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State v. Spivey
| 115015 | Aggravated murder; plain error; Crim.R. 52; ineffective assistance of counsel; identification testimony; hearsay; surveillance footage; manifest weight of the evidence; juror bias; abuse of discretion. It was not plain error to admit testimony as to how the defendant-appellant was identified as a suspect or the defendant-appellant’s identity in the surveillance footage, and it was not ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel to fail to object to this testimony. It was not plain error to admit palm-print evidence or evidence regarding attempts to locate the defendant-appellant, and it was not ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel to fail to object to this evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to separately inquire of a juror where it inquired of the foreperson following an allegation of misconduct. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1550 |
|
State v. Greene
| 115111 | Hearsay; sufficient evidence; manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err or prejudice appellant by admitting hearsay statements from forensic interviews of the victims. The appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1551 |
|
State v. Burge
| 115282, 115563 | Vacate plea; withdrawal of plea; Crim.R. 11; knowing and voluntary pleas; plea agreement; colloquy; State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; purposes of felony sentencing; ineffective assistance of counsel. - Judgment affirmed. Defendant-appellant failed to demonstrate that his plea was entered unknowingly, involuntarily, or unintelligently. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences. The trial court complied with the principles and purposes of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Defendant-appellant has not demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1552 |
|
State v. Peterson
| 115313 | Withdrawal of plea; Crim.R. 11; knowing, voluntary and intelligent; State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765; ineffective assistance of counsel; cruel and unusual punishment; consecutive sentences; maximum sentence. - Judgment affirmed. Defendant-appellant did not demonstrate that his plea was entered unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily nor did he demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective for such reason. The trial court’s sentence is not contrary to law. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1553 |
|
In re A.C.-L.
| 115359 | R.C. 2151.23(A)(2); application to determine custody; best interest; R.C. 3109.04(F)(1); objections to the magistrate’s decision; guardian ad litem; notice. Court did not abuse its discretion in designating Father as legal custodian and residential parent the Child. Mother did not file a transcript with the trial court to support her late-filed objections to the magistrate’s decisions, so we must accept as true the court’s findings of fact. Court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding to hearing despite inactive guardian ad litem where none was required and where Mother identified no resulting prejudice. Reviewing for plain error, no manifest injustice resulted from week-on, week-off parenting schedule. Because the docket indicated that the magistrate’s decisions and trial court’s judgment entry were sent to wrong address for Mother, we review her late-filed objections out of caution. Because we find no merit in her other assignments of error, we also find that she can demonstrate no manifest injustice resulting from any notice issue. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1554 |
|
State v. Jones
| 115378 | Abduction; rape; attempted rape; firearm specifications; firearm; gun; sufficiency; manifest weight; threatened; reasonable inferences; circumstantial evidence; direct evidence; possession; control; facilitate. Affirmed appellant’s conviction upon finding the challenged firearm specifications accompanying the charges for rape and attempted rape were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trier of fact could reasonably infer from the direct and circumstantial evidence provided that the firearm displayed during the victim’s abduction from her home was used to facilitate the rape and attempted rape offenses that followed 10 to 15 minutes thereafter at another location and that appellant had the firearm in his possession and under his control throughout the entire course of criminal conduct committed against the victim. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1555 |
|
Shechter v. Dubick
| 115412, 115413 | Divorce; arbitration; R.C. Ch. 2711; confirmation; award; judgment. Affirmed. The domestic relations court’s order confirming and entering the final decree of divorce in conformity with the arbitration award was not in error because that judgment was based on the domestic relations court’s jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration award and no motion to vacate, modify, or otherwise change the arbitration award was filed by the appellant. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1556 |
|
Joy v. MetroHealth Sys.
| 115437 | Motion for judgment on the pleadings; Civ.R. 12(C); breach of contract; at-will employment; handbook; policy; wrongful termination in violation of public policy; clear public policy; clarity element; specificity. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in granting defendant-appellee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing plaintiff-appellant’s complaint asserting breach-of-contract and wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claims. Neither the complaint’s factual allegations nor the documents attached the pleadings support the conclusion that an employment contract existed between plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee. Moreover, plaintiff-appellant did not cite any specific statement of law in support of his claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Consequently, plaintiff-appellant did not sufficiently plead the claim’s clarity element. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1557 |
|
In re M.W.H.
