| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
|
State v. Hilton
| 114888 | R.C. 2950.02(B); R.C. 2950.021(B)(4); R.C. 2950.09; R.C. 2950.021(B)(1); R.C. 2950.021(B)(3); Megan’s Law; the law of the case; sexual predator; aggravated sexually oriented offender; sexual-offender classification; Tier offender; Adam Walsh Act; de novo evidentiary hearing; res judicata; reporting requirements. Affirmed in part; remanded in part. This court previously affirmed appellant’s classification as a sexual predator pursuant to former R.C. 2950.09, Ohio’s version of the federal Megan’s Law (“Megan’s Law”), in State v. Hilton, 2008-Ohio-3010 (8th Dist.) (“Hilton I”). The Hilton I decision remains the law of the case. The trial court’s entry did not comply with R.C. 2950.021(B)(4); therefore, we remand and direct the trial court to issue an entry that complies with the statute. We also find that the trial court did not err when it classified Hilton as both a sexual predator and an aggravated sexually oriented offender because the reporting requirements are the same for both classifications. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
|
1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-255 |
|
Eagle Ridge Subdivision, Inc. v. Ott & Assocs. Co., L.P.A.
| 114907 | Res judicata; final, appealable order; interlocutory; attorney-client relationship; legal malpractice; pro se litigant. Trial court properly dismissed legal-malpractice claim brought by a nonattorney because a nonattorney cannot represent the interests of a corporation. Trial court properly dismissed legal-malpractice claim where there was no evidence or allegation of an attorney-client relationship between the plaintiff and defendant law firm. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
|
1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-256 |
|
State v. Clemons
| 115030 | Victim-impact testimony; plain error; prejudicial; ineffective assistance of counsel; self-defense; consecutive sentences. - Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not plainly err in allowing the family of the decedent to give a victim-impact statement at sentencing where the record demonstrates that the trial court considered numerous factors aside from the victim’s testimony. Since there was no error in receiving the testimony, defendant has not shown that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
|
1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-257 |
|
L.G. v. R.G.
| 115041 | Abuse of discretion, de novo review, competent credible evidence, R.C. 3127.16, continuing jurisdiction, exclusive jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, intent to relocate, R.C. 3109.05(G)(1), change of circumstances, best interest, R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), alienation, terminating spousal support, child support, imputed income, R.C. 3119.01, R.C. 3119.02, attorney fees, R.C. 3105.73(B). Judgment affirmed. We find that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the parties even though none of the parties resided in Ohio because once Ohio courts obtained jurisdiction over a child-custody determination, it retains continuing jurisdiction, even when the parties no longer reside in Ohio, so long as no other court has asserted jurisdiction. Further, a notice of relocation does not strip the trial court of jurisdiction to modify parental rights and responsibilities when a motion is pending before the court. There was competent, credible evidence of a change of circumstances and that it was in the best interest of the children to modify custody. In addition, spousal support was properly terminated. Moreover, ordering appellant to pay child support was not an abuse of discretion, and imputing income to appellant was proper when she was voluntarily unemployed. Finally, the trial court is not required to consider appellant’s income when awarding attorney fees. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
|
1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-258 |
|
State v. Burks
| 115054 | Sexual-predator classification; sexual-predator hearing; Megan’s Law; manifest weight of the evidence; insufficient record for review. Appellant pleaded guilty to sexual battery, a felony of the third degree. Prior to sentencing, the trial court held a sexual-predator hearing pursuant to Megan’s Law. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court classified appellant as a sexual predator. On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial court’s decision to classify him as a sexual predator. The appellate court held that when pronouncing its decision to classify appellant as a sexual predator, the trial court failed to have a discussion on the record to explain its decision, nor did the trial court discuss the relevant evidence, facts, or statutory factors it considered or relied upon in coming to its decision. As a result, the appellate court vacated the sexual-predator designation and remanded the case to the trial court to hold a new sexual-predator hearing consistent with its opinion. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
|
1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-259 |
|
Osborne v. Parkview Fed. Sav. Bank
| 115067, 115068, & 115069 | Receivership; R.C. 2735.04; notice; sale of personal property; subject-matter jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction, venue. Judgment affirmed. The trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the receivership proceedings. Although the subject assets were out of the county, courts of common pleas are courts of general jurisdiction and have original jurisdiction in all civil suits that fall within the monetary requirements of a common pleas court. The trial court did not enter a judgment against the nonparty appellants; personal jurisdiction was not implicated. Venue was not raised in the trial court and therefore is waived on appeal. The pipeline was personal property, and under R.C. 2735.04(D), the receiver was not required to provide notice to the appellants prior to selling it. Further, under R.C. 2735.04, the trial court had the authority to authorize the receiver to sell the personal property free and clear of any liens. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
|
1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-260 |
|
Pinnacle Condominiums Unit Owners' Assn. v. 701 Lakeside, L.L.C.
