommends that AEP Ohio provide a typical bill impact for residential customers in the CSP rate zone within 30 days following the Commission's decision in these proceedings, once the new rates and rider impacts are known, to determine if the complete phase-in of the winter tail block capacity rates is appropriate. (Staff Ex. 15 at 6.) AEP Ohio does not object to this recommendation (Co. Br. at 20).

Regarding the GENC rider, OCC argues that AEP Ohio's proposal to allocate responsibility for capacity costs based on the load factor of each customer class will result in a $30 million annual cost premium for capacity supplied to residential SSO customers.

OCC witness Kahal contends that residential customers pose less migration risk and account for a sizable portion of SSO load, which completely offsets the relatively greater capacity costs incurred by SSO suppliers to provide generation services for the residential class. Mr. Kahal recommends, therefore, that the residential customer class be allocated only an average share of capacity costs or, alternatively, that the CBP auctions be conducted in a manner that procures generation services for the residential class separately from the other classes. (OCC Ex. 13 at 56-59; OCC Br. at 114-117.) AEP Ohio responds that the methodology used by Company witness Roush, including the allocation of capacity costs based on class load factors, has been approved by the Commission for the other Ohio electric distribution utilities. AEP Ohio also asserts that OCC witness Kahal failed to account for governmental aggregation in his assessment of migration risk; failed to conduct an analysis to demonstrate that migration risk would substantially offset the lower capacity factor of the residential class; and did not account for other risks factored into SSO suppliers' bids, such as the weather sensitive nature of residential usage. With respect to OCC's alternative recommendation, AEP Ohio points out that, as Mr. Kahal admits, a separate procurement for the residential class would introduce an undue and unnecessary complexity and cost into the CBP process. AEP Ohio adds that smaller auctions may also result in lower participation and ultimately higher clearing prices. (OCC Ex. 13 at 58; Tr. IX at 2101-2109; Co. Br. at 21-22; Co. Reply Br. at 16.) OCC replies that AEP Ohio has not demonstrated that SSO suppliers will incur greater costs to provide capacity to the residential class. OCC contends, therefore, that AEP Ohio's capacity pricing proposal is discriminatory and contrary to R.C. 4905.33, 4905.35, and 4928.02(A). (OCC Reply Br. at 99-104.)

The Commission finds that AEP Ohio's SSO pricing proposal, including establishment of the GENE and GENC riders and the ACRR, which was generally unopposed, is reasonable and should be approved, subject to Staff's recommendations (Co. Ex. 12 at 4-5, Ex. DMR-2; Co. Ex. 13 at 4, 8-9, 11, Ex. AEM-4; Co. Ex. 15 at 34). Specifically, regarding the ACRR, we note that AEP Ohio is authorized to collect only its prudently incurred CBP-related costs through the rider. The ACRR shall be subject to an annual audit by Staff, which, among other matters, should ensure that there is no overlap of costs recovered through the new ACRR and the current APIR that will be eliminated. AEP Ohio should provide any and all documents or information requested by Staff, and otherwise cooperate with Staff, in conjunction with each annual audit. (Staff Ex. 7 at 2-3.) The Commission notes that this change may result in an increase in rates for residential customers in the CSP zone with high usage in non-peak months. The amount of this increase will be dependent upon the results of the auctions to be held under the ESP, and other provisions of the ESP. We will continue to review the rate impact, including the reasonableness of the impact, on these customers. Accordingly, we reserve our prerogative to phase in any increase we consider necessary to ensure rate stability for these consumers. (Staff Ex. 15 at 6.)

The Commission declines to adopt OCC's recommendations regarding the allocation of capacity costs to the residential customer class. AEP Ohio's proposed allocation, which is based on class load factors, is consistent with cost causation principles. Further, AEP Ohio witness Roush noted that the Company's calculation methodology is consistent with the manner in which auction prices are converted into customer rates for the other Ohio electric distribution utilities (Co. Ex. 12 at 5), and the Commission has previously approved the Company's allocation of capacity costs based on the contribution of each customer class to the PJM 5 CP. *In re Ohio Power Company*, Case No. 13-1530-EL-UNC, Finding and Order (Mar. 19, 2014) at 3, 7-8. OCC witness Kahal admitted that, all other considerations being held equal, the low load factor of the residential class may well merit a pricing premium in comparison to a customer class with a higher load factor. Mr. Kahal nevertheless claimed that the larger load size and lower migration risk of the residential class should also be factored into the determination of capacity rates. (OCC Ex. 13 at 56-57.) Mr. Kahal, however, did not demonstrate that the alleged lower migration risk or the larger size of the residential class would have a material impact on the bids of SSO auction participants, or that these particular factors would substantially offset the increased costs attributable to the low load factor of the residential class. Additionally, Mr. Kahal did not consider other factors in his analysis, such as the weather sensitive nature of residential usage. With respect to OCC's alternative recommendation to conduct a separate procurement for the residential class, the Commission finds that this proposal would introduce an unnecessary layer of complexity in the CBP process, as Mr. Kahal recognizes, and may result in higher costs and lower participation in AEP Ohio's auctions. (OCC Ex. 13 at 58-59.) Accordingly, we find no merit in OCC's contention that AEP Ohio's capacity pricing proposal is discriminatory or otherwise unlawful.

4. Alternative Energy Rider

AEP Ohio proposes to continue the bypassable alternative energy rider (AER), which was approved by the Commission in the Company's prior ESP proceedings. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 18. AEP Ohio explains that the AER enables the Company to recover the renewable energy credit expense associated with acquiring or creating renewable energy. AEP Ohio notes that its proposal to continue the AER is unopposed. (Co. Ex. 1 at 9; Co. Ex. 13 at 3-4; Co. Br. at 69; Co. Reply Br. at 63-64.) The Commission finds that AEP Ohio's proposed extension of the AER is reasonable and should be approved (Co. Ex. 1 at 9; Co. Ex. 13 at 3-4). In the *ESP 2 Case*, the Commission specified that the AER should be subject to an annual audit in conjunction with the audit of AEP Ohio's FAC mechanism. *ESP 2 Case* at 18. Although the FAC mechanism has been replaced with other generation riders, we note that the annual audits of the AER should nevertheless continue in a separate proceeding under the direction of Staff.

5. Variable Price Tariffs

In light of the implementation of full auction based pricing for SSO customers and the continued development of the competitive marketplace, AEP Ohio proposes to eliminate the interruptible power-discretionary rider (IRP-D), supplement no. 18 (Supp. No. 18), schedule standby service (Schedule SBS), and the generation component of the standard time of use (TOU) tariffs not related to the pilot gridSMART project tariffs. AEP Ohio witnesses Spitznogle and Moore testified that CRES providers are better positioned to offer innovative generation service rate offerings, whereas the Company, as a wires business, should no longer provide these generation services. Mr. Spitznogle added that AEP Ohio does not expect any significant customer impact from the elimination of its variable price tariffs, given that there were relatively few customers, ranging from 3 to 915, taking service under any of these tariffs as of August 2013. Regarding the IRP-D, AEP Ohio emphasizes that, because it will procure generation services for SSO customers through an auction process, the Company is not the entity best able to provide an interruptible service product. Similarly, with respect to Supp. No. 18, AEP Ohio states that discounts on demand charges for off-peak usage by schools and churches should no longer be offered by the electric distribution utility and, in any event, a discount on demand is no longer applicable, because SSO rates will be structured as a per kWh charge. Next, AEP Ohio explains that it can no longer administer Schedule SBS, because the Company cannot monitor or provide backup and maintenance service, given that it no longer owns generation assets. Finally, AEP Ohio proposes to eliminate its residential TOU generation rates, in light of the new residential rate design to take effect on January 1, 2015, which the Commission ordered the Company to implement in Case No. 11-351-EL-AIR, et al. *In re Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company*, Case No. 11-351-EL-AIR, et al. (*Distribution Rate Case*), Opinion and Order (Dec. 14, 2011) at 10, Entry Nunc Pro Tunc (Dec. 15, 2011) at 2, Entry on Rehearing (Feb. 14, 2012) at 4-9. AEP Ohio explains that this change will flatten the energy rate on residential tariffs, reflecting no benefit of operating during on- or off-peak periods. (Co. Ex. 1 at 9; Co. Ex. 3 at 12-13; Co. Ex. 13 at 9-11; Co. Br. at 70-71.)

RESA, Constellation, and IGS support AEP Ohio's proposal. RESA and IGS assert that the elimination of AEP Ohio's TOU rates would enable CRES providers to provide TOU products in furtherance of the competitive market. Constellation points out that AEP Ohio, as an electric distribution utility, should be providing only basic default service for supply, while CRES providers should be the exclusive suppliers of TOU and other innovative products and services. Constellation adds that the continued reliance on TOU products that are not truly market supplied or market based will prolong the day that such products are developed by CRES providers and that now is the appropriate time to eliminate AEP Ohio's TOU rates. (Constellation Ex. 1 at 11; RESA Br. at 32-33; Constellation Br. at 23; IGS Br. at 21-22; Constellation Reply Br. at 25-26.)

In response to AEP Ohio's request to eliminate the IRP-D, OEG argues that the Company should be required to continue an interruptible program. In light of the proposed PPA rider, OEG points out that, contrary to AEP Ohio's claim, it would not be a wires only company during the ESP term, because the Company would retain its OVEC generation assets, if the rider is approved. OEG adds that Duke and the FirstEnergy operating companies have Commission-approved interruptible programs. Further, OEG contends that there are no realistic market alternatives for customers that currently participate in AEP Ohio's interruptible program. Finally, OEG emphasizes that a number of significant benefits, which were recognized by the Commission in the *ESP 2 Case*, would be lost if the program is terminated. According to OEG, AEP Ohio's interruptible program enhances the reliability of the Company's system, promotes economic development, and contributes to the Company's energy efficiency and peak demand reduction (EE/PDR) requirements under R.C. 4928.66. (OEG Ex. 2 at 7-16, Ex. SJB-4 to SJB-7; Tr. X at 2362-2367, 2383-2385; OEG Br. at 18-25.)

OEG recommends two interruptible rate options for the Commission's consideration. First, OEG proposes that AEP Ohio offer an interruptible program that provides for an interruptible credit equal to 50 percent of the Net Cost of New Entry (Net CONE) ($5.36/kilowatt (kW)-month for 2017/2018), based on Duke's approach and patterned after the PJM Limited Emergency Demand Response program, which limits interruptions to ten times during the months of June through September for participating SSO and shopping customers. As a second option, OEG proposes that AEP Ohio be required to offer an unlimited emergency interruptible program under which a participating customer would continue to receive the existing credit of $8.21/kW-month, with no limitations on the frequency, duration, and timing of emergency interruptions, although the existing notice provisions would continue to apply. According to OEG witness Baron, the potential for unlimited emergency curtailments increases the reliability value of the interruptible load compared to PJM's program, which justifies the larger monthly credit for this option. OEG recommends that AEP Ohio be required to maximize the financial value of the interruptible capacity by bidding it into the appropriate PJM capacity auction and credit that revenue back to consumers through the EE/PDR rider, which would significantly reduce the cost of the program. Further, OEG proposes that AEP Ohio's interruptible program continue to be capped at 525 MW, although, at a minimum, OEG requests that all current IRP-D customers be permitted to participate in one or the other of the two options, if the Commission elects to impose a more restrictive cap. Finally, OEG asserts that, in light of the interruptible program benefits, it would be appropriate for AEP Ohio to recover the costs associated with the interruptible credits through either the EE/PDR rider or the economic development rider (EDR). (OEG Ex. 2 at 16-19; Tr. X at 2346; OEG Br. at 25-26.)

AEP Ohio responds that, in light of changed circumstances, the Company does not object to continuing the IRP-D for existing IRP-D customers and as an option for economic

development purposes, along with the existing $8.21/kW-month credit, and for purposes of unlimited emergency interruptions only. AEP Ohio emphasizes that its support for a modified IRP-D is contingent upon its ability to recover the costs of any interruptible credits through the EE/PDR rider, as OEG suggests. With respect to OEG's recommended limited emergency interruption program, AEP Ohio states that the program is not appropriate. (Co. Br. at 72-73; Co. Reply Br. at 66-67.) OEG responds that, in light of AEP Ohio's change in position, the Commission should modify the IRP-D to provide for unlimited emergency interruptions with a credit of $8.21/kW-month available to shopping and non-shopping customers (OEG Reply Br. at 11-13). EnerNOC believes that there are not enough details in the record regarding OEG's proposed interruptible load program expansion and, therefore, recommends that the Commission open a new docket and direct the parties to develop a reasonable tariff, if the program is approved (EnerNOC Reply Br. at 6-7). OMAEG points out that AEP Ohio has requested recovery of approximately $45 million associated with the IRP-D credit received by three customers from 2012 through 2014. In light of the significant cost, OMAEG recommends that, if the Commission finds that the interruptible load program serves an economic development purpose, the Commission should either continue the existing program or institute a program comparable to Duke's, wherein the credit is equal to 50 percent of the applicable Net CONE rate per MW. OMAEG believes that the costs of the program should be recovered through the EDR rather than the EE/PDR rider. Finally, OMAEG asserts that AEP Ohio should be required to continue to bid the interruptible load in PJM's capacity auctions, with any resulting revenues credited back to customers through the EDR. (Tr. X at 2342-2352; OMAEG Reply Br. at 20-25.) OCC objects to AEP Ohio's late change in position and argues that the Commission should seek ways to protect the customers that fund the IRP-D credit, such as by allowing the credit to continue only until existing IRP-D customers can find a curtailment service provider or bid their interruptible loads into the PJM auctions (OCC Reply Br. at 96-99).

Staff notes that, with respect to Schedule SBS, AEP Ohio proposes to assess generation-related charges for backup power and planned maintenance services under the GENE, GENC, and ACRR based on the actual energy used for those services during a billing period. Staff recommends that Schedule SBS be maintained and modified to reference the applicable generation-related riders, along with the appropriate tariffs for distribution service. Staff asserts that its proposal will make it easier for customers to understand how backup and planned maintenance charges will be calculated and ensure that customers are aware that the services are provided through the SSO. (Staff Ex. 1; Staff Ex. 6 at 2-4; Staff Br. at 68-70.) In its reply brief, Staff points out that AEP Ohio has not clearly indicated whether the Company requests to eliminate standby service or just Schedule SBS. In any event, Staff believes that AEP Ohio has an obligation and should be required, pursuant to R.C. 4928.14 and 4928.141, to continue both standby service and the corresponding tariff. (Staff Reply Br. at 43-47.) For its part, AEP Ohio replies that Staff's recommendation that Schedule SBS be maintained is unnecessarily complex and

inappropriate, because the tariff would no longer be used to collect a separate charge for standby service. AEP Ohio adds that it can directly resolve any confusion over the elimination of Schedule SBS with the Company's three standby customers. (Co. Reply Br. at 64-65.)

OCC, ELPC, OEC, and EDF urge the Commission to reject AEP Ohio's proposal to eliminate the generation component of the standard TOU tariffs. OCC points out that CRES providers are not offering TOU products to customers and that the majority of electric utilities in Ohio continue to have tariff based TOU rates, which OCC believes should be retained as the market emerges for these types of product offerings. OCC adds that approximately 915 customers would lose their savings from the TOU rates, if AEP Ohio's proposal is adopted. ELPC argues that AEP Ohio's proposal is contrary to R.C. 4928.02(D); inconsistent with prior Commission directives set forth in the *CRES Market Case* and other proceedings; detrimental to consumers and the environment; and untimely. Because no CRES provider is currently offering TOU rates and the majority of residential consumers continue to receive service under the SSO, ELPC disputes AEP Ohio's claim that CRES providers are better situated to provide TOU rates. OEC and EDF assert that AEP Ohio should provide TOU rates until a reasonable number of CRES providers offer TOU products. (OCC Ex. 11 at 33-34, Ex. JDW-15; ELPC Ex. 1; Tr. I at 78-79; Tr. III at 694-695; OCC Br. at 109-112; ELPC Br. at 4-6; OEC/EDF Br. at 3-6; OCC Reply Br. at 86-88.) In response to such concerns, RESA points out that there is adequate time for CRES providers to make TOU offers before AEP Ohio's proposed elimination of TOU rates would take effect, particularly in light of the small number of affected customers. In any event, RESA believes that the Commission should encourage the competitive market to offer TOU products by approving AEP Ohio's request to terminate its TOU rates. (RESA Br. at 33; RESA Reply Br. at 21.) IGS adds that the Commission should find means to enable CRES providers to offer TOU products, such as ensuring access to the necessary customer data (IGS Reply Br. at 13-14). In its reply brief, AEP Ohio points out that CRES providers are eager to provide TOU products to customers. Regarding the Commission's directives on TOU rates as set forth in the *CRES Market Case*, AEP Ohio notes that this matter should be addressed in the context of the Company's application to eliminate its TOU tariffs associated with the first phase of the gridSMART program, which was filed in Case No. 13-1937-EL-ATA. (Co. Reply Br. at 65-66.)

The Commission finds that AEP Ohio's request to eliminate the IRP-D, Supp. No. 18, Schedule SBS, and the generation component of the standard TOU tariffs not related to the pilot gridSMART project tariffs should be denied. We believe that it is reasonable and appropriate for AEP Ohio to continue the IRP-D, Supp. No. 18, Schedule SBS, and the TOU tariffs at this point in time. Although the Commission fully expects that CRES providers will begin to offer TOU and other innovative and dynamic products as smart grid deployment expands and we strongly encourage their endeavors in this area, the record is clear that such products are not, at present, offered by CRES providers in AEP Ohio's

service territory (OCC Ex. 11 at 33-34, Ex. JDW-15; Tr. I at 78-79). As the Commission recently stated in the *CRES Market Case*, time-differentiated rates are a type of generation service that should be offered by generation service providers. We directed the electric distribution utilities to offer time-differentiated rates and to participate in the Market Development Working Group (MDWG) to assist in the development of proper data exchange protocols to improve the ability of CRES providers to offer time-differentiated rates. *CRES Market Case*, Finding and Order (Mar. 26, 2014) at 37-38. Throughout the ESP period, AEP Ohio will remain the SSO provider, regardless of the fact that generation services will be fully procured through the CBP process. Therefore, for the same reasons articulated in the *CRES Market Case* with respect to time-differentiated rates, the Commission finds that AEP Ohio should continue to make its TOU and other variable price tariffs available to customers, while the competitive market sufficiently develops such that a reasonable number of CRES providers, in fact, begin to offer these types of innovative generation services and pricing.

At the same time, we recognize that AEP Ohio's variable price tariffs may require modifications, in light of the implementation of full auction based pricing through several new generation riders. Consequently, Schedule SBS should be modified, as recommended by Staff (Staff Ex. 6 at 3-4), to reference the applicable generation riders and distribution tariffs, such that customers are able to understand how the Company calculates supplemental, backup, and maintenance service charges. With respect to Supp. No. 18 and the residential TOU tariffs, AEP Ohio should propose any rate design changes necessary for schools, churches, and residential customers to retain the current financial benefits associated with using power during off-peak periods. Accordingly, AEP Ohio should file proposed revised tariffs within 60 days of the date of this Opinion and Order.

Finally, the Commission agrees with OEG that the IRP-D offers numerous benefits, including the promotion of economic development and the retention of manufacturing jobs, and furthers state policy, which we recognized in the *ESP 2 Case*. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 26, 66. We find that the IRP-D should be modified to provide for unlimited emergency interruptions and that the $8.21/kW-month credit should be available to new and existing shopping and non-shopping customers. Consistent with its current practice, AEP Ohio should continue to apply for recovery of the costs associated with the IRP-D through the EE/PDR rider, until otherwise ordered by the Commission. AEP Ohio should also bid the additional capacity resources associated with the IRP-D into PJM's base residual auctions held during the ESP term, with any resulting revenues credited back to customers through the EE/PDR rider.

6. Distribution Investment Rider

The DIR was previously approved by the Commission, in the *ESP 2 Case*, to facilitate the timely and efficient replacement of aging infrastructure to improve service

reliability. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 46-47. Presently, the DIR is updated quarterly using FERC forms and AEP Ohio's DIR rider rates are automatically approved 60 days after the application is filed, unless the Commission specifically orders otherwise. The Commission reviews the DIR annually for accounting accuracy, prudency, and compliance with the DIR plan developed by AEP Ohio with Staff input.

In this ESP application, under the authority of R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h), AEP Ohio requests the continuation of the DIR, with certain modifications and adjustments. AEP Ohio requests that the DIR rate caps be established at $155 million for 2015, $191 million for 2016, $219 million for 2017, and $102 million for January 1 through May 31, 2018, for a total of $667 million. For any year that AEP Ohio's investment results in revenues to be collected that exceed the cap, the excess would be recovered and be subject to the cap applicable in the subsequent period. The same would be true when AEP Ohio's investment results in revenues to be collected that fall below the cap for the period; the cap for the subsequent period would be increased by the amount available from the prior period. AEP Ohio proposes DIR capital projects that primarily fall into eight categories: asset improvement, customer service, forestry, general, other, planning capacity, reliability, and system restoration. AEP Ohio reasons that these types of capital investments are key components in its strategy for maintaining the distribution system and improving reliability. One of the capital investments that AEP Ohio plans to make, if this ESP is approved, is to replace its 800 megahertz radio system at a cost of approximately $23 million. The radio system is used to support field communication, dispatching, remote equipment interrogation, global positioning satellite communications, service restoration, and remote meter reading. (Co. Ex. 1 at 9-10; Co. Ex. 4 at 17-19; Co. Ex. 14 at 5-7.)

However, AEP Ohio requests that the DIR, as currently implemented, be modified in three respects.[6] First, AEP Ohio requests that the DIR mechanism be modified such that the balance of each category of plant incurs an applicable associated carrying charge. Second, AEP Ohio proposes that the DIR be expanded to include general plant. Third, AEP Ohio requests that a gross-up factor be added to riders, including the DIR, to account for the Company's obligation to fund a portion of the budgets of the Commission and OCC. (Co. Ex. 13 at 5-7; Co. Ex. 14 at 1-2.)

Market Strategies International (MSI) conducted telephone surveys for AEP Ohio in 2012 to determine customer reliability expectations. MSI conducted two series of telephone surveys, interviewing a total of 400 residential customers and 400 small commercial customers. According to the survey results, 69.8 percent of residential customers and 75.8 percent of small commercial customers believe that their electric

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[6] AEP Ohio also requests that gridSMART Phase 1 capital costs be transferred into the DIR and that issue is addressed in the gridSMART section of this Opinion and Order.

service reliability expectations will stay about the same over the next five years. Significantly fewer customers surveyed, 13.0 percent of residential customers and 14.8 percent of small commercial customers, thought that their service reliability expectations over the next five years would increase somewhat. Some of the customers surveyed thought that their service reliability expectations would increase significantly over the next five years, 5.8 percent of residential customers and 3.0 percent of small commercial customers. On the other hand, the surveys revealed that relatively few customers believe that their service reliability expectations will decrease somewhat, 5.3 percent of residential customers and 2.8 percent of small commercial customers. (Co. Ex. 4 at 5-8, Ex. SJD-1 at 1-2.)

AEP Ohio submits that the DIR advances the state policies expressed in R.C. 4928.02(A), (D), (E), (G), and (M). Further, AEP Ohio encourages the Commission to find that the DIR, as proposed, satisfies the statutory requirements set forth in R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h) and to approve the rider. (Co. Br. at 84.)

OHA supports the Commission's approval of the DIR, as proposed by AEP Ohio (OHA Br. at 3). Similarly, Staff generally does not oppose the continuation of the DIR, as the Commission approved the mechanism and the process for review in AEP Ohio's previous ESP proceedings. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 46-47. Staff testified that AEP Ohio's most recent system reliability standards were developed pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-10-10(B)(2), in Case No. 12-1945-EL-ESS, and adopted by the Commission in accordance with a stipulation filed by all of the parties to the proceeding. *In re Ohio Power Company*, Case No. 12-1945-EL-ESS (*Reliability Standards Case)*, Opinion and Order (Mar. 19, 2014) at 6. In the *Reliability Standards Case*, the Commission established a customer average interruption duration index (CAIDI) of 150.0 minutes and a system average interruption frequency index (SAIFI) of 1.20, excluding "major event days," as defined by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. The new CAIDI and SAIFI standards were first applicable to AEP Ohio for calendar year 2013. Staff confirmed that, based on AEP Ohio's application filed in Case No. 14-517-EL-ESS, the Company met both its SAIFI and CAIDI performance standards for 2013. For that reason, Staff recommends that the Commission find that AEP Ohio's reliability expectations are aligned with those of its customers. (Staff Ex. 10 at 5-6; Staff Ex. 17 at 2; Staff Br. at 43.)

Staff, however, opposes the substantial increase and modifications that AEP Ohio requests with respect to the DIR. Regarding the request to include general plant, Staff, OCC, and Kroger assert that the request is another example of AEP Ohio's attempt to avoid a distribution rate case. OCC argues that general plant is not, by definition, infrastructure and, therefore, it is not appropriate to include general plant in the DIR. Staff reasons that the recovery of general plant costs via a rider is inconsistent with the intent of the ESP statute and the Commission's directives with respect to the DIR. Noting the

Commission's rationale for approving the DIR as stated in the *ESP 2 Case*, Staff asks the Commission to reaffirm its directive that AEP Ohio's DIR spending focus on those components that will best improve or maintain reliability. General plant, in Staff's and OCC's opinion, does not satisfy the Commission's stated criteria, because the types of general plant expenses that AEP Ohio seeks to include in the DIR do not directly relate to the reliability of the distribution system. Staff maintains that general plant like the radio system and service centers, at best, supports maintaining reliability, but does not directly relate to distribution system reliability. Staff argues that the DIR was never intended to facilitate the recovery of all capital expenditures. General plant, Staff reasons, does not satisfy the Commission's stated objective for the DIR, which is "to encourage the electric utility to proactively and efficiently replace and modernize infrastructure." *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 47. Staff requests that AEP Ohio's proposal to modify the DIR to include general plant be denied. (OCC Ex. 18 at 14; Staff Br. at 43-47; Staff Reply Br. at 34-36; OCC Br. at 85-86; OCC Reply Br. at 59-60; Kroger Reply Br. at 3-4.)

AEP Ohio responds that the general plant investments in question primarily consist of service centers and the radio communications systems that directly support the front-line employees. AEP Ohio witness Dias testified that some of the facilities were built in the World War II era and need work. AEP Ohio notes that the DIR plan will be discussed with Staff, as it has been since implementation, and filed with the Commission. AEP Ohio further notes that Staff witness McCarter indicated that, after a full review, Staff may agree to the inclusion of the radio system. (Tr. II at 344; Tr. IX at 2295; Co. Reply Br. at 73-74.)

AEP Ohio also proposes that the DIR be modified to include a factor to account for the Commission's and OCC's budgets. According to Staff, including a gross-up factor to account for AEP Ohio's share of the Commission's and OCC's budgets is short-sighted and unnecessary. Staff contends that there are only two scenarios where AEP Ohio would owe a significantly larger dollar amount for the assessments in a subsequent year: first, if AEP Ohio's revenues increase disproportionally to the revenues of all of the other regulated public utilities in Ohio; and, second, if there is an increase in either the Commission's or OCC's budget. Staff notes that the Commission's and OCC's budgets have not increased in recent years and are not expected to increase in the foreseeable future. Staff also argues that AEP Ohio did not demonstrate that its revenues would increase so disproportionately as to justify the proposed change in the gross-up factor. (Staff Ex. 17 at 4; Staff Br. at 47-48.)