| 115498 | Best interest of the child; R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b); R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(c); shared parenting agreement; contempt of court. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to terminate shared parenting where the record reflected that there was evidence in the record establishing that it was in the best interest of the child to continue parenting time with appellee, most of the issues that led to appellant filing the motion had been addressed, and appellant testified that she did not oppose parenting time as long as it did not occur in appellee’s house. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suspend overnight visits with appellee where the record established that appellee had addressed most of the issues, there still remained concerns about appellee’s residence, but he established that he had utilities in his name, had remained in the residence for two years after its sale at foreclosure, and appellant testified that she was not opposed to overnight visits only the location. The trial court erred in holding appellant in contempt of court where appellant established by a preponderance of the evidence that she had a good-faith basis for her decision to terminate parenting time where the minor child reported no heat or water in the home, and appellee refused to discuss the issues with appellant or show her that he had addressed the issues in the home until several months later. Further, throughout the case, appellee refused to allow the guardian ad litem to inspect his home and appellee did not complete court-ordered substance-abuse assessments in a timely manner. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1558 |
|
Semaj v. Savelli
| 115531 | Settlement agreement; motion to enforce settlement agreement; jurisdiction. The parties resolved a tort claim by settlement agreement, the terms of which the court read into the record at hearing, including that the court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. The court’s journal entry failed to reflect the settlement provision concerning the court’s ongoing enforcement authority. Case remanded for issuance of a nunc pro tunc order noting that the court retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and for further proceedings regarding appellant’s motion to enforce the agreement’s terms. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1559 |
|
McIntyre v. Landscape Mgt. & Design, Inc.
| 115539 | Pro se litigant; small claims court; manifest-weight standard of review; negligence claim; competent, credible evidence; App.R. 9(C). The municipal court’s judgment, under a manifest-weight standard, was supported by competent, credible evidence and the applicable case law. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1560 |
|
State v. Abraham
| 115553 | Motion for new trial; Crim.R. 33; motion for leave. The trial court properly denied defendant’s untimely motion for new trial because it was filed without first obtaining leave to file the motion for new trial. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1561 |
|
State v. Jordan
| 115625 | Motion to withdraw guilty plea; Crim.R. 11; hearing; change of heart. Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, where the scope of the hearing was sufficient to address appellant’s claims and the trial court fully and completely considered the motion; appellant’s decision was based on a change of heart where he engaged in a detailed conversation with the trial court, was advised that he had the option of proceeding to trial if he wanted to tell his version of events, was given the opportunity to consult with counsel and entered the guilty pleas, and later moved to withdraw the pleas because he claimed that the advice of counsel scared him into entering a plea rather than proceed to trial. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1562 |
|
Leghart v. Schuler Painting, Inc.