| 115118 & 115119 | Contempt; final appealable order; untimely; purge; first time on appeal. Appellants appealed from the trial court’s order finding that two nonparty witnesses remained in contempt of court, stemming from a previously issued contempt order. Neither of appellants’ arguments are properly before the court. The trial court’s initial contempt order finding the nonparty witnesses in contempt was a final appealable order from which appellants could have appealed but chose not to do so. As such, appellants were precluded from challenging the court’s finding of contempt in this later appeal. Also, appellants never moved the trial court to purge the contempt order and the trial court never made any determination whether nonparty witnesses had complied with the purge conditions set forth in the initial contempt order. As such, we will not determine, for the first time on appeal, whether the purge conditions had been met. The court further held that one of the appellants that had not been found in contempt was precluded from intervening in a matter between the contemnor and the court. The court therefore dismissed the appeal that had been filed by the appellant that was not subject to the trial court’s contempt order. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
|
1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-261 |
|
State v. Hawkins
| 115145 | Successive; petition for postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.23; hearing; jurisdiction; de novo; abuse of discretion; unavoidably prevented; evidence outside the record; res judicata. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain defendant’s successive petition for postconviction relief as a matter of law and did not abuse its discretion by dismissing it without a hearing. Appellant failed to meet the requirements of R.C. 2953.23 by failing to demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering any evidence. Furthermore, because appellant raised his sentencing issue in his direct appeal, and has failed to demonstrate evidence outside of the record, this issue is barred by res judicata. While Ohio law permits the filing of multiple petitions, a petitioner does not have carte blanche to file successive petitions endlessly. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
|
1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-262 |
|
Pizzuli v. Yurko
| 115206 | Political-subdivision immunity; statute of limitations; motion to dismiss. The trial court did not err in granting the appellees’ motion to dismiss because the appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
|
1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-263 |
|
In re B.M.
| 115239 | R.C. 3119.96, et seq.; paternity; motion for relief from paternity; genetic-test results; willfully failed to comply. The trial court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to consider appellant’s motion for relief from paternity because he did not provide timely genetic-test results. While the court could not grant relief without the proper results, the submission of such results was not a jurisdictional impediment. Where appellant argued that the mother of the child had refused to submit the child to genetic testing, the trial court was required under R.C. 3119.963 to determine whether the mother had “willfully” failed to submit the child to genetic testing. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
|
1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-264 |
|
Bello v. Highland Pointe Health & Rehab Ctr.
| 115326 | R.C. 2711.03; enforcement of arbitration provision; oral hearing unequivocally and specifically requested is mandatory; abuse of discretion. Appellants appealed the trial court’s denial of their motion to stay and enforce an arbitration agreement before conducting an oral hearing as requested in their motion. We find that while an oral hearing is not always required to satisfy the “hearing” mandate of R.C. 2711.03, an oral hearing is required and shall be granted when unequivocally and specifically requested by a party pursuant to R.C. 2711.03. As such the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to stay and enforce arbitration before conducting an oral hearing. The matter is reversed and remanded to the trial court to conduct an oral hearing to determine whether the validity of the arbitration agreement is at issue. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
|
1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-265 |
|
In re K.L.
| 115381 | Parental rights; motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody; abandon; failure to remedy; incarcerated parent; manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review; sufficiency-of-the-evidence review. - The juvenile court did not err in placing the child in the permanent custody of the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services because its decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence demonstrated that mother abandoned the child by failing to visit the child for almost two years and that she failed to present verifiable documentation that she completed any of her case-plan objectives, remedying the reasons for removal. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
|
1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-266 |
|
In re Y.G.
