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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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Cleveland v. Shaker Hts. Apts. Owner, L.L.C.
| 114852, 114853, 114854 | Motion to suppress; consent to search/inspect; criminal penalties for organizations; community-control sanctions; fines; R.C. 2929.31. Trial court properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress where there was competent, credible evidence in the record to establish that the inspector obtained consent from persons with common and/or apparent authority. Trial court abused its discretion in imposing fines well over the statutory maximum. Trial court was permitted to impose community-control sanctions on an organization where R.C. 2929.31 applied to organizational fines but did not preclude the court from imposing penalties under R.C. 2929.24-2929.28. However, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing community- control conditions that were overbroad and did not meet the misdemeanor sentencing requirements of rehabilitation and preventing future crime. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-449 |
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Patrick v. Patrick
| 115037 | Divorce; marital property division; valuation dates; financial accounts; retirement accounts; posttrial evidence; spousal support; temporary spousal support; temporary support; economic misconduct; distributive award; attorney’s fees; R.C. 3105.171(A)(2); R.C. 3105.171(E)(4); R.C. 3105.18(C)(1); R.C. 3105.73(A); App.R. 16(A)(7). Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The trial court, which determined that the marriage terminated on the first day of trial (August 4, 2020), abused its discretion by dividing the parties’ marital financial accounts using February 2023 balances while dividing marital retirement accounts as of August 4, 2020, without an adequate explanation, logically related to the facts of the case, for the inconsistent valuation dates. On remand, the court must divide the financial accounts as of August 4, 2020, based on testimony and admitted exhibits, without reopening trial or rebalancing equities elsewhere. The court also erred to the extent it relied on posttrial, nonadmitted materials to assign a $148,025 value to appellant’s Thrift Savings Account. The decree must be corrected to the only value supported by the evidence, $77,219, though no broader recalculation of the defined-contribution retirement division is required because the decree divides those accounts as of August 4, 2020, plus earnings/gains/losses. The trial court’s spousal support determinations are affirmed. The award of $4,000 per month for 44 months from appellant to appellee commencing August 1, 2023, was within the court’s discretion under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1), and appellant was not entitled to a credit that would shorten the permanent-support duration based on temporary support previously paid. The trial court also acted within its discretion in finding that appellee was not entitled to her request of $12,000 per month indefinitely with the trial court to retain jurisdiction. Appellee’s economic misconduct claim, through which she sought a distributive award, failed for lack of proof of the requisite wrongful intent under R.C. 3105.171(E)(4). Finally, the attorney’s fee award to appellee of $35,000 is affirmed as equitable under R.C. 3105.73(A) given the parties’ income disparity and the stipulation to the reasonableness of appellee’s fees. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-450 |
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State v. Centers
| 115050 | Rape; kidnapping; gross sexual imposition; hearsay; abuse of discretion; prior consistent statement; merger; allied offenses of similar import; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the victim’s prior consistent statement to rebut the charge that she was fabricating allegations against the defendant-appellant. The rape and gross sexual imposition offenses were committed separately and were not allied offenses of similar import. The convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-451 |
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State v. Willis
| 115052 | Misdemeanor sentencing; definite jail term; suspended sentence; community control; R.C. 2929.24; R.C. 2929.25; R.C. 2929.41(A); concurrency; felony prison term; contrary to law; sentencing error; illegal sentence; jail-time credit; remand for resentencing; statutory authority; ripeness; cross-appeal; jurisdiction. When a trial court imposes a definite misdemeanor jail term under R.C. 2929.24, it may not suspend that jail term unless it also imposes community-control sanctions in accordance with R.C. 2929.25; a sentence that imposes definite misdemeanor jail terms but suspends them without community control is contrary to law. Further, absent a statutory exception, R.C. 2929.41(A) requires misdemeanor jail terms to be run concurrently with a felony prison term imposed in the same case, and a sentencing entry that suspends the misdemeanor jail terms rather than imposing a lawful concurrent disposition is subject to correction on direct appeal. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-452 |
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State v. Al-Shami
| 115077 | Rape; R.C. 2907.02(A); anal intercourse; cunnilingus; penetration; sufficiency. Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. Penetration is not required to prove cunnilingus; therefore, testimony that appellant was eating or licking the victims’ vaginas was sufficient to establish cunnilingus. Nevertheless, penetration, however slight, is required to establish anal intercourse. Testimony that appellant was trying to get “his private” in the victim’s “behind” was not sufficient to establish penetration. However, when victim testified that there were times when appellant put his penis in her “behind” and “it hurt” there was sufficient evidence to establish penetration. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-453 |
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M.T.O. v. A.O.