| 115657, 115663 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); workers’ compensation; employee; independent contractor; right to control test. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants-appellees because plaintiff-appellant failed to demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether he was an employee of defendant-appellee when he injured himself on the job. The evidence presented in support of the trial court’s finding that plaintiff-appellant was an independent contractor and not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits included the undisputed fact that prior to starting work for defendant-appellee, plaintiff-appellant never (1) signed a Form I-9; (2) provided a driver’s license or any documents to Schuler Painting establishing his eligibility to work in the country; (3) executed a Form W-4; (4) received an employee handbook; or (5) received any employee benefits, including health insurance. Defendant-appellee also produced text messages between the parties demonstrating that the job was to be for a week. Defendant-appellee also introduced medical records that indicated that when plaintiff-appellant sought treatment, he told the treating physician that he was “self-employed.” The only evidence plaintiff-appellant presented to establish that he was an employee were his own claims made at a deposition. This was insufficient to meet his reciprocal burden on summary judgment. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1563 |
|
Abdelmalek v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio
| 115665 | Standard of review; findings of fact and conclusions of law; R.C. 4731.22(F)(5); burden of proof. The common pleas court did not err when it did not issue factual findings and legal conclusions where R.C. 119.12 did not require them. The fact that the common pleas court found the testimony of the seven patients more credible than the five chaperones who testified in support of appellant did not equate to the common pleas court impermissibly shifting the burden of proof. The common pleas court erred when it found that the State Medical Board’s decision was supported by reliable and probative evidence when R.C. 119.12(N) requires a finding that the evidence is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, particularly where the appellant challenged the weight of the evidence. The common pleas court did not err when it refused to allow appellant access to an ombudsman report. Appellant requested the report four days before trial, and the common pleas court denied the request because it was untimely and appellant failed to show good cause for the delay. Additionally, the State Medical Board used an excerpt from the report to impeach a witness whose statement at trial was different from a statement she gave in an earlier investigation and provided a copy of the excerpt to appellant the day before trial. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1564 |
|
Kung v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
| 115719 | Bootstrapping; Civ.R. 60(B); motion for relief from judgment; timeliness; direct appeal. - Judgment affirmed. Appellant did not appeal the ruling on the motion for summary judgment and cannot now contest the merits on her appeal of the court’s denial of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1565 |
|
State v. Yancy
| 114608 | Application to reopen appeal; App.R. 26; ineffective assistance of counsel; prejudice; res judicata; appellate review; limited to the record; failure to object; tactical decision; trial strategy; prosecutorial misconduct; closing arguments. Appellant’s application for reopening is denied. Appellant did not demonstrate that her appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise her proposed assignments of error. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/28/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1549 |
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State v. Griffin
| 114895 | Guilty plea; waiver of nonjurisdictional issues; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; separately assigned error; waive argument; hybrid sentence; no-contact order; community-control sanction; plain error; prejudice; invited error. Because appellant pled guilty, he waived any arguments related to the probable-cause finding by the juvenile court. Under App.R. 12(A) and 16(A), the court declined to consider appellant’s argument regarding the validity of his plea because he did not separately assign this argument as error. Further, while the trial court improperly imposed hybrid sentences of a prison sentence and a no-contact order, which is a community-control sanction, appellant invited any error by accepting a plea agreement that included hybrid sentences. Moreover, appellant failed to demonstrate how he suffered any prejudice and therefore could not demonstrate plain error. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-925 |
|
State ex rel. Boggs v. Cleveland
| 112111 | Motion for summary judgment; writ of mandamus; taking; appropriation; eminent domain; standing; redressability; municipality; outside municipal corporate limits; Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution; Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution; R.C. 719.02; R.C. 719.01. Relators lacked standing to obtain a writ of mandamus against Cleveland to compel it to begin appropriation proceedings of their property, which is located outside of its municipal corporate limits. Section 19, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution, as limited by Section 3, Article XVIII, does not provide Cleveland with the power of eminent domain beyond its geographical limits. Nor is the appropriation of Relators’ property within the statutory authority conferred by R.C. 719.02, which allows municipalities to acquire property outside of its limits, when reasonably necessary, for the specific purposes set forth in R.C. 719.01. Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that Relators’ claim is not redressable by a writ of mandamus and concluded that Relators lacked standing to bring the action. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in Cleveland’s favor. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1450 |
|
Stewart v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Inc.