| 115538 | Permanent custody; manifest weight of the evidence; best interest of the child; legal custody; permanent planned living arrangement. The juvenile court’s judgments awarding permanent custody of three children to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS"), granting legal custody of two children to their respective caregivers, and placing one child in a permanent planned living arrangement ("PPLA") are supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
|
1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-267 |
|
In re A.G.
| 115558 | Motion for continuance; abuse of discretion. Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s request for a continuance. Appellant’s attorney made the request at the dispositional hearing when appellant failed to show for the proceeding. Appellant had notice of the hearing and offered no reason for his failure to appear. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
|
1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-268 |
|
State ex rel. Powell v. Sheehan
| 115809 | Petition for writ of mandamus; dismissal; sua sponte; jail-time credit; moot; adequate remedy at law. Petition for writ of mandamus dismissed, sua sponte, where trial court had already awarded relator jail-time credit in sentencing journal entry and had already ruled on all motions for jail-time credit before relator filed his petition, such that to the extent relator sought to compel a ruling on his motions for jail-time credit, his petition was moot. Further, alleged errors regarding jail-time credit are not cognizable in mandamus because relator has or had an adequate remedy at law to address the issue. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/28/2026
|
1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-269 |
|
State v. Macklin
| 111117 | Juvenile court; jurisdiction; bindover; indictment. When a juvenile is bound over to adult court, the State may pursue charges for any crime that was bound over by the juvenile court, in addition to any crimes that were not presented to the juvenile court but were rooted in the underlying crimes. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
1/22/2026
|
1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-181 |
|
W.A. Smith Fin., L.L.C. v. Doe
| 114884 | Motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; unopposed; issue of fact; hearsay; App.R. 12(A)(2); defamation; fact or opinion; jury interrogatory; invited error. Affirmed. The trial court did not err in denying the unopposed motion for summary judgment leading to a jury trial in which the defendant presented questions of fact as to the truth of the alleged defamatory statements in an online review of plaintiff’s services and the amount of damages. Further, the plaintiff failed to identify the place in the record where the jury was presented newspaper articles in violation of hearsay principles, such that evidentiary errors cannot be reviewed. And finally, plaintiff’s claim that the jury considered a legal question of whether the alleged defamatory statement was an opinion was invited error. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/22/2026
|
1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-184 |
|
Perozeni v. Perozeni
| 114960 | App.R. 16; App.R. 12; marital property; separate property; clerical errors. Trial court’s finding that the marital residence was wholly marital property was supported by clear and convincing evidence where the sole evidence of a gift was appellant’s testimony and there was contradictory testimony that appellant paid consideration for the property in the past. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. Although the trial court’s entry designates appellee as the health insurance obligor, a clerical error in the entry suggests appellant is responsible; accordingly, the case is remanded for the trial court to correct its entry. The court of appeals may disregard any assignment of error where the party fails to comply with App.R. 16. Where assigned errors are not supported by citations to legal authority, the brief is out of compliance with the rule. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
1/22/2026
|
1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-185 |
|
State v. Crenshaw
| 115006 | Unlawful possession of dangerous ordnance, firearm specifications, ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Crim.R. 11, guilty plea, “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Appellant appealed conviction for unlawful possession of dangerous ordnance. Appellant argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because plea agreement guaranteed that he would be sentenced on the greater of two firearm specifications. However, the record did not indicate that appellant's plea was less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and the court engaged in a full Crim.R. 11 colloquy. Further, nothing in the record indicated that, absent the plea agreement, appellant would have been sentenced to the lesser firearm specification. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
1/22/2026
|
1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-186 |
|
In re M.R.