| 115091, 115208 | Subject-matter jurisdiction; R.C. 3109.051; R.C. 3107.15; visitation and companionship rights post-adoption; final appealable orders. Judgment vacated, in part, remanded in part and dismissed in part. Ohio’s adoption statute R.C. 3101.15 divests a trial court of its subject-matter jurisdiction under R.C. 3109.051 to grant visitation rights to relatives of biological parents whose rights have been terminated by an adoption decree. Thus, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear appellant’s motion to intervene in the underlying action. Accordingly, the trial court’s order dismissing appellant’s motion to intervene is vacated and this matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to dismiss appellant’s motion to intervene for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Additionally, the trial court had no subject-matter jurisdiction to issue its order denying appellant’s motion for relief from judgment and, therefore, this order is void. A void order is not a final appealable order. The appeal from this order is dismissed. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-454 |
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State v. Sowell
| 115120 | Postrelease control; res judicata; voidable. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to terminate postrelease control. Any challenge to appellant’s sentence should have been brought up on direct appeal, and appellant’s untimely argument is barred by res judicata. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-455 |
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Highland Hills v. Safford
| 115179 | Codified ordinances; minor misdemeanor; right to counsel; venue; plain error; R.C. 2901.12; Ohio Const., art. X, § 12; manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant’s conviction for a violation of Village of Highland Hills Cod.Ord. 331.08 was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant was not entitled to assigned counsel because he was cited with a minor misdemeanor and the right to counsel does not apply to minor misdemeanors that have no possibility of jail time. Appellant did not challenge venue at the trial court level; therefore, we review appellant’s claim that the city did not establish venue for plain error. We find no plain error — venue was clearly established by witness testimony. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-456 |
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Euclid v. R.C.
| 115182 | Application; expungement; minor misdemeanor; conviction; de novo; expunge; R.C. 2953.31(B)(1); R.C. 2953.32; former R.C. 2953.32; R.C. 2953.32(D)(2); R.C. 2953.32(D)(5); Ohio Rules of Superintendence; guidelines; public policy. Vacated the trial court’s denial of appellant’s application to expunge the record of his minor-misdemeanor conviction and remanded the matter to the trial court to engage in the required analysis under R.C. 2953.32. The trial court erred in finding R.C. 2953.32 does not permit the physical destruction of records, in finding the records at issue may not be expunged pursuant to the Ohio Rules of Superintendence, and in finding an expungement of appellant’s record would be per se against public policy. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-457 |
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J.E.S. v. A.S.
| 115183 | Support; spousal; child; impute income; minimum wage; voluntarily underemployed; abuse of discretion; R.C. 3105.18 factors; R.C. 3119.01 factors; pending appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court; mandate; subject-matter jurisdiction; S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.04(D). Judgment affirmed. The trial court had jurisdiction to proceed with the case following the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision to decline Husband’s jurisdictional appeal on May 27, 2025, and issue an amended judgment entry, two days later on May 29, 2025. S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.04(D) does not require a mandate as Husband contends. Therefore, May 27, 2025, the day the decision was issued, guides us. Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imputing minimum wage income to Wife, declining to award spousal support, and ordering Husband to pay child support. Husband reargues the same facts and issues we considered in the previous appeal, referencing the gifts Wife received from B.T. (her father), her monthly expenses, and the money in B.T.’s trust account that Wife receives as a beneficiary. However, we found that the trial court’s consideration of these gift was improper. As a result, the trial court and this court cannot consider B.T.’s gifts to Wife when determining Wife’s income. When reviewing the other evidence in the record, it is clear that Wife did not have any source of income in her own name. The court found the testimony established that Wife is voluntarily underemployed based upon her education, work history, and potential employment. Notably, other than referring to the gifts Wife received from B.T., which we previously found was improper for the trial court to consider, Husband can point to no evidence of Wife’s income. Therefore, the trial court’s conclusion that Wife was voluntarily underemployed and imputing an annual minimum wage income of $22,256 was not an abuse of discretion. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-458 |
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J.S. v. A.S.
| 115184 | Attorney fees; mandate rule; guardian ad litem fees; R.C. 3105.73(A); Ohio Sup.R. 48.02(H)(3). Reversed and remanded. The trial court’s award of attorney fees to appellee is reversed and remanded because the trial court was considering financial support appellant received from her father when making determinations, the award of attorney fees was not supported by the record, and the trial court failed to follow the mandate of the appellate court on remand. The trial court’s allocation of guardian ad litem fees is reversed and remanded because it is not supported by the record and does not follow Ohio Sup.R. 48.02(H)(3). | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-459 |
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D.E. v. R.M.