OCC emphasizes AEP Ohio's failure to provide specific service reliability improvements for each DIR program implemented. OCC and OMAEG argue that AEP Ohio failed to present any analysis to support its claims that service reliability has and will deteriorate without the DIR. For that reason, OCC and OMAEG oppose any increase in the DIR without supporting documentation. (OMAEG Br. at 10; OCC Reply Br. at 56.)

If the Commission approves the continuation of the DIR, Staff makes six recommendations to facilitate the Commission's efficient review of plant recovery costs across the Company's riders. More specifically, Staff recommends that, in all subsequent DIR filings, AEP Ohio include additional detailed account and subaccount information; employ jurisdictional allocations and accrual rates from the *Distribution Rate Case*; provide a full reconciliation between the functional ledger and FERC forms; detail the DIR revenue collected by month; and highlight and quantify any proposed changes to capitalization policy. Staff also recommends that the Commission direct AEP Ohio to file a fully updated depreciation study by November 2016, with a study date of December 31, 2015. (Staff Ex. 17 at 5-7.)

OCC notes that AEP Ohio's enhanced service reliability rider (ESRR) and DIR programs include the widening and clearing of right-of-ways. OCC recommends that the Commission delete $3.9 million from the forestry component of the DIR for each year 2015 through 2018 to avoid any double recovery by AEP Ohio. (Tr. II at 353; OCC Br. at 84-85.) Further, OCC contends that the depreciation reserve used to calculate property taxes should be adjusted to eliminate the cumulative amortization of the excess depreciation reserve and the net plant to which the property tax is applied (OCC Br. at 90). Staff concurs with OCC's recommendation (Staff Reply Br. at 36-37).

OCC believes that the DIR, as well as other riders, should not be allocated based on total base distribution revenues, as AEP Ohio proposes, but rather in proportion to the allocation of net electric plant in service as set forth in the cost-of-service studies filed in the *Distribution Rate Case*. OCC contends that AEP Ohio's allocation does not follow cost causation principles and would result in residential customers being charged approximately $29 million more than their fair share for the DIR, ESRR, and sustained and skilled workforce rider (SSWR). (OCC Ex. 14 at 5-12; OCC Br. at 107-109.)

OEG and IEU-Ohio oppose OCC's reallocation proposal. OEG advocates that the costs underlying the DIR and the other riders are related to the provision of distribution service and it is, therefore, reasonable to allocate the rider costs to rate schedules on the basis of distribution revenues. OEG notes that the Commission adopted the DIR in the *ESP 2 Case* and reasons that it is appropriate for the Commission to follow this methodology for the new and modified riders proposed in these ESP proceedings. OEG also reasons that the approach recommended by OCC would require a fresh review of the cost of service and allocation methodology, which would equate to a "mini rate case" on rider allocation and rate design. OEG offers that such a review is outside of the scope and would unduly complicate the ESP proceedings. OEG and IEU-Ohio submit that the cost-of-service study relied on by OCC is outdated and reliance on the study would be unreasonable. OEG asserts that there is insufficient evidence in these proceedings to change an allocation method and rate design that the Commission has previously vetted

and determined to be fair, just, and reasonable. (OEG Br. at 27; IEU-Ohio Reply Br. at 28-30.)

OPAE and APJN challenge the DIR, noting that AEP Ohio is not claiming that reliability will decline if the DIR is not approved in this ESP. Given that the DIR currently constitutes approximately 17.1 percent of the average residential customer's distribution charges, OPAE and APJN reason that this rider makes electric service less affordable for residential customers who are struggling financially. On that basis, OPAE and APJN opine that it is reasonable for the Commission to discontinue the DIR. OPAE and APJN dispute AEP Ohio's contention that the DIR advances the state policy as expressed in R.C. 4928.02(A), which requires the availability to consumers of reliable and reasonably priced retail electric service. OPAE and APJN claim that AEP Ohio failed to present any testimony or discussion on brief indicating how the DIR complies with R.C. 4928.02(L), regarding the protection of at-risk populations. To address this oversight, OPAE and APJN suggest that the Commission require AEP Ohio to continue its annual $1 million funding commitment of the Neighbor-to-Neighbor program. Further, OPAE and APJN ask the Commission to direct AEP Ohio to contribute $1 million annually from shareholders to the Neighbor-to-Neighbor program. Finally, these intervenors ask the Commission to exempt income-eligible customers from riders approved in these ESP proceedings, including the DIR, to mitigate the impact of rate increases on at-risk customers, in support of R.C. 4928.02(L). (OPAE/APJN Reply Br. at 4-9.)

First, the Commission notes that, under R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h), an ESP may include provisions regarding distribution infrastructure and modernization incentives for the electric distribution utility. In determining whether to approve an ESP that includes a provision for distribution infrastructure modernization, R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h) directs the Commission to examine the reliability of the electric distribution utility's distribution system, ensure that the expectations of customers and the electric distribution utility are aligned, and determine that the electric distribution utility is placing sufficient emphasis on and dedicating sufficient resources to the reliability of its distribution system.

The Commission concludes that the record indicates that the vast majority of residential customers, 82.8 percent, and small commercial customers, 90.6 percent, believe their electric service expectations will be about the same, or increase somewhat over the next five years (Co. Ex. 4 at Ex. SJD-1 at 1-2). We note that, in the prior ESP proceedings, when the Commission approved the implementation of the DIR, AEP Ohio's reliability measures were or had been below its reliability standards for 2010 and 2011. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 45. The record in these proceedings indicates that AEP Ohio has met its system reliability standards, CAIDI and SAIFI, for 2013 (Staff Ex. 10 at 5). Further, in the *Reliability Standards Case,* AEP Ohio agreed to file an updated reliability performance standards application by June 30, 2016, to reflect the impact of system design changes, technological advancements, geographical effects of programs

like, but not limited to, the DIR and gridSMART programs, and the results of updated and current customer perception surveys. *Reliability Standards Case*, Opinion and Order (Mar. 19, 2014) at 3.

As several of the parties have noted, the Commission approved the current DIR mechanism on the premise offered by AEP Ohio that aging infrastructure was the primary cause of customer outages and reliability issues and the DIR would improve reliability and support the installation of gridSMART technologies. The expanded DIR for which AEP Ohio seeks approval in these ESP proceedings far exceeds the justification offered and accepted by the Commission in approving the original DIR. Furthermore, it appears that AEP Ohio's interpretation of distribution infrastructure exceeds the intent of the statute (Tr. II at 436-438). Accordingly, we must deny AEP Ohio's request to significantly increase the amount to be recovered via the DIR and to incorporate general plant into the DIR mechanism. The record does not support such a significant expansion of the DIR. We find that AEP Ohio's DIR investments, at the level requested in these proceedings, would be better considered and reviewed in the context of a distribution rate case where the costs can be evaluated in the context of the Company's total distribution revenues and expenses, and the Company's opportunity to recover a return on and of its investment can be balanced against customers' right to reasonably priced service. (Staff Ex. 17 at 3.) For these reasons, the Commission denies AEP Ohio's request to increase the DIR to the level proposed in the ESP application and its request to incorporate general plant into the DIR mechanism.

Likewise, we deny AEP Ohio's request to adjust the DIR to account for the budgets of the Commission and OCC. The Commission agrees with the arguments of Staff that it is unlikely that the budgets of either agency will increase significantly over the next few years sufficient to justify revising the DIR (Staff Ex. 17 at 4). For this reason, we find that the requested modification to the DIR is inappropriate and unreasonable. Further, the Commission declines to adopt OCC's recommendation regarding the allocation of the DIR, as it is reasonable and consistent with the *ESP 2 Case* to allocate the rider costs to rate schedules on the basis of distribution revenues. We also decline to adopt OCC's proposal to adjust the forestry component of the DIR, because OCC has not established the occurrence of any double recovery through the DIR and ESRR. We note, however, that the DIR will continue to be subject to an annual audit.

The Commission finds merit in OCC's recommendation to revise the property tax calculation and, therefore, we adopt the adjustment recommended by OCC witness Effron (OCC Ex. 18 at 9-11; Staff Ex. 17 at 4-5). We further modify the DIR to adopt the six recommendations by Staff regarding detailed account information, jurisdictional allocations and accrual rates, reconciliation between functional ledgers and FERC form filings, revenue collected by month in the DIR, highlighting and quantifying DIR

capitalization policy, and the filing of an updated depreciation study by November 2016, as outlined in Staff witness McCarter's testimony (Staff Ex. 17 at 5-7).

However, the Commission recognizes that AEP Ohio is now performing at or above its established reliability standards and its reliability expectations appear to be aligned with its customers (Staff Ex. 10 at 5; Co. Ex. 4 at Ex. SJD-1 at 1-2). Therefore, we conclude that it is no longer necessary for AEP Ohio to work with Staff to develop a DIR plan, so long as the Company continues to perform at or above its adopted reliability standards.

To facilitate AEP Ohio's continued proactive investment in its aging distribution infrastructure, we approve the Company's request to continue the DIR at $124 million for 2015, $146.2 million for 2016, $170 million for 2017, and $103 million for January through May 2018, for a total of $543.2 million. The Commission has determined the annual DIR amounts based on the level of growth of three to four percent as permitted for the DIR in the *ESP 2 Case*. We find this to be a reasonable level to allow AEP Ohio to continue to replace aging distribution infrastructure in order to maintain and improve service reliability over the term of this ESP. With the modifications discussed herein, the Commission approves the continuation of the DIR as a component of the ESP.

7. Enhanced Service Reliability Rider

AEP Ohio's ESRR was originally approved by the Commission, under R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h), in the *ESP 1 Case*, as the Enhanced Service Reliability Plan – Enhanced Vegetation Initiative. *ESP 1 Case*, Opinion and Order (Mar. 18, 2009) at 34. The ESRR was approved again in the *ESP 2 Case*. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 64-65. As previously approved, AEP Ohio's ESRR is the cost recovery mechanism for implementation of a proactive, cycle-based vegetation management program. Particularly, in the *ESP 2 Case*, the ESRR was focused on AEP Ohio's transition to a four-year proactive cycle rather than primarily reactive vegetation control. Under the program, trees and other vegetation along AEP Ohio's circuits are to be trimmed end-to-end every four years, right-of-ways widened, and danger trees removed, among other things. According to AEP Ohio, the vegetation management program provides storm hardening by reducing the risk of trees contacting power lines during a storm. (Co. Ex. 1 at 9-10; Co. Ex. 4 at 10, 14; Co. Ex. 13 at 3-4; Co. Br. at 84-87.)

In this ESP, AEP Ohio requests the continuation of the ESRR, in order to complete the transition to a cycle-based vegetation management program. AEP Ohio seeks approval to increase operations and maintenance (O&M) and capital costs for the program over the amount currently included in base distribution rates. Beginning in June 2015, AEP Ohio forecasts $1 million per year for 2015 through 2017, and $1.1 million for 2018, in capital costs, as well as $25 million per year for 2015 through 2017, and $26.3 million for 2018, in O&M expense, based on an updated ESRR forecast. AEP Ohio submits that the

increase in O&M expense over the approximately $18 million previously included in the ESRR is primarily due to increased fuel and labor costs and the availability of actual historic data used to develop the forecast. Otherwise, AEP Ohio is proposing that the ESRR continue as it is presently approved. AEP Ohio submits that the continuation of the vegetation management program promotes the state policy objectives expressed in R.C. 4928.02(A) and (E). (Co. Ex. 4 at 10, 14, 20; Co. Ex. 13 at 3-4; Tr. I at 80-81; Co. Br. at 84-87.)

Staff opposes the proposed cost increase in O&M expense from $18 million to $25 million. Staff notes that the ESRR was approved to facilitate AEP Ohio's transition to a cycle-based vegetation management program. Staff further notes that, in the *ESP 2 Case*, the Commission approved, at AEP Ohio's request, $18 million in annual O&M expense to enable the Company to recover, through the ESRR, incremental costs above the amount already recovered through base distribution rates. Emphasizing that AEP Ohio expects to have fully transitioned to a four-year maintenance cycle in 2014, Staff submits that catching up on the trimming of the Company's circuits involved higher costs than more routine trimming. Staff challenges the accuracy of the current $25 million annual O&M estimate in comparison to the process AEP Ohio used in the prior ESP. Staff points out that AEP Ohio's current estimate is derived from the Company's average cost per mile for 2009 to 2012, which included the period of time when the vegetation management program was in transition, with a 30 percent reduction based on the experience of the Company's Oklahoma affiliate when it transitioned to a four-year vegetation maintenance program. Staff posits that the prior estimate and methodology used in the *ESP 2 Case* were robust and accurate, incorporating a broad set of factors to determine the costs associated with a cycle-based vegetation maintenance program in Ohio. Staff argues that the $25 million O&M estimate is based on the cost of a special, more expensive catch-up project and then reducing that amount by an inaccurate and inappropriate percentage. Further, Staff asserts that AEP Ohio failed to produce any evidence that tree trimming activities in Oklahoma are comparable to those in Ohio; demonstrate that the former methodology used to estimate vegetation management costs was flawed; or show that the current methodology to estimate vegetation management is more accurate or an improvement. Staff notes that, if AEP Ohio's O&M expense exceeds $18 million, there is a mechanism to ensure the Company recovers the appropriate amount in the annual ESRR reconciliation filing. Staff recommends that the Commission reject the increased ESRR amount and maintain the $18 million O&M estimate already in place. (Staff Ex. 10 at 7-10; Tr. II at 445-446; Staff Br. at 52-55; Staff Reply Br. at 42-43.)

OPAE and APJN object to the continuance of the ESRR, on the basis that AEP Ohio has been approved for sufficient funding to transition to a four-year cycle-based vegetation plan. The intervenors argue that any continued recovery of O&M and capital costs for vegetation management should be reflected in base distribution rates, with any additional collection for vegetation management expense subject to a base distribution rate case, so that AEP Ohio's costs can be reviewed. (OPAE/APJN Br. at 36-37.)

OCC recommends that the ESRR not be allocated based on total base distribution revenues, as AEP Ohio proposes, but that the capital costs be allocated instead in proportion to the allocation of net electric plant in service and the O&M costs be allocated in proportion to the allocation of distribution O&M expenses as set forth in the cost-of-service studies filed in the *Distribution Rate Case.* OCC believes that AEP Ohio's allocation is contrary to cost causation principles and would require residential customers to pay approximately $29 million more than they should for the DIR, ESRR, and SSWR. (OCC Ex. 14 at 5-12; OCC Br. at 107-109.) OEG asserts that the costs underlying the ESRR and the other riders mentioned by OCC are related to the provision of distribution service and it is, therefore, reasonable to allocate the rider costs to rate schedules on the basis of distribution revenues. For the same reasons noted above with respect to the DIR, OEG believes that it is appropriate for the Commission to follow the methodology adopted in the *ESP 2 Case.* (OEG Br. at 27.)

AEP Ohio points out that, while Staff prefers the $18 million O&M estimate for the ESRR, Staff did not perform its own quantification of O&M expense necessary for a four-year trim cycle and, in any event, Staff supports the Company's recovery of prudently incurred costs to maintain the cycle. AEP Ohio retorts that the record evidence supports its $25 million O&M forecast for continuance of the ESRR so that the Company can continue to proactively prevent tree-related outages. (Tr. V at 1349-1350, 1360; Co. Br. at 85-87; Co. Reply Br. at 76.)

The Commission finds that AEP Ohio's request to continue the ESRR is reasonable and should be approved, as proposed by the Company, and as currently allocated between the customer classes and rate schedules. As required pursuant to R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h), the Commission has previously considered and discussed the alignment of the expectations of AEP Ohio and its customers with respect to the DIR. The ESRR supports a proactive vegetation program that reduces the impact of weather events and maintains the overall electric system. Continuing the ESRR, including the widening of right-of-ways, the removal of danger trees, and the proactive trimming of vegetation, will prevent and reduce tree-related outages and service interruptions. Regarding AEP Ohio's forecast of O&M expense for the ESRR over the ESP term, the record reflects that the Company's projected increase in O&M expense is derived from an updated estimate based on the actual costs to trim vegetation in Ohio under the current program. AEP Ohio's forecast also incorporates an estimated 30 percent reduction in the cost per mile based on the experience of the Company's affiliate in transitioning from a catch-up period to an ongoing four-year trim cycle. (Co. Ex. 4 at 10, 20; Tr. II at 443-446.) Accordingly, we find that the increased O&M expense, as presented by AEP Ohio, is reasonable and should be approved. The Commission emphasizes, however, that the ESRR is based on AEP Ohio's prudently incurred costs and is subject to the Commission's review and reconciliation on an annual basis.

8. gridSMART Rider

In this ESP, AEP Ohio proposes the continuation of the gridSMART program, including the gridSMART rider initially approved by the Commission in the *ESP 1 Case* and continued in the *ESP 2 Case*. *ESP 1 Case*, Opinion and Order (Mar. 18, 2009) at 37-38, Entry on Rehearing (July 23, 2009) at 18-24; *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 62. However, AEP Ohio proposes modification of the gridSMART rider to transfer the remaining gridSMART Phase 1 costs to the DIR and use the gridSMART rider to track gridSMART Phase 2 costs. AEP Ohio reasons that gridSMART Phase 1 spending concluded at the end of 2013 and the gridSMART Phase 1 assets are not currently in base rates and have been excluded from the DIR. AEP Ohio requests that the DIR be modified to include the existing gridSMART Phase 1 assets. In support of the request, AEP Ohio claims that, beginning in June 2015, the total cost data for gridSMART Phase 1 will be available for reconciliation. With the reconciliation of gridSMART Phase 1, AEP Ohio posits that eliminating the removal of gridSMART Phase 1 net book value from the DIR mechanism will allow the Company to recover its investment on and of gridSMART Phase 1 assets in service. As of the filing of AEP Ohio's direct testimony in these cases, the Company expected to complete the installation of equipment associated with gridSMART Phase 1 and to submit data on gridSMART Phase 1 to the United States Department of Energy (USDOE) by December 31, 2014. AEP Ohio notes that it filed an evaluation of gridSMART Phase 1 with the Commission on or about March 31, 2014. AEP Ohio also notes that the Commission granted the Company authority to initiate the installation of certain gridSMART technologies that have demonstrated success and are cost-effective. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 62-63. AEP Ohio filed its proposed expansion of the gridSMART program, gridSMART Phase 2, in Case No. 13-1939-EL-RDR (*gridSMART 2 Case*), on September 13, 2013. According to AEP Ohio's application in the *gridSMART 2 Case*, the Company plans to invest $465 million in gridSMART Phase 2. (Co. Ex. 1 at 10; Co. Ex. 3 at 4-5; Co. Ex. 4 at 10-11, 13, 15-16, 20; Co. Ex. 13 at 7.)

AEP Ohio reasons that continuation of the gridSMART Phase 2 rider provides for continued deployment of emerging distribution system technologies where they can cost-effectively improve the efficiency and reliability of the distribution system, develop performance standards and targets for service quality for all consumers, and encourage the use of energy efficiency programs and alternative energy resources. AEP Ohio submits that authority for including the gridSMART program in the ESP is set forth in R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h). AEP Ohio avers that the continuation of the proposed gridSMART Phase 2 program and rider is consistent with the policies listed in R.C. 4905.31(E) and R.C. 4928.02. (Co. Br. at 87-88.)

OCC argues that customers should not incur gridSMART Phase 2 charges on their bills until there has been a complete review of the gridSMART Phase 1 program and

customer representatives and other interested stakeholders are provided an opportunity to raise any issues or concerns. On that basis, OCC requests that AEP Ohio's proposed treatment of gridSMART Phase 1 and gridSMART Phase 2 be rejected. (OCC Br. at 112-113.)

IGS, OEC, and EDF support AEP Ohio's gridSMART rider and the deployment of smart meters throughout the service territory. IGS, OEC, and EDF reason that smart meters are essential for the widespread offering of TOU products to customers. OEC and EDF believe that there is great potential for improved air quality resulting from the deployment of gridSMART technology, due to the reduced number of trucks that must be deployed to read meters and to disconnect and reconnect electric utility service. OEC and EDF also submit that Volt-VAR optimization will facilitate savings through energy efficiency and demand response programs. (OEC/EDF Br. at 7; IGS Reply Br. at 14.)

Further, while OEC and EDF recognize that the details of gridSMART Phase 2 will be determined in the *gridSMART 2 Case*, OEC and EDF aver that certain issues relating to the prudency of gridSMART costs and the associated benefits should be addressed by the Commission as a part of these ESP proceedings. To that end, OEC and EDF recommend that the Commission approve the continuation of the gridSMART program and the introduction of the gridSMART Phase 2 rider subject to nine conditions. (OEC/EDF Ex. 1 at 3-8; Tr. XII at 2784-2785.) OEC and EDF assert that their recommendations are intended to facilitate AEP Ohio's demonstration of the additional benefits of its gridSMART deployment, ease compliance with forthcoming United States Environmental Protection Agency regulations regarding greenhouse gas emissions for existing coal plants under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, and ensure transparency and accountability (OEC/EDF Br. at 7-9; OEC/EDF Reply Br. at 7-8).

Kroger opposes AEP Ohio's request to transfer the remaining gridSMART Phase 1 cost into the DIR. Kroger notes that the Commission previously directed that gridSMART costs be recovered via a separate rider and not be incorporated into the DIR. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 63. Kroger submits that, if gridSMART costs are recovered outside the framework of a distribution rate case, the associated costs should be recovered through a separate rider that properly recovers costs on a per-customer basis. (Kroger Ex. 1 at 11; Kroger Br. at 4, 6.) In reply to Kroger, AEP Ohio states that moving gridSMART Phase 1 costs into the DIR is appropriate in order to dedicate the gridSMART Phase 2 rider to recovery of costs associated with Phase 2 of the program as approved in the *gridSMART 2 Case*. AEP Ohio also posits that the recommendations of OEC and EDF for gridSMART Phase 2 should be addressed in the *gridSMART 2 Case*, not these ESP proceedings. (Co. Reply Br. at 77-78.)

As discussed in the *ESP 1 Case* and the *ESP 2 Case*, the Commission continues to find significant long-term value and benefit for AEP Ohio and its customers with the

implementation of advanced metering infrastructure, distribution automation, and other smart grid technologies. In the *ESP 2 Case*, the Commission approved AEP Ohio's request to initiate gridSMART Phase 2, directed that the Company file its proposed gridSMART Phase 2 project with the Commission, and directed that gridSMART Phase 2 costs be recovered through a separate rider as opposed to merging the costs into the gridSMART Phase 1 rider. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 62-63. For that reason, the Commission finds AEP Ohio's request to continue the gridSMART rider, with certain modifications as proposed by the Company, to be reasonable. Further, consistent with our decision in these proceedings to continue the gridSMART Phase 2 rider, we approve AEP Ohio's request to transfer gridSMART Phase 1 capital costs to the DIR mechanism upon the Company's accounting for all USDOE reimbursements due. (Co. Ex. 1 at 10; Co. Ex. 3 at 4-5; Co. Ex. 4 at 10-11, 13, 15-16, 20; Co. Ex. 13 at 7.) Given that, at the conclusion of gridSMART Phase 1, AEP Ohio will have recovered the vast majority of O&M expense, with only capital asset cost remaining to be collected over the useful life of installed gridSMART assets, it is efficient for the associated gridSMART Phase 1 costs to be included in the DIR. We remind AEP Ohio that, consistent with the Commission's directive in the *ESP 2 Case*, within 90 days after the expiration of ESP 2, the Company shall file an application for review and reconciliation of the gridSMART Phase 1 rider. *ESP 2 Case*, Entry on Rehearing (Jan. 30, 2013) at 53. After the Commission has reviewed and reconciled gridSMART Phase 1 costs, AEP Ohio may transfer the approved capital cost balance into the DIR, which will not be subject to the DIR caps, and may also transfer any unrecovered O&M balance into the gridSMART Phase 2 rider.

As with gridSMART Phase 1, the Commission will continue to annually review and approve AEP Ohio's gridSMART Phase 2 program, including the prudency of expenditures and the reconciliation of investments placed in service with revenues collected. We will also evaluate AEP Ohio's gridSMART Phase 2 program and determine the gridSMART rate to be charged customers, as well as consider OEC's and EDF's remaining recommendations, in the *gridSMART 2 Case* currently pending before the Commission.

9. Storm Damage Recovery Rider

AEP Ohio notes that, in the *ESP 2 Case*, the Commission approved the Company's proposed storm damage recovery mechanism for the deferral of incremental O&M expenses that exceed $5 million annually and are related to major events as defined in Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4901:1-10. Pursuant to R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h), AEP Ohio proposes to continue to defer major storm expenses that exceed the $5 million baseline, while also offering a few proposed modifications to the SDRR. Specifically, AEP Ohio seeks approval to file an annual true-up in April of each year, which would be based on the major storm expense incurred in the previous calendar year and include a proposed rate design to collect or refund the regulatory asset or liability recorded at the end of the

prior year. AEP Ohio also proposes to establish a carrying charge based on the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for major storm damage costs exceeding the $5 million baseline, if the costs are deferred and remain unrecovered for longer than 12 months. AEP Ohio witnesses Hawkins and Allen testified that rate recovery that occurs more than a year after an expense is incurred should recognize that the expense has been financed with a combination of both debt and equity and, therefore, a WACC carrying charge should apply until the assets are fully recovered. Ms. Hawkins asserted that the long-term debt rate would not enable AEP Ohio to recover all of its capital costs inclusive of the equity component. Ms. Hawkins further asserted that, if the Commission determines that the long-term debt rate is the appropriate carrying cost rate for the SDRR, that portion of debt should be excluded from the WACC for other assets, in order to ensure that the same debt is not being used to finance multiple assets, which would be inconsistent with how the Company finances its operations. (Co. Ex. 1 at 11; Co. Ex. 4 at 12, 16; Co. Ex. 13 at 4-5; Co. Ex. 17 at 9-12; Co. Ex. 18 at 6; Co. Ex. 33 at 13-14.)

OHA urges the Commission to adopt the proposed SDRR, as a reasonable means to facilitate and improve reliable electric distribution service (OHA Br. at 3). Although Staff also generally supports the continuation of the SDRR, Staff recommends that carrying charges for major storm costs recovered under the rider be calculated using the most recently approved long-term debt rate as opposed to the WACC rate, because there are no capital costs in the SDRR. According to Staff, carrying charges should only accrue until recovery or refund of the difference between AEP Ohio's total major storm costs and the $5 million baseline begins. (Staff Ex. 12 at 3-4; Tr. VII at 1690; Staff Br. at 57; Staff Reply Br. at 37-38.) OCC agrees that, if carrying charges are approved by the Commission, the long-term debt rate should be used. OCC asserts that AEP Ohio's proposal to use the WACC rate to determine the carrying charges associated with various riders is unreasonable; would unnecessarily impose excessive costs on customers; and is inconsistent with the Commission's precedent and sound regulatory policy. (OCC Br. at 143-146; OCC Reply Br. at 112-115.)