| 115049 | Class action; breach of contract; automobile insurance; actual cash value; appraisal provision; binding; moot. - Trial court’s decision granting class certification is reversed because the plaintiff’s individual claims became moot prior to class certification. The trial court ordered the parties to undergo a contractually mandated appraisal process. The subsequent appraisal award was contractually binding on both parties, and the insurance company tendered payment to plaintiff, leaving no live controversy between the parties. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1451 |
|
Gringo v. Hanak
| 115341 | Defamation; defamation per se; online review; vexatious litigator; presumed damages; presumed malice; summary judgment; Crim.R. 56; improper Crim.R. 56 material; affidavit; privileged statements; motion to quash; abuse of discretion; damages hearing; compensatory damages; punitive damages; plain error. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the appellee, a doctor, in his defamation lawsuit against a former patient who published a Yelp review accusing the doctor of multiple crimes, including rape. The statements amounted to defamation per se and were not privileged. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a witness’ motion to quash and in excluding the testimony of one of appellant’s friends because neither had personal knowledge of appellee’s damages. The court did not commit plain error in awarding compensatory and punitive damages to appellee because there was ample evidence to support the award. The defamatory statements were made with hatred, ill will, a spirit of revenge, or with disregard to the doctor’s rights and safety. The parties concede that appellant had already been declared a vexatious litigator at the time the order in this case was entered. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1452 |
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State v. Riley
| 115512 | R.C. 2953.74; postconviction DNA testing; biological material; parent sample. Affirmed. The trial court’s decision denying the offender’s application for postconviction DNA testing under R.C. 2953.71-2953.81 was not in error; it cannot be determined that a scientifically sufficient amount of material is held by the State from which a test sample could be extracted under R.C. 2953.74(C)(2) because the offender concedes that no parent sample exists under R.C. 2953.74(C)(1) for further testing. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1453 |
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State v. Centers
| 115518 | Merger; allied offenses of similar import; limited record; guilty plea; R.C. 2941.25; abuse of a corpse; tampering with evidence. It was not plain error to sentence defendant separately for the offenses of abuse of a corpse and tampering with evidence where the limited record did not support his assertion that the offenses were committed by the same conduct. | Clary | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1454 |
|
State v. Jones
| 115535 | Postconviction relief; successive petition; untimely petition; motion for leave to file motion for new trial; unavoidably prevented; Brady violation; Brady v. Maryland; suppression; suppressed evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel; work product; newly discovered evidence; res judicata; R.C. 2953.21; R.C. 2953.21(A); R.C. 2953.21(A)(1); R.C. 2953.21(A)(2); R.C. 2953.23; Crim.R. 33; Crim.R. 33(B). Judgment affirmed. The trial court properly denied appellant’s untimely and successive petition for postconviction relief and his motion for leave to file an untimely motion for new trial because he failed to show that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence on which he relied. Appellant offered no affidavits from persons with firsthand knowledge establishing that an assistant prosecutor’s interoffice memorandum had been suppressed or explaining when and how it was obtained. The memorandum did not refer to evidence and any contention that the assistant prosecutor’s impressions were based on suppressed evidence was speculation. The memorandum was work product, not evidence that the State was required to disclose. Furthermore, appellant could not circumvent the “unavoidably prevented” requirement by arguing in the alternative that if his trial counsel possessed the memorandum, counsel was ineffective in not using it. Arguments that could have been made on direct appeal or in his previous petition for postconviction relief were barred by res judicata. Appellant likewise failed to show that Larissa Taylor’s affidavit could not have been obtained earlier, and her proffered account of the conflict did not undermine confidence in the verdict because it conflicted with the trial evidence and appellant’s own statement to police. Any hearing on appellant’s Crim.R. 33(B) motion for leave to file a motion for new trial would be an exercise in futility because the same “unavoidably prevented” requirement applicable to an untimely, successive petition for postconviction relief applies to a Crim.R. 33(B) motion. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1455 |
|
State v. Becks
| 115653 | Crim.R. 32.1; ineffective assistance of counsel; hearing; pressure; defective performance. - Appellant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel during her presentence motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Appellant failed to demonstrate that a conflict existed between her and counsel, and the record does not support that appellant was pressured by her counsel to plead guilty. Counsel strongly advocated for appellant’s plea to be withdrawn, and thus counsel’s representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonable representation. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1456 |
|
In re C.F.