| 115201 | Separation agreement; divorce; contract; duress. The parties entered into a separation agreement regarding all matters involved in their divorce. Defendant stated on the record that he read the agreement, that he voluntarily signed it, and that he was not forced or coerced to sign it. Thus, defendant’s assigned errors were overruled, and the trial court’s judgment entry of divorce was affirmed. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-460 |
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Fast Tract Title Servs., Inc. v. Barry
| 115213 | Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss; fraud claim; tort claim; contract claim; economic-loss rule; separate and distinct damages; piercing-the-corporate-veil claim. Where the plaintiff-appellant’s fraud claim failed to seek damages separate and distinct from damages awarded under a breach-of-contract claim, the trial court properly dismissed the fraud complaint and its related piercing-the-corporate-veil claim. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-461 |
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DiSanto v. United States Steel Corp.
| 115241 | Denial of pro hac vice motion; Gov.Bar R. XII; factors for trial court to review; decision to deny the motion lacked any rationale; failure to apply factors; abuse of discretion; judgment reversed and remanded. Appellants appealed the trial court’s denial of their three motions for pro hac vice admission. Upon review we find the trial court failed to support its decision with any rationale and failed to apply any the nine factors appellate courts instruct trial courts to use when reviewing motions for pro hac vice. The trial court’s failure to support its decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. Judgment reversed and matter remanded. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-462 |
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SRS 2019, L.L.C. v. ARK Mgt., L.L.C.
| 115251 | Breach of contract; unjust enrichment; void; R.C. 4735.02; weight of the evidence; damages; R.C. 2323.51; frivolous conduct. Affirmed. The trial court did not err by concluding that an enforceable contract existed based on the claims asserted in the complaint and at trial for damages stemming from a breach of the agreement, and the trial court’s determination that the plaintiff failed to prove damages was not against the weight of the evidence. And finally, because the plaintiff failed to file a motion for attorney fees under R.C. 2323.51, no claim for fees was preserved. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-463 |
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Independence v. Murphy
| 115268 | Ineffective assistance of counsel; trial strategy; prejudice; mistrial; discovery irregularity; evidentiary irregularity; cross-examination; impeachment; bench trial; operating a vehicle while intoxicated; ("OVI"); speeding; seatbelt violation; R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a); R.C. 4511.21(D)(5); R.C. 4513.263(B)(1); Crim.R. 29; body-camera footage; impaired-driver report. Judgment affirmed. Appellant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel where, during cross-examination of state trooper, it emerged that defense counsel and the trooper had different versions of the trooper’s impaired-driver report (a draft used by defense counsel lacking language that the trooper smelled alcohol on appellant’s person versus a final report adding that detail). The record was adequately preserved because the transcript and trial video detailed the discrepancy and the trial court itself explored the differences on the record. Counsel’s decision not to seek a mistrial or extend cross-examination was reasonable trial strategy, particularly in a bench trial where the judge was plainly aware of the inconsistency. There was no showing of prejudice because the City’s case rested on live testimony and body-camera evidence, not the report, the report discrepancy did not meaningfully undercut the trooper’s testimony, and nothing suggested a mistrial would have been granted or the outcome would probably have changed. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-464 |
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In re S.H.
| 115278 | Pro se litigant; Loc.App.R. 3(B)(1); presume regularity; transcript of lower court proceedings; wishes of minor’s parents; special weight accorded to parent’s wishes. This court has discretion to consider an appeal even if the defendant-appellant failed to affix a judgment entry to his or her notice of appeal. Where the defendant-appellant failed to file a copy of the transcript of the lower court proceedings, the court of appeals must presume regularity of those proceedings and overrule the assigned errors. Additionally, language in the lower court’s judgment entry that the court considered the parents’ wishes and concerns as expressed by them to the court — coupled with the absence of a trial transcript — indicated that the lower court applied the correct standard and accorded special weight to the Father’s wishes. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-465 |
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Grdn. DST Servs., L.L.C. v. Elite Technology, L.L.C.
| 115283 | Motion for sanctions; contempt; jurisdiction; agreed judgment entry; consent decree; retention of jurisdiction after final judgment; inherent authority to enforce judgments; contempt; R.C. 2705.02. Because the terms of the parties’ settlement were outlined in an agreed judgment entry, the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce the judgment and address a party’s failure to comply. The trial court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to consider appellant’s motion for sanctions. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-466 |
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In re A.H.