Staff also sets forth a number of recommendations regarding the recovery of incremental labor expenses related to major storm restoration work. Specifically, Staff witness Lipthratt testified that the first 40 straight-time labor hours that an employee works in a week are already reflected in AEP Ohio's base rates and should, therefore, not be included in the SDRR. With respect to overtime hours, Mr. Lipthratt testified that, although overtime performed by union employees is considered incremental labor and should be included in the SDRR, management overtime should not be considered incremental labor, because management employees are usually salaried and any such expense would be strictly discretionary. In its brief, Staff also clarifies and recommends that any revenues received by AEP Ohio as a participant in mutual assistance agreements with other utilities should be reviewed to determine whether they should be applied as an offset to the SDRR revenue requirement. Staff notes that, consistent with its position on

labor expenses, any revenues received by AEP Ohio for the first 40 hours of straight-time labor related to mutual assistance work may constitute a double recovery, because those hours are already reflected in base rates, and, if so, those revenues should be offset against the SDRR. Staff, therefore, requests that the Commission direct AEP Ohio to maintain a detailed accounting of all expenses incurred and revenues received for providing mutual assistance to other utilities, provide this information annually to Staff, and demonstrate in each SDRR case that the revenues received were incremental and not associated with labor hours already reflected in base rates. (Staff Ex. 12 at 4-7; Staff Br. at 58-62; Staff Reply Br. at 39-41.)

Regarding the rate design of the SDRR, Staff asserts that a fixed charge per customer is appropriate, which would be determined by separating the total amount allowed for recovery between residential and non-residential customers based on the percentage of distribution revenues from the prior calendar year and then dividing the amount in each category by the number of customers, which is consistent with the approach adopted in the *Storm Damage Case*. (Staff Ex. 12 at 7-8; Staff Br. at 62.) According to OCC, AEP Ohio indicated, in a discovery response, that the Company plans to allocate storm damage expenses based on the contribution of each customer class to total base distribution revenues. OCC asserts that AEP Ohio's proposed SDRR allocation method does not follow cost causation principles. OCC, therefore, recommends that storm damage expenses be allocated in proportion to the allocation of distribution O&M expenses contained in the cost-of-service studies from the *Distribution Rate Case*. (OCC Ex. 14 at 6-9; OCC Br. at 107-109; OCC Reply Br. at 84-86.) OPAE and APJN agree with OCC's recommendation (OPAE/APJN Br. at 38-39). OEG, however, argues that storm expenses are distribution-related costs that should, therefore, be allocated using base distribution revenues, which is consistent with the methodology approved in the *ESP 2 Case* for a number of AEP Ohio's riders (OEG Ex. 2 at 6-7; OEG Br. at 27). IEU-Ohio also urges the Commission to reject OCC's position, contending that it is contrary to the concept of rate gradualism and based on an outdated cost-of-service study (IEU-Ohio Reply Br. at 28-30). In response to Staff's and OCC's recommendations, AEP Ohio argues that there is no record evidence to counter the Company's proposal other than Staff's inappropriate attempt to rely on the stipulated allocation methodology used in the *Storm Damage Case* and OCC's preference for a different method based on cost causation principles (Co. Reply Br. at 82).

In response to Staff's other recommendations, AEP Ohio emphasizes that Staff offered no justification for its proposal that carrying charges be calculated using the long-term debt rate. AEP Ohio asserts that Staff's position is without any record support and should, therefore, be disregarded. AEP Ohio reiterates that assigning a long-term debt rate to a regulatory asset fails to recognize that the debt component of the Company's capital structure has already been used to fund other investments and, effectively, uses the same dollar of debt to finance two investments simultaneously. AEP Ohio adds that, once

a regulatory asset's recovery has been deferred for longer than a year, it is financed as a long-term asset, with a combination of debt and equity and, therefore, the WACC rate is both appropriate and necessary to enable the Company to recover its costs. Regarding overtime expenses, AEP Ohio points out that Staff witness Lipthratt did not review or consider any of the Company's union contracts, labor policies, or how labor is accounted for in the deferral calculation with respect to the $5 million baseline. AEP Ohio contends that Staff's position is contrary to the establishment of the $5 million baseline in the *ESP 2 Case*, ignores recent Commission precedent in the *Storm Damage Case*, and disregards the realities of major storm restoration work, which involves 16 hour work days, sometimes in extreme conditions, to restore power as quickly and safely as possible. With respect to mutual assistance, AEP Ohio notes that revenues and expenses associated with mutual assistance provided to other utilities are not included in base rates or in the $5 million baseline. AEP Ohio adds that Mr. Lipthratt failed to recognize the benefit received by the Company's customers due to mutual assistance agreements. (Co. Ex. 33 at 10-14, Ex. WAA-R6, Ex. WAA-R7; Tr. VII at 1696, 1699-1702, 1716; Co. Br. at 90-99; Co. Reply Br. at 78-81, 98.)

The Commission finds that AEP Ohio's proposal to continue the SDRR is reasonable and should be approved to the extent addressed herein. Regarding AEP Ohio's recommended modifications, we find that the Company's request to file an annual true-up in April of each year should be adopted. The annual true-up should be based on the major storm expense incurred in the prior calendar year and include a proposed rate design to collect or refund the regulatory asset or liability recorded at the end of the previous year. (Co. Ex. 4 at 12, 16; Co. Ex. 13 at 5; Co. Ex. 18 at 6.) We do not find it necessary to establish a particular rate design in these proceedings. With respect to the carrying cost rate applicable to major storm damage costs recovered through the SDRR, the Commission finds that AEP Ohio's carrying charges should be calculated using the most recently approved cost of long-term debt rate. We agree with Staff that the WACC rate is typically used to determine carrying charges when capital expenditures are involved. *See, e.g., ESP 1 Case*, Opinion and Order (Mar. 18, 2009) at 28; *In re Columbus Southern Power Company*, Case No. 10-164-EL-RDR, Finding and Order (Aug. 11, 2010) at 7, 10; *In re Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company*, Case No. 10-155-EL-RDR, Finding and Order (Aug. 25, 2010) at 9-10. Because only O&M expenses are included in the SDRR, the long-term debt rate is more appropriate. Also, once collection of a deferral balance begins, the risk of non-collection is significantly reduced and, as such, it is more appropriate to use the long-term cost of debt rate, which is consistent with sound regulatory practice and longstanding Commission precedent. *See, e.g., In re Columbus Southern Power Company*, Case No. 11-4920-EL-RDR, et al., Finding and Order (Aug. 1, 2012) at 18. AEP Ohio's carrying charges should only accrue on deferred costs that remain unrecovered for a period longer than 12 months and the accrual should cease once recovery of the difference between the Company's total major storm costs and the $5 million baseline begins. (Staff Ex. 12 at 3-4; Tr. VII at 1690.)

Regarding Staff's remaining recommendations, the Commission specified, in the *ESP 2 Case*, that major storm costs eligible for recovery through the SDRR must be incremental, as well as prudently incurred and reasonable. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 68-69. The Commission reiterates that AEP Ohio, in seeking recovery of any major storm expense through the SDRR, must demonstrate that such cost was reasonably and prudently incurred and incremental to any cost recovery through base rates. Consistent with our decision in the *Storm Damage Case*, if AEP Ohio seeks to recover the expense associated with overtime compensation paid to exempt employees during a major storm event, the Company must demonstrate that, under the specific facts and circumstances of the major storm event in question, the overtime compensation was paid in accordance with the Company's non-discretionary major storm restoration overtime policy, and was a reasonable and prudent expense associated with safely and efficiently restoring electric service to customers. *Storm Damage Case*, Opinion and Order (Apr. 2, 2014) at 25-26. Further, regarding mutual assistance revenues, AEP Ohio must show that any such revenues are not a reimbursement of labor hours that are already reflected in base rates. Finally, AEP Ohio should continue to maintain and provide to Staff, on an annual basis, a detailed accounting of all storm expenses, including incidental costs and capital costs, and should also provide a detailed accounting of expenses incurred and revenues received for providing mutual assistance to other utilities. The Commission disagrees with AEP Ohio's contention that Staff's audit of such data constitutes needless review or that it may chill mutual assistance efforts; rather, it will ensure that customers pay only for reasonably and prudently incurred major storm expenses and that there is no double recovery by the Company.

10. Sustained and Skilled Workforce Rider

AEP Ohio proposes the new SSWR to support the Company's comprehensive strategy for long-term improved reliability as permitted under R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h). According to AEP Ohio, the SSWR mechanism would recover the incremental O&M labor cost needed to execute infrastructure investments to comply with the Company's long-term reliability strategy. AEP Ohio forecasts the costs to be recovered through the SSWR to be $1.6 million in 2015, $4.9 million in 2016, $7.7 million in 2017, and $8.0 million in 2018. The capital construction costs would continue to be recovered through the DIR mechanism. AEP Ohio proposes to increase the workforce by a total of 150 permanent, full time equivalent (FTE) employees and contractors over the next three years, 50 FTEs each year. AEP Ohio contends that the SSWR would not increase the cost of performing targeted reliability activities, but would serve as a streamlined cost recovery mechanism for prudently incurred costs. (Co. Ex. 1 at 11; Co. Ex. 4 at 22-28; Co. Ex. 13 at 12.)

AEP Ohio projects a shortfall in internal labor resources in both front-line construction and construction support required to execute infrastructure investments.

AEP Ohio contends that it must address the need for additional labor resources necessary to support future work requirements and to achieve an optimal balance of workforce labor resources, including internal company employees and external contract employees. AEP Ohio reasons that, as it reviews the current level of internal labor, additional field employees will be required to execute the infrastructure investment plan. According to AEP Ohio, the approximate number of contract crews and FTEs utilized by the Company has increased from 125 in December 2012 to 496 in November 2013. AEP Ohio submits that contractor firms are sometimes unable to meet the Company's demands for skilled personnel given the transient nature of construction crews. Further, AEP Ohio notes that, in light of the fact that it takes approximately five years to train a new employee from an apprentice-level line, meter, or substation mechanic to the journeyman level, the development cycle requires an appropriate hiring plan to assure a sustainable and skilled labor workforce is available. AEP Ohio submits that, while the Company will continue to utilize contractors as a part of its labor strategy, it is important to augment its labor force because of the transient nature of contract crews. (Co. Ex. 4 at 22-28; Co. Br. at 99-100.)

Staff supports the development and implementation of a comprehensive strategy for long-term reliability. However, Staff and OMAEG oppose the implementation of the SSWR. Staff notes that AEP Ohio has an approved DIR, which is the mechanism to recover labor and other capital costs associated with the replacement of aging infrastructure. For that reason, Staff and OMAEG assert that the proper recovery mechanism for new employee labor is through a distribution rate case, not a rider. Staff reasons that the SSWR is an effort by AEP Ohio to accelerate cost recovery, while avoiding a base rate case and the scrutiny that a base rate case entails. (Staff Ex. 8 at 3-4; Staff Br. at 27-28; OMAEG Br. at 18-19.)

OCC, OPAE, and APJN also oppose the SSWR on the basis that AEP Ohio has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the SSWR may be authorized under any provision of R.C. 4928.143(B)(2). OCC insists that this is an attempt by AEP Ohio to recover more costs via a rider than through a distribution rate case. OCC submits that the SSWR does not meet any of the criteria previously used by the Commission for the recovery of costs through a rider. OCC notes that labor costs incurred for new employees are within the control of the utility, are not volatile or subject to unpredictable fluctuations, are not immaterial for a utility the size of AEP Ohio, and are not of the magnitude that should qualify for collection by way of a rider. Further, OCC and Staff argue that AEP Ohio has not established that the number of retiring employees will not offset the number of new employees, the total number of employees will increase actual labor expenses, or that new employees will reduce the need for outside contractors. Finally, OCC notes that AEP Ohio failed to describe any potential offsetting reductions to costs for the new employees reflected in the new SSWR. OCC contends that AEP Ohio has not demonstrated that the Company's financial integrity would be negatively impacted if the costs of new employees had to be recovered by way of a distribution rate case as opposed to through a rider. For

these reasons, the intervenors request that the Commission deny the establishment of the SSWR. (OCC Ex. 18 at 20-23; OCC Br. at 101-103; OCC Reply Br. at 63-64; OPAE/APJN Br. at 37; OMAEG Reply Br. at 15-17.)

OCC recommends that, if approved, the SSWR not be allocated based on total base distribution revenues, as AEP Ohio proposes, but in proportion to the allocation of distribution O&M labor expense as set forth in the cost-of-service studies filed in the *Distribution Rate Case*. OCC argues that AEP Ohio's allocation is not consistent with cost causation principles and would cause residential customers to pay approximately $29 million more than is fair for the DIR, ESRR, SDRR, and SSWR. (OCC Ex. 14 at 5-12; OCC Br. at 107-109.) OEG advocates that the costs underlying the DIR, SSWR, SDRR, and ESRR are related to the provision of distribution service and it is, therefore, reasonable to allocate the rider costs to rate schedules based on distribution revenues. For the same reasons mentioned above with respect to the DIR, OEG believes that the Commission should follow the methodology adopted in the *ESP 2 Case*. (OEG Br. at 27.)

AEP Ohio submits that OCC's statutory foundation claim is without merit. As previously noted, AEP Ohio asserts that R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h) is the statutory authority for the SSWR. AEP Ohio interprets Staff's and intervenors' positions as supporting the need for additional workforce to assist in the maintenance of the distribution system. AEP Ohio also acknowledges Staff's, OCC's, and other intervenors' preference for the recovery of labor costs by way of a distribution rate case rather than through a rider. AEP Ohio retorts that the General Assembly provided electric utilities the ability to recover costs to ensure safe and efficient operations through an ESP and notes that the option of a base rate case does not eliminate the option of recovering costs needed for operations in an ESP. Furthermore, AEP Ohio acknowledges that employees may retire between the time the rider is implemented and a distribution rate case occurs, but the Company points out that retiring skilled employees will not be replaced by workers related to the SSWR, given the time required for the new employees to train and reach that skill level. However, AEP Ohio offers that, in this ESP, the Company is requesting only 150 FTEs over three years and notes that, as of November 2013, the Company had 496 FTEs and retiring employees were likely skilled labor dedicated to capital projects recovered via the DIR. (Co. Br. at 100; Co. Reply Br. 82-83.)

AEP Ohio further reasons that the intervenors' arguments lose focus of the purpose of the SSWR - to address the projected shortfall of internal construction and construction support labor and the associated costs. AEP Ohio emphasizes that the additional labor is needed to address future work requirements to implement its comprehensive reliability plan and to recast the balance of workforce resources. AEP Ohio notes that the SSWR reflects the Company's prudent planning to avoid being left with an unskilled workforce and unavailable contract services that would be beyond the Company's control. AEP Ohio reiterates that additional Company employees are needed to support the increased level of

contractors or to displace or offset the labor supplied by the contractors. AEP Ohio contends that the SSWR would allow the Company to reduce its reliance on contract labor, recognizing that contract labor represents an uncontrollable risk regarding availability and increased costs because of the supply and demand for qualified personnel throughout the country. AEP Ohio implores the Commission to recognize that now is the time to act and commence training and that the SSWR would ensure that the Commission and the Company are currently planning for a sustainable workforce. AEP Ohio also submits that, ultimately, these labor costs will be incorporated into base distribution rates. AEP Ohio encourages the Commission to approve the SSWR, as proposed, to facilitate the immediate implementation of a dedicated and developed training program focused on decreasing contract labor and ensuring the availability of a skilled workforce, as a trained workforce is important to reliable service and safety. (Co. Reply Br. 82-86.)

R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h) permits an ESP to include provisions regarding the electric utility's distribution service, including, without limitation, provisions regarding single issue ratemaking, a revenue decoupling mechanism or any other incentive ratemaking, and provisions regarding distribution infrastructure and modernization incentives for the electric utility. It is important that an electric utility have a long-term reliability strategy, including the adequacy of its workforce. However, for the Commission to approve a proposed provision of an ESP requires more than a mere demonstration that the provision is statutorily permissible. In this instance, AEP Ohio has not demonstrated that the proposed new SSWR, to facilitate the hiring of new skilled construction and construction employees, is necessary in relation to the Company's total workforce. While the Commission recognizes AEP Ohio's proposal is for only about a third of its FTEs as of the filing of this ESP, we nevertheless find that such a significant portion of labor expense is more appropriately reviewed as part of a more comprehensive analysis in the context of a distribution rate case. A comprehensive review of AEP Ohio's overall labor expense in a distribution rate case, rather than approving the SSWR as a provision of the ESP merely to expedite cost recovery, will ensure that the Company is prudent and cost-effective with its labor costs and management. (Co. Ex. 4 at 23, 25, 27-28; Staff Ex. 8 at 4; OCC Ex. 18 at 21-23.) Accordingly, the Commission denies AEP Ohio's request for approval of the SSWR as a component of this ESP.

11. NERC Compliance and Cybersecurity Rider

AEP Ohio proposes the implementation of a new, non-bypassable rider, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) compliance and cybersecurity rider (NCCR). The rider would facilitate AEP Ohio's expedited recovery of significant increases in capital and O&M costs for NERC compliance and cybersecurity. As proposed, the rider would be established at zero and AEP Ohio would track associated costs from the date of adoption by the Commission and forward for the remainder of the term of this ESP. NCCR costs would be deferred, including carrying costs, until AEP Ohio files an

application and the Commission approves the recovery of NCCR costs. AEP Ohio requests that carrying charges accrue based on the Company's WACC on capital cost components until the costs are fully recovered. All NCCR costs would be subject to the Commission's review for prudency. (Co. Ex. 1 at 11-12; Co. Ex. 2 at 13-18; Co. Ex. 13 at 12; Co. Ex. 17 at 9-13, Ex. RVH-4.)

AEP Ohio reasons that the Company has been required to comply with NERC reliability standards since 2007; however, recent federal and state interests have increased the focus on cybersecurity. NERC reliability standards are implemented and enforced through FERC-approved agreements with regional entities. AEP Ohio is registered with ReliabilityFirst Corporation, the FERC regional operating entity in Ohio. AEP Ohio submits that the dynamic and broad landscape covered by cybersecurity, including the prevention and mitigation of manmade physical and cyber attacks, is continuously evolving and encompasses protection and security of physical distribution and transmission grids, substations, Company offices, communications equipment and systems, and human resources. AEP Ohio offers that cybersecurity includes not only utility-owned systems but aspects of customer and third-party components that interact with the grid, such as advanced meters and devices behind the meter. Citing the National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2013, AEP Ohio emphasizes that the Company has faced and complied with ever-increasing new or revised NERC reliability standards and faces increasing compliance requirements in light of recent legislation proposed to strengthen the cybersecurity of the nation's 16 critical infrastructure sectors and the federal government. AEP Ohio argues that approval of the NCCR would permit recovery of the costs of information technology infrastructure, physical security, workforce training, supervisory control and data acquisition systems, smart grid security systems, internal and external audits, external reporting, and recordkeeping that are not recovered through other regulatory mechanisms. AEP Ohio submits that the NCCR supports the state policy articulated in R.C. 4928.02(E). (Co. Ex. 2 at 13-18; Co. Br. at 100-103.)

OCC contends that NERC compliance and cybersecurity costs do not meet the requirements set forth in R.C. 4928.143(B)(2) to be included in an ESP and AEP Ohio has failed to demonstrate that NERC compliance and cybersecurity costs meet any of the nine provisions outlined that may be part of an ESP. Furthermore, OCC agrees with Staff that the NCCR is premature. OCC reasons that AEP Ohio has not provided sufficient specific information for the Commission to determine the need for a separate compliance and cybersecurity rider as opposed to the Company using a distribution rate case for the recovery of such costs. Finally, OCC offers that AEP Ohio has not demonstrated that the scope of NCCR costs is beyond the Company's control. (OCC Br. at 104-107, 119-122.)

Staff argues that there is no reason to believe that AEP Ohio, as a distribution company, will incur costs for compliance with NERC standards, as NERC lacks the

authority to establish standards for distribution companies. According to Staff, the FPA grants NERC the authority to establish and enforce reliability standards for the bulk power system including transmission and generation facilities, but specifically excludes facilities used in the local distribution of electric energy. *See* 16 U.S.C. § 824o(a)(1) and (a)(2). Staff reasons that, to the extent that AEP Ohio must comply with NERC requirements, the appropriate mechanism for the recovery of such costs is the TCRR. However, at this point, Staff submits that the types of investments for which AEP Ohio would seek recovery and the magnitude of such investments is unknown. Accordingly, Staff reasons that, until AEP Ohio is able to identify and quantify its cybersecurity and reliability related expenditures, Staff and the other parties to these proceedings are unable to assess the appropriateness and adequacy of those expenditures. Staff, OPAE, APJN, and OCC assert that it is premature to approve recovery of NERC compliance costs, where AEP Ohio has failed to demonstrate that it will be subject to NERC standards, to identify potential investments and costs, and to explain how costs would be allocated between generation, transmission, and distribution functions or why NERC compliance costs cannot be absorbed within the Company's existing budgets. (Staff Ex. 11 at 4-6; Staff Br. at 29-31; OPAE/APJN Br. at 38; OCC Reply Br. at 67-68.)

OMAEG opposes the implementation of the proposed new NCCR as premature. However, OMAEG reasons that, if the Commission elects to approve the NCCR, AEP Ohio should not begin to recover NCCR costs unless or until the Company implements measures to address new NERC compliance and cybersecurity requirements and not while the Company is deliberating to determine the best means of compliance. (OMAEG Br. at 20-21.)

AEP Ohio insists that any attempt to limit NCCR cost recovery to only costs incurred to comply with new NERC compliance and cybersecurity requirements is premature. AEP Ohio argues that costs attributable to new interpretations of existing NERC compliance and cybersecurity requirements should also be recoverable under the rider. AEP Ohio declares that the appropriate time to address the prudency of NERC compliance and cybersecurity costs would be in a future docket where the recovery of such costs has been requested. (Co. Reply Br. at 87.)

AEP Ohio retorts that Staff's opposition to the NCCR, as premature, is somewhat misleading. AEP Ohio notes that Staff witness Pearce admitted on cross-examination that NERC compliance and cybersecurity is very important and Staff is not opposed to the recovery of NERC compliance costs. AEP Ohio further notes that Staff also acknowledged that the Commission has approved placeholder riders set at zero in prior ESPs. (Tr. VI at 1424-1425, 1431.) AEP Ohio reasons that Staff's opposition is not supported by Commission precedent, and points to the Commission's prior approval of a placeholder rider in the *ESP 2 Case* and Staff's endorsement of such riders. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 24-25. Further, AEP Ohio emphasizes that any NERC compliance

and cybersecurity costs would be reviewed in a future Commission proceeding, including evaluation of the magnitude and prudency of such costs. AEP Ohio asserts that this process has been followed by the Commission in both of the Company's prior ESP cases and the ESP proceedings of other electric distribution utilities. On that basis, AEP Ohio requests that the Commission approve the NCCR, as proposed. (Co. Br. at 100-103; Co. Reply Br. at 86-87.)

The Commission believes that NERC compliance and cybersecurity matters are of the utmost importance for Ohio's customers and customer information, as well as for the security of the electric grid and electric distribution utility facilities. Just as the Commission has encouraged the implementation and installation of smart grid technologies to allow customers and the electric utility to better manage energy consumption, reduce energy costs, and make energy service more efficient, we must accept that with the introduction of technology comes an increased cybersecurity risk. We recognize that it is important that AEP Ohio take the necessary action to secure the electric grid and react quickly to protect the electric distribution system for the benefit of all consumers and the economic stability of our state. Nonetheless, the Commission finds that AEP Ohio has not sustained its burden of proof and that its request to establish a placeholder rider for NERC compliance and cybersecurity costs is premature at this point in time and should, therefore, be denied. We agree with Staff that it is not evident that AEP Ohio, as an electric distribution company, will incur costs for compliance with NERC standards. Further, as Staff points out, the types of investments for which AEP Ohio would seek recovery and the magnitude of such investments is not presently known and the Company has not demonstrated how any potential costs would be allocated between generation, transmission, and distribution functions. (Staff Ex. 11 at 4-6.) Finally, the Commission notes that, in the event that AEP Ohio incurs NERC compliance or cybersecurity costs during the ESP term, the Company has existing means through which to seek recovery of its costs, such as through a distribution rate case.

12. <u>Pilot Throughput Balancing Adjustment Rider</u>

AEP Ohio proposes to continue, throughout the entire ESP term, the pilot throughput balancing adjustment rider (PTBAR), which is related to a revenue decoupling pilot program applicable to the residential and GS-1 tariff rate schedules and implemented pursuant to the Commission's approval of a stipulation and recommendation in the *Distribution Rate Case*. AEP Ohio notes that, in that case, the Commission extended the PTBAR past its proposed termination at the end of 2014, and directed that the PTBAR continue until otherwise ordered by the Commission. *Distribution Rate Case*, Opinion and Order (Dec. 14, 2011) at 10, Entry on Rehearing (Feb. 14, 2012) at 3-4. According to AEP Ohio, the PTBAR is intended to compensate the Company for the loss of load associated with EE/PDR programs. AEP Ohio notes that no party appears to oppose the Company's

proposal to continue the PTBAR. (Co. Ex. 1 at 12; Co. Ex. 3 at 10; Co. Ex. 13 at 4; Tr. I at 230-231.)

NRDC supports the continuation of the PTBAR through the ESP term. According to NRDC, the PTBAR is an effective tool to remove AEP Ohio's throughput incentive and to encourage the Company to assist customers in saving energy through EE/PDR programs. NRDC adds that the PTBAR facilitates AEP Ohio's ongoing efforts to comply with the requirements of R.C. 4928.66. NRDC contends that the PTBAR is working as intended, and that the rider should be extended so that AEP Ohio and interested stakeholders may continue to collect and assess additional performance metrics. (NRDC Br. at 1-4.)

OCC objects to the extension of the PTBAR through these ESP proceedings rather than in the context of an extension of AEP Ohio's EE/PDR plan. OCC points out that the PTBAR was established on a pilot basis in the *Distribution Rate Case* in connection with evaluation of AEP Ohio's EE/PDR plan. Consistent with the Commission's directives in that case regarding measurement of the success of the pilot program, OCC asserts that the Commission should not approve an extension of the PTBAR beyond the period necessary to complete the evaluation. In its reply brief, OCC goes further and argues that the Commission should only consider an extension of the PTBAR in conjunction with the evaluation of the pilot program. (OCC Ex. 11 at 37; OCC Br. at 113-114; OCC Reply Br. at 90-95). AEP Ohio responds that OCC seeks to elevate form over substance and, in any event, the Commission has the discretion to approve the extension of the PTBAR in the present proceedings (Co. Br. at 104; Co. Reply Br. at 88).