| 115689 | Permanent custody; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iv); plain error; best interest of child; R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); clear and convincing evidence; plain error; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; engagement with case-plan services. Where Mother failed to challenge factual findings in her objections to magistrate’s decision, she waived all but plain error with respect to those findings. Juvenile court’s determination that permanent custody was in the best interest of the child was supported by clear and convincing evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mother’s initial progress with case-plan services did not preclude a grant of permanent custody to the agency where progress did not continue as the case progressed. Mother had not substantially remedied the conditions that caused child’s removal, and there was no indication she would do so at any reasonable time in the future. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1457 |
|
State ex rel. Lundeen v. Miday
| 115697 | Mandamus; Civ.R. 12(C); motion for judgment on the pleadings; jurisdiction; adequate remedy; counterclaim dismissal. When a specific action is within a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction renders the court’s judgment voidable, not void. Any extraordinary relief, such as through an original action, is not available to attack a voidable judgment. When a court possesses basic subject-matter jurisdiction to act, and an appeal is available, a writ will not issue. Thus, we find that the relators have failed to establish a right to have the dismissal of their counterclaim vacated, failed to establish that respondent-judge is required to vacate the judgment that dismissed their counterclaim, and failed to establish that an appeal does not constitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1458 |
|
Hunter v. Dahdouh
| 115847 | Denial of motion to continue; Unger test; abuse of discretion. Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to continue the trial filed the day before trial was scheduled. We find that the trial court applied the proper test and weighed the factors in Unger and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to continue. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/23/2026
|
4/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1459 |
|
State v. Cooper
| 108923 | App.R. 26(B); application for reopening. Appellant’s application to reopen his direct appeal is denied where his application was filed beyond the 90-day deadline and he failed to establish good cause for the delayed filing. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/21/2026
|
4/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1548 |
|
Citywide RX, L.L.C. v. Providence Healthcare Mgt., Inc.
| 115352 | Attorney fees; reasonableness; breach of contract; Civ.R. 56(C); summary judgment; de novo review; new arguments; waived; App. 16(A)(7); App. 12(A)(2); locale; evidence. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of appellee on a request for attorney fees. Appellee set forth sufficient Civ.R. 56(C) evidence to establish that the rates and hours charged were reasonable. Appellant failed to set forth any Civ.R. 56(C) evidence to establish that a genuine issue of material fact remained to be litigated on the reasonableness of attorney fees charged by appellee. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1377 |
|
State v. Stafford
| 115414 | Plain error; waiver; constitutionality; R.C. 2923.13(A)(2); ineffective assistance. Appellant waived argument regarding the constitutionality of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) based on this court’s ruling in State v. Philpotts, 2025-Ohio-1179 (8th Dist.), when he failed to raise it with the trial court. Nevertheless, the record reflects that the trial court did not plainly err, where the Ohio Supreme Court stayed execution of the Philpotts case pending appeal. Appellant did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on allegations that his counsel did not consider or advise him of the Philpotts decision before entering his plea, where the record did not reflect counsel’s failure. To the extent appellant argued events that happened off the record, his remedy was in postconviction-relief proceedings and not direct appeal. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1378 |
|
Islam v. Razzak
| 115438 | Domestic relations; post-decree motion hearing; motion for continuance; abuse of discretion; Sup.R. 41(B); ineffective assistance of counsel; right to counsel; ex parte; cumulative-error doctrine; App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16(A)(7). Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff-appellant’s motion for continuance. In light of the discovery delays created by plaintiff-appellant, the trial court’s clear directives regarding continuances based on counsel’s unavailability, plaintiff-appellant’s eleventh-hour motion for continuance, and plaintiff-appellant’s complete failure to appear for the post-decree motion hearing, we cannot say that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in denying the motion. Moreover, Sup.R. 41(B) did not require the granting of plaintiff-appellant’s motion for continuance in this case. Next, we find no grounds for reversal based on plaintiff-appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Plaintiff-appellant did not have a constitutional right to counsel at this domestic-relations hearing, and the trial court was within its right to proceed with the hearing in plaintiff-appellant’s and his counsel’s absence. Finally, since plaintiff-appellant did not provide any legal authority to suggest that (1) any error — let alone multiple — occurred and (2) application of the cumulative-error doctrine is appropriate in this case, we decline to find that the doctrine mandates reversal. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1379 |
|
Frederico v. 1795 Spino Dr., L.L.C.