| 115457 | Permanent custody, parental rights, best interest of the child, motion to continue, abuse of discretion, R.C. 2151.352, Unger factors, R.C. 2151.414, unconstitutional as applied, abandonment, R.C. 2151.011(C), manifest weight, clear and convincing evidence. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s motion to continue when she was properly notified and failed to appear on numerous occasions. The trial court’s finding that Mother abandoned the child was not against the manifest weight of the evidence when Mother had not visited or supported the child in two years. Finally, it was in the best interest of the child to terminate Mother’s parental rights and grant permanent custody to the agency. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-467 |
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In re K.C.
| 115491 | Permanent custody; manifest weight of the evidence; clear and convincing evidence; best interests; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.415(D)(4). Affirmed. We affirm the juvenile court’s decision granting the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services’ motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody and terminating appellant’s parental rights where the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that permanent custody was in the child’s best interests pursuant to both R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-468 |
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Strongsville v. Smith
| 115551, 115552 | Accelerated appeal; traffic citations; motion to dismiss; speedy trial; tolling; reasonable; R.C. 2945.72(H). - Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for violating speedy trial. The record did not demonstrate that the trial court’s setting of trial beyond the speedy-trial time frame was reasonable for this court to conclude that it qualified as a tolling provision under R.C. 2945.72(H). | Keough | Cuyahoga |
2/12/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-469 |
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State v. Evans
| 111986 | App.R. 26; application to reopen an appeal; Murnahan; ineffective assistance of counsel; untimely filing; good cause. An appellant’s application to reopen his appeal is denied where the appellant filed his application outside the 90-day requirement specified in App.R. 26, and appellant failed to provide good cause for his untimely filing. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
2/11/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-448 |
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State v. Velez
| 115848 | Mandamus; Civ.R. 10(A); R.C. 2731.04; R.C. 2969.25(A); R.C. 2969.25(C). The respondent-judge’s motion to dismiss is granted. The complaint for mandamus does not comply with Civ.R. 10(A) that requires the caption of a complaint must include the names and addresses of all the parties. The relator has failed to comply with R.C. 2731.04 that requires an application for a writ of mandamus must be by petition and in the name of the state in the relation of the person applying. In addition, the relator’s complaint for mandamus complaint fails to contain a sworn affidavit that contains a description of each civil action or appeal filed in the previous five years as required by R.C. 2969.25(A). The complaint also fails to contain a statement certified by the institutional cashier setting forth the balance in the inmate’s account for the preceding six months as required by R.C. 2969.25(C). The requirements of R.C. 2969.25 are mandatory and failure to comply with them requires dismissal. Motion to dismiss is granted. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/11/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-470 |
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State ex rel. Annayan v. Gall
| 115966 | Mandamus, pending motions, issue ruling on pending motions, moot. The complaint for a writ of mandamus, to compel the trial court judge to render rulings with regard to pending motions, is moot. The trial court judge has rendered rulings with regard to the claimed pending motions in the underlying consolidated civil actions. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
2/10/2026
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2/12/2026
| 2026-Ohio-471 |
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Cleveland Hts. v. Preston
| 114908 | Pro se; civil contempt; moot; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; Traf.R. 11(A); not guilty plea; Double Jeopardy Clause; allied offenses; R.C. 2941.25(A); plain error; constitutionality of a statute; new arguments on appeal; waiver. Appellant appealed various aspects of the trial court’s proceedings concerning three traffic citations she was found guilty of, raising five assignments of error. Her first assignment of error raised issues with the trial court’s finding of contempt for her behavior during her arraignment; however, the issues related to the contempt are moot once she complied with the court’s order which was purged. Her second assignment of error alleged the trial court violated her due-process rights by accepting her not guilty plea because it was not knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily made and that the trial court violated Traf.R. 11(A). Appellant pled not guilty at her arraignment and the case went to trial where the court found her guilty of all charges. As such the trial court did not accept a guilty or no contest plea from her and these requirements do not apply. Similarly, the trial court did not violate Traf.R. 11(A) since appellant was given an opportunity to present a motion to dismiss prior to trial and she did in fact make such a motion, which the trial court denied. Appellant’s third assignment of error alleged the trial court violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, committing plain error, by entering two convictions under the same ordinance for the same expired plates and that these offenses should have been merged as allied offenses. Both of these arguments fail because appellant’s two convictions for driving with expired plates occurred on two separate days and therefore constitute separate offenses such that she was not being punished for the same offense twice nor were they allied offenses of a similar import. Appellant’s fourth assignment of error alleged the local ordinance at issue was unconstitutional, but she failed to raise this issue in the trial court and we decline to exercise discretion to review it for plain error. Appellant’s fifth assignment of error made several arguments that were not raised in the trial court, not supported by any case law and contradicted the record. These new issues on appeal were waived. All assignments of error were overruled and judgment affirmed. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-344 |