| 115035 | Temporary custody; case plan; Juv.R. 40; failure to file objections to magistrate’s decision; transcript; App.R. 12; effective assistance of trial counsel; abuse of discretion; disposition; adjudication; statutory time limit. The trial court did not err when it placed the children in the agency’s temporary custody. Father failed to file objections to the magistrate’s decision finding the children dependent and recommending they be placed in the agency’s temporary custody. Because father failed to file objections to the magistrate’s decision he has waived all but plain error on appeal. Although father filed a transcript of the dispositional hearing with this court, he did not file a transcript of the adjudicatory hearing. Even if he had filed the proper transcript, we cannot consider the transcript because it was not filed in the trial court. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the timing of the adjudicatory and dispositional hearings. The dispositional hearing was held within the statutory timeframe and the statute governing adjudicatory hearings in not jurisdictional. Father’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the magistrate’s decision. The record shows that a case plan was developed with the goal of returning the children to father’s custody but father failed to follow the case plan recommendations and requirements. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
1/22/2026
|
1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-187 |
|
State v. Watson
| 115036 | Felonious assault; self-defense; jury instructions; manifest weight of the evidence. Jury verdict finding defendant guilty of felonious assault affirmed. Surveillance videos show defendant assaulting the victim in a car repair shop, including her punching him in the face, pushing him multiple times and hitting him with a baseball bat. Her claim of self-defense failed. A defendant’s belief that she was in immediate danger must be objectively reasonable, and as shown by the videos, the victim did nothing to cause the defendant to fear for her life. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/22/2026
|
1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-188 |
|
In re H.C.
| 115276 | Adjudication; abused; neglected; temporary custody; injury; Brittle Bone Disease. - Juvenile court’s decision adjudicating the child abused and neglected was based on sufficient clear and convincing evidence because the evidence showed that the child suffered from several unexplained multiple leg fractures while in the care and custody of Mother. Medical testing and testimony revealed that the child did not suffer from Brittle Bone Disease. Temporary custody was in the child’s best interest and properly granted to the agency. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
1/22/2026
|
1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-189 |
|
Miles v. Cleveland Clinic Health Sys.-E. Region
| 115648 | Motion to compel payment of expert witness deposition fees; abuse of discretion. The court’s granting the appellee’s motion to compel payment of expert witness deposition fees is affirmed. Appellant failed to demonstrate that the court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion when she knew of the fees prior to taking the deposition. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/22/2026
|
1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-190 |
|
State v. Skanes
| 114528 | App.R. 26(B) application for reopening, res judicata, prosecutorial misconduct. The appellant’s App.R. 26(B) application for reopening is denied because appellate counsel was not ineffective on appeal. The issues raised in support of the application for reopening are barred from further review by the doctrine of res judicata. The appellant has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by appellate counsel on appeal. Application for reopening is denied. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/21/2026
|
1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-182 |
|
State v. Smith
| 114637 | Conviction; sufficiency; manifest weight; investigation; preparation; trial tactics; strategy, appellate counsel; ineffective-assistance claim; colorable; joinder; severance; selective prosecution; prosecutorial misconduct; expert. Appellant’s application to reopen his appeal under App.R. 26(B) is denied because he failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
1/16/2026
|
1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-183 |
|
State ex rel. Peterson v. Miday
| 115723 | Procedendo, moot, Civ.R. 58(B), petition for postconviction relief is civil in nature. The relator’s complaint for procedendo, to require the respondent-judge to issue a ruling with regard to a pending successive petition for postconviction relief, is moot. The respondent-judge rendered a judgment that denied the relator’s successive petition for postconviction relief. However, the respondent-judge failed to comply with Civ.R. 58(B). Thus, the respondent-judge must comply with Civ.R. 58(B) and reissue any judgment, that denied a petition for postconviction relief, with language that directs the clerk of courts to serve upon all parties notice of the judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
1/16/2026
|
1/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-191 |
|
Caldwell v. Custom Craft Builders, Inc.
| 113209 | Reconsideration; App.R. 26(A)(1)(a); error of law; contract; breach of contract; conspiracy to commit fraud; fraud; consumer sales practices act ("CSPA"); permit; employee; employer; relevant evidence; Evid.R. 401; Evid.R. 403; damages; insufficient evidence; manifest weight; unfair or deceptive acts; piercing the corporate veil; alter ego; apparent authority; principal; agent; attorney fees. The trial court’s journal entry following a bench trial is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The evidence presented at trial supported the trial court’s finding that the defendant-appellant LLC contracted with the plaintiff-appellee to do HVAC work through the apparent authority of its employee/agent and that the LLC breached the contract and violated the CSPA. However, there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the owner of the LLC was individually liable on these claims. There was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding of a civil conspiracy to commit fraud and, therefore, the award of punitive damages and the award of statutory damages are vacated; however, the trial court’s award of attorney fees was supported by sufficient evidence. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
|
1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-115 |
|
State v. Carpenter
| 114655 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; strangulation; domestic violence; endangering children; discovery; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Crim.R. 16. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Defendant-appellant’s convictions for strangulation and domestic violence are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, there is insufficient evidence to support his endangering-children conviction; we cannot say that a substantial risk to the child’s health or safety was created based on the child’s witnessing of the incident alone. Moreover, we find that the State’s allegedly delayed disclosure of a cassette-tape recording did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), or Crim.R. 16. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
|
1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-116 |
|
Wells v. Right Choice Contracting, L.L.C.