| 115468 | Civ.R. 12(B)(6); motion to dismiss; political subdivision tort immunity, R.C. 2744.02(B)(3). Judgment reversed. The trial court erred by denying the city’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss on immunity grounds. Plaintiff did not allege facts in his complaint to demonstrate that the tree was an obstruction on the roadway that blocked or clogged the roadway. Thus, the plaintiff failed to allege facts that an exception under R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) to the city’s general grant of immunity applied. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1380 |
|
State v. Sampson
| 115478 | Sixth Amendment; right to counsel of choice; motion to continue; abuse of discretion; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; felony sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G); contrary to law; judicial bias; presumed unbiased and unprejudiced; fair proceeding. Judgment affirmed. The record is clear that appellant’s last-minute request for a continuance to hire an attorney was a delay tactic, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion. The record establishes that the trial court considered the R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 factors when sentencing the appellant and the sentence was not contrary to law. Finally, there is no compelling evidence that the trial court was biased against appellant. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1381 |
|
State v. Lewis
| 115526 | Motion to suppress; traffic stop; probable cause; odor; burnt marijuana; vehicle search; automobile exception; R.C. 3780.36; R.C. 3780.99; smoking marijuana while in vehicle. The trial court did not err in determining that the police officer lacked probable cause to search appellant’s vehicle. The odor of burnt marijuana combined with appellant’s admission that he had smoked marijuana in the vehicle earlier that day supported a potential violation of former R.C. 3780.36(D)(2), which prohibits smoking marijuana in a vehicle. However, pursuant to former R.C. 3780.99, this provision only applies to passengers in a vehicle, not the operator of the vehicle. Accordingly, probable cause that a criminal offense had been committed did not exist, and the search of appellant’s vehicle was improper. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1382 |
|
In re L.N.
| 115709 | R.C. 2151.353(A)(4); permanent custody; termination of parental rights; R.C. 2151.414(E)(11); best interest of the child; R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); clear and convincing evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; legal custody; temporary custody. - Juvenile court did not err in granting permanent custody of children to agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(4). The record supported juvenile court’s finding that mother, who had her parental rights terminated as to two of her other children, failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she could provide a legally secure placement for the children under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). The juvenile court’s findings that (1) the children could not be placed with one of the children’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent and (2) permanent custody was in the children’s best interest were supported by clear and convincing evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Given the juvenile court’s determination that permanent custody to the agency was in the children’s best interest, granting legal custody to a relative or temporary custody to the agency necessarily was not in their best interest. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1383 |
|
State v. Humphries
| 115756 | Conceded error; statute of limitations; motion to dismiss; ineffective assistance of counsel. - State concede that appellant was deprived of effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to raise a statute-of-limitations argument in the motion to dismiss. A reasonable probability existed that the five-year-old misdemeanor offense would have been dismissed and thus he would not have been subsequently convicted. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/16/2026
|
4/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1384 |
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State v. Frazier
| 115203 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; murder; having a weapon while under disability; aiding and abetting; ineffective assistance of counsel; jury instructions; abuse of discretion. Convictions affirmed. There was sufficient evidence to support appellant’s convictions for murder and having a weapon while under disability. Appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where both circumstantial and direct evidence linked appellant to the crimes. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on a complicity theory of aiding and abetting, nor did its discretion in instructing the jury that it may compare a picture of the suspect at the scene of the crime to appellant’s in-court appearance as a defendant at trial. Lastly, trial counsel was not ineffective where trial counsel’s actions were a matter of trial strategy. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
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4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1275 |
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Hrina v. KLS Martin, L.P.
