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State v. Dobson
| 114967 | Juvenile; R.C. 2151.10(A); discretionary bindover; mandatory bindover; probable cause hearing; hearsay; category-two offense; possession of a firearm; aggravated robbery; R.C. 2911.01(A); firearm specifications; R.C. 2152.02(BB)(1); direct evidence; circumstantial evidence; inference; plain error; Crim.R. 52(B); jury instructions; criminal gang activity; passive involvement; R.C. 2923.42; active participation; sufficiency; manifest weight; R.C. 2941.141(A); R.C. 2941.145; R.C. 2923.41(B); jury interrogatory; abuse of discretion; complicity; reverse bindover; R.C. 2151.121(B)(3); jurisdiction; resentencing; R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g); consecutive sentences for firearm specifications. Judgment affirmed. Appellant was subject to mandatory bindover because he was 16 years old at the time of the alleged offenses and there was probable cause to believe that appellant committed multiple category-two offenses and was in possession of a firearm during the commission of the alleged offenses. Hearsay evidence is admissible in juvenile bindover proceedings. The term “active participation” as it relates the criminal gang charge is a term of common usage and thus a separate jury instruction defining the term is unnecessary. There was sufficient evidence that appellant participated in a criminal act and possessed and brandished a firearm during the commission of an aggravated robbery. Appellant’s convictions for participating in a criminal gang and aggravated robbery with accompanying firearm specifications were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. A separate jury interrogatory is unnecessary for firearm specifications because the jury verdict form requires the jury to separately find that a defendant is in possession of a firearm. A reverse bindover proceeding was not required because appellant was 16 years old at the time of the offenses, and he was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, which is a category-two offense, and was found guilty of brandishing or using a firearm in the commission of the aggravated robberies. Finally, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to resentence appellant when his case was pending on appeal. Nor did the trial court have discretion to chose between the one- and three-year firearm specifications when sentencing appellant, because R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) applied to his situation. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
7/30/2026
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7/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-2929 |
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25515 Tungsten, L.L.C. v. Ikner
| 115248 | Pro se; App.R. 9(A); App.R. 9(B); duty of appellant to file a transcript; presumed regularity; cannot raise issues for the first time on appeal; waiver of issues. Appellant appeals the trial court’s judgment awarding appellee-landlord damages for unpaid rent and late fees. Appellant failed to file a transcript as required by App.R. 9(B) and the court sua sponte converted the appeal into an App.R. 9(A) record. Because appellant failed to file a transcript, this court is unable to conduct a meaningful review of the trial court’s judgment and must presume regularity in the proceedings, accept the trial court’s findings as true and affirm the judgment. Additionally, appellant’s claims that the trial court erred by failing to find the landlord breached the implied warranty of habitability, failed to maintain the premises in a fit and habitable condition and was negligent, were not brought before the trial court. It is well settled that appellant cannot raise new arguments for the first time on appeal and that her failure to raise the issues before the trial court results in a waiver of the issues on appeal. Judgment affirmed. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/30/2026
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7/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-2930 |
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State v. Abdelhady
| 115345 | Manifest weight of the evidence; abuse of discretion; consecutive sentences. The appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting lay opinion testimony or denying appellant’s motion for a mistrial. The trial court erred when it failed to determine on the record whether consecutive sentences were appropriate. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
7/30/2026
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7/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-2931 |
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Crocker Park, L.L.C. v. Westlake
| 115356 | Summary judgment; slander of title; discovery; Civ.R. 56(F); abuse of process; right of first refusal; counteroffer. Trial court did not err in ordering parties to file motions for summary judgment where issues involved questions of law and responding party could request time for discovery pursuant to Civ.R. 56(F) if discovery were needed. Trial court properly granted summary judgment on appellant’s slander-of-title claim where appellant failed to produce evidence establishing that the appellees maliciously or recklessly refused to remove a lien on appellant’s property. Trial court properly granted summary judgment on appellant’s abuse-of-process claim that was based on a lien placed on appellant’s property where the undisputed evidence established that appellees had a legitimate basis for maintaining the lien on appellant’s property. Trial court erred in declaring that the appellees did not waive their right of first refusal where instead of accepting the terms of the sale, the appellees proposed different terms that amounted to a counteroffer. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/30/2026
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7/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-2932 |
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State v. Pietri
| 115418 | Rape; unlawful sexual conduct with a minor; illegal use of minor in nudity-oriented material or performance, pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor; possession of criminal tools; plea; knowing; intelligent; voluntary; deviation; agreed, recommended sentence; reasonable expectation. Appellant’s pleas reversed because the trial court deviated from the agreed, recommended sentence without giving the appellant, who had a reasonable expectation of receiving the agreed, recommended sentence, an opportunity to withdraw his plea after the trial court determined to deviate. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
7/30/2026
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7/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-2933 |
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