We find that the PTBAR should be continued, until otherwise ordered by the Commission. In the *Distribution Rate Case*, we noted that the PTBAR should continue for a sufficient period to enable the Commission to evaluate the revenue decoupling pilot program following its conclusion on January 1, 2015, and to determine whether revenue decoupling should be extended permanently or another mechanism should be implemented. *Distribution Rate Case*, Entry on Rehearing (Feb. 14, 2012) at 3-4. Subsequently, in Case No. 10-3126-EL-UNC, the Commission encouraged AEP Ohio and the other electric utilities to propose a straight fixed variable rate design in their next base rate cases. *In re Aligning Electric Distribution Utility Rate Structure*, Case No. 10-3126-EL-UNC, Finding and Order (Aug. 21, 2013) at 20. Therefore, in accordance with our prior orders, the revenue decoupling pilot program will be evaluated once the program concludes and, at that time, the Commission will determine whether to adopt the program and PTBAR on a permanent basis, or whether a straight fixed variable rate design should be considered as an alternative.

13. Residential Distribution Credit Rider

As a part of this ESP, AEP Ohio proposes continuation of the residential distribution credit rider (RDCR), initially approved by the Commission in the *Distribution Rate Case*, pursuant to a stipulation filed by the parties to the proceedings. *Distribution Rate Case*, Opinion and Order (Dec. 14, 2011) at 5-6, 9, 10. AEP Ohio seeks to extend the RDCR for all residential tariff schedules, as currently implemented, for the term of this ESP from June 1, 2015, to May 31, 2018. (Co. Ex. 1 at 12; Co. Ex. 7 at 4; Co. Ex. 13 at 4; Co. Br. at 104.)

No party directly opposes the continuation of the RDCR. However, OPAE and APJN submit that the RDCR approved by the Commission in the *Distribution Rate Case* included a component to fund a low-income bill payment assistance program, known as the Neighbor-to-Neighbor program. OPAE and APJN note that AEP Ohio states that it will be continuing the RDCR as implemented, but the Company did not explain in its application or any direct testimony that the RDCR would no longer include the funding of the low-income bill payment assistance program in this ESP. (OPAE/APJN Br. at 12-18.) AEP Ohio contends that the RDCR and the bill payment assistance program are separate issues (Tr. III at 696-697).

OPAE and APJN assert that AEP Ohio failed to demonstrate how the proposed ESP advances the state policy to protect at-risk populations as required by R.C. 4928.02(L). OPAE and APJN argue that AEP Ohio is taking a significant step backward by seeking to end its commitment to fund a low-income bill payment assistance program without regard to the effect it will have on vulnerable low-income customers. OPAE and APJN note that the Commission previously ordered AEP Ohio to fund the Partnership with Ohio Initiative at $15 million over the three-year term of the Company's first ESP, with all the funds going to low-income, at-risk customer programs. *ESP 1 Case*, Opinion and Order (Mar. 18, 2009) at 48. Therefore, OPAE and APJN ask the Commission, at a minimum, to order AEP Ohio to continue funding the low-income bill payment assistance program at the current level of $1 million annually and, in addition, direct the Company to add $1 million annually of shareholder funds to increase funding to a total of $2 million annually. Moreover, OPAE and APJN request that the Commission exempt income-eligible customers from riders approved by the Commission in these ESP proceedings to mitigate the bill impact on low-income customers. (OPAE/APJN Br. at 12-18; OPAE/APJN Reply Br. at 7-9.)

The Commission finds the continuation of the RDCR to be reasonable. Additionally, as addressed further below, the Commission concludes that certain intervenors' claims that the RDCR is not a quantifiable benefit of this ESP are without merit. When the Commission adopted the stipulation in the *Distribution Rate Case*, the *ESP 2 Case* was still pending before the Commission. The RDCR was, therefore, approved by

the Commission in the *Distribution Rate Case* to prevent a potential double recovery of distribution revenues. *Distribution Rate Case*, Opinion and Order (Dec. 14, 2011) at 5-6, 9, 10. No party has submitted any record evidence that a likelihood of double recovery of distribution investment costs exists in these proceedings. Based on the ESP application and other evidence of record, the Commission approves AEP Ohio's proposal to continue the residential distribution credit of $14.688 million annually for residential customers as a percentage of base distribution charges to continue through May 31, 2018, with one modification (Co. Ex. 1 at 12; Co. Ex. 7 at 4; Co. Ex. 13 at 4).

The Commission finds that the annual $1 million funding of the Neighbor-to-Neighbor program, the other component of the original RDCR mechanism, is an essential element of the credit that furthers the state policy set forth in R.C. 4928.02(L). Further, we agree with OPAE and APJN that nothing in AEP Ohio's application or direct testimony indicates that the funding of the low-income bill payment assistance program was specifically excluded from the Company's request to continue the RDCR, although Company witness Allen testified, on cross-examination, that the Company does not propose to continue the funding (Tr. III at 696-697). Thus, the Commission modifies AEP Ohio's RDCR proposal to continue to include $1 million annually to fund the bill payment assistance program to support at-risk and low-income customers in the Company's service territory.

14. Basic Transmission Cost Rider

Currently, AEP Ohio recovers its PJM-assessed transmission costs from SSO customers through the bypassable TCRR, while CRES providers include their PJM-assessed transmission costs in their rates charged to shopping customers. Under the proposed ESP, AEP Ohio seeks to eliminate the TCRR, following a final true-up filing, and establish a non-bypassable basic transmission cost rider (BTCR) through which the Company would recover non-market based transmission charges from all of its customers, both shopping and non-shopping. Specifically, as proposed, the BTCR would include charges associated with Network Integration Transmission Service; Transmission Enhancement; Transmission Owner Scheduling, System Control, and Dispatch Service; Reactive Supply and Voltage Control from Generation and Other Sources Service; Load Reconciliation for Transmission Owner Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service, as well as credits for Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service and Non-Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service. AEP Ohio witness Vegas explained that market based transmission charges would be included as part of the auction product offering for SSO customers, while CRES providers would be responsible for paying market based transmission charges for their shopping customers. Mr. Vegas testified that the proposed BTCR would align AEP Ohio's transmission cost recovery mechanism with the other electric distribution utilities in Ohio; enable CRES providers and SSO suppliers to operate and provide product offerings in a similar manner across the state; and ensure that

customers only pay the actual costs from PJM through a true-up of the BTCR. AEP Ohio witness Moore testified that the mechanics of the BTCR would operate consistent with the current TCRR and that the BTCR rates would be computed on a consolidated class basis. Finally, AEP Ohio notes that annual filings for the BTCR would comply with the requirements of Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4901:1-36. (Co. Ex. 1 at 12-13; Co. Ex. 2 at 10-12; Co. Ex. 13 at 4, 7-8, 11, Ex. AEM-3; Co. Ex. 15 at Ex. CL-2, Attach. F.)

RESA, Constellation, and IGS support the proposed BTCR, noting that, currently, it is difficult for CRES providers to predict and manage certain non-market based transmission charges, while AEP Ohio's recommended approach would be competitively neutral, efficient, and likely to result in more competitive prices for consumers (RESA Ex. 1 at 7; Constellation Ex. 1 at 29-30; RESA Br. at 20-21; Constellation Br. at 24; IGS Br. at 19-20). RESA, Constellation, and FES recommend that Generation Deactivation, PJM Invoice Item No. 1930, also be included in the BTCR to ensure consistency among the electric distribution utilities (RESA Ex. 1 at 7-8; Constellation Ex. 1 at 30-31; RESA Ex. 1 at 6-8; FES Ex. 1 at 3-4; Co. Ex. 15 at Ex. CL-2, Attach. F; Tr. I at 167-168; Tr. IV at 1009; RESA Br. at 21-22; Constellation Br. at 26-27; FES Br. at 5-6). AEP Ohio agrees with the recommendation (Co. Br. at 117; Co. Reply Br. at 99).

IEU-Ohio urges the Commission to reject the proposed BTCR. IEU-Ohio points out that, contrary to AEP Ohio's assertion, the BTCR will not result in uniformity of transmission pricing terms across the electric distribution utilities, given that there are distinctions in their respective riders, including the Company's rider, as proposed. Further, IEU-Ohio asserts that the proposed BTCR may disrupt contractual relationships between shopping customers and CRES providers and result in such customers paying twice for non-market based transmission and ancillary services. According to IEU-Ohio, the BTCR would limit customer options, contrary to R.C. 4928.02(B), and is not needed to advance the competitive marketplace. Finally, IEU-Ohio asserts that the BTCR would fail to provide customers with efficient price signals to reduce usage at times of peak demand, in light of AEP Ohio's intention to assign and bill certain non-market based transmission costs in a manner different from PJM. If the BTCR is not rejected, IEU-Ohio recommends that the Commission ensure efficient price signals by directing AEP Ohio to assign Reactive Supply costs to customer classes on a 1 CP basis and to use a 1 CP billing determinant for demand-metered customers. Additionally, to prevent double billing, IEU-Ohio proposes that any shopping customer that can affirmatively demonstrate that its CRES provider has not removed the non-market based transmission services from its bills should be permitted to opt out of the BTCR or receive a credit under the rider, until such time as the customer is no longer paying the CRES provider for the non-market based transmission services. (IEU-Ohio Ex. 1B at 29-33; IEU-Ohio Ex. 10; IGS Ex. 3 at 4; Tr. III at 869; Tr. IV at 1056-1067; Tr. VI at 1390-1392; IEU-Ohio Br. at 37-44; IEU-Ohio Reply Br. at 21-23.) Like IEU-Ohio, OMAEG recommends that the Commission reject the proposed BTCR and require AEP Ohio to maintain the TCRR or, alternatively, direct Staff and the

Company to work with customers and CRES providers to ensure that customers are not charged twice for the same transmission and ancillary services. OMAEG also supports IEU-Ohio's recommendation that the BTCR be bypassable for any shopping customer that can demonstrate that its CRES provider will continue to collect non-market based transmission costs for the remaining term of the contract. (OMAEG Br. at 11-13; OMAEG Reply Br. at 14-15.)

AEP Ohio replies that IEU-Ohio witness Murray conceded that most CRES contracts have a regulatory-out provision; a limited number of customers would be impacted; and the Commission has means to address the concern other than outright rejection of the proposed rider. AEP Ohio and IGS note that CRES providers and the affected customers have been afforded a reasonable amount of time to make contractual adjustments for the transition, given that the BTCR proposal was addressed in the Company's application filed in December 2013 and the rider would not take effect until June 2015. IGS, RESA, and Constellation also note that the Commission has the necessary tools to avoid double billing. RESA and Constellation add that the Commission recently rejected IEU-Ohio's arguments in the *DP&L ESP Case,* in approving a proposal from DP&L comparable to AEP Ohio's proposed BTCR. With respect to IEU-Ohio's recommendations that Reactive Supply costs be assigned to customer classes on a 1 CP basis and that a 1 CP billing determinant be used for demand-metered customers, Constellation points out that IEU-Ohio failed to present sufficient justification for its proposals or to explain their impact. AEP Ohio notes that, as to Reactive Supply costs, the Company's proposal is consistent with the current treatment of such costs under the TCRR, as approved in the *ESP 2 Case,* whereas IEU-Ohio's proposal would have an unknown impact on SSO customer bills. AEP Ohio adds that it cannot bill demand charges on a 1 CP basis, because the Company does not have interval recorders for all customers, while selective billing would have bill impacts that have not been analyzed in these proceedings. (Co. Ex. 13 at Ex. AEM-3; Tr. VI at 1518-1529; Co. Br. at 117-118; RESA Br. at 22-24; Co. Reply Br. at 99-101; IGS Reply Br. at 11-13; RESA Reply Br. at 12-13; Constellation Reply Br. at 17-21.)

Pursuant to R.C. 4928.05(A)(2) and R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(g), the Commission finds that AEP Ohio's proposal to eliminate the TCRR and implement the BTCR is reasonable and should be approved and modified to include Generation Deactivation charges, as recommended by RESA, Constellation, and FES and agreed to by the Company (Co. Ex. 1 at 12-13; Co. Ex. 2 at 10-12; Co. Ex. 13 at 4, 7-8, 11, Ex. AEM-3; Co. Ex. 15 at Ex. CL-2, Attach. F; RESA Ex. 1 at 7-8; Constellation Ex. 1 at 30-31; RESA Ex. 1 at 6-8; FES Ex. 1 at 3-4; Tr. I at 167-168; Tr. IV at 1009). The proposed BTCR is comparable to the transmission riders approved for the other electric utilities. *DP&L ESP Case,* Opinion and Order (Sept. 4, 2013) at 36; *In re Ohio Edison Co., The Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., and The Toledo Edison Co.,* Case No. 12-1230-EL-SSO, Opinion and Order (July 18, 2012) at 11, 58; *In re Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.,* Case No. 11-2641-EL-RDR, et al., Opinion and Order (May 25, 2011) at 7, 17. As the Commission recently found, the bifurcation of the market based and non-

market based bill components more accurately reflects how transmission costs are billed to customers. *DP&L ESP Case* at 36. The Commission also stated, with respect to IEU-Ohio's concerns, that it was not persuaded that the bifurcation of the market based and non-market based costs poses a significant risk of double billing. *DP&L ESP Case*, Second Entry on Rehearing (Mar. 19, 2014) at 25. As IEU-Ohio witness Murray admitted, CRES contracts tend to include provisions to address regulatory changes, which is particularly common for commercial and industrial customers (Tr. VI at 1518-1519). In any event, AEP Ohio and CRES providers in the Company's service territory should work together, including Staff in the process if necessary, to ensure that customers do not pay twice for the same transmission-related expenses. If double billing issues nevertheless arise, there are existing means for impacted customers to seek the Commission's assistance, either informally by contacting Staff or through the formal complaint process available under R.C. 4905.26.

Further, we decline to adopt IEU-Ohio's recommendations that AEP Ohio be directed to assign Reactive Supply costs to customer classes on a 1 CP basis and to use a 1 CP billing determinant for demand-metered customers. As AEP Ohio points out, IEU-Ohio's proposals would have an unknown impact on customer bills and, in the absence of any analysis, it is inappropriate to modify the Company's current cost allocation methodology. Finally, consistent with our recent decisions in Case No. 14-1094-EL-RDR, the Commission notes that any remaining over/under recovery balance associated with the TCRR, which will be eliminated effective June 1, 2015, will be addressed in that proceeding. *In re Ohio Company*, Case No. 14-1094-EL-RDR, Finding and Order (Aug. 27, 2014) at 3, Finding and Order (Jan. 28, 2015) at 3.

15. Energy Efficiency and Peak Demand Reduction Rider

AEP Ohio seeks approval to continue its EE/PDR rider. According to AEP Ohio, the EE/PDR rider enables the Company to offer innovative energy efficiency programs for all customer segments and to achieve the established benchmarks for EE/PDR programs. AEP Ohio notes that no party opposes its proposal to continue the EE/PDR rider. (Co. Ex. 1 at 13; Co. Ex. 3 at 6; Co. Ex. 13 at 3; Co. Br. at 133-134; Co. Reply Br. at 109.) The Commission finds, pursuant to R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(i), that AEP Ohio's request to continue the EE/PDR rider is reasonable and should be approved (Co. Ex. 1 at 13; Co. Ex. 3 at 6; Co. Ex. 13 at 3).

16. Economic Development Rider

AEP Ohio proposes to continue the EDR, as previously approved by the Commission, throughout the new ESP term. AEP Ohio witness Spitznogle testified that the EDR, which enables the Company to recover foregone revenues associated with reasonable arrangements approved by the Commission under R.C. 4905.31, facilitates the

state's effectiveness in a regional, national, and global economy by supporting mercantile customers that create and retain Ohio jobs. AEP Ohio notes that no party opposes the continuation of the EDR. (Co. Ex. 1 at 13; Co. Ex. 3 at 9; Co. Ex. 13 at 3; Co. Br. at 134; Co. Reply Br. at 109.)

OEC and EDF argue that the EDR should be modified such that customers with Commission-approved reasonable arrangements are required to engage in all cost-effective energy efficiency programs. OEC and EDF point out that, although such customers enjoy the benefit of subsidized electric rates, they are not currently required to make any commitment regarding the manner in which they use their energy. OEC and EDF witness Roberto recommends, therefore, that, prior to seeking recovery of foregone revenues, AEP Ohio be required to undertake good faith efforts to work with its reasonable arrangement customers to implement cost-effective energy efficiency measures. OEC and EDF assert that Ms. Roberto's recommendation would benefit AEP Ohio and its customers by lowering the Company's cost of complying with the EE/PDR standards. (OEC/EDF Ex. 1 at 9-11; Tr. XII at 2799-2800; OEC/EDF Br. at 9-10.)

AEP Ohio responds that OEC's and EDF's proposal is unworkable, unclear, and incapable of implementation. AEP Ohio points out that Ms. Roberto did not explain why the Company's recovery, through the EDR, of foregone revenues attributable to customers with Commission-approved reasonable arrangements should depend on whether such customers meet OEC's and EDF's energy efficiency goals. AEP Ohio adds that there is no basis for Ms. Roberto's position that customers with reasonable arrangements do not sufficiently know how to make cost-effective investments and that there is no statutory duty to pursue all cost-effective energy efficiency measures. (Co. Br. at 134-136; Co. Reply Br. at 109-110.) Similarly, IEU-Ohio argues that OEC's and EDF's proposal lacks specificity and is unnecessary, in light of existing market incentives, as well as the fact that the Commission already addresses EE/PDR concerns in its orders approving reasonable arrangements (IEU-Ohio Reply Br. at 26-28). OEC and EDF counter that their proposal furthers Ohio's energy policy goals; is intended to lessen the financial impact associated with the subsidies paid by AEP Ohio's customers in support of economic development; and reasonably places responsibility on the Company, as the regulated entity, to ensure that customers with reasonable arrangements successfully implement energy efficiency measures (OEC/EDF Reply Br. at 3-7).

The Commission finds that the EDR should be continued, pursuant to R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(i), as a means to promote economic development efforts in AEP Ohio's service territory and facilitate the state's effectiveness in the global economy, in accordance with R.C. 4928.02(N) (Co. Ex. 1 at 13; Co. Ex. 3 at 9; Co. Ex. 13 at 3). Additionally, we direct AEP Ohio to continue the Ohio Growth Fund, which creates private sector economic development resources to support and work in conjunction with other resources to attract new investment and improve job growth in Ohio. The Ohio Growth Fund should be

funded by shareholders at $2 million per year, or portion thereof, during the term of ESP 3, which is consistent with our decision in the *ESP 2 Case*. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 67. Any funds that are not allocated during a given year shall remain in the fund and carry over to be allocated in subsequent years.

Further, the Commission declines to adopt the recommendations of OEC and EDF. As we have previously stated, each reasonable arrangement application, including consideration of any associated delta revenue recovery, should be evaluated on its own merits, in light of the benefits received by the parties to the arrangement, the electric utility's ratepayers, and the state of Ohio. *In re Ohio Edison Company and V&M Star*, Case No. 09-80-EL-AEC, Opinion and Order (Mar. 4, 2009) at 7. Although the Commission encourages customers receiving electric service pursuant to a reasonable arrangement with AEP Ohio to engage in cost-effective energy efficiency programs, we believe that imposing energy efficiency requirements on either the customer or the Company, as proposed by OEC and EDF, would unnecessarily curtail the benefits of reasonable arrangements afforded under R.C. 4905.31. Apart from energy efficiency considerations, reasonable arrangements may serve numerous other purposes that serve the public interest, such as attracting new businesses and facilitating the expansion of existing businesses in Ohio.

17. Purchase of Receivables Program and Bad Debt Rider

(a) AEP Ohio

AEP Ohio seeks approval to establish a purchase of receivables (POR) program without recourse, in conjunction with a new bad debt rider (BDR). AEP Ohio notes that, in the *ESP 2 Case*, the Commission directed the Company to evaluate a POR program, as a means of supporting retail competition in Ohio. AEP Ohio believes that the combination of the POR program and the BDR would support a competitive marketplace that is attractive to CRES providers, thereby enhancing shopping opportunities for customers, while also providing financial security for the Company. As proposed, the POR program would consist of an agreement between AEP Ohio and each participating CRES provider, under which the Company would purchase and receive title of ownership for receivables billed on behalf of the CRES provider by the Company via consolidated billing. Specifically, AEP Ohio witness Gabbard proposes that CRES providers that elect consolidated billing be required to participate in the POR program, although CRES providers would still be able to choose the dual-billing option, if they prefer, on an account-by-account basis. Further, Mr. Gabbard proposes that shopping customers that are already enrolled in dual billing with a CRES provider, and with receivables in arrears 60 days or more, would not be permitted to enroll in consolidated billing until they are in arrears 30 days or less. Mr. Gabbard also recommends that the initial POR discount rate be set at zero and that only commodity-related charges be included in the POR program.

Regarding POR payment terms, Mr. Gabbard explains that monthly payments for receivables billed and purchased during the prior month would be wired to CRES providers on a date derived by using a revenue lag metric, specifically, AEP Ohio's yearly Day Sales Outstanding value, which would be posted on the support website for CRES providers by January 1 of each year. Finally, AEP Ohio requests a waiver, for receivables purchased under the POR program, of Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-18-10(D), which prohibits utilities from disconnecting service for failure to pay any non-tariffed service charges, including CRES-related charges. AEP Ohio believes that it must have leverage in the collections process to disconnect service for non-payment. (Co. Ex. 1 at 14; Co. Ex. 2 at 12-13; Co. Ex. 11 at 3, 6-8, 10-13.)

AEP Ohio estimates that implementation of a fully automated POR program would cost approximately $1.5 million, while ongoing incremental O&M support costs for system and program maintenance are forecasted at $207,600 on an annual basis. To recover these costs, AEP Ohio proposes that CRES providers that utilize consolidated billing would be charged an administrative fee each year, with such fees credited to cost of service for customers. AEP Ohio notes that the administrative fee would be designed to recover its initial capital investment over a five-year period as well as ongoing administrative costs, with the fee for each CRES provider based on its current number of enrolled customers or a forecasted number for new market entrants. According to AEP Ohio, the proposed annual per-consolidated bill fee would be $0.77, which the Company derived by dividing the amortized implementation costs over five years and the forecasted yearly administrative costs by the total number of residential and small commercial shopping customers that CRES providers tend to register in consolidated billing. Finally, AEP Ohio projects that it would need approximately 9 to 12 months in order to implement the POR program from the date of approval, with receivables purchased based on the first billing cycle after implementation. In terms of customer impact, AEP Ohio notes that, although the bill format would not change, customers would be able to use the Company's budget billing and average monthly payment plans for both their generation and wires charges; some customers may be required to pay an additional deposit to the Company to cover generation and transmission charges; and, if the requested waiver of Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-18-10(D) is granted, customers would be subject to disconnection for non-payment of CRES-related charges. (Co. Ex. 11 at 13-17; Tr. III at 784-785.)

Regarding the benefits of the POR program, AEP Ohio explains that all customers would benefit from the likelihood of increased CRES providers and product offerings in the competitive market, while shopping customers, in particular, would benefit from the option to be placed on the Company's budget billing and average monthly payment plans for both wires and commodity charges; the elimination of duplicative credit checks; and dealing with only one entity for late payments and other billing issues. AEP Ohio emphasizes that CRES providers would also benefit from predictable payments for generation services; certainty regarding the amount of incoming receivables; limited need

to address billing and payment issues; elimination of the need to perform credit checks, secure collateral, or engage in collections practices for accounts on consolidated billing; and, ultimately, having a more attractive market in which to offer products and services. Finally, AEP Ohio believes that the POR program has the potential to streamline a number of customer service processes for both CRES providers and the Company, such as customer credit and collections calls related to consolidated billing and inquiries regarding past due amounts. (Co. Ex. 11 at 4-6.)

With respect to the BDR, AEP Ohio notes that $12,221,000 in bad debt expense is already included in the Company's base distribution rates. AEP Ohio witnesses Gabbard and Moore testified that the BDR would be designed to recover the forecasted incremental bad debt expense, for each year going forward, that is above the amount already being recovered through base distribution rates, including incremental factoring expense. Mr. Gabbard further testified that this incremental recovery approach would continue until AEP Ohio's next distribution rate case, at which point bad debt expense would be unbundled from the distribution rates and recovered only through the BDR. AEP Ohio proposes that bad debt from both shopping customers and SSO customers be included in the BDR, as well as percentage of income payment plan (PIPP) installment payments not recovered through the universal service fund rider, or from the customer net of any unused low-income credit funds. Mr. Gabbard testified that the BDR would be trued up each year with an application period of January 1 to December 31 and that AEP Ohio's long-term debt rate would be applied to the over/under recovery amount carried forward to the next year. Mr. Gabbard also testified that the BDR would be applied based on the percentage of base distribution revenues and that, for the first year of implementation, the BDR is forecasted to be set at zero percent of base distribution revenues, as the incremental bad debt is forecasted to be zero. AEP Ohio emphasizes that the BDR is preferable to incorporation of the bad debt associated with purchased receivables into the discount rate. Specifically, AEP Ohio points out that its proposed BDR is consistent with the practice of Duke and other utilities with POR programs; would be used to recover bad debt costs associated with both shopping and non-shopping customers through one mechanism that is trued up annually; and would prevent cross-subsidization between shopping and non-shopping customers through the sharing of bad debt costs by all customers. (Co. Ex. 11 at 8-10; Co. Ex. 13 at 11, 12-13.)

Additionally, AEP Ohio seeks to establish for all residential customers, except those enrolled in PIPP plans, a late payment charge of 1.5 percent on the unpaid account balance, including charges related to receivables purchased from CRES providers, existing five days after the due date of the bill. AEP Ohio witness Spitznogle explained that the late payment charge would be assessed once and would become due and payable for that month. Mr. Spitznogle further explained that, if payment is not made by the subsequent month, an additional late payment charge would be applied to the new month's service charges, but would not be applied again to the previous month's unpaid balance. Finally,

Mr. Spitznogle noted that any revenues generated from residential late payment charges would be used to offset the bad debt expense that is proposed to be collected through the BDR. AEP Ohio proposes the late payment charge in order to encourage residential customers to pay their bills on time; ensure that late payments from residential customers are treated comparably to late payments from the Company's other customer classes as well as customers of other utilities; and reduce the cost of bad debt paid by all customers. (Co. Ex. 3 at 10-11; Co. Ex. 11 at 9.)

(b) Intervenors and Staff

Although Staff supports the concept of a POR program, Staff opposes AEP Ohio's proposed BDR, late payment charge, and annual administrative fee assessed to CRES providers to pay for POR implementation and administrative costs. In place of the BDR, Staff recommends that AEP Ohio be required to purchase receivables at a discount rate. Staff contends that implementation of a discount rate prior to the BDR would be consistent with the process followed for Duke and the large gas companies, which purchased discounted receivables for years until their uncollectible expense riders were eventually established. Staff also advises that beginning the POR program with a discount rate would enable AEP Ohio to gain experience regarding the potential cost impact of CRES-related uncollectible charges. Staff recommends that AEP Ohio be directed to implement a specific discount rate calculation method that would establish a separate discount rate for each CRES provider, in order to ensure that each CRES provider assumes the appropriate amount of risk of non-collection associated with its customers. Staff further recommends that AEP Ohio establish a POR discount rate cap of 5 percent and implement a partial payment tracking methodology in conjunction with calculation of the discount rate, whereby partial payments would be allocated, after taxes, to generation, transmission, and distribution services based on the percentage that each service represents on the particular bill. Because Staff is opposed to the BDR, Staff states that it cannot support AEP Ohio's requested late payment charge, although Staff notes that it would not oppose a late payment charge proposed by the Company in a distribution rate case. As an alternative to its discount rate proposal, Staff notes that another option would be for AEP Ohio to implement the BDR, with a discount rate, that is limited to CRES receivables and generation-related uncollectable costs. Staff notes that its alternative proposal would avoid the need to rely on the $12.2 million uncollectible expense baseline reflected in base distribution rates, which relates to transmission and distribution. Noting that AEP Ohio has recently experienced uncollectible expenses in excess of the baseline, Staff expresses concern that AEP Ohio's proposal would allow the Company, in effect, to adjust its baseline through the BDR. Staff believes that uncollectible expenses related to distribution and transmission should be adjusted in a distribution rate case. (Staff Ex. 13 at 7-8; Staff Ex. 14 at 4-13; Tr. IV at 1108; Tr. IX at 2171-2172; Staff Br. at 33-36, 38-39; Staff Reply Br. at 27-28.)