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State v. Davis
| 114914 | Ineffective assistance of counsel; lesser-included offense; reckless homicide; murder; Bruton; Confrontation Clause; hearsay; prosecutorial misconduct; joinder; severance; jury instructions; transferred intent; cumulative error; sufficiency of the evidence. Trial counsel was not ineffective even though he did not request a lesser-included offense instruction and did not object to out-of-court statements of the defendant’s coconspirators where the evidence did not support the lesser-included offense instruction and the out-of-court statements were not hearsay and did not violate Bruton or the Confrontation Clause. The State did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct and because there were no errors, there was no cumulative error. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of accomplice liability. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-345 |
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State v. Parker
| 114916 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; circumstantial evidence; accomplice testimony; jury credibility determinations; ShotSpotter technology; surveillance video; GPS ankle-monitor data; ballistics evidence; forensic expert testimony; Confrontation Clause; plain-error review; Crim.R. 29 motion; joint jury trial; firearm specifications; murder conviction; attempted murder conviction; allied offenses; jury instructions; rational trier of fact; appellate standard of review; corroborating evidence; shooting; affirmed judgment. In a joint jury trial arising from a shooting that resulted in the death of a three-year-old child and injuries to another victim, appellant was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and related offenses. The evidence established that a black Mercedes-Benz transported the shooter to and from the scene, that surveillance footage and ShotSpotter data placed the vehicle and gunfire at the precise location and time of the offenses, and that GPS ankle-monitor records corroborated the movements of those involved. An accomplice testified that the defendant exited the vehicle armed with a handgun and fired multiple shots toward the victims’ location, and ballistics testing linked the recovered firearm to the fatal projectile. Although the accomplice admitted prior false statements and testified pursuant to a plea agreement, the jury was instructed to view such testimony with grave suspicion. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find that appellant purposefully shot into a moving vehicle. The essential elements of the offenses were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury did not clearly lose its way in resolving credibility issues. The admission of forensic evidence through expert testimony did not constitute plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel under the Confrontation Clause. Accordingly, the convictions are affirmed. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-346 |
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State v. Inkton
| 115045 | Guilty plea; knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made; Crim.R. 11(C); maximum penalty; consecutive sentences; trial court advisement. Under Ohio law, a trial court is not required to advise a defendant of the possibility that each individual sentence may be imposed consecutively. The trial court fully complied with Crim.R. 11(C), and appellant failed to demonstrate that his pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-347 |
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State v. Ford
| 115098 | Engaging in pattern of corrupt activity, predicate offenses, enterprise, R.C. 2923.32, theft, R.C. 2913.02, sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence. Ford appealed three felony theft convictions, arguing that the State did not provide credible evidence about the value of the stolen items as required to determine the classification of each theft. The manifest weight of the evidence supported all three theft convictions where the State’s witnesses testified as to the value of the stolen merchandise, their basis of knowledge thereof, and where Ford did not introduce contradictory evidence or identify substantial inconsistencies in the estimates of value provided by the State's witnesses. Ford also appealed the sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weight of the evidence regarding his conviction for engaging in pattern of corrupt activity, which was based on these same thefts. Evidence supported this conviction where record, including surveillance video, showed that Ford and codefendant stole cigarettes together in the same manner, arriving together in the same vehicle, at least three times in less than five months. That Ford’s codefendant had been charged, in other incidents, with stealing items other than cigarettes with individuals other than Ford did not preclude a finding that an enterprise existed between Ford and codefendant. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-348 |
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State v. M.F.
| 115110 | Expungement; record sealing; R.C. 2953.32; R.C. 2953.34; R.C. 2953.31; R.C. Ch. 2953. - Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in finding that restitution had been paid and that final discharge occurred, thus allowing the court to grant appellee’s motion to seal his conviction. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-349 |
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State v. T.T.