| 114802 | Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act; supplier; purchaser; consumer transaction; personal purposes; breach of contract; existence of a contract. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. The trial court committed reversible error when it determined that the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act did not apply to the transaction between appellant and appellee as a matter of law. The trial court also committed reversible error when it determined that appellant failed to substantially perform the obligations he owed to appellee under their contract. The trial court misidentified the documents that constitute the parties’ contract. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
|
1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-117 |
|
In re D.L.T.
| 114925 | Objections to magistrate’s decision; failure to file transcript; raising issues for the first time on appeal; Juv.R. 40; subject-matter jurisdiction. Appellant’s failure to file the transcript with the juvenile court precludes our review of the lower court’s factual findings related to granting father legal custody, granting the grandparents visitation, and in allowing expert testimony. Because appellant’s arguments are based on the court’s factual findings, or were not made at the trial-court level, and because appellant’s objections were not stated with sufficient specificity, we are unable to review these arguments. Appellant also raised the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, for which we do not need the transcript to determine. The trial court did not have jurisdiction to award attorney or expert fees for work done in another court on another case. Award of attorney fees is void and issue of expert fees is remanded for the court to calculate the amount of fees relating to the juvenile case. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
|
1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-118 |
|
Morgan v. Applied Med. Technology, Inc.
| 114963 | Motion for sanctions; hearing; R.C. 2323.51; Civ.R. 11; frivolous conduct; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motions for sanctions without a hearing. The mere fact that plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims is not enough to warrant sanctions, especially when the record is devoid of any evidence of frivolous conduct throughout the litigation. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
|
1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-119 |
|
State v. Newton
| 114965 | Marsy’s Law; restitution; guilty plea; sentencing; innocence; affirmative defenses. Reversed and remanded. The trial court erred by denying the victim restitution based on the defendant’s protestations of innocence raised for the first time at sentencing following a guilty plea. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
|
1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-120 |
|
M.E. v. M.A.
| 115021 | Domestic-violence civil protection order (“DVCPO”); abuse of discretion; domestic violence; Civ.R. 65.1; R.C. 3113.31; sufficient credible evidence; competency of a minor; R.C. 2317.01; motion to strike. The domestic relations court issued a DVCPO in favor of petitioner-appellee (“Petitioner”) against Respondent-appellant (“Respondent.”) Respondent appealed claiming (1) the court abused its discretion in overruling his objections to the magistrate’s order and adopting the DVCPO issued by the magistrate, and (2) the magistrate erred in denying Respondent’s motion to strike the testimony of his seven-year-old daughter S.A. The lower court’s issuance of the DVCPO was supported by sufficient credible evidence. Petitioner testified with respect to multiple instances of physical abuse from Respondent towards herself and S.A. Respondent also testified at the full hearing, claiming that he was never physically abusive towards Petitioner or S.A. The trial court was in the best position to consider the contradictory testimony between Petitioner and Respondent. As such, the reviewing court declined to substitute its judgment for that of the lower court. Respondent and Petitioner’s seven year old daughter S.A. testified at the hearing. Prior to the hearing, the magistrate conducted an in camera voir dire of S.A., which neither party objected to. The magistrate concluded that S.A. was competent to testify. Following S.A.’s testimony, Respondent filed a motion to strike S.A.’s testimony that was denied by the magistrate. Respondent claims that S.A.’s testimony at the hearing demonstrate that she was incompetent to testify because she did not recall certain facts concerning the abuse. However, the court determined that even if S.A. may not have remembered the date the assault occurred or of certain particulars of the assault does not relate so much to her competency to testify, but rather to S.A.’s credibility as a witness. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
|
1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-121 |
|
State v. Hicks
| 115116 | Conceded error; nunc pro tunc. The trial court erred by issuing a sentencing journal entry that stated the appellant was sentenced on Count 185, when the appellant was not. The State conceded the error, and the trial court must issue a nunc pro tunc to correct the sentencing entry. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
|
1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-122 |
|
Cleveland v. Hall
| 115143 | Separation-of-powers doctrine; prosecutor; court; pretrial diversion program. Trial court violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by referring defendant to a pretrial diversion program over the prosecutor’s objection. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
|
1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-123 |
|
In re T.W.