With respect to AEP Ohio's recovery of POR program costs, Staff asserts that, with its discount rate proposal in place, recovery of the $207,600 in incremental O&M support costs through an administrative fee to CRES providers would be unnecessary, although Staff agrees with the Company's proposal to assess an annual per-consolidated bill fee for the estimated $1.5 million in implementation costs. Staff believes that such fee should be adjusted annually, when AEP Ohio performs its annual calculation of the discount rate, with the true-up comparing the actual cost of implementation with the cost estimate and also including an adjustment for the most recent consolidated billing customer numbers. Staff does not believe that a hard cap on the cost to implement the POR program is necessary, although Staff recommends that AEP Ohio track its implementation cost. Staff recommends that, if AEP Ohio finds that the implementation cost will exceed the $1.5 million estimate by ten percent, the Company should notify Staff and participating CRES providers, which may then request that an audit be performed at the Commission's discretion, with Staff to file its report within three months of the Commission's approval of the audit request. (Staff Ex. 14 at 13-15; Staff Br. at 37-38.)

Additionally, Staff proposes that the POR program be limited to residential and GS-1 customers that participate in consolidated billing. Noting that AEP Ohio's bad debt expense in 2013 was $22.5 million, which included a $7.2 million charge-off associated with the Ormet Primary Aluminum Corporation, Staff points out that the inclusion of large customers in the POR program may have a severe impact on residential rates. Finally, Staff recommends that, if AEP Ohio's proposed BDR is approved, the Commission should instruct the Company to work with Staff to ensure that strong collection practices are in place, in light of the fact that the rider will collect both CRES- and Company-related uncollectible expenses. Staff emphasizes that AEP Ohio has not provided any criteria or benchmarks that are used by the Company to evaluate collection performance. Staff notes that Duke has criteria that it uses to monitor and evaluate its collection practice. Staff asserts that, like Duke, AEP Ohio should have established benchmarks in place, and provide the benchmarks to Staff, before the BDR is approved. (Staff Ex. 13 at 4-5, 8-9; Staff Ex. 14 at 4; Tr. IV at 1117, 1119; Tr. VIII at 1905, 1911; Staff Br. at 40-43; Staff Reply Br. at 29-31.)

AEP Ohio responds that, in the *CRES Market Case*, Staff emphasized the need for consistent application of policies and practices to encourage the growth of the competitive market and minimize barriers to entry, although the Company believes that Staff's recommendations in the present proceedings are contrary to that goal and fundamentally inconsistent with the current practice in Ohio. AEP Ohio points out that Duke and a number of gas companies have POR programs that are structured similarly to the Company's proposal, with a zero discount rate and recovery of bad debt in a rider. AEP Ohio argues, among other matters, that Staff's assertion that the Company needs time to understand its experience with bad debt is undermined by the fact that the Company will have time to evaluate the relevant data prior to any BDR cost or credit being implemented,

because the Company's proposal calls for the establishment of an initial BDR rate of zero. AEP Ohio contends that Staff's recommended POR program will not achieve the same level of intended benefits, as evidenced by the increased competition experienced in Duke's service territory following implementation of a zero discount rate and BDR. With respect to Staff's proposal that a specific discount rate be implemented for each individual CRES provider based on its past experience, AEP Ohio responds that Staff's proposal discriminates against at-risk populations with a higher credit risk and does not support the underlying goal of the POR program. Further, AEP Ohio maintains that, contrary to Staff's position, the Company's collection efforts and history of bad debt management support approval of the proposed BDR. According to AEP Ohio, although Staff opposes the BDR based, in part, on the perceived lack of benchmarks for evaluation of bad debt collection practices, Staff is unaware of any electric distribution utility having such benchmarks. In any event, AEP Ohio argues that the record reflects that the Company manages and takes steps to minimize its bad debt. AEP Ohio concludes that, while Staff agrees that the implementation of a POR program should not harm the utility, Staff's proposal would nevertheless have that effect by capping the level of bad debt recovery and shifting risk to the Company. Finally, AEP Ohio urges the Commission to reject other intervenors' recommended modifications, although the Company states that some of the recommendations would benefit from further discussion in the collaborative environment. (Tr. VIII at 1903-1907, 1911-1912, 1916-1917; Tr. IX at 2131, 2139, 2145, 2163-2164, 2168, 2178-2187; Co. Br. at 125-133; Co. Reply Br. at 105-107.) In its reply brief, Staff responds that, although consistency among utilities is important, POR programs should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and, in any event, Staff has been consistent in requesting that AEP Ohio develop collections performance benchmarks like Duke, which is the only other electric distribution utility with a POR program combined with a BDR (Staff Reply Br. at 27-31).

OCC argues that AEP Ohio failed to prove any justification for the proposed POR program and BDR, which, according to OCC, would require the Company's customers to subsidize CRES providers' receivables. In support of its argument, OCC emphasizes that neither AEP Ohio nor any CRES provider provided any assurance that implementation of the POR and BDR would bring about additional products or providers in the Company's service territory. Further, OCC asserts that the lack of a POR program is not a barrier to market entry, in light of the significant number of registered CRES providers and current shopping rates, as well as the fact that there is no evidence that the absence of a POR program has inhibited competition. OCC adds that the claimed customer benefits of a POR program cited by AEP Ohio witness Gabbard are non-quantifiable and speculative, while there is no guarantee that CRES providers will flow their cost savings through to customers. With respect to AEP Ohio's proposed late payment charge, OCC argues that the Company failed to demonstrate a need for the charge or consider the impact on affordability of service, and did not provide any supporting documentation in the form of statistics showing the number of customers that make late payments, how late those

payments are made, and the impact on the Company's finances. OCC concludes that the proposed POR program, BDR, and late payment charge should be rejected. (OCC Ex. 11 at 21-28; OCC Ex. 13 at 31-42; Tr. III at 830, 836, 839-842, 869; Tr. XI at 2675, 2695, 2709; OCC Br. at 90-101, 150-155; OCC Reply Br. at 71-80, 117-119.) AEP Ohio replies that the evidence of record reflects that a POR program is the appropriate next step to encourage competition in Ohio, consistent with the Commission's findings in the *CRES Market Case* (Co. Reply Br. at 102-103).

Like OCC, OPAE and APJN argue that AEP Ohio's proposed POR program, BDR, and late payment charge should be rejected by the Commission. According to OPAE and APJN, CRES providers should remain responsible for the bad debt of their customers and AEP Ohio should not be permitted to shift the collection risk to all distribution customers, which OPAE and APJN contend is counter to R.C. 4928.02(H). With respect to the late payment charge, OPAE and APJN assert that AEP Ohio failed to perform any study or analysis to demonstrate a need for the proposed charge or to consider its impact on the affordability of electric rates. If the late payment charge is approved, OPAE and APJN recommend that Graduate PIPP customers be exempt in addition to other PIPP customers. Further, OPAE and APJN argue that AEP Ohio should not be permitted to impose additional security deposits under the proposed POR program, given that shopping customers may have already paid a security deposit to their CRES providers or otherwise demonstrated creditworthiness. Next, OPAE and APJN maintain that AEP Ohio's requested waiver of Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-18-10(D) is an inappropriate attempt to circumvent important consumer protections and should be rejected. OPAE and APJN point out that Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-10-19(A) also prohibits AEP Ohio from disconnecting service to a residential customer for failure to pay a non-tariffed service, including CRES charges. Finally, OPAE and APJN argue that the POR program would impose significant costs on all distribution customers without any quantifiable benefit. (OPAE/APJN Br. at 18-31; OPAE/APJN Reply Br. at 9-18.) AEP Ohio counters that, among other benefits of the POR program, increased competition and lower prices will serve to protect at-risk populations, while the Company's proposed late payment charge is a common and reasonable type of charge that would be used to offset the BDR and incent timely bill payment (Co. Reply Br. at 104, 107).

IEU-Ohio also contends that the proposed POR program should be rejected. Alternatively, IEU-Ohio recommends that, if the Commission authorizes a POR program, the Commission should reject the BDR and direct that receivables be purchased at a discount. According to IEU-Ohio, AEP Ohio failed to demonstrate a need or customer benefit with respect to the POR program and BDR, particularly for commercial and industrial customers. Specifically, IEU-Ohio asserts that the record does not reflect that a POR program would lower a barrier to entry or that there is currently a shortage of CRES providers or products in AEP Ohio's service territory. Noting that AEP Ohio's proposal is based, in part, on the fact that Duke has a similar POR program and BDR, IEU-Ohio

maintains that the Company's position is unwarranted and contrary to the stipulation through which Duke's POR program and BDR were approved. IEU-Ohio notes that AEP Ohio is a signatory party to Duke's stipulation and, as such, is prohibited by its terms from relying on the stipulation in the present proceedings. IEU-Ohio also believes that the BDR will fail to enhance competition; will unreasonably shift the market risk for bad debt to all of AEP Ohio's customers; and will remove the market discipline that encourages CRES providers to evaluate their customers and price their services appropriately. (IEU-Ohio Ex. 2 at 9-14; Co. Ex. 33 at Ex. WAA-R3; Tr. III at 869, 872-876; Tr. VII at 1652-1654; IEU-Ohio Br. at 44-51; IEU-Ohio Reply Br. at 23-26.) In response, AEP Ohio points out that the fact that Duke has a POR program with a BDR, regardless of the stipulation, may be considered by the Commission in these proceedings, contrary to IEU-Ohio's assertion (Co. Reply Br. at 104-105.)

According to FES, the proposed POR program has the potential to act as a barrier to competition and disadvantage responsible CRES providers that have effective collection practices. FES notes that AEP Ohio seeks to tie a CRES provider's use of consolidated billing to the POR program and to raise the discount rate in the future in order to recover costs associated with supplier enhancements unrelated to the POR program. FES contends that CRES providers should not be forced to choose between giving up revenues by participating in the POR program and foregoing the benefits of consolidated billing. FES adds that, under Duke's POR program, CRES providers are free to use consolidated billing apart from the POR program and there is no per-customer fee. FES, therefore, recommends that CRES providers be permitted to use consolidated billing without being required to participate in AEP Ohio's POR program; the proposed per-customer fee be rejected; and the Company be prohibited from recovering non-POR related costs through a non-zero discount rate at any point in the future. (FES Ex. 1 at 4-6; Tr. III at 795-800; FES Br. at 1-5.)

RESA and Constellation assert that AEP Ohio's proposed POR program and BDR should be approved. RESA notes that AEP Ohio's proposal addresses many of the POR-related issues and concerns raised in the *CRES Market Case* and incorporates the best practices from the POR programs in place for Duke and the large gas utilities. RESA witness Bennett testified that the POR program would encourage more CRES providers to enter AEP Ohio's service territory, lower the hurdle for market entry, increase competition, and bring more competitive prices and product offers; simplify billing and the debt and collection process; permit customers to have a single budget plan for energy and wires services; reduce the uncollectible risk for CRES providers; and eliminate customer confusion that results from dual collection efforts and the partial payment priority rules. In response to OCC's and IEU-Ohio's contentions, RESA points out that increases in supplier participation have occurred following implementation of a POR program. RESA believes that residential customers in AEP Ohio's service territory are not taking advantage of lower competitive prices due to the lack of a POR program. With

respect to OCC's and IEU-Ohio's opposition to the BDR, RESA asserts that, consistent with AEP Ohio's proposal, all customers by class should contribute on a pro rata basis to cover bad debt, regardless of whether the power was supplied through a CRES provider or the SSO. RESA also argues that Staff's recommendations should be rejected. Specifically, RESA maintains that exclusion of large commercial and industrial customers would be inconsistent with the other POR programs in Ohio and would broadly and inappropriately exclude small GS-2 customers; a zero discount is reasonable at the outset of AEP Ohio's POR program, whereas Staff's proposal for CRES provider-specific discount rates is inconsistent with the existing POR programs, unsubstantiated, time consuming, and unduly burdensome; O&M costs should not be recovered through an adder; and rejection of the BDR is unwarranted, in light of Staff's willingness to accept a BDR that recovers only generation-related bad debt, which is what the Company has proposed. In its reply brief, RESA states that it would not object if mercantile customers are omitted from the POR program and BDR. Finally, as a related matter, RESA recommends that AEP Ohio be required to provide to CRES providers all payment and collection information for the Company-consolidated billing accounts until the POR program is in place and to continue to do so for CRES providers that do not use the program. RESA also notes that certain language in tariff sheets 103-20D and 103-41D grants AEP Ohio sole discretion to terminate certain delinquent customers' CRES contracts and bar such customers from shopping until their arrearages are paid. RESA recommends that the language in question be removed from AEP Ohio's tariffs, as RESA believes that it is unreasonable and anticompetitive. (RESA Ex. 3 at 4-11; Co. Ex. 11 at 4; Tr. III at 829-830; Tr. IX at 2135, 2148, 2169-2172; Tr. XI at 2667, 2681, 2692, 2694-2695, 2709; RESA Br. at 2-19; RESA Reply Br. at 2-12.) With respect to these last two recommendations, AEP Ohio argues that these issues should be considered, if at all, in another proceeding (Co. Br. at 147-148).

Constellation argues that AEP Ohio's proposal is consistent with R.C. 4928.02(C), which requires the Commission to ensure diversity of electricity supplies and suppliers, as well as comparable to similar POR programs that have been successfully implemented by Duke and the large gas utilities. Constellation recommends that the BDR explicitly be made a non-bypassable rider and that AEP Ohio provide a mechanism that shows the various costs included in the BDR. Constellation believes that the proposed BDR is a reasonable approach to fairly socialize the costs of bad debt and ensure that shopping customers do not pay a disproportionate share of bad debt expense. However, if the BDR is rejected in favor of a discount rate, Constellation proposes that the discount rate be based on AEP Ohio's actual historic bad debt experience by customer class, as opposed to Staff's proposal, which Constellation contends is complex and administratively burdensome. Constellation also argues that the Commission should not adopt Staff's proposal to limit the applicability of the POR program to residential and GS-1 customers only, because it has no basis in the record and is inconsistent with Duke's POR program. (Constellation Ex. 1 at 10; Constellation Br. at 20-23; Constellation Reply Br. at 21-24.)

IGS also supports AEP Ohio's proposed POR program and BDR. IGS emphasizes that AEP Ohio currently recovers uncollectible expense associated with SSO generation service from all customers, shopping and non-shopping, through distribution rates. IGS believes that it is more reasonable to recover the uncollectible expense associated with all generation service from all customers equally through the BDR. Additionally, IGS recommends that AEP Ohio be directed to implement supplier consolidated billing, whereby CRES providers would purchase the Company's receivables associated with distribution service and then be responsible for billing and collecting all charges, generation and distribution, from their customers. IGS believes that the flexibility afforded by supplier consolidated billing would enable CRES providers to develop and offer a broader range of products and services. According to IGS, supplier consolidated billing and AEP Ohio's proposed POR program complement each other and could be implemented concurrently. (Co. Ex. 11 at 6-8; IGS Ex. 2 at 22-24; IGS Br. at 18-19, 20-21; IGS Reply Br. at 17-18.)

Direct Energy also asserts that AEP Ohio should be directed to take steps to implement supplier consolidated billing, which Direct Energy contends would enable CRES providers to offer new and better products on a single bill. Specifically, Direct Energy recommends that, within 30 days of the Commission's decision in these proceedings, AEP Ohio be required to convene a working group for the purpose of creating a structure and process for supplier consolidated billing. Direct Energy further recommends that, within one year of the Commission's decision, AEP Ohio be required to file proposed tariffs in a new proceeding to address the timing for programming and the costs associated with supplier consolidated billing. With respect to the POR program, Direct Energy argues that the program, as proposed by AEP Ohio, would eliminate the current option for shopping customers to be billed by the Company for additional products and services outside of their ordinary commodity service. Direct Energy points out that AEP Ohio would expect CRES providers to bill and collect for these types of products and services, which would eliminate the benefits of a single bill. Direct Energy, therefore, recommends that AEP Ohio be required to program its billing system to allow for continued billing and collection for non-POR items, even if a CRES provider chooses to participate in the POR program. Alternatively, Direct Energy recommends that AEP Ohio be directed to allow CRES providers to continue to participate in utility consolidated billing, even if they elect not to participate in the POR program. Finally, Direct Energy contends that approval of the POR program should not relieve AEP Ohio of its obligation to provide payment information to CRES providers, consistent with the Commission's directives in the *CRES Market Case*. (Direct Energy Ex. 1 at 6-8; Tr. III at 787-789; Direct Energy Br. at 5-11.)

AEP Ohio opposes the supplier consolidated billing proposals of IGS and Direct Energy. According to AEP Ohio, an ESP proceeding is not the appropriate forum in which to consider intervenors' new and experimental ideas. AEP Ohio argues that, if the

Commission finds that the proposals warrant any consideration, they should be deferred to another proceeding. AEP Ohio further argues that Direct Energy's request that the Company continue to allow non-commodity items on the bill, including termination fees, should be rejected, because such items are not related to the provision of electric service or regulated by the Commission. AEP Ohio does not oppose Direct Energy's request to continue to receive customer payment information to the extent that it involves accounts with past due amounts and only for the period prior to implementation of the POR program. (Co. Br. at 147-148; Co. Reply Br. at 107-109.) Direct Energy responds that it agrees with AEP Ohio that these proceedings are not the proper venue for addressing the details of supplier consolidated billing, which is why Direct Energy merely proposes that the Company be directed to convene a stakeholder group and to file proposed tariffs within a year (Direct Energy Reply Br. at 2-3).

(c) Conclusion

The Commission notes that we have previously addressed the issue of implementation of a POR program in AEP Ohio's service territory. In the *ESP 2 Case*, several CRES providers and RESA advocated for implementation of a POR program, which, at the time, AEP Ohio neither supported nor opposed. The Commission, however, declined to adopt the recommendation and instead directed interested stakeholders to further discuss the merits of a POR program in conjunction with the five-year rule review of Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4901:1-10, in Case No. 12-2050-EL-ORD. *ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 41-42. Subsequently, in the *CRES Market Case*, the Commission declined to adopt Staff's recommendation that the electric distribution utilities be required to file an application to implement a POR program within one year, although the Commission encouraged the utilities to include, in their next SSO or distribution rate case, a proposal to implement a POR program or equivalent. *CRES Market Case*, Finding and Order (Mar. 26, 2014) at 21.

The Commission continues to encourage the electric distribution utilities to consider and propose a POR program for implementation in their respective service territories. However, we also agree that each such proposal should be evaluated on its own merits, on a case-by-case basis, as Staff contends in the present proceedings. Consistent with this approach, and upon careful consideration of AEP Ohio's proposal, the Commission finds that a POR program should be approved for the Company, with the implementation details to be determined in a subsequent proceeding. Specifically, as discussed further below, we authorize AEP Ohio to establish a POR program that complies with the following requirements: (1) receivables must be purchased at a single discount rate that applies to all CRES providers; (2) only commodity-related charges may be included in the POR program; (3) participation in the POR program by CRES providers that elect consolidated billing must not be mandatory; and (4) a detailed implementation plan should be discussed within the MDWG, with a proposal subsequently filed for the

Commission's consideration. Additionally, AEP Ohio is authorized to establish a generation-related BDR set initially at zero.

We find that a POR program will provide significant customer benefits, including the likelihood of increased numbers of active CRES providers and product offerings in AEP Ohio's service territory, which, as the record reflects, occurred following the implementation of a POR program in Duke's service territory (Co. Ex. 11 at 4-6; RESA Ex. 3 at 8; Tr. III at 824-825). The Commission notes that the MDWG will provide an existing forum for discussion regarding the implementation of AEP Ohio's POR program, and interested stakeholders should address matters such as the POR program rules, calculation of the discount rate, implementation and maintenance costs, collection rates and procedures, and the timing and other mechanics of the process by which the Company will purchase receivables from CRES providers. We direct Staff to report on the progress of such discussions. The specific discount rate to be initially established, as well as the detailed implementation plan for the POR program, should be proposed for the Commission's consideration by AEP Ohio, Staff, and any other interested stakeholders through a filing made in a new docket by August 31, 2015. The Commission also notes that the recommendations regarding supplier consolidated billing offered by Direct Energy and IGS and RESA's objections to the switching provisions in tariff sheets 103-20D and 103-41D should be further discussed within the MDWG.

The Commission finds that, with the implementation of a discount rate, AEP Ohio's request for approval of the BDR should be approved, with modifications. We note that, as proposed by AEP Ohio, the BDR would flow the bad debt of both shopping and non-shopping customers, whether generation- or distribution-related, through a single rider, which may cause the type of subsidy that the Commission must avoid under R.C. 4928.02(H). Although AEP Ohio emphasizes that its BDR was modeled after Duke's approach in many respects, the proposed rider is inconsistent with Duke's practice of maintaining separate uncollectible expense riders for generation- and distribution-related bad debt. *See, e.g., In re Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.*, Case No. 14-953-EL-UEX, Finding and Order (Sept. 25, 2014); *In re Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.*, Case No. 14-955-EL-UEX, Finding and Order (Sept. 25, 2014). As Staff points out, AEP Ohio's proposal would effectively enable the Company to adjust, through the BDR, the $12.2 million in bad debt expense that is already reflected in its base distribution rates. We agree with Staff that, if this baseline is to be adjusted, it should be done in the context of a distribution rate case and not in these proceedings. Consequently, consistent with Staff's alternative recommendation, the BDR should be limited to CRES receivables and generation-related uncollectible expenses above the amount already being recovered through base distribution rates. As the implementation details of the POR program will be resolved in another docket, the BDR should initially be established as a placeholder rider set at zero. Further, we believe that the merits of a late payment charge for residential customers would be more appropriately

addressed in a distribution rate case and, accordingly, do not approve the proposed charge at this time.

The Commission also finds it necessary to address AEP Ohio's request for a waiver of Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-18-10(D), which provides that a utility company shall not disconnect service due to failure to pay CRES-related charges. Additionally, as OPAE and APJN point out, Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-10-19(A) similarly provides that no electric utility may disconnect service to a residential customer for failure to pay CRES-related charges. More importantly, we note that R.C. 4928.10(D)(3) requires the Commission to adopt rules regarding a number of specific consumer protections, including, with respect to disconnection and service termination, a prohibition against blocking, or authorizing the blocking of, customer access to a non-competitive retail electric service when a customer is delinquent in payments to the electric utility or electric services company for a competitive retail electric service. No party has persuaded the Commission that we can waive Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-18-10(D) in light of this statutory provision. We, therefore, find that AEP Ohio's request for a waiver of Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-18-10(D) should be rejected, as it is counter to the statute's prohibition on disconnection for non-payment of CRES-related charges. The Commission cannot grant a rule waiver that is inconsistent with the statute.

Finally, in accordance with the Commission's directive in the *CRES Market Case*, AEP Ohio should continue to make available to CRES providers the data necessary to assist them in collection efforts, including the total customer payment amount, the amount billed by the CRES provider, the amount of the payment allocated to the CRES provider, the date on which the payment was applied, and a payment plan flag. *CRES Market Case*, Finding and Order (Mar. 26, 2014) at 21-22.

18. Continuation or Elimination of Other Riders

In addition to the riders specifically addressed above, AEP Ohio requests authority to continue or eliminate other existing riders. Specifically, AEP Ohio witness Moore testified that the pool termination rider and generation resource rider would be eliminated, while the deferred asset phase-in rider, universal service fund rider, kWh tax rider, phase-in recovery rider, and transmission under recovery rider would continue in their current form. (Co. Ex. 1 at 14; Co. Ex. 13 at 4, Ex. AEM-1; Co. Br. at 137; Co. Reply Br. at 110.) The Commission finds that AEP Ohio's request is reasonable and should be approved (Co. Ex. 1 at 14; Co. Ex. 13 at 4, Ex. AEM-1).

19. Capital Structure and Cost of Capital

AEP Ohio proposes to use the expected capital structure and cost of capital for the wires business that will exist as of May 31, 2015, following completion of the Company's transfer of its generation assets. Specifically, AEP Ohio witness Hawkins testified that the

targeted capital structure is 52.5 percent long-term debt and 47.5 percent equity, which is a change from the current capital structure of approximately 43 percent debt and 57 percent equity. Ms. Hawkins recommended a pre-tax weighted cost of capital of 10.86 percent, after-tax weighted cost of capital of 8.23 percent, and an embedded cost for long-term debt of 6.05 percent. AEP Ohio witness Avera recommended an ROE of 10.65 percent, in order to enable the Company to maintain its financial integrity, provide a return commensurate with investments of comparable risk, and support the Company's ability to attract capital. (Co. Ex. 17 at 4-9; Co. Ex. 19 at 5-9; Co. Br. at 106-110.)

OCC urges the Commission to adopt an ROE of 9.00 percent for AEP Ohio. OCC points out that AEP Ohio, as a wires only business, has a lower risk than an integrated generation, transmission, and distribution owner. OCC also asserts that its recommendation is reasonable, given the lower risk inherent in the electric industry and AEP Ohio's continued reliance on numerous riders, as well as the relatively slow growth in the economy. Further, OCC argues that AEP Ohio witness Avera's analysis is flawed in numerous respects and, therefore, the Company's requested ROE is overstated and unreasonable. (OCC Ex. 12; OCC Ex. 12A; OCC Br. at 134-142; OCC Reply Br at 107-112.) AEP Ohio replies that OCC recommends an inordinately low ROE and that Dr. Avera thoroughly explained and supported his methodology. AEP Ohio adds that Dr. Avera's analysis implicitly accounts for all risk affecting factors. (Co. Br. at 111-113; Co. Reply Br. at 89-97.)