| 115127 | Expungement; seal; eligible; former R.C. 2953.32; de novo; felony conviction; fifth-degree felony; fourth-degree felony; third-degree felony. Vacated the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion for expungement and remanded the matter to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether T.T. has been rehabilitated to the satisfaction of the court. The trial court erred in finding appellant is not an eligible offender for expungement in this case when the plain and unambiguous language of former R.C. 2953.32 does not exclude fourth- or fifth-degree felony convictions from expungement eligibility based on the existence of a third-degree felony conviction in a different case. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-350 |
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State v. Woods
| 115149 | Community-control sanctions; nonresidential; jail time; R.C. 2929.15; R.C. 2929.16; monitored time. - Defendant’s sentence was not contrary to law because R.C. 2929.15 provides that the trial can impose both residential and nonresidential sanctions, which include a jail sentence and monitored time. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-351 |
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T.K. v. D.O.
| 115177 | Civil stalking protection order; menacing by stalking; R.C. 2903.214; R.C. 2903.11; abuse of discretion; pattern of conduct; knowingly; R.C. 2901.22; First Amendment. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a civil stalking protection order to petitioner. Appellant repeatedly harassed and made inappropriate comments to petitioner, leading her to be in fear for her life. There was competent and credible evidence in the record that appellant acted knowingly. Appellant’s actions and words are not protected speech under the First Amendment. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-352 |
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State v. Aziz
| 115209 | Motion to compel discovery; traffic encounter; police officer; investigation of police officer relative to other traffic encounters; indictment of police officer; Crim.R. 16; pretrial discovery; exculpatory material; favorable to defense; law-enforcement privilege; in camera review. Judgment affirmed, with instructions for trial court to conduct an in camera review on remand. The defendant was entitled to pretrial discovery of investigative materials of a police officer who was indicted for his actions in other traffic encounters. This case involves a traffic encounter with the defendant and therefore the investigatory material of the officer relative to the other incidents is favorable to the defense. The law-enforcement privilege is not an absolute bar to the material—the trial court must conduct an in camera review of the material to determine whether the public interest in confidentiality of the material is outweighed by the defendant’s specific need for the evidence. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-353 |
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In re O.J.
| 115272 | examination; expert witness; expert report; psychologist; mental-health diagnoses; learning disability; adjudication; disposition; hearing; admission; colloquy; voluntary; knowing; intelligent; rebuttable presumption; allocution; plain error; sufficient indicia of incompetence; R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); R.C. 2152.51; R.C. 2152.52; R.C. 2152.10(8); R.C. 2152.12(E)(6); R.C. 2152.12(E)(7); Juv.R. 30; App.R. 16(A)(4). Judgment affirmed. The juvenile court did not err by accepting appellant’s admission without further exploring his competency. Neither appellant’s counsel nor the State ever raised the issue of appellant’s competency or requested a competency evaluation, and the juvenile court had the opportunity to observe and interact with appellant extensively over the course of several hearings. Nothing in the record suggests sufficient indicia of incompetence requiring the juvenile court to inquire into appellant’s competence sua sponte. In addition, nothing in the record suggested appellant had ever been found incompetent or that competency issues were even raised, in previous juvenile proceedings. Testimony at the amenability hearing, along with the testifying psychologist’s report, established that appellant was of average intelligence, that he could identify risks and address potential outcomes, that his thinking was logical, and that he displayed adequate insight. Further, appellant’s behavior at every hearing indicated he understood the nature and objective of the proceedings and could assist in his own defense. This included his right to remain silent because he immediately sought clarification from the court when it asked him to speak about the offense in allocution. Appellant’s statements in allocution were articulate and rational. Appellant’s responses to the juvenile court during previous hearings likewise reflected his understanding of the court process. Furthermore, appellant’s mental-health history and learning disability did not render him incompetent or require further inquiry into his competence. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-354 |
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Kaba v. Cuyahoga Cty. Treasurer
| 115274 | Pro se; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16; failure to make and support arguments for why trial court’s judgment was wrong; assignment of error disregarded. Pro se appellant appeals the trial court’s judgment entry granting the appellees’ motions to dismiss, alleging the dismissal failed to satisfy the notice requirements of Civ.R. 41(B). This argument is without merit since the trial court’s dismissal was pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), which does not have notice requirements. Appellant fails to make and support any arguments for why the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is wrong. The burden is on the appellant to make and substantiate one’s argument pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2). It is not an appellate court’s job to make arguments for an appellant. Assignment of error is disregarded and the judgment is affirmed. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-355 |
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Cleveland v. Damato
| 115295 | Dismissal; jurisdiction; untimely; App.R. 4(B)(3)(d); Crim.R. 19(D)(3)(a)(ii); trial judge; magistrate. - Appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Defendant attempted to use App.R. 4(B)(3)(d) to resurrect an otherwise untimely appeal. Crim.R. 19(D)(3)(a)(ii) only applies to magistrates; the trial judge conducted the trial. No findings of fact or conclusions of law were required. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-356 |
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In re C.K.