| 115222 | Motion to dismiss; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); Civ.R. 10(D)(2); Civ.R. 15(C); affidavit of merit. Trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss where plaintiffs failed to timely file an affidavit of merit as required by Civ.R. 10(D)(2). | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
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4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1276 |
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State v. Kijanski
| 115281 | Consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); multiple victims; proportionality; criminal history; mitigation evidence, mitigation report; presentence-investigation report; allocution; weapons under disability; felonious assault; discharge of firearm on or near prohibited premises; tampering with evidence. Judgment affirmed. The record supported the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences after appellant pleaded guilty to discharge of firearm on or near prohibited premises, two counts of felonious assault involving two separate teenage victims, tampering with evidence, and having weapons while under disability. Review of a trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) is highly deferential. Here the trial court made the required R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings, and the record supported those findings. Appellant shot two random victims, and the existence of multiple victims reasonably supported consecutive terms on the felonious-assault counts. In addition, his repeated weapons-related conduct, including both juvenile and adult criminal history, supported the finding that consecutive service was necessary to protect the public. The trial court did not err in rejecting appellant’s reliance on mitigation evidence and arguments about consistency with similarly situated offenders. Such arguments are more appropriately raised with respect to findings under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 rather than consecutive-sentence findings. Moreover, the trial court expressly considered the presentence-investigation report, the mitigation report, victim-impact statements, appellant’s statements in allocution, and the arguments of counsel at the sentencing hearing but remained skeptical of his claimed blackout, remorse, and explanation for the shooting. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
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4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1277 |
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State v. Fluker
| 115355 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; burglary; force; menacing by stalking; intimidation; unlawful threat of harm; ineffective assistance of counsel; joinder; Crim.R. 8(A); jury instructions; curative instructions; hearsay; state-of-mind exceptions; Evid.R. 803(3); constitutional speedy trial; statutory speedy trial; mistrial. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support appellant’s convictions for burglary, menacing by stalking, and intimidation. Appellant’s convictions for burglary, menacing by stalking, and intimidation were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in joining appellant’s cases together for the purposes of trial because the evidence supporting appellant’s convictions would have been admitted in each trial if tried separately. The error in the jury instructions concerning the date of appellant’s prior convictions was corrected by the court, and the jury was advised of the correct date; therefore, there was no prejudice. The trial court did err in instructing the jury to determine whether appellant used a deadly weapon in a manner calculated to destroy life since there was nothing in the record to support this instruction, but the error was harmless. The trial court did not err in admitting jail calls made by the appellant while incarcerated because they were permitted to demonstrate consciousness of guilt. The trial court did err in allowing an officer to testify as to why the victim in this case was scared of appellant, but that error was harmless since the victim testified at trial and appellant had an opportunity to cross-examine her. Appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel was not required to file a motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds when speedy trial had not yet run. Counsel was also not ineffective for choosing not to move for a mistrial. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
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4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1278 |
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SPM Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Italian Restaurant Group, L.L.C.
| 115382 | Summary judgment; breach of contract; motion to disqualify attorney; mitigation of damages; abrogation of duty to mitigate damages. A review of the contracts at issue shows that the landlord had a duty to mitigate its damages in the event the tenant defaulted and landlord retook possession of the property. Furthermore, there was a factual issue for the jury regarding whether the landlord did mitigate its damages. The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord. Because summary judgment was improper, the trial court also erred by rendering moot the motion to disqualify one of the landlord’s attorneys based on conflict of interest. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
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4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1279 |
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Marcinkevicius v. Galloway
| 115391 | Probate; appointment of successor trustee; trustee rejects trustee appointment; trust instrument; courts of equity; Ohio Trust Code; priority of trustee appointment; R.C. 5807.04(C). - Judgment affirmed. The court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a successor trustee where there was a vacancy and then an attempted appointment pursuant to the terms of the trust. The court’s jurisdiction was properly invoked and as a court of equity, it was enabled to make the successor appointment when it found that the person named in the trust to make an appointment did not follow the wishes of the settlor. The court’s appointment comported with the order of priority in R.C. 5807.04(C) and aligned with the settlor’s wishes. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
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4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1280 |
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M.H. v. B.S.