Like OCC, Walmart also contends that AEP Ohio's proposed ROE is unreasonable, because it fails to reflect a reduction in regulatory lag attributable to the DIR and other riders, and is inflated in comparison to the average ROE of 9.57 percent for other distribution only utilities since 2012. In addition to supporting OCC's recommended ROE of 9.00 percent, Walmart requests that the Commission approve an ROE of no higher than 9.57 percent. (Walmart Ex. 1 at 7-10, Ex. SWC-2; Tr. II at 313-314; Tr. V at 1299; Walmart Br. at 3-5.) AEP Ohio responds that riders, such as the DIR, are commonplace and do not distinguish the Company's risk level and, in any event, the impact on the risk due to the DIR is already factored into Company witness Avera's analysis. Addressing Walmart's argument regarding the average ROE for other distribution only entities, AEP Ohio points out that the most relevant historical ROE is the one authorized for the Company by the Commission. AEP Ohio notes that Dr. Avera's ROE recommendation of 10.65 percent is squarely within the range recently established for the Company by the Commission, namely above the 10.20 percent ROE approved in the *Distribution Rate Case* and below the 11.15 percent ROE approved in Case No. 10-2929-EL-UNC with respect to capacity charges. AEP Ohio adds that Dr. Avera's recommendation is further supported by the fact that the ROE established in these proceedings will be used for rates that do not go into effect until June 2015, when interest rates and costs of equity are likely to be higher. (Co. Br. at 110-111; Co. Reply Br. at 89.)

Upon review of the parties' positions, the Commission finds that the record reflects a range in ROE recommendations, beginning with a low of 9.00 percent, put forth by OCC and supported by Walmart, increasing to Walmart's upper bound recommendation of 9.57 percent, and, finally, ending at the Company's requested ROE of 10.65 percent. We agree with Walmart and OCC that AEP Ohio's requested ROE is too high, as gauged by comparison with the average reported ROE for comparable utilities since 2012 (Walmart Ex. 1 at 9-10). Further, AEP Ohio's requested ROE does not adequately account for the Company's reduced exposure to risk from regulatory lag in light of the DIR and numerous other riders (Walmart Ex. 1 at 8; OCC Ex. 12 at 54-55; OCC Ex. 12A). On the other hand, we find that OCC's and Walmart's ROE recommendations are not sufficient to enable AEP Ohio to maintain its financial integrity and protect its ability to attract capital.

In the *Distribution Rate Case*, the Commission adopted a joint stipulation and recommendation submitted by the parties, which included approval of an ROE of 10.00 percent for CSP and 10.30 percent for OP, or an ROE of 10.20 percent for the merged corporate entity. *Distribution Rate Case*, Opinion and Order (Dec. 14, 2011) at 12, 14. Following our review of the record in the present ESP proceedings, we find that it is appropriate to maintain the ROE of 10.20 percent authorized for AEP Ohio in the *Distribution Rate Case*. The Commission recognizes that the ROE was adopted pursuant to the stipulation in the *Distribution Rate Case*, which was intended by the parties to have no precedential effect. The Commission has stated, however, that, while parties may agree not to be bound by the provisions contained within a stipulation, such limitations do not extend to the Commission. *See, e.g., ESP 2 Case*, Opinion and Order (Aug. 8, 2012) at 10. We, therefore, find that an ROE of 10.20 percent is appropriate, just, reasonable, and supported by the record, as it falls within AEP Ohio witness Avera's recommended range of 9.50 percent to 11.00 percent (Co. Ex. 19 at 7, Ex. WEA-2), as well as within the range of recommendations put forth by OCC, Walmart, and the Company.

20. Accounting Authority

AEP Ohio requests authority to record regulatory liabilities and regulatory assets and, thus, to perform regulatory deferral over/under recovery true-up accounting for a number of riders, as well as continued deferral accounting authority for the SDRR and additional deferral authority related to the proposed NCCR. (Co. Ex. 1 at 15; Co. Ex. 18 at 3-6.) The Commission finds that AEP Ohio's request for accounting authority is reasonable and should be approved (Co. Ex. 1 at 15; Co. Ex. 18 at 3-6), except with respect to the NCCR, consistent with our rejection of the proposed rider.

21. Early Termination

In its application, AEP Ohio states that it reserves the right to terminate the proposed ESP one year early (i.e., by June 1, 2017), based upon a substantive change in

Ohio law (including rules or orders of the Commission) affecting SSO obligations or rate plan options under R.C. Chapter 4928; or a substantive change in federal law (including FERC rules or orders) or PJM tariffs or rules with respect to capacity, energy, or transmission regulation or pricing that has an impact on SSO obligations or rate plan options. AEP Ohio further states that it may exercise its early termination right, at its sole option and discretion, by giving written notice to the Commission no later than October 1, 2016. Finally, AEP Ohio states that, if the Company elects to exercise its right to early termination, it will propose a new SSO rate plan to encompass the period from June 1, 2017, through May 31, 2018, which may also encompass a longer time period consistent with applicable law. According to AEP Ohio, the early termination provision is reasonable, prudent, and necessary to protect the interests of the Company and its customers, in light of the rapidly changing legal and regulatory environment and the attendant supply risks. (Co. Ex. 1 at 15; Co. Ex. 2 at 8; Tr. I at 65-67; Co. Br. at 137-139.)

Staff, OCC, OMAEG, Constellation, Direct Energy, and RESA oppose AEP Ohio's reservation of right to terminate the ESP at the end of the second year. These parties raise a number of reasons for their opposition, arguing that AEP Ohio's reservation of right lacks statutory or other legal authority; interferes with the MRO/ESP analysis; grants the Company nearly unfettered discretion; lacks objective criteria for determining when the right may be properly exercised; creates substantial uncertainty, risk, and higher costs in the market for customers, SSO suppliers, and CRES providers; harms competition; and proposes a timeframe that would allow little time for a new ESP to be approved. OCC adds that, if the Commission nevertheless approves the early termination provision, it should not apply to the PPA rider. (Staff Ex. 16 at 2-4; OCC Ex. 15A at 44; Constellation Ex. 1 at 24-27; RESA Ex. 3 at 11-12; Tr. I at 67-68; Staff Br. at 67-68; OCC Br. at 154-157; OMAEG Br. at 3-6; Constellation Br. at 25-26; Direct Energy Br. at 12; RESA Br. at 34-36; OCC Reply Br. at 40-42; OMAEG Reply Br. at 18-20; Constellation Reply Br. at 24-25; RESA Reply Br. at 22.)

AEP Ohio responds that intervenors' concerns are misplaced, because the Commission and customers would receive advance notice if the Company exercises its early termination right, and a new SSO would have to be approved by the Commission before ESP 3 would end. AEP Ohio points out that its advance notice should eliminate any uncertainty for customers and CRES providers. AEP Ohio also argues that nothing in R.C. 4928.143 or any other statutory provision prohibits the Commission from approving the Company's reservation of an early termination right. Further, AEP Ohio contends that the length of the ESP term has no bearing on the Commission's MRO/ESP analysis. Finally, AEP Ohio notes that it is not opposed to extending the PPA rider past the ESP term, to the extent that the Commission is committed, at the outset, to the Company's proposed hedging arrangement. (Co. Ex. 1 at 15; Co. Ex. 2 at 8; Tr. I at 65-66, 68, 133; Co. Reply Br. at 110-114.)

To the extent that AEP Ohio seeks the Commission's approval of its reservation of right to terminate the ESP after a two-year period, we find that the Company's request should be denied. AEP Ohio offers no statutory or other legal citation in support of its request. Further, as proposed, AEP Ohio's early termination provision is neither reasonable nor prudent. As noted by Staff and numerous intervenors, AEP Ohio's proposal would afford the Company considerable discretion to end the ESP after two years. In fact, among other circumstances, the ESP would be subject to early termination due to any Commission order that affects the ESP, including any of its riders, or the Company's SSO obligations under R.C. Chapter 4928. The Commission also believes that the proposed early termination provision would generate a significant measure of uncertainty and risk in the market and, potentially, higher costs for customers. (Staff Ex. 16 at 4; Constellation Ex. 1 at 24-27; RESA Ex. 3 at 11-12; Tr. I at 67-68.) Finally, the Commission notes that, if AEP Ohio finds it necessary to take steps to protect the interests of the Company or its customers, in light of regulatory or other changes in the law, the Company has other existing means by which to seek relief.

22. Other Issues

(a) Demand Response

In its brief, AEP Ohio notes that the recent polar vortex affirms that demand response programs play an important role, even when sponsored by a wires only company. AEP Ohio also points out that a federal appeals court ruling called into question FERC's approval of PJM's demand response programs and emphasized the states' role in overseeing demand response programs for retail customers. OEG recommends that the Commission ensure that state-established demand response programs for shopping and non-shopping customers remain available, even if PJM is required to change its tariffs as a result of federal proceedings. OEG adds that demand response programs provide both reliability and efficiency benefits. (Co. Br. at 72-73; OEG Reply Br. at 12.)

The Commission notes that the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has vacated FERC Order 745, which established a means for regional transmission organizations to compensate demand response resources in wholesale electricity markets. *Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC*, 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Specifically, the court determined that demand response is solely a retail matter subject exclusively to state jurisdiction. The United States Solicitor General, on behalf of FERC, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari at the United States Supreme Court on January 15, 2015.

The Commission agrees with AEP Ohio and OEG that demand response plays an important role in ensuring reliability, while also encouraging state economic development.

We find that, because of the possibility that federal proceedings may significantly alter the jurisdiction of demand response, a new placeholder pilot demand response rider should be established. The Commission emphasizes that this is merely a placeholder rider and that no cost allocation or recovery shall occur at this time. Within 30 days of a final order from the United States Supreme Court or an order denying petitions for certiorari, AEP Ohio or the Commission may open a new docket to revisit any provisions in these proceedings that relate to demand response and load management mechanisms within the Company's service territory.

(b) Retail Stability Rider

In the ESP application, AEP Ohio states that it plans to continue the RSR through the term of the proposed ESP, consistent with the Commission's decision in the *ESP 2 Case*. AEP Ohio explains that the sole purpose of the RSR during the ESP term will be to collect the Company's previously authorized capacity charge deferrals, including carrying charges, for three years or until fully recovered. AEP Ohio notes that it intends to file a separate application to continue the RSR, although the rider has been incorporated into the Company's projected rate impacts submitted as part of these proceedings. (Co. Ex. 1 at 3, 14; Co. Ex. 7 at 11-12; Co. Ex. 13 at 4; Co. Br. at 137.)

The Commission notes that, in Case No. 14-1186-EL-RDR, AEP Ohio filed an application on July 8, 2014, to continue the RSR until the deferrals and carrying charges are fully recovered. Accordingly, continuation of the RSR will be addressed in that case.

(c) Significantly Excessive Earnings Test

AEP Ohio requests that the Commission confirm the methodology by which it intends to implement the SEET for the duration of the ESP, in order to maintain a level of consistency to enable investors and utility managers to make the significant investments in utility infrastructure that are necessary to meet customers' needs and expectations. AEP Ohio witness Allen testified that, while none of the SEET threshold values for 2009, 2010, 2011, or 2012 can possibly include the ROE for comparable companies for the term of the proposed ESP, they individually and collectively support the proposition that an earned ROE below 15 percent cannot be the result of significantly excessive earnings. Mr. Allen further testified that, although AEP Ohio does not believe that a SEET threshold should be set prospectively for the ESP period, if the Commission elects to establish such a threshold in these proceedings, the Company believes that a threshold of 15 percent would be reasonable under the terms of the proposed ESP, as well as consistent with other SEET thresholds established by the Commission in prior proceedings. (Co. Ex. 7 at 5-8; Co. Br. at 146-147.)

OCC points out that the business and financial risk faced by AEP Ohio has declined, in light of the fact that the Company is now a wires only business and continues to rely on riders to collect revenues. OCC also notes that AEP Ohio's current SEET threshold is 12 percent, which was established in the *ESP 2 Case*, at which time the Company still owned numerous generation assets. Further, OCC argues that AEP Ohio has not demonstrated that it is reasonable or in the public interest to increase the SEET threshold from 12 percent to 15 percent. OCC, therefore, recommends that the SEET threshold remain at 12 percent or be lowered, given AEP Ohio's lower risk exposure. Alternatively, OCC recommends that the Commission determine the SEET threshold within the context of each annual proceeding, as it has done in the past. (OCC Ex. 12 at 54-55; OCC Ex. 12A; OCC Br. at 147-149; OCC Reply Br. at 116-117.) AEP Ohio replies that a SEET threshold of 15 percent is reasonable and appropriate based upon the methodology previously used by the Commission, while OCC's proposal lacks any connection to either historical or future earnings. AEP Ohio adds that the 12 percent SEET threshold established in the *ESP 2 Case* is inadequate in numerous respects and, in any event, the Commission should not prospectively establish a SEET threshold. (Co. Ex. 7 at 5-7; Co. Reply Br. at 130-132.)

The Commission finds that, since we have not authorized or renewed a service stability rider, it is not necessary to establish a SEET threshold in these ESP proceedings. Accordingly, AEP Ohio's SEET threshold for each year of the ESP will be determined within the context of each annual SEET case.

(d) Market Energy Program

RESA proposes that the Commission adopt a market energy program (MEP), which would be modeled after a similar concept implemented in Pennsylvania. RESA contends that the proposed MEP would be a direct and easy way in which to introduce shopping to eligible customers by means of a straightforward competitive offer that would be approved by the Commission. Specifically, RESA proposes that AEP Ohio's non-shopping residential and small commercial customers, when calling the Company's call center for any reason other than termination or emergency, would be offered a three percent discount off the applicable price to compare at the time of enrollment for a six-month period, with no termination fee. If a customer elects to participate in the MEP, RESA explains that the customer would be immediately enrolled with a specific CRES provider, if desired, or otherwise assigned sequentially to a CRES provider from a list of participating providers. With respect to costs, RESA recommends that AEP Ohio, following consultation with interested CRES providers, submit a start-up and maintenance plan with estimated costs for the Commission's review and approval of a per-enrolled customer charge to be paid by participating CRES providers at a level that will recoup the start-up costs, over a three-year period, as well as ongoing maintenance costs. RESA also proposes that the MEP be evaluated through quarterly reports and an annual meeting

among interested stakeholders. (RESA Ex. 2 at 4-8; Tr. VIII at 1945, 1949-1951; RESA Br. at 24-27; RESA Reply Br. at 13-14.)

IGS recommends that RESA's proposed MEP be approved, in order to encourage customers to engage in the competitive retail electric market (IGS Br. at 22; IGS Reply Br. at 15-16). Staff states that it is not opposed to RESA's MEP proposal, but makes a number of recommendations. If the Commission approves the MEP, Staff recommends that the Commission direct that Staff has final authority regarding how the program will be implemented; the customer enrollment processing and notification rules contained in Ohio Adm.Code Chapters 4901:1-10 and 4901:1-21 apply to the program; and AEP Ohio must track certain customer enrollment data and report the data to Staff upon request. (Staff Br. at 73-74.)

AEP Ohio opposes the proposed MEP. AEP Ohio argues that the MEP proposal has not been adequately developed and would benefit from discussion and further refinement in a collaborative environment. According to AEP Ohio, the Commission's sole focus in these proceedings should be on the proposed ESP, while the MEP, if considered at all, should be the subject of review in another proceeding. (Co. Br. at 147-148; Co. Reply Br. at 132-133.) OCC, OPAE, and APJN also oppose the MEP proposal put forth by RESA. OCC emphasizes that RESA provided very few details regarding its proposal; failed to support the basic terms that were proposed, particularly the three percent discount; and failed to explain key differences between its proposal and the similar program implemented in Pennsylvania. OCC believes that the MEP would result in customer confusion and higher costs. OPAE and APJN point out that many important details of the MEP have not been worked out and that the program is an attempt to undermine the SSO. OPAE and APJN add that the MEP would result in a subsidy of a CRES product through distribution rates and is, therefore, contrary to R.C. 4928.02(H). (OCC Br. at 125-131; OPAE/APJN Br. at 48-51; OCC Reply Br. at 82-84; OPAE/APJN Reply Br. at 26-27.)

The Commission declines to adopt the proposed MEP. RESA's proposal is outside the scope of these ESP proceedings and, as several intervenors note, many of the key elements of the MEP have not been adequately developed. In the *CRES Market Case*, the Commission established the MDWG to be facilitated by Staff as a forum for the electric distribution utilities, CRES providers, and other interested stakeholders to address issues related to the development of the competitive market. *CRES Market Case*, Finding and Order (Mar. 26, 2014) at 23. The Commission, therefore, notes that interested stakeholders and Staff may work through the MDWG to evaluate the proposed MEP. If, upon further evaluation by the MDWG, Staff concludes that the proposed MEP or a comparable program should be considered by the Commission for implementation in the state of Ohio, Staff should file a detailed proposal in a new case with an EL-EDI designation.

(e) Immediate Enrollment and Accelerated Switching

IGS witness White testified that customers are currently required to enroll in SSO generation service upon enrolling in AEP Ohio's distribution service and must wait a minimum period of time before they can enroll with a CRES provider. Mr. White further testified that this requirement is a barrier to competition. IGS, therefore, proposes that customers be permitted to enroll with a CRES provider immediately upon enrolling in AEP Ohio's distribution service. Additionally, IGS recommends that AEP Ohio be directed to implement accelerated switching for customers with smart meters, such that customers are permitted to switch from one generation service to another in a period of five days or less. (IGS Ex. 2 at 24-25; IGS Reply Br. at 16-17.)

RESA supports IGS' immediate enrollment proposal, as another means to develop the competitive market in AEP Ohio's service territory. RESA asserts that IGS' recommendation will not conflict with the efforts of the MDWG to develop an operational plan for a statewide instant connect process, as directed by the Commission in the *CRES Market Case*. (RESA Br. at 33-34.) AEP Ohio, however, opposes both of IGS' proposals and urges the Commission to consider the issues raised by IGS, if at all, in another proceeding (Co. Br. at 147-148).

The Commission finds that IGS' proposals should not be adopted at this time, as they are outside the scope of these ESP proceedings and would be more appropriately addressed through the MDWG.

(f) Affordability of Retail Electric Service

OCC, OPAE, and APJN argue that AEP Ohio failed to propose an ESP that will result in reasonably priced retail electric service and that will protect at-risk populations, as required by R.C. 4928.02(A) and (L), respectively. OCC, OPAE, and APJN point out that AEP Ohio did not evaluate or even address the impact of its proposed ESP on rate affordability. Relying on current rate information, OCC witness Williams testified that approximately 21.8 percent of AEP Ohio's customers are significantly and negatively impacted by the Company's current rates, with approximately 7.6 percent of customers disconnected for non-payment in 2013. OCC, therefore, recommends that the Commission reject the proposed POR program, BDR, and late payment charge; discontinue the DIR and ESRR; and reject the proposed elimination of the TOU tariffs. Raising similar concerns, OPAE and APJN recommend that AEP Ohio be required to continue the annual $1 million funding commitment for the low-income bill payment assistance program known as the Neighbor-to-Neighbor program, which is currently part of the residential distribution credit approved in the *Distribution Rate Case*. OPAE and APJN further recommend that AEP Ohio be required to add $1 million annually from shareholder funds to increase the Company's funding commitment, as a means to ensure that there is adequate funding to

meet the current need. Additionally, OPAE and APJN assert that the Commission should consider exempting income-eligible customers from any of the approved riders in order to mitigate the bill impact. (OCC Ex. 11 at 4-20; Tr. III at 696-697; OCC Br. at 31-37; OPAE/APJN Br. at 5-18; OPAE/APJN Reply Br. at 5-9.) AEP Ohio responds that the proposed POR program, distribution-related riders, PPA rider, and extension of the residential distribution credit will benefit and protect at-risk populations (Co. Reply Br. at 104).

Walmart contends that AEP Ohio's rates are inordinately complex, noting that the Company has more than 20 riders, some of which are adjusted on a quarterly basis, and, therefore, it is difficult for commercial customers to evaluate their rates and determine the complete billing impact. Walmart encourages the Commission to find ways in which to simplify AEP Ohio's rate structure and recommends that the Company be directed to file a rate case with new rates to be effective on or before May 31, 2018. (Walmart Ex. 1 at 4-6; Tr. II at 424-425; Walmart Br. at 2.)

The Commission finds that the concerns raised by OCC, OPAE, and APJN have been thoroughly addressed above through our modifications to AEP Ohio's proposed ESP, including, but not limited to, limitations imposed on the DIR and continuation of the Company's variable price tariffs and the funding commitment for the Neighbor-to-Neighbor program. The Commission finds that, with these modifications, AEP Ohio's ESP will provide reasonably priced retail electric service for consumers, including at-risk populations, consistent with the state policy enumerated in R.C. 4928.02. Regarding Walmart's recommendation, although the Commission declines to direct AEP Ohio to file a distribution rate case application by a specific date, we encourage Staff and intervenors to recommend, in the Company's next rate case, ways in which the Company's rate structure may be simplified.

III. IS THE PROPOSED ESP MORE FAVORABLE IN THE AGGREGATE AS COMPARED TO THE RESULTS THAT WOULD OTHERWISE APPLY UNDER R.C. 4928.142?

Addressing the statutory test set forth in R.C. 4928.143(C)(1), AEP Ohio asserts that its proposed ESP is more favorable in the aggregate than would be expected under an MRO. AEP Ohio points out that, under either an ESP or MRO, the Company would acquire all generation services for SSO customers from the market and, accordingly, there would be no quantifiable difference in the commodity prices. However, AEP Ohio notes that its proposed extension of the RDCR through May 31, 2018, provides an annual benefit of $14,688,000, or $44,064,000 over the three-year term of the ESP, which would not exist under an MRO. AEP Ohio adds that it estimates that the PPA rider would provide an $8.4 million credit over the ESP term, while the DIR and ESRR would offer a streamlined approach to recovering many of the costs associated with investment in distribution

infrastructure without the time and expense of a distribution rate case. Further, AEP Ohio emphasizes that there are numerous non-quantifiable benefits of the ESP compared to an MRO, including the Company's accelerated move to fully market based rates by June 1, 2015, the increased rate stability of the proposed PPA rider, and the benefits associated with the proposed POR program. AEP Ohio concludes that the combination of these numerous quantifiable and non-quantifiable benefits demonstrates that the Company's proposed ESP is more favorable in the aggregate than the results that would be expected under an MRO. (Co. Ex. 2 at 9; Co. Ex. 7 at 3-5; Co. Ex. 33 at 10; Tr. XIII at 3251-3252; Co. Br. at 139-143.)

Staff witness Turkenton testified that the ESP, as modified by Staff's recommendations, is more favorable in the aggregate than an MRO. Initially, Ms. Turkenton explained that there would be no difference in AEP Ohio's fully market based generation rates under an MRO compared to the ESP. According to Ms. Turkenton, there are a number of benefits under the ESP. Specifically, Ms. Turkenton testified that AEP Ohio's base distribution rates would remain frozen through May 31, 2018, and the DIR and ESRR would enable the Company to make necessary distribution system investments, while avoiding the time and expense of a distribution rate case. Ms. Turkenton also cited the $44,064,000 associated with the RDCR; the accelerated implementation of fully market based generation rates; and the possibility of increased CRES providers, products, and payment options and elimination of customer confusion under the POR program. Finally, Ms. Turkenton testified that, because Staff recommends that certain proposed riders be rejected, including the PPA rider, SSWR, NCCR, and BDR, the potential costs of these riders were not considered in her MRO/ESP analysis. (Staff Ex. 15 at 2-5; Tr. IX at 2202, 2211, 2225; Staff Reply Br. at 49-50.)

OCC, IEU-Ohio, and OMAEG argue that AEP Ohio failed to demonstrate that the proposed ESP is more favorable in the aggregate than an MRO. OMAEG notes that the $44,064,000 residential distribution credit is only available to the residential customer class and would be reduced to $29,376,000, if AEP Ohio exercises its reserved right to terminate the ESP after two years. OCC believes that the residential distribution credit is not a quantifiable benefit, because the credit may be needed to correct excess revenue collections under the proposed expansion of the DIR. OCC, IEU-Ohio, and OMAEG further note that AEP Ohio failed to quantify the effects of several riders, including the BDR, NCCR, PPA rider, DIR, ESRR, and SSWR. According to OCC, over the three-year term of the ESP, customers are projected to pay $116 million for the PPA rider and $240 million for the DIR, ESRR, and SSWR combined, which OCC asserts should be accounted for in the MRO/ESP analysis. Similarly, IEU-Ohio argues that the known cost of the PPA rider is somewhere in the range of $82 million to $116 million over the ESP term and, accordingly, the proposed ESP is $38 million to $72 million worse than an MRO, after accounting for the RDCR. OCC and OMAEG add that, contrary to Staff's interpretation, AEP Ohio did not commit to refrain from filing a distribution rate case during the term of the ESP. According to

OMAEG, AEP Ohio also did not account for costs associated with accelerating the recovery period of capacity deferrals collected through the RSR from 36 months to 32 months, as proposed by the Company in Case No. 14-1186-EL-RDR. With respect to AEP Ohio's claimed non-quantifiable benefits, IEU-Ohio and OCC argue that the Commission may not lawfully weigh such benefits against the quantifiable costs of the proposed ESP, because the Commission must apply an objective standard to the MRO/ESP analysis, in accordance with R.C. 4903.09. Further, OCC, IEU-Ohio, and OMAEG contend that, even if non-quantifiable benefits are considered, the PPA rider and POR program would impose costs on customers without any commensurate benefit, while also harming customer choice. OCC maintains that there is no evidence in the record that the POR program would drive market development or that the PPA rider would provide rate stability. Further, OCC, IEU-Ohio, and OMAEG assert that AEP Ohio's commitment to implement fully market based rates cannot be claimed as a non-quantifiable benefit, because it was already factored into the statutory test in the *ESP 2 Case*. IEU-Ohio adds that there is no benefit in AEP Ohio's agreement to implement a CBP process to fulfill its obligation to provide market based default service under the statutory scheme of R.C. Chapter 4928. With respect to Staff's position regarding the non-quantifiable benefits of the DIR and ESRR, IEU-Ohio responds that the same benefits can be realized under an MRO and, in any event, AEP Ohio failed to provide evidence showing that distribution investment will improve customer satisfaction or service quality. (OCC Ex. 13 at 15-30; IEU-Ohio Ex. 1B at 18-27, Ex. KMM-5; Tr. II at 603, 606, 611-613; OCC Br. at 6-26; IEU-Ohio Br. at 51-67; OMAEG Br. at 21-26; OCC Reply Br. at 42-50; IEU-Ohio Reply Br. at 30-38; OMAEG Reply Br. at 25-29.)

AEP Ohio responds that the intervenors' concerns are without merit. With respect to the residential distribution credit, AEP Ohio emphasizes that the credit is set to expire as of May 31, 2015, and there is no requirement that the Company provide the credit after that date, either as part of an ESP or as part of a future distribution rate case. AEP Ohio points out that OCC witness Kahal conceded that residential customers' rates would increase by $14,688,000 per year beginning on June 1, 2015, in the absence of the Company's proposal to extend the credit. In terms of the capacity deferrals, AEP Ohio responds that recovery of the deferrals through the RSR is not a provision of ESP 3, because recovery was authorized by the Commission in the *ESP 2 Case*, and, therefore, it is not appropriate to consider the deferrals in the MRO/ESP analysis. Regarding the $240 million cost of the DIR, ESRR, and SSWR combined, AEP Ohio contends that the revenue requirements associated with the recovery of incremental distribution investments are considered to be the same whether recovered through a provision included in an ESP or through a distribution rate case conducted in conjunction with an MRO and, therefore, such investments are not considered in the quantitative MRO/ESP analysis. Addressing the PPA rider, AEP Ohio maintains that OCC and IEU-Ohio fail to recognize the rate stability and hedging benefits of the rider and, in any event, the Company projects an $8.4 million credit over the ESP term. In terms of the POR program,

AEP Ohio responds that the program would provide substantial qualitative benefits, which would not otherwise be available under an MRO. Finally, with respect to the transition to fully market based rates, AEP Ohio argues that the proposed ESP continues to facilitate the Company's accelerated transition to competition and should be recognized as a qualitative benefit, since that progress would be much more uncertain under an MRO. In making its arguments regarding the various qualitative benefits of the proposed ESP, AEP Ohio points out that R.C. 4928.143(C)(1) does not preclude the Commission from considering the significant non-quantifiable benefits of an ESP, which, according to the Company, is consistent with the Commission's own interpretation of the statutory test in prior cases. (Co. Ex. 33 at 10; Tr. IX at 2129-2130; Tr. XIII at 3251-3252; Co. Br. at 143-146; Co. Reply Br. at 114-130.)