| 115324 | Permanent custody; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a); best interest; R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.414(E); clear and convincing; sufficiency; manifest weight. Affirmed the juvenile court’s judgment granting permanent custody of the minor children to the agency and terminating all parental rights. The juvenile court engaged in the proper analysis and made the requisite determinations under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), (D)(1), and (E). The juvenile court’s judgment was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
2/5/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-357 |
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State ex rel. Miller v. Saffold
| 115886 | Procedendo, mootness, and postconviction-relief petition. - Procedendo action to compel a ruling on a postconviction-relief petition was rendered moot by the respondent judge denying the subject petition. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
2/4/2026
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2/5/2026
| 2026-Ohio-358 |
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State v. Hilton
| 114888 | R.C. 2950.02(B); R.C. 2950.021(B)(4); R.C. 2950.09; R.C. 2950.021(B)(1); R.C. 2950.021(B)(3); Megan’s Law; the law of the case; sexual predator; aggravated sexually oriented offender; sexual-offender classification; Tier offender; Adam Walsh Act; de novo evidentiary hearing; res judicata; reporting requirements. Affirmed in part; remanded in part. This court previously affirmed appellant’s classification as a sexual predator pursuant to former R.C. 2950.09, Ohio’s version of the federal Megan’s Law (“Megan’s Law”), in State v. Hilton, 2008-Ohio-3010 (8th Dist.) (“Hilton I”). The Hilton I decision remains the law of the case. The trial court’s entry did not comply with R.C. 2950.021(B)(4); therefore, we remand and direct the trial court to issue an entry that complies with the statute. We also find that the trial court did not err when it classified Hilton as both a sexual predator and an aggravated sexually oriented offender because the reporting requirements are the same for both classifications. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-255 |
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Eagle Ridge Subdivision, Inc. v. Ott & Assocs. Co., L.P.A.
| 114907 | Res judicata; final, appealable order; interlocutory; attorney-client relationship; legal malpractice; pro se litigant. Trial court properly dismissed legal-malpractice claim brought by a nonattorney because a nonattorney cannot represent the interests of a corporation. Trial court properly dismissed legal-malpractice claim where there was no evidence or allegation of an attorney-client relationship between the plaintiff and defendant law firm. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-256 |
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State v. Clemons
| 115030 | Victim-impact testimony; plain error; prejudicial; ineffective assistance of counsel; self-defense; consecutive sentences. - Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not plainly err in allowing the family of the decedent to give a victim-impact statement at sentencing where the record demonstrates that the trial court considered numerous factors aside from the victim’s testimony. Since there was no error in receiving the testimony, defendant has not shown that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-257 |
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L.G. v. R.G.
| 115041 | Abuse of discretion, de novo review, competent credible evidence, R.C. 3127.16, continuing jurisdiction, exclusive jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, intent to relocate, R.C. 3109.05(G)(1), change of circumstances, best interest, R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), alienation, terminating spousal support, child support, imputed income, R.C. 3119.01, R.C. 3119.02, attorney fees, R.C. 3105.73(B). Judgment affirmed. We find that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the parties even though none of the parties resided in Ohio because once Ohio courts obtained jurisdiction over a child-custody determination, it retains continuing jurisdiction, even when the parties no longer reside in Ohio, so long as no other court has asserted jurisdiction. Further, a notice of relocation does not strip the trial court of jurisdiction to modify parental rights and responsibilities when a motion is pending before the court. There was competent, credible evidence of a change of circumstances and that it was in the best interest of the children to modify custody. In addition, spousal support was properly terminated. Moreover, ordering appellant to pay child support was not an abuse of discretion, and imputing income to appellant was proper when she was voluntarily unemployed. Finally, the trial court is not required to consider appellant’s income when awarding attorney fees. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-258 |
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State v. Burks
| 115054 | Sexual-predator classification; sexual-predator hearing; Megan’s Law; manifest weight of the evidence; insufficient record for review. Appellant pleaded guilty to sexual battery, a felony of the third degree. Prior to sentencing, the trial court held a sexual-predator hearing pursuant to Megan’s Law. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court classified appellant as a sexual predator. On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial court’s decision to classify him as a sexual predator. The appellate court held that when pronouncing its decision to classify appellant as a sexual predator, the trial court failed to have a discussion on the record to explain its decision, nor did the trial court discuss the relevant evidence, facts, or statutory factors it considered or relied upon in coming to its decision. As a result, the appellate court vacated the sexual-predator designation and remanded the case to the trial court to hold a new sexual-predator hearing consistent with its opinion. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-259 |