| 115158 | Permanent custody; motion to continue; R.C. 2151.353(A)(3); Juv.Loc.R. 35(C); Juv.R. 23; manifest weight; sufficiency of the evidence; clear and convincing evidence; R.C. 2151.353(A)(4); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.414(E). Judgment affirmed. Weighing the potential prejudice to appellant-mother against the juvenile court’s right to control its docket, the public’s interest in the prompt and efficient dispatch of justice, and the minor child’s best interests and need for stability and permanency, we find that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant-mother’s motion for continuance. Moreover, clear and convincing evidence supports each of the juvenile court’s R.C. 2151.414(E) and (D)(1) findings. Accordingly, the juvenile court’s award of permanent custody to Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) is supported by sufficient evidence within the record and is not contrary to that evidence’s manifest weight. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
|
1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-124 |
|
2222 Internatl., L.L.C. v. Law Search, L.L.C.
| 115220 | Foreclosure; summary judgment; objections to magistrate’s decision; statute of limitations; quiet title; mortgage; retroactive application of statute; constitutionality. The trial court’s judgment adopting the magistrate’s decision entering summary judgment in favor of appellee on appellant’s foreclosure action is affirmed. All necessary parties were joined to the action and the trial court had jurisdiction to issue its decision. Furthermore, application of an eight-year statute of limitations on the foreclosure action was proper and not an unconstitutionally retroactive application of the law. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
|
1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-125 |
|
Cleveland Hts. v. Watts
| 115265 | App.R. 9; record on appeal; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; appellate brief requirements; pro se party. Judgment affirmed. Appellant’s assignments of error are overruled for noncompliance with App.R. 9 and 16. Appellant’s failure to identify errors with reference to the record and to present an argument containing his contentions with respect to the claimed errors permit this court to disregard his assignments of error under App.R. 12. Further, we must presume the regularity of the proceedings below because of appellant’s failure to provide us with a transcript. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
|
1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-126 |
|
In re K.G.
| 115351 | Parental rights; motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody; incarcerated parent; manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review; sufficiency-of-the-evidence review; motion for continuance. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
|
1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-127 |
|
State v. Redding
| 115633 | Conceded error; driver’s license suspension; motion to modify or terminate; R.C. 4510.54(B); hearing. The trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing under R.C. 4510.54(B) prior to granting the defendant’s motion to vacate or modify his driver’s license suspension and reinstating his driving privileges. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/15/2026
|
1/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-128 |
|
In re J.U.
| 114400 | Companionship; visitation; custody; adoption; grandparents; mother; juvenile; best interest; Juv.R. 40(D); R.C. 3109.12; R.C. 2505.02; de novo; abuse of discretion; sexual offenses; stay; Lorain; therapy. A parent’s fundamental interest in the care, custody, and control of a child is a substantial right; therefore, an order resolving a statutorily created companionship claim under R.C. 3109.12 is a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02 when it fully disposes of the grandparents’ request and the parent’s objections. A juvenile court satisfies Juv.R. 40(D)(4)’s independent review requirement when, after timely objections, it conducts its own evaluation of the record and modifies a magistrate’s decision to narrow companionship time, incorporating Troxel’s “special weight” for a fit parent’s wishes. In the absence of an abuse of discretion, a trial court does not err by granting limited, structured virtual companionship to grandparents when the record demonstrates the trial court balanced the best interest of the child and the parent’s wishes under R.C. 3109. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
1/8/2026
|
1/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-34 |
|
Fulkroad v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth.
| 114570; 115257 | Workers’ compensation; default judgment; sanction; case-management conference; abuse of discretion; failure to appear. The trial court abused its discretion by sua sponte entering default judgment for the plaintiff when defense counsel failed to appear for the initial case-management conference. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
1/8/2026
|
1/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-35 |
|
McCoy v. Avon Place Skilled Nursing & Rehab. Ctr.