Pursuant to R.C. 4928.143(C)(1), the Commission must determine whether the proposed ESP, as modified, including its pricing and all other terms and conditions, including any deferrals and any future recovery of deferrals, is more favorable in the aggregate as compared to the expected results that would otherwise apply under R.C. 4928.142. The Supreme Court of Ohio has determined that R.C. 4928.143(C)(1) does not bind the Commission to a strict price comparison, but rather instructs the Commission to consider pricing as well as all other terms and conditions. *In re Columbus S. Power Co.*, 128 Ohio St.3d 402, 2011-Ohio-958, 945 N.E.2d 501. Therefore, we must ensure that the modified ESP as a total package is considered, including both a quantitative and qualitative analysis. Upon consideration of the modified ESP, in its entirety, we find that the ESP is, in fact, more favorable in the aggregate than the expected results under R.C. 4928.142.

Initially, the Commission finds that the modified ESP is more favorable quantitatively than an MRO. Under the ESP, the rates to be charged customers will be established through a fully auction based process and, therefore, will be equivalent to the results that would be obtained under R.C. 4928.142. However, as part of its proposed ESP, AEP Ohio has made a commitment to continue, throughout the ESP term, the RDCR, which would otherwise expire as of May 31, 2015, and which would not be available under an MRO. The record reflects that the residential distribution credit will provide a quantifiable benefit in the amount of $44,064,000 over the three-year term of the ESP. Further, in light of our rejection of AEP Ohio's proposed NCCR and SSWR, and the fact that the PPA rider and BDR have been set at zero, it is not necessary to attempt to quantify the impact of any of these riders in the MRO/ESP analysis. Finally, regarding the DIR, ESRR, and other approved distribution-related riders, we agree with AEP Ohio that the revenue requirements associated with the recovery of incremental distribution investments should be considered to be the same whether recovered through the ESP or through a distribution rate case conducted in conjunction with an MRO. Accordingly, we do not consider such investments in our quantitative MRO/ESP analysis. We further agree with AEP Ohio that it is not necessary to consider the Company's recovery of the

capacity deferrals through the RSR, which were authorized by the Commission in the *ESP 2 Case* and are, therefore, not a provision of ESP 3. In sum, the Commission finds that, quantitatively, the modified ESP is better in the aggregate than an MRO by $44,064,000. (Co. Ex. 7 at 4; Staff Ex. 15 at 3-5.)

The evidence in the record reflects that there are additional benefits that make the ESP, as modified by the Commission, more favorable in the aggregate than the expected results under R.C. 4928.142. The Commission notes that many of the provisions of the modified ESP advance the state policy enumerated in R.C. 4928.02, as discussed above. The modified ESP also continues to enable AEP Ohio to move more quickly to market rate pricing than would be expected under an MRO. In fact, under ESP 3, AEP Ohio will implement fully market based prices beginning on June 1, 2015. The Commission continues to believe that the more rapid implementation of market based rates possible under an ESP is a qualitative benefit that is consistent with R.C. 4928.02. (Co. Ex. 7 at 4-5; Staff Ex. 15 at 4.) Additionally, although AEP Ohio has not committed to refrain from filing a distribution rate case application during the ESP period, the Commission's approval of the continuation of the DIR, ESRR, and other distribution-related riders should enable the Company to hold base distribution rates constant over the ESP period, while making significant investments in distribution infrastructure and improving service reliability (Co. Ex. 7 at 4; Tr. II at 611-613).

IV. CONCLUSION

Upon consideration of the ESP application filed by AEP Ohio, the Commission finds that the ESP, including its pricing and all other terms and conditions, including any deferrals and any future recovery of deferrals, as modified by this Opinion and Order, is more favorable in the aggregate as compared to the expected results that would otherwise apply under R.C. 4928.142. Therefore, the Commission finds that the proposed ESP should be approved, with the modifications set forth in this Opinion and Order. As modified herein, the ESP provides rate stability for customers and revenue certainty for AEP Ohio. To the extent that intervenors have proposed modifications to AEP Ohio's ESP that have not been addressed by this Opinion and Order, the Commission concludes that the requests for such modifications should be denied.

AEP Ohio is directed to file revised tariffs consistent with this Opinion and Order, to be effective with the first billing cycle in June 2015.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

(1) AEP Ohio is a public utility as defined in R.C. 4905.02 and an electric utility as defined in R.C. 4928.01(A)(11), and, as such, is subject to the jurisdiction of this Commission.

(2) On December 20, 2013, AEP Ohio filed an application for an SSO pursuant to R.C. 4928.141. The application is for an ESP in accordance with R.C. 4928.143.

(3) On January 8, 2014, a technical conference was held regarding AEP Ohio's ESP application.

(4) Notice was published and local public hearings were held in Columbus, Lima, Canton, and Marietta, at which a total of 11 witnesses offered testimony.

(5) The following parties were granted intervention in these proceedings: IEU-Ohio, OCC, OEG, Dominion, Duke, OHA, DERS, DECAM, IGS, OMAEG, FES, OPAE, Kroger, DP&L, EDF, OEC, Direct Energy, APJN, RESA, Constellation, ELPC, Walmart, NRDC, Border Energy, EnerNOC, Paulding II, and EPO. Border Energy filed a notice of withdrawal from these proceedings on October 3, 2014.

(6) A procedural conference regarding the ESP application was held on May 27, 2014.

(7) The evidentiary hearing on the ESP application commenced on June 3, 2014, and concluded on June 30, 2014.

(8) Briefs and reply briefs were filed on July 23, 2014, and August 15, 2014, respectively.

(9) An oral argument was held before the Commission on December 17, 2014.

(10) The proposed ESP, as modified pursuant to this Opinion and Order, including its pricing and all other terms and conditions, including any deferrals and any future recovery of deferrals, is more favorable in the aggregate as compared to the expected results that would otherwise apply under R.C. 4928.142.

ORDER:

It is, therefore,

ORDERED, That the motions for protective order filed by AEP Ohio, OCC, and IEU-Ohio be granted for 24 months from the date of this Opinion and Order. It is, further,

ORDERED, That AEP Ohio shall file proposed final tariffs consistent with this Opinion and Order, subject to review and approval by the Commission. It is, further,

ORDERED, That a copy of this Opinion and Order be served on all parties of record.

THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

Thomas W. Johnson, Chairman

Steven D. Lesser

Lynn Slaby



M. Beth Trombold

Asim Z. Haque

SJP/GNS/sc

Entered in the Journal

FEB 2 5 2015

Barcy F. McNeal
Secretary

1.42 Common, technical or particular terms.

Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.

Cite as R.C. § 1.42

Effective Date: 01-03-1972 .

4903.13 Reversal of final order - notice of appeal.

A final order made by the public utilities commission shall be reversed, vacated, or modified by the supreme court on appeal, if, upon consideration of the record, such court is of the opinion that such order was unlawful or unreasonable. The proceeding to obtain such reversal, vacation, or modification shall be by notice of appeal, filed with the public utilities commission by any party to the proceeding before it, against the commission, setting forth the order appealed from and the errors complained of. The notice of appeal shall be served, unless waived, upon the chairman of the commission, or, in the event of his absence, upon any public utilities commissioner, or by leaving a copy at the office of the commission at Columbus. The court may permit any interested party to intervene by cross-appeal.

Cite as R.C. § 4903.13

Effective Date: 10-01-1953 .

4909.18 Application to establish or change rate.

Any public utility desiring to establish any rate, joint rate, toll, classification, charge, or rental, or to modify, amend, change, increase, or reduce any existing rate, joint rate, toll, classification, charge, or rental, or any regulation or practice affecting the same, shall file a written application with the public utilities commission. Except for actions under section 4909.16 of the Revised Code, no public utility may issue the notice of intent to file an application pursuant to division (B) of section 4909.43 of the Revised Code to increase any existing rate, joint rate, toll, classification, charge, or rental, until a final order under this section has been issued by the commission on any pending prior application to increase the same rate, joint rate, toll, classification, charge, or rental or until two hundred seventy-five days after filing such application, whichever is sooner. Such application shall be verified by the president or a vice-president and the secretary or treasurer of the applicant. Such application shall contain a schedule of the existing rate, joint rate, toll, classification, charge, or rental, or regulation or practice affecting the same, a schedule of the modification amendment, change, increase, or reduction sought to be established, and a statement of the facts and grounds upon which such application is based. If such application proposes a new service or the use of new equipment, or proposes the establishment or amendment of a regulation, the application shall fully describe the new service or equipment, or the regulation proposed to be established or amended, and shall explain how the proposed service or equipment differs from services or equipment presently offered or in use, or how the regulation proposed to be established or amended differs from regulations presently in effect. The application shall provide such additional information as the commission may require in its discretion. If the commission determines that such application is not for an increase in any rate, joint rate, toll, classification, charge, or rental, the commission may permit the filing of the schedule proposed in the application and fix the time when such schedule shall take effect. If it appears to the commission that the proposals in the application may be unjust or unreasonable, the commission shall set the matter for hearing and shall give notice of such hearing by sending written notice of the date set for the hearing to the public utility and publishing notice of the hearing one time in a newspaper of general circulation in each county in the service area affected by the application. At such hearing, the burden of proof to show that the proposals in the application are just and reasonable shall be upon the public utility. After such hearing, the commission shall, where practicable, issue an appropriate order within six months from the date the application was filed.

If the commission determines that said application is for an increase in any rate, joint rate, toll, classification, charge, or rental there shall also, unless otherwise ordered by the commission, be filed with the application in duplicate the following exhibits:

(A) A report of its property used and useful, or, with respect to a natural gas, water-works, or sewage disposal system company, projected to be used and useful as of the date certain, in rendering the service referred to in such application, as provided in section 4909.05 of the Revised Code;

(B) A complete operating statement of its last fiscal year, showing in detail all its receipts, revenues, and incomes from all sources, all of its operating costs and other expenditures, and any analysis such public utility deems applicable to the matter referred to in said application;

(C) A statement of the income and expense anticipated under the application filed;

(D) A statement of financial condition summarizing assets, liabilities, and net worth;

(E) Such other information as the commission may require in its discretion.

Cite as R.C. § 4909.18

Amended by 129th General AssemblyFile No.199, HB 379, §1, eff. 3/27/2013.

Amended by 129th General AssemblyFile No.20, HB 95, §1, eff. 9/9/2011.

Effective Date: 01-11-1983 .

4928.02 State policy.

It is the policy of this state to do the following throughout this state:

(A) Ensure the availability to consumers of adequate, reliable, safe, efficient, nondiscriminatory, and reasonably priced retail electric service;

(B) Ensure the availability of unbundled and comparable retail electric service that provides consumers with the supplier, price, terms, conditions, and quality options they elect to meet their respective needs;

(C) Ensure diversity of electricity supplies and suppliers, by giving consumers effective choices over the selection of those supplies and suppliers and by encouraging the development of distributed and small generation facilities;

(D) Encourage innovation and market access for cost-effective supply- and demand-side retail electric service including, but not limited to, demand-side management, time-differentiated pricing, waste energy recovery systems, smart grid programs, and implementation of advanced metering infrastructure;

(E) Encourage cost-effective and efficient access to information regarding the operation of the transmission and distribution systems of electric utilities in order to promote both effective customer choice of retail electric service and the development of performance standards and targets for service quality for all consumers, including annual achievement reports written in plain language;

(F) Ensure that an electric utility's transmission and distribution systems are available to a customer-generator or owner of distributed generation, so that the customer-generator or owner can market and deliver the electricity it produces;

(G) Recognize the continuing emergence of competitive electricity markets through the development and implementation of flexible regulatory treatment;

(H) Ensure effective competition in the provision of retail electric service by avoiding anticompetitive subsidies flowing from a noncompetitive retail electric service to a competitive retail electric service or to a product or service other than retail electric service, and vice versa, including by prohibiting the recovery of any generation-related costs through distribution or transmission rates;

(I) Ensure retail electric service consumers protection against unreasonable sales practices, market deficiencies, and market power;

(J) Provide coherent, transparent means of giving appropriate incentives to technologies that can adapt successfully to potential environmental mandates;

(K) Encourage implementation of distributed generation across customer classes through regular review and updating of administrative rules governing critical issues such as, but not limited to, interconnection standards, standby charges, and net metering;

(L) Protect at-risk populations, including, but not limited to, when considering the implementation of any new advanced energy or renewable energy resource;

(M) Encourage the education of small business owners in this state regarding the use of, and encourage the use of, energy efficiency programs and alternative energy resources in their businesses;

(N) Facilitate the state's effectiveness in the global economy.

In carrying out this policy, the commission shall consider rules as they apply to the costs of electric distribution infrastructure, including, but not limited to, line extensions, for the purpose of development in this state.

Cite as R.C. § 4928.02

Amended by 129th General AssemblyFile No.125, SB 315, §101.01, eff. 9/10/2012.

Effective Date: 10-05-1999; 2008 SB221 07-31-2008

4928.08 Certification to provide retail electric competitive service.

(A) This section applies to an electric cooperative, or to a governmental aggregator that is a municipal electric utility, only to the extent of a competitive retail electric service it provides to a customer to whom it does not provide a noncompetitive retail electric service through transmission or distribution facilities it singly or jointly owns or operates.

(B) No electric utility, electric services company, electric cooperative, or governmental aggregator shall provide a competitive retail electric service to a consumer in this state on and after the starting date of competitive retail electric service without first being certified by the public utilities commission regarding its managerial, technical, and financial capability to provide that service and providing a financial guarantee sufficient to protect customers and electric distribution utilities from default. Certification shall be granted pursuant to procedures and standards the commission shall prescribe in accordance with division (C) of this section, except that certification or certification renewal shall be deemed approved thirty days after the filing of an application with the commission unless the commission suspends that approval for good cause shown. In the case of such a suspension, the commission shall act to approve or deny certification or certification renewal to the applicant not later than ninety days after the date of the suspension.

(C) Capability standards adopted in rules under division (B) of this section shall be sufficient to ensure compliance with the minimum service requirements established under section 4928.10 of the Revised Code and with section 4928.09 of the Revised Code. The standards shall allow flexibility for voluntary aggregation, to encourage market creativity in responding to consumer needs and demands, and shall allow flexibility for electric services companies that exclusively provide installation of small electric generation facilities, to provide ease of market access. The rules shall include procedures for biennially renewing certification.

(D) The commission may suspend, rescind, or conditionally rescind the certification of any electric utility, electric services company, electric cooperative, or governmental aggregator issued under this section if the commission determines, after reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing, that the utility, company, cooperative, or aggregator has failed to comply with any applicable certification standards or has engaged in anticompetitive or unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable acts or practices in this state.

(E) No electric distribution utility on and after the starting date of competitive retail electric service shall knowingly distribute electricity, to a retail consumer in this state, for any supplier of electricity that has not been certified by the commission pursuant to this section.

Cite as R.C. § 4928.08

Effective Date: 10-05-1999 .

4928.141 Distribution utility to provide standard service offer.

(A) Beginning January 1, 2009, an electric distribution utility shall provide consumers, on a comparable and nondiscriminatory basis within its certified territory, a standard service offer of all competitive retail electric services necessary to maintain essential electric service to consumers, including a firm supply of electric generation service. To that end, the electric distribution utility shall apply to the public utilities commission to establish the standard service offer in accordance with section 4928.142 or 4928.143 of the Revised Code and, at its discretion, may apply simultaneously under both sections, except that the utility's first standard service offer application at minimum shall include a filing under section 4928.143 of the Revised Code. Only a standard service offer authorized in accordance with section 4928.142 or 4928.143 of the Revised Code, shall serve as the utility's standard service offer for the purpose of compliance with this section; and that standard service offer shall serve as the utility's default standard service offer for the purpose of section 4928.14 of the Revised Code. Notwithstanding the foregoing provision, the rate plan of an electric distribution utility shall continue for the purpose of the utility's compliance with this division until a standard service offer is first authorized under section 4928.142 or 4928.143 of the Revised Code, and, as applicable, pursuant to division (D) of section 4928.143 of the Revised Code, any rate plan that extends beyond December 31, 2008, shall continue to be in effect for the subject electric distribution utility for the duration of the plan's term. A standard service offer under section 4928.142 or 4928.143 of the Revised Code shall exclude any previously authorized allowances for transition costs, with such exclusion being effective on and after the date that the allowance is scheduled to end under the utility's rate plan.

(B) The commission shall set the time for hearing of a filing under section 4928.142 or 4928.143 of the Revised Code, send written notice of the hearing to the electric distribution utility, and publish notice in a newspaper of general circulation in each county in the utility's certified territory. The commission shall adopt rules regarding filings under those sections.

Cite as R.C. § 4928.141

Effective Date: 2008 SB221 07-31-2008 .

4928.142 Standard generation service offer price - competitive bidding.

(A) For the purpose of complying with section 4928.141 of the Revised Code and subject to division (D) of this section and, as applicable, subject to the rate plan requirement of division (A) of section 4928.141 of the Revised Code, an electric distribution utility may establish a standard service offer price for retail electric generation service that is delivered to the utility under a market-rate offer.

(1) The market-rate offer shall be determined through a competitive bidding process that provides for all of the following:

(a) Open, fair, and transparent competitive solicitation;

(b) Clear product definition;

(c) Standardized bid evaluation criteria;

(d) Oversight by an independent third party that shall design the solicitation, administer the bidding, and ensure that the criteria specified in division (A)(1)(a) to (c) of this section are met;

(e) Evaluation of the submitted bids prior to the selection of the least-cost bid winner or winners. No generation supplier shall be prohibited from participating in the bidding process.

(2) The public utilities commission shall modify rules, or adopt new rules as necessary, concerning the conduct of the competitive bidding process and the qualifications of bidders, which rules shall foster supplier participation in the bidding process and shall be consistent with the requirements of division (A)(1) of this section.

(B) Prior to initiating a competitive bidding process for a market-rate offer under division (A) of this section, the electric distribution utility shall file an application with the commission. An electric distribution utility may file its application with the commission prior to the effective date of the commission rules required under division (A)(2) of this section, and, as the commission determines necessary, the utility shall immediately conform its filing to the rules upon their taking effect. An application under this division shall detail the electric distribution utility's proposed compliance with the requirements of division (A)(1) of this section and with commission rules under division (A)(2) of this section and demonstrate that all of the following requirements are met:

(1) The electric distribution utility or its transmission service affiliate belongs to at least one regional transmission organization that has been approved by the federal energy regulatory commission; or there otherwise is comparable and nondiscriminatory access to the electric transmission grid.

(2) Any such regional transmission organization has a market-monitor function and the ability to take actions to identify and mitigate market power or the electric distribution utility's market conduct; or a similar market monitoring function exists with commensurate ability to identify and monitor market conditions and mitigate conduct associated with the exercise of market power.

(3) A published source of information is available publicly or through subscription that identifies pricing information for traded electricity on- and off-peak energy products that are contracts for delivery beginning at least two years from the date of the publication and is updated on a regular basis. The commission shall initiate a proceeding and, within ninety days after the application's filing date, shall

determine by order whether the electric distribution utility and its market-rate offer meet all of the foregoing requirements. If the finding is positive, the electric distribution utility may initiate its competitive bidding process. If the finding is negative as to one or more requirements, the commission in the order shall direct the electric distribution utility regarding how any deficiency may be remedied in a timely manner to the commission's satisfaction; otherwise, the electric distribution utility shall withdraw the application. However, if such remedy is made and the subsequent finding is positive and also if the electric distribution utility made a simultaneous filing under this section and section 4928.143 of the Revised Code, the utility shall not initiate its competitive bid until at least one hundred fifty days after the filing date of those applications.

(C) Upon the completion of the competitive bidding process authorized by divisions (A) and (B) of this section, including for the purpose of division (D) of this section, the commission shall select the least-cost bid winner or winners of that process, and such selected bid or bids, as prescribed as retail rates by the commission, shall be the electric distribution utility's standard service offer unless the commission, by order issued before the third calendar day following the conclusion of the competitive bidding process for the market rate offer, determines that one or more of the following criteria were not met:

(1) Each portion of the bidding process was oversubscribed, such that the amount of supply bid upon was greater than the amount of the load bid out.

(2) There were four or more bidders.

(3) At least twenty-five per cent of the load is bid upon by one or more persons other than the electric distribution utility. All costs incurred by the electric distribution utility as a result of or related to the competitive bidding process or to procuring generation service to provide the standard service offer, including the costs of energy and capacity and the costs of all other products and services procured as a result of the competitive bidding process, shall be timely recovered through the standard service offer price, and, for that purpose, the commission shall approve a reconciliation mechanism, other recovery mechanism, or a combination of such mechanisms for the utility.

(D) The first application filed under this section by an electric distribution utility that, as of July 31, 2008, directly owns, in whole or in part, operating electric generating facilities that had been used and useful in this state shall require that a portion of that utility's standard service offer load for the first five years of the market rate offer be competitively bid under division (A) of this section as follows: ten per cent of the load in year one, not more than twenty per cent in year two, thirty per cent in year three, forty per cent in year four, and fifty per cent in year five. Consistent with those percentages, the commission shall determine the actual percentages for each year of years one through five. The standard service offer price for retail electric generation service under this first application shall be a proportionate blend of the bid price and the generation service price for the remaining standard service offer load, which latter price shall be equal to the electric distribution utility's most recent standard service offer price, adjusted upward or downward as the commission determines reasonable, relative to the jurisdictional portion of any known and measurable changes from the level of any one or more of the following costs as reflected in that most recent standard service offer price:

(1) The electric distribution utility's prudently incurred cost of fuel used to produce electricity;

(2) Its prudently incurred purchased power costs;

(3) Its prudently incurred costs of satisfying the supply and demand portfolio requirements of this state, including, but not limited to, renewable energy resource and energy efficiency requirements;

(4) Its costs prudently incurred to comply with environmental laws and regulations, with consideration of the derating of any facility associated with those costs. In making any adjustment to the most recent standard service offer price on the basis of costs described in division (D) of this section, the commission shall include the benefits that may become available to the electric distribution utility as a result of or in connection with the costs included in the adjustment, including, but not limited to, the utility's receipt of emissions credits or its receipt of tax benefits or of other benefits, and, accordingly, the commission may impose such conditions on the adjustment to ensure that any such benefits are properly aligned with the associated cost responsibility. The commission shall also determine how such adjustments will affect the electric distribution utility's return on common equity that may be achieved by those adjustments. The commission shall not apply its consideration of the return on common equity to reduce any adjustments authorized under this division unless the adjustments will cause the electric distribution utility to earn a return on common equity that is significantly in excess of the return on common equity that is earned by publicly traded companies, including utilities, that face comparable business and financial risk, with such adjustments for capital structure as may be appropriate. The burden of proof for demonstrating that significantly excessive earnings will not occur shall be on the electric distribution utility. Additionally, the commission may adjust the electric distribution utility's most recent standard service offer price by such just and reasonable amount that the commission determines necessary to address any emergency that threatens the utility's financial integrity or to ensure that the resulting revenue available to the utility for providing the standard service offer is not so inadequate as to result, directly or indirectly, in a taking of property without compensation pursuant to Section 19 of Article I, Ohio Constitution. The electric distribution utility has the burden of demonstrating that any adjustment to its most recent standard service offer price is proper in accordance with this division.

(E) Beginning in the second year of a blended price under division (D) of this section and notwithstanding any other requirement of this section, the commission may alter prospectively the proportions specified in that division to mitigate any effect of an abrupt or significant change in the electric distribution utility's standard service offer price that would otherwise result in general or with respect to any rate group or rate schedule but for such alteration. Any such alteration shall be made not more often than annually, and the commission shall not, by altering those proportions and in any event, including because of the length of time, as authorized under division (C) of this section, taken to approve the market rate offer, cause the duration of the blending period to exceed ten years as counted from the effective date of the approved market rate offer. Additionally, any such alteration shall be limited to an alteration affecting the prospective proportions used during the blending period and shall not affect any blending proportion previously approved and applied by the commission under this division.

(F) An electric distribution utility that has received commission approval of its first application under division (C) of this section shall not, nor ever shall be authorized or required by the commission to, file an application under section 4928.143 of the Revised Code.

Cite as R.C. § 4928.142

Effective Date: 2008 SB221 07-31-2008; 2008 HB562 09-22-2008 .

4928.143 Application for approval of electric security plan - testing.

(A) For the purpose of complying with section 4928.141 of the Revised Code, an electric distribution utility may file an application for public utilities commission approval of an electric security plan as prescribed under division (B) of this section. The utility may file that application prior to the effective date of any rules the commission may adopt for the purpose of this section, and, as the commission determines necessary, the utility immediately shall conform its filing to those rules upon their taking effect.

(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of Title XLIX of the Revised Code to the contrary except division (D) of this section, divisions (I), (J), and (K) of section 4928.20, division (E) of section 4928.64, and section 4928.69 of the Revised Code:

(1) An electric security plan shall include provisions relating to the supply and pricing of electric generation service. In addition, if the proposed electric security plan has a term longer than three years, it may include provisions in the plan to permit the commission to test the plan pursuant to division (E) of this section and any transitional conditions that should be adopted by the commission if the commission terminates the plan as authorized under that division.

(2) The plan may provide for or include, without limitation, any of the following:

(a) Automatic recovery of any of the following costs of the electric distribution utility, provided the cost is prudently incurred: the cost of fuel used to generate the electricity supplied under the offer; the cost of purchased power supplied under the offer, including the cost of energy and capacity, and including purchased power acquired from an affiliate; the cost of emission allowances; and the cost of federally mandated carbon or energy taxes;

(b) A reasonable allowance for construction work in progress for any of the electric distribution utility's cost of constructing an electric generating facility or for an environmental expenditure for any electric generating facility of the electric distribution utility, provided the cost is incurred or the expenditure occurs on or after January 1, 2009. Any such allowance shall be subject to the construction work in progress allowance limitations of division (A) of section 4909.15 of the Revised Code, except that the commission may authorize such an allowance upon the incurrence of the cost or occurrence of the expenditure. No such allowance for generating facility construction shall be authorized, however, unless the commission first determines in the proceeding that there is need for the facility based on resource planning projections submitted by the electric distribution utility. Further, no such allowance shall be authorized unless the facility's construction was sourced through a competitive bid process, regarding which process the commission may adopt rules. An allowance approved under division (B)(2)(b) of this section shall be established as a nonbypassable surcharge for the life of the facility.