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Osborne v. Parkview Fed. Sav. Bank
| 115067, 115068, & 115069 | Receivership; R.C. 2735.04; notice; sale of personal property; subject-matter jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction, venue. Judgment affirmed. The trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the receivership proceedings. Although the subject assets were out of the county, courts of common pleas are courts of general jurisdiction and have original jurisdiction in all civil suits that fall within the monetary requirements of a common pleas court. The trial court did not enter a judgment against the nonparty appellants; personal jurisdiction was not implicated. Venue was not raised in the trial court and therefore is waived on appeal. The pipeline was personal property, and under R.C. 2735.04(D), the receiver was not required to provide notice to the appellants prior to selling it. Further, under R.C. 2735.04, the trial court had the authority to authorize the receiver to sell the personal property free and clear of any liens. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-260 |
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Pinnacle Condominiums Unit Owners' Assn. v. 701 Lakeside, L.L.C.
| 115118 & 115119 | Contempt; final appealable order; untimely; purge; first time on appeal. Appellants appealed from the trial court’s order finding that two nonparty witnesses remained in contempt of court, stemming from a previously issued contempt order. Neither of appellants’ arguments are properly before the court. The trial court’s initial contempt order finding the nonparty witnesses in contempt was a final appealable order from which appellants could have appealed but chose not to do so. As such, appellants were precluded from challenging the court’s finding of contempt in this later appeal. Also, appellants never moved the trial court to purge the contempt order and the trial court never made any determination whether nonparty witnesses had complied with the purge conditions set forth in the initial contempt order. As such, we will not determine, for the first time on appeal, whether the purge conditions had been met. The court further held that one of the appellants that had not been found in contempt was precluded from intervening in a matter between the contemnor and the court. The court therefore dismissed the appeal that had been filed by the appellant that was not subject to the trial court’s contempt order. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-261 |
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State v. Hawkins
| 115145 | Successive; petition for postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.23; hearing; jurisdiction; de novo; abuse of discretion; unavoidably prevented; evidence outside the record; res judicata. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain defendant’s successive petition for postconviction relief as a matter of law and did not abuse its discretion by dismissing it without a hearing. Appellant failed to meet the requirements of R.C. 2953.23 by failing to demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering any evidence. Furthermore, because appellant raised his sentencing issue in his direct appeal, and has failed to demonstrate evidence outside of the record, this issue is barred by res judicata. While Ohio law permits the filing of multiple petitions, a petitioner does not have carte blanche to file successive petitions endlessly. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-262 |
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Pizzuli v. Yurko
| 115206 | Political-subdivision immunity; statute of limitations; motion to dismiss. The trial court did not err in granting the appellees’ motion to dismiss because the appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-263 |
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In re B.M.
| 115239 | R.C. 3119.96, et seq.; paternity; motion for relief from paternity; genetic-test results; willfully failed to comply. The trial court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to consider appellant’s motion for relief from paternity because he did not provide timely genetic-test results. While the court could not grant relief without the proper results, the submission of such results was not a jurisdictional impediment. Where appellant argued that the mother of the child had refused to submit the child to genetic testing, the trial court was required under R.C. 3119.963 to determine whether the mother had “willfully” failed to submit the child to genetic testing. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-264 |
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Bello v. Highland Pointe Health & Rehab Ctr.
| 115326 | R.C. 2711.03; enforcement of arbitration provision; oral hearing unequivocally and specifically requested is mandatory; abuse of discretion. Appellants appealed the trial court’s denial of their motion to stay and enforce an arbitration agreement before conducting an oral hearing as requested in their motion. We find that while an oral hearing is not always required to satisfy the “hearing” mandate of R.C. 2711.03, an oral hearing is required and shall be granted when unequivocally and specifically requested by a party pursuant to R.C. 2711.03. As such the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to stay and enforce arbitration before conducting an oral hearing. The matter is reversed and remanded to the trial court to conduct an oral hearing to determine whether the validity of the arbitration agreement is at issue. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
1/29/2026
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1/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-265 |
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