| 115470 | Domestic violence civil protection order; motion for continuance; abuse of discretion; R.C. 3113.31; Civ.R. 65.1; child abuse; sufficient evidence in the record. The domestic relations court did not abuse its discretion by granting one continuance of the full hearing on a domestic violence civil protection order, because the respondent had not been served with the petition or the ex parte order, and the petitioner’s attorney could not attend the originally scheduled full hearing. The domestic relations court did not err in granting the domestic violence civil protection order, because sufficient evidence in the record showed that the respondent committed child abuse against the victim, which is enough to issue a protection order under R.C. 3113.31 and Civ.R. 65.1. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
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4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1281 |
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State v. R.T.
| 115475 | Seal record of federal conviction; R.C. 2953.32. Reversed, vacated, and remanded. The trial court’s order sealing the record of a federal conviction contains requirements exceeding the state court’s limited authority to seal any state-retained record of the federal conviction not used or maintained pursuant to federal law. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
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4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1282 |
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R.S. v. G.S.
| 115476 | Domestic-violence civil-protection order (“DVCPO”); domestic violence; R.C. 3113.31; sufficient, credible evidence. Judgment vacated and remanded. The trial court erred in granting a DVCPO because the petitioner did not present sufficient, credible evidence that she was in danger of domestic violence. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
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4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1283 |
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State v. Moore
| 115503 | Domestic violence; manifest weight of the evidence; bench trial; credibility; victim testimony; delayed medical treatment; physical harm; attempt to cause physical harm; visible injury not required; Crim.R. 29; R.C. 2919.25(A). Judgment affirmed. Following a bench trial, appellant was convicted of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a felony of the third degree, for assaulting his mother in their shared home by shoving her into a freezer door after she refused to buy him cigarettes. In arguing that the conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence, he claimed that the victim was not credible because she wanted him removed from the home, delayed going to the hospital, and allegedly could have deliberately injured herself after police told her the day before that appellant could not be removed from the home unless he put his hands on her. The trial court, as factfinder in a bench trial, was entitled to credit the victim’s testimony over the appellant’s denial, especially where photographs and medical records supported the victim’s account. Visible injury is not required for a domestic-violence conviction because the statute also prohibits an attempt to cause physical harm. This was not the exceptional case in which the factfinder clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
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4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1284 |
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State v. Wright
| 115514 | Effective assistance of counsel; deficient performance; plea bargain; sexual battery; sexual activity; sexual conduct; U.S. Const. amend VI; Ohio Const. art. I, § 10; R.C. 2907.03; R.C. 2907.02; R.C. 2907.01; Crim.R. 11(C)(2). Affirmed. Appellant did not show that defense counsel’s assistance was deficient or that appellant’s defense was prejudiced where defense counsel did not interject after the trial court did not state the elements of an amended charge during the plea colloquy and defense counsel did not move to withdraw the appellant’s guilty plea after appellant made statements at sentencing minimizing his actions. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
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4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1285 |
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State v. Clark
| 115520 | Sentencing hearing, presumption of incarceration, sexual battery, R.C. 2907.03, plain error, Crim.R. 52(B), purposes of felony sentencing, R.C. 2929.11, seriousness and recidivism factors, R.C. 2929.12. Appellant’s sentence for sexual battery affirmed. During sentencing hearing, court mistakenly stated that sexual battery under R.C. 2907.03 carries a presumption of incarceration. However, appellant did not demonstrate that this affected the outcome of the proceeding or amounted to a manifest miscarriage of justice. Court made explicit finding that community-control sanction would not have been appropriate in this case, where appellant’s victim was under the age of 12, was a family member, and where appellant had a significant criminal history, including for prior violent offenses. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
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4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1286 |
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State v. Green
| 115598 | Effective assistance of counsel; knowing and voluntary plea; plea colloquy; mental-health-court docket; postsentence motion to withdraw guilty plea; manifest injustice; Crim.R. 11(C); Cuyahoga C.P., Gen.Div., Loc.R. 30.1; Crim.R. 32.1. Affirmed. The trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea because appellant did not establish a manifest injustice. Defense counsel’s assistance was not ineffective when defense counsel did not request a transfer to the mental-health-court docket because appellant did not establish that he qualified for the specialized docket, that the trial court would have applied for a transfer, or that the administrative judge would have granted a request for a transfer. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/9/2026
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4/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1287 |
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