(c) The establishment of a nonbypassable surcharge for the life of an electric generating facility that is owned or operated by the electric distribution utility, was sourced through a competitive bid process subject to any such rules as the commission adopts under division (B)(2)(b) of this section, and is newly used and useful on or after January 1, 2009, which surcharge shall cover all costs of the utility specified in the application, excluding costs recovered through a surcharge under division (B)(2)(b) of this section. However, no surcharge shall be authorized unless the commission first determines in the proceeding that there is need for the facility based on resource planning projections submitted by the electric distribution utility. Additionally, if a surcharge is authorized for a facility pursuant to plan

approval under division (C) of this section and as a condition of the continuation of the surcharge, the electric distribution utility shall dedicate to Ohio consumers the capacity and energy and the rate associated with the cost of that facility. Before the commission authorizes any surcharge pursuant to this division, it may consider, as applicable, the effects of any decommissioning, deratings, and retirements.

(d) Terms, conditions, or charges relating to limitations on customer shopping for retail electric generation service, bypassability, standby, back-up, or supplemental power service, default service, carrying costs, amortization periods, and accounting or deferrals, including future recovery of such deferrals, as would have the effect of stabilizing or providing certainty regarding retail electric service;

(e) Automatic increases or decreases in any component of the standard service offer price;

(f) Consistent with sections 4928.23 to 4928.2318 of the Revised Code, both of the following:

(i) Provisions for the electric distribution utility to securitize any phase-in, inclusive of carrying charges, of the utility's standard service offer price, which phase-in is authorized in accordance with section 4928.144 of the Revised Code;

(ii) Provisions for the recovery of the utility's cost of securitization.

(g) Provisions relating to transmission, ancillary, congestion, or any related service required for the standard service offer, including provisions for the recovery of any cost of such service that the electric distribution utility incurs on or after that date pursuant to the standard service offer;

(h) Provisions regarding the utility's distribution service, including, without limitation and notwithstanding any provision of Title XLIX of the Revised Code to the contrary, provisions regarding single issue ratemaking, a revenue decoupling mechanism or any other incentive ratemaking, and provisions regarding distribution infrastructure and modernization incentives for the electric distribution utility. The latter may include a long-term energy delivery infrastructure modernization plan for that utility or any plan providing for the utility's recovery of costs, including lost revenue, shared savings, and avoided costs, and a just and reasonable rate of return on such infrastructure modernization. As part of its determination as to whether to allow in an electric distribution utility's electric security plan inclusion of any provision described in division (B)(2)(h) of this section, the commission shall examine the reliability of the electric distribution utility's distribution system and ensure that customers' and the electric distribution utility's expectations are aligned and that the electric distribution utility is placing sufficient emphasis on and dedicating sufficient resources to the reliability of its distribution system.

(i) Provisions under which the electric distribution utility may implement economic development, job retention, and energy efficiency programs, which provisions may allocate program costs across all classes of customers of the utility and those of electric distribution utilities in the same holding company system.

(C)

(1) The burden of proof in the proceeding shall be on the electric distribution utility. The commission shall issue an order under this division for an initial application under this section not later than one hundred fifty days after the application's filing date and, for any subsequent application by the utility under this section, not later than two hundred seventy-five days after the application's filing date. Subject to division (D) of this section, the commission by order shall approve or modify and approve

an application filed under division (A) of this section if it finds that the electric security plan so approved, including its pricing and all other terms and conditions, including any deferrals and any future recovery of deferrals, is more favorable in the aggregate as compared to the expected results that would otherwise apply under section 4928.142 of the Revised Code. Additionally, if the commission so approves an application that contains a surcharge under division (B)(2)(b) or (c) of this section, the commission shall ensure that the benefits derived for any purpose for which the surcharge is established are reserved and made available to those that bear the surcharge. Otherwise, the commission by order shall disapprove the application.

(2)

(a) If the commission modifies and approves an application under division (C)(1) of this section, the electric distribution utility may withdraw the application, thereby terminating it, and may file a new standard service offer under this section or a standard service offer under section 4928.142 of the Revised Code.

(b) If the utility terminates an application pursuant to division (C)(2)(a) of this section or if the commission disapproves an application under division (C)(1) of this section, the commission shall issue such order as is necessary to continue the provisions, terms, and conditions of the utility's most recent standard service offer, along with any expected increases or decreases in fuel costs from those contained in that offer, until a subsequent offer is authorized pursuant to this section or section 4928.142 of the Revised Code, respectively.

(D) Regarding the rate plan requirement of division (A) of section 4928.141 of the Revised Code, if an electric distribution utility that has a rate plan that extends beyond December 31, 2008, files an application under this section for the purpose of its compliance with division (A) of section 4928.141 of the Revised Code, that rate plan and its terms and conditions are hereby incorporated into its proposed electric security plan and shall continue in effect until the date scheduled under the rate plan for its expiration, and that portion of the electric security plan shall not be subject to commission approval or disapproval under division (C) of this section, and the earnings test provided for in division (F) of this section shall not apply until after the expiration of the rate plan. However, that utility may include in its electric security plan under this section, and the commission may approve, modify and approve, or disapprove subject to division (C) of this section, provisions for the incremental recovery or the deferral of any costs that are not being recovered under the rate plan and that the utility incurs during that continuation period to comply with section 4928.141, division (B) of section 4928.64, or division (A) of section 4928.66 of the Revised Code.

(E) If an electric security plan approved under division (C) of this section, except one withdrawn by the utility as authorized under that division, has a term, exclusive of phase-ins or deferrals, that exceeds three years from the effective date of the plan, the commission shall test the plan in the fourth year, and if applicable, every fourth year thereafter, to determine whether the plan, including its then-existing pricing and all other terms and conditions, including any deferrals and any future recovery of deferrals, continues to be more favorable in the aggregate and during the remaining term of the plan as compared to the expected results that would otherwise apply under section 4928.142 of the Revised Code. The commission shall also determine the prospective effect of the electric security plan to determine if that effect is substantially likely to provide the electric distribution utility with a return on common equity that is significantly in excess of the return on common equity that is likely to be earned by publicly traded companies, including utilities, that face comparable business and financial risk, with such adjustments for capital structure as may be appropriate. The burden of proof for demonstrating

that significantly excessive earnings will not occur shall be on the electric distribution utility. If the test results are in the negative or the commission finds that continuation of the electric security plan will result in a return on equity that is significantly in excess of the return on common equity that is likely to be earned by publicly traded companies, including utilities, that will face comparable business and financial risk, with such adjustments for capital structure as may be appropriate, during the balance of the plan, the commission may terminate the electric security plan, but not until it shall have provided interested parties with notice and an opportunity to be heard. The commission may impose such conditions on the plan's termination as it considers reasonable and necessary to accommodate the transition from an approved plan to the more advantageous alternative. In the event of an electric security plan's termination pursuant to this division, the commission shall permit the continued deferral and phase-in of any amounts that occurred prior to that termination and the recovery of those amounts as contemplated under that electric security plan.

(F) With regard to the provisions that are included in an electric security plan under this section, the commission shall consider, following the end of each annual period of the plan, if any such adjustments resulted in excessive earnings as measured by whether the earned return on common equity of the electric distribution utility is significantly in excess of the return on common equity that was earned during the same period by publicly traded companies, including utilities, that face comparable business and financial risk, with such adjustments for capital structure as may be appropriate. Consideration also shall be given to the capital requirements of future committed investments in this state. The burden of proof for demonstrating that significantly excessive earnings did not occur shall be on the electric distribution utility. If the commission finds that such adjustments, in the aggregate, did result in significantly excessive earnings, it shall require the electric distribution utility to return to consumers the amount of the excess by prospective adjustments; provided that, upon making such prospective adjustments, the electric distribution utility shall have the right to terminate the plan and immediately file an application pursuant to section 4928.142 of the Revised Code. Upon termination of a plan under this division, rates shall be set on the same basis as specified in division (C)(2)(b) of this section, and the commission shall permit the continued deferral and phase-in of any amounts that occurred prior to that termination and the recovery of those amounts as contemplated under that electric security plan. In making its determination of significantly excessive earnings under this division, the commission shall not consider, directly or indirectly, the revenue, expenses, or earnings of any affiliate or parent company.

Cite as R.C. § 4928.143

Amended by 129th General AssemblyFile No.61, HB 364, §1, eff. 3/22/2012.

Effective Date: 2008 SB221 07-31-2008

4928.144 Phase-in of electric distribution utility rate or price.

The public utilities commission by order may authorize any just and reasonable phase-in of any electric distribution utility rate or price established under sections 4928.141 to 4928.143 of the Revised Code, and inclusive of carrying charges, as the commission considers necessary to ensure rate or price stability for consumers. If the commission's order includes such a phase-in, the order also shall provide for the creation of regulatory assets pursuant to generally accepted accounting principles, by authorizing the deferral of incurred costs equal to the amount not collected, plus carrying charges on that amount. Further, the order shall authorize the collection of those deferrals through a nonbypassable surcharge on any such rate or price so established for the electric distribution utility by the commission.

Cite as R.C. § 4928.144

Effective Date: 2008 SB221 07-31-2008 .

4928.20 Local aggregation of retail electric loads - limitations.

(A) The legislative authority of a municipal corporation may adopt an ordinance, or the board of township trustees of a township or the board of county commissioners of a county may adopt a resolution, under which, on or after the starting date of competitive retail electric service, it may aggregate in accordance with this section the retail electrical loads located, respectively, within the municipal corporation, township, or unincorporated area of the county and, for that purpose, may enter into service agreements to facilitate for those loads the sale and purchase of electricity. The legislative authority or board also may exercise such authority jointly with any other such legislative authority or board. For customers that are not mercantile customers, an ordinance or resolution under this division shall specify whether the aggregation will occur only with the prior, affirmative consent of each person owning, occupying, controlling, or using an electric load center proposed to be aggregated or will occur automatically for all such persons pursuant to the opt-out requirements of division (D) of this section. The aggregation of mercantile customers shall occur only with the prior, affirmative consent of each such person owning, occupying, controlling, or using an electric load center proposed to be aggregated. Nothing in this division, however, authorizes the aggregation of the retail electric loads of an electric load center, as defined in section 4933.81 of the Revised Code, that is located in the certified territory of a nonprofit electric supplier under sections 4933.81 to 4933.90 of the Revised Code or an electric load center served by transmission or distribution facilities of a municipal electric utility.

(B) If an ordinance or resolution adopted under division (A) of this section specifies that aggregation of customers that are not mercantile customers will occur automatically as described in that division, the ordinance or resolution shall direct the board of elections to submit the question of the authority to aggregate to the electors of the respective municipal corporation, township, or unincorporated area of a county at a special election on the day of the next primary or general election in the municipal corporation, township, or county. The legislative authority or board shall certify a copy of the ordinance or resolution to the board of elections not less than ninety days before the day of the special election. No ordinance or resolution adopted under division (A) of this section that provides for an election under this division shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the electors voting upon the ordinance or resolution at the election held pursuant to this division.

(C) Upon the applicable requisite authority under divisions (A) and (B) of this section, the legislative authority or board shall develop a plan of operation and governance for the aggregation program so authorized. Before adopting a plan under this division, the legislative authority or board shall hold at least two public hearings on the plan. Before the first hearing, the legislative authority or board shall publish notice of the hearings once a week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the jurisdiction or as provided in section 7.16 of the Revised Code. The notice shall summarize the plan and state the date, time, and location of each hearing.

(D) No legislative authority or board, pursuant to an ordinance or resolution under divisions (A) and (B) of this section that provides for automatic aggregation of customers that are not mercantile customers as described in division (A) of this section, shall aggregate the electrical load of any electric load center located within its jurisdiction unless it in advance clearly discloses to the person owning, occupying, controlling, or using the load center that the person will be enrolled automatically in the aggregation program and will remain so enrolled unless the person affirmatively elects by a stated procedure not to be so enrolled. The disclosure shall state prominently the rates, charges, and other terms and conditions of enrollment. The stated procedure shall allow any person enrolled in the

aggregation program the opportunity to opt out of the program every three years, without paying a switching fee. Any such person that opts out before the commencement of the aggregation program pursuant to the stated procedure shall default to the standard service offer provided under section 4928.14 or division (D) of section 4928.35 of the Revised Code until the person chooses an alternative supplier.

(E)

(1) With respect to a governmental aggregation for a municipal corporation that is authorized pursuant to divisions (A) to (D) of this section, resolutions may be proposed by initiative or referendum petitions in accordance with sections 731.28 to 731.41 of the Revised Code.

(2) With respect to a governmental aggregation for a township or the unincorporated area of a county, which aggregation is authorized pursuant to divisions (A) to (D) of this section, resolutions may be proposed by initiative or referendum petitions in accordance with sections 731.28 to 731.40 of the Revised Code, except that:

(a) The petitions shall be filed, respectively, with the township fiscal officer or the board of county commissioners, who shall perform those duties imposed under those sections upon the city auditor or village clerk.

(b) The petitions shall contain the signatures of not less than ten per cent of the total number of electors in, respectively, the township or the unincorporated area of the county who voted for the office of governor at the preceding general election for that office in that area.

(F) A governmental aggregator under division (A) of this section is not a public utility engaging in the wholesale purchase and resale of electricity, and provision of the aggregated service is not a wholesale utility transaction. A governmental aggregator shall be subject to supervision and regulation by the public utilities commission only to the extent of any competitive retail electric service it provides and commission authority under this chapter.

(G) This section does not apply in the case of a municipal corporation that supplies such aggregated service to electric load centers to which its municipal electric utility also supplies a noncompetitive retail electric service through transmission or distribution facilities the utility singly or jointly owns or operates.

(H) A governmental aggregator shall not include in its aggregation the accounts of any of the following:

(1) A customer that has opted out of the aggregation;

(2) A customer in contract with a certified electric services company;

(3) A customer that has a special contract with an electric distribution utility;

(4) A customer that is not located within the governmental aggregator's governmental boundaries;

(5) Subject to division (C) of section 4928.21 of the Revised Code, a customer who appears on the "do not aggregate" list maintained under that section.

(I) Customers that are part of a governmental aggregation under this section shall be responsible only for such portion of a surcharge under section 4928.144 of the Revised Code that is proportionate to

the benefits, as determined by the commission, that electric load centers within the jurisdiction of the governmental aggregation as a group receive. The proportionate surcharge so established shall apply to each customer of the governmental aggregation while the customer is part of that aggregation. If a customer ceases being such a customer, the otherwise applicable surcharge shall apply. Nothing in this section shall result in less than full recovery by an electric distribution utility of any surcharge authorized under section 4928.144 of the Revised Code. Nothing in this section shall result in less than the full and timely imposition, charging, collection, and adjustment by an electric distribution utility, its assignee, or any collection agent, of the phase-in-recovery charges authorized pursuant to a final financing order issued pursuant to sections 4928.23 to 4928.2318 of the Revised Code.

(J) On behalf of the customers that are part of a governmental aggregation under this section and by filing written notice with the public utilities commission, the legislative authority that formed or is forming that governmental aggregation may elect not to receive standby service within the meaning of division (B)(2)(d) of section 4928.143 of the Revised Code from an electric distribution utility in whose certified territory the governmental aggregation is located and that operates under an approved electric security plan under that section. Upon the filing of that notice, the electric distribution utility shall not charge any such customer to whom competitive retail electric generation service is provided by another supplier under the governmental aggregation for the standby service. Any such consumer that returns to the utility for competitive retail electric service shall pay the market price of power incurred by the utility to serve that consumer plus any amount attributable to the utility's cost of compliance with the renewable energy resource provisions of section 4928.64 of the Revised Code to serve the consumer. Such market price shall include, but not be limited to, capacity and energy charges; all charges associated with the provision of that power supply through the regional transmission organization, including, but not limited to, transmission, ancillary services, congestion, and settlement and administrative charges; and all other costs incurred by the utility that are associated with the procurement, provision, and administration of that power supply, as such costs may be approved by the commission. The period of time during which the market price and renewable energy resource amount shall be so assessed on the consumer shall be from the time the consumer so returns to the electric distribution utility until the expiration of the electric security plan. However, if that period of time is expected to be more than two years, the commission may reduce the time period to a period of not less than two years.

(K) The commission shall adopt rules to encourage and promote large-scale governmental aggregation in this state. For that purpose, the commission shall conduct an immediate review of any rules it has adopted for the purpose of this section that are in effect on the effective date of the amendment of this section by S.B. 221 of the 127th general assembly, July 31, 2008. Further, within the context of an electric security plan under section 4928.143 of the Revised Code, the commission shall consider the effect on large-scale governmental aggregation of any nonbypassable generation charges, however collected, that would be established under that plan, except any nonbypassable generation charges that relate to any cost incurred by the electric distribution utility, the deferral of which has been authorized by the commission prior to the effective date of the amendment of this section by S.B. 221 of the 127th general assembly, July 31, 2008.

Cite as R.C. § 4928.20

Amended by 130th General Assembly File No. TBD, SB 310, §1, eff. 9/12/2014.

Amended by 129th General AssemblyFile No.61, HB 364, §1, eff. 3/22/2012.

Amended by 129th General AssemblyFile No.28, HB 153, §101.01, eff. 9/29/2011.

Amended by 128th General AssemblyFile No.29, HB 48, §1, eff. 7/2/2010.

Effective Date: 06-15-2000; 12-20-2005; 07-04-2006; 2008 SB221 07-31-2008; 2008 HB562 09-22-2008

4928.37 Receiving transition revenues.

(A)

(1) Sections 4928.31 to 4928.40 of the Revised Code provide an electric utility the opportunity to receive transition revenues that may assist it in making the transition to a fully competitive retail electric generation market. An electric utility for which transition revenues are approved pursuant to sections 4928.31 to 4928.40 of the Revised Code shall receive those revenues through both of the following mechanisms beginning on the starting date of competitive retail electric service and ending on the expiration date of its market development period as determined under section 4928.40 of the Revised Code:

(a) Payment of unbundled rates for retail electric services by each customer that is supplied retail electric generation service during the market development period by the customer's electric distribution utility, which rates shall be specified in schedules filed under section 4928.35 of the Revised Code;

(b) Payment of a nonbypassable and competitively neutral transition charge by each customer that is supplied retail electric generation service during the market development period by an entity other than the customer's electric distribution utility, as such transition charge is determined under section 4928.40 of the Revised Code. The transition charge shall be payable by each such retail electric distribution service customer in the certified territory of the electric utility for which the transition revenues are approved and shall be billed on each kilowatt hour of electricity delivered to the customer by the electric distribution utility as registered on the customer's meter during the utility's market development period as kilowatt hour is defined in section 4909.161 of the Revised Code or, if no meter is used, as based on an estimate of kilowatt hours used or consumed by the customer. The transition charge for each customer class shall reflect the cost allocation to that class as provided under bundled rates and charges in effect on the day before the effective date of this section. Additionally, as reflected in section 4928.40 of the Revised Code, the transition charges shall be structured to provide shopping incentives to customers sufficient to encourage the development of effective competition in the supply of retail electric generation service. To the extent possible, the level and structure of the transition charge shall be designed to avoid revenue responsibility shifts among the utility's customer classes and rate schedules.

(2)

(a) Notwithstanding division (A)(1)(b) of this section, the transition charge shall not be payable on electricity supplied by a municipal electric utility to a retail electric distribution service customer in the certified territory of the electric utility for which the transition revenues are approved, if the municipal electric utility provides electric transmission or distribution service, or both services, through transmission or distribution facilities singly or jointly owned or operated by the municipal electric utility, and if the municipal electric utility was in existence, operating, and providing service as of January 1, 1999.

(b) The transition charge shall not be payable on electricity supplied or consumed in this state except such electricity as is delivered to a retail customer by an electric distribution utility and is registered on the customer's meter during the utility's market development period or, if no meter is used, is based on an estimate of kilowatt hours used or consumed by the customer. However, no transition charge shall be payable on electricity that is both produced and consumed in this state by a self-generator.

(3) The transition charge shall not be discounted by any party.

(4) Nothing prevents payment of all or part of the transition charge by another party on a customer's behalf if that payment does not contravene sections 4905.33 to 4905.35 of the Revised Code or this chapter.

(B) The electric utility shall separately itemize and disclose, or cause its billing and collection agent to separately itemize and disclose, the transition charge on the customer's bill in accordance with reasonable specifications the commission shall prescribe by rule under division (A) of section 4928.06 of the Revised Code.

Cite as R.C. § 4928.37

Effective Date: 10-05-1999 .

4928.38 Commencing and terminating transition revenues.

Pursuant to a transition plan approved under section 4928.33 of the Revised Code, an electric utility in this state may receive transition revenues under sections 4928.31 to 4928.40 of the Revised Code, beginning on the starting date of competitive retail electric service. Except as provided in sections 4905.33 to 4905.35 of the Revised Code and this chapter, an electric utility that receives such transition revenues shall be wholly responsible for how to use those revenues and wholly responsible for whether it is in a competitive position after the market development period. The utility's receipt of transition revenues shall terminate at the end of the market development period. With the termination of that approved revenue source, the utility shall be fully on its own in the competitive market. The commission shall not authorize the receipt of transition revenues or any equivalent revenues by an electric utility except as expressly authorized in sections 4928.31 to 4928.40 of the Revised Code.

Cite as R.C. § 4928.38

Effective Date: 10-05-1999 .

4928.39 Determining total allowable transition costs.

Upon the filing of an application by an electric utility under section 4928.31 of the Revised Code for the opportunity to receive transition revenues under sections 4928.31 to 4928.40 of the Revised Code, the public utilities commission, by order under section 4928.33 of the Revised Code, shall determine the total allowable amount of the transition costs of the utility to be received as transition revenues under those sections. Such amount shall be the just and reasonable transition costs of the utility, which costs the commission finds meet all of the following criteria:

(A) The costs were prudently incurred.

(B) The costs are legitimate, net, verifiable, and directly assignable or allocable to retail electric generation service provided to electric consumers in this state.

(C) The costs are unrecoverable in a competitive market.

(D) The utility would otherwise be entitled an opportunity to recover the costs. Transition costs under this section shall include the costs of employee assistance under the employee assistance plan included in the utility's approved transition plan under section 4928.33 of the Revised Code, which costs exceed those costs contemplated in labor contracts in effect on the effective date of this section. Further, the commission's order under this section shall separately identify regulatory assets of the utility that are a part of the total allowable amount of transition costs determined under this section and separately identify that portion of a transition charge determined under section 4928.40 of the Revised Code that is allocable to those assets, which portion of a transition charge shall be subject to adjustment only prospectively and after December 31, 2004, unless the commission authorizes an adjustment prospectively with an earlier date for any customer class based upon an earlier termination of the utility's market development period pursuant to division (B)(2) of section 4928.40 of the Revised Code. The electric utility shall have the burden of demonstrating allowable transition costs as authorized under this section. The commission may impose reasonable commitments upon the utility's collection of the transition revenues to ensure that those revenues are used to eliminate the allowable transition costs of the utility during the market development period and are not available for use by the utility to achieve an undue competitive advantage, or to impose an undue disadvantage, in the provision by the utility of regulated or unregulated products or services.

Cite as R.C. § 4928.39

Effective Date: 10-05-1999 .

4928.40 Establishing transition charge for each customer class.

(A) Upon determining under section 4928.39 of the Revised Code the allowable transition costs of an electric utility authorized for collection as transition revenues under sections 4928.31 to 4928.40 of the Revised Code, the public utilities commission, by order under section 4928.33 of the Revised Code, shall establish the transition charge for each customer class of the electric utility and, to the extent possible, each rate schedule within each such customer class, with all such transition charges being collected as provided in division (A)(1)(b) of section 4928.37 of the Revised Code during a market development period for the utility, ending on such date as the commission shall reasonably prescribe. The market development period shall end on December 31, 2005, unless otherwise authorized under division (B)(2) of this section. However, the commission may set the utility's recovery of the revenue requirements associated with regulatory assets, as established pursuant to section 4928.39 of the Revised Code, to end not later than December 31, 2010. The commission shall not permit the creation or amortization of additional regulatory assets without notice and an opportunity to be heard through an evidentiary hearing and shall not increase the charge recovering such revenue requirements associated with regulatory assets. Factors the commission shall consider in prescribing the expiration date of the utility's market development period and the transition charge for each customer class and rate schedule of the utility include, but are not limited to, the total allowable amount of transition costs of the electric utility as determined under section 4928.39 of the Revised Code; the relevant market price for the delivered supply of electricity to customers in that customer class and, to the extent possible, in each rate schedule as determined by the commission; and such shopping incentives by customer class as are considered necessary to induce, at the minimum, a twenty per cent load switching rate by customer class halfway through the utility's market development period but not later than December 31, 2003. In no case shall the commission establish a shopping incentive in an amount exceeding the unbundled component for retail electric generation service set in the utility's approved transition plan under section 4928.33 of the Revised Code, and in no case shall the commission establish a transition charge in an amount less than zero.

(B)

(1) The commission may conduct a periodic review no more often than annually and, as it determines necessary, adjust the transition charges of the electric utility as initially established under division (A) of this section or subsequently adjusted under this division. Any such adjustment shall be in accordance with division (A) of this section and may reflect changes in the relevant market.

(2) For purposes of this chapter, the market development period shall not end earlier than December 31, 2005, unless, upon application by an electric utility, the commission issues an order authorizing such earlier date for one or more customer classes as is specified in the order, upon a demonstration by the utility and a finding by the commission of either of the following:

(a) There is a twenty per cent switching rate of the utility's load by the customer class.

(b) Effective competition exists in the utility's certified territory.

(C) Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter, the commission shall issue an order under section 4928.33 of the Revised Code approving a transition plan for an electric utility that contains a rate reduction for residential customers of that utility, provided that the rate reduction shall not increase the rates or transition cost responsibility of any other customer class of the utility. The rate reduction shall be in effect only for such portion of the utility's market development period as the commission

shall specify and shall be applied to the unbundled generation component for retail electric generation service as set in the utility's approved transition plan under section 4928.33 of the Revised Code subject to the price cap for residential customers required under division (A)(6) of section 4928.34 of the Revised Code. The amount of the rate reduction shall be five per cent of the amount of that unbundled generation component, but shall not unduly discourage market entry by alternative suppliers seeking to serve the residential market in this state. The commission, after reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing, may terminate the rate reduction by order upon a finding that the rate reduction is unduly discouraging market entry by such alternative suppliers. No such termination of the rate reduction shall take effect prior to the midpoint of the utility's market development period.

(D) Beginning on the starting date of competitive retail electric service, no electric utility in this state shall prohibit the resale of electric generation service or impose unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or limitations on the resale of electric generation service.

(E) Notwithstanding any provision of Title XLIX [49] of the Revised Code to the contrary, any customer that receives a noncompetitive retail electric service from an electric distribution utility shall be a retail electric distribution service customer, irrespective of the voltage level at which service is taken.

Cite as R.C. § 4928.40

Effective Date: 10-05-1999 .

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the Appendix to the Merit Brief of Appellant Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel, Volume II, was served upon the below parties of record via electronic transmission this 15th day of August, 2017.



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