| 114779 | Nursing home malpractice; admitted liability; jury instructions; jury interrogatories; punitive damages; R.C. 2315.21; invited error; plain error; wavier; judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”); de novo; ratification; corporate entity; scope of employment; actual malice; damages cap; noneconomic damages; R.C. 2315.18; $250,000; separate incident; nursing home resident’s bill of rights (“NHRBR”); abuse of discretion; attorney fees; reconstructed hours; expenses; lodestar; prejudgment interest; R.C. 1343.04; good-faith settlement. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in denying defendants’ JNOV motion as to punitive damages in Plaintiffs’ nursing home malpractice case. In the instant case, there is no dispute that Defendants drafted the jury instructions that it complains of on appeal. The trial court adopted the jury instructions verbatim, and the Defendants’ did not object at trial. Because defendants invited this error by providing the court with jury instructions and never objected to the instructions, it may not now seek to use the instruction to its advantage on appeal. In addition, Defendants’ failure to object to the interrogatory constituted waiver of any error on appeal. Furthermore, trial court did not apply the wrong standard for punitive damages against a corporate entity as Defendants contend. Defendants failed to raise ratification in its JNOV motion and, therefore, waived the issue on appeal, but for plain error. We do not find plain error because Plaintiffs established ratification at trial. Plaintiffs adduced evidence demonstrating that the nurse’s job responsibilities included decedent’s trach care and the Defendants ratified the nurse’s conduct when Defendants failed to terminate or discipline the nurse. The evidence at trial also demonstrated actual malice. The Defendants’ staff nurse ignored the Plaintiff’s cries for help. A reasonable person could conclude that the staff’s conduct amounted to a conscious disregard for the decedent’s rights, health, and safety, which had great probability of causing substantial harm. The trial court did not err in permitting the Estate to recover $250,000 in noneconomic damages for decedent’s pain and suffering as a result of the failures in care on August 1, 2020. The trial court was also correct in permitting the Estate to recover $250,000 in noneconomic damages for the decedent’s NHRBR claim, which related to a separate incident on July 23, 2020. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees and expenses. The trial court was in the best position to determine if Plaintiffs’ reconstructed fee request was accurate. The beginning point for determining the award of attorney fees is the reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the number of hours worked, a calculation that is sometimes referred to as lodestar. Here, the trial court considered the factors such as the fee customarily charged in the locality, the injuries and damages involved in the case, the results obtained, the fact that Plaintiffs’ counsel was not paid during the litigation and that they advanced litigation expenses, as well as the fact that the fee was contingent. The court found that a multiplier of 2.65 was an appropriate modification to the lodestar. Lastly, the trial court did not err in awarding pre-judgment interest because the evidence indicates that Defendants made no effort to consider the risk of an adverse verdict at trial and did not negotiate in good faith. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
1/8/2026
|
1/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-36 |
|
State v. Morris
| 114927 | Guilty plea; motion to withdraw; Crim.R. 32.1; res judicata; manifest injustice; newly discovered evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. Because the exhibits appellant attached to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea are not newly discovered, res judicata bars his claims. Furthermore, appellant fails to demonstrate that a manifest injustice has occurred, particularly because he was aware of these exhibits before his guilty plea and trial counsel was not ineffective. This is not the case where “an extraordinary and fundamental flaw in the plea proceeding” occurred. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
1/8/2026
|
1/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-37 |
|
Selzer v. Union Home Mtge. Corp.
| 114959 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; evidence; age discrimination; direct evidence; discriminatory intent; prima facie case. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for employer where employee presented direct evidence of discriminatory intent in his age-discrimination suit. This evidence created a genuine issue of material fact. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
1/8/2026
|
1/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-38 |
|
Taye v. Cuyahoga Hills Juvenile Corr. Facility
| 115004 | Motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; workers’ compensation claim; R.C. 4123.01(C)(5); preexisting condition; substantially aggravated; clear and unambiguous statute; and objective pre-injury medical evidence. The trial court erred when it granted an employer’s motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff-appellant worker provided, pursuant to R.C. 4123.01(C)(5), objective clinical findings, objective test results, and subjective complaints to support his claim that his work incident caused a substantial aggravation of preexisting conditions. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
1/8/2026
|
1/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-39 |