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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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State v. Zolikoff
| 114660 | Gross sexual imposition; R.C. 2907.05(A)(4); Evid.R. 404(B); other-acts evidence; motive; preparation or plan; lack of mistake or accident. Defendant appealed his conviction for gross sexual imposition, arguing that he was prejudiced by introduction of other-acts evidence that served no permissible purpose under Evid.R. 404(B). Testimony that defendant had developed relationships with and touched a friend of his daughter years prior to the charged offense did not show motive, preparation or plan, or lack of mistake or accident regarding alleged touching of victim in this case. Inadmissible other-acts evidence prejudiced defense, requiring a new trial, where only defendant and victim had firsthand knowledge regarding the touching at issue. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5040 |
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Estate of Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp.
| 114713 | Motion for class certification; R.C. 2505.39; remand; mandate; law-of-the-case doctrine; standing; concrete injury. The trial court erred in granting class certification where plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not demonstrate that they had suffered a concrete injury. The court further erred by granting class certification in violation of the law-of-the-case doctrine. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5041 |
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State v. Chavers
| 114727 | Sufficient evidence; plain error; ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court erred when it found appellant guilty of the higher degree of the felonies charged because there was not sufficient evidence. The appellant did not argue plain error, so we are not inclined to address it. The appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5042 |
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S. Shore Lake Erie Assets & Operations, L.L.C. v. Johnson
| 114777 | Summary judgment; standing; counterclaims; limited-liability company; vessel; boat; fraud; breach of contract; indemnification; defamation; flooding; broker; third-party defendant; damages; false statement of fact; genuine issue of material fact. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, a boat-brokerage firm, was affirmed as to defendant, the sole member of a limited-liability company, where the defendant failed to present evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact on his counterclaim for defamation. The defendant did not have standing to assert claims on appeal that belonged to the limited-liability company, for which he was the sole member. These claims belonged to the limited-liability company, not the defendant in his individual capacity. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5043 |
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Galloway v. Garmon, Exr.
| 114786, 115075 | Declaratory judgment; summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; de novo; evidence; unauthenticated; contract; agreement; property; real estate; right of first refusal; signed; statute of frauds; offer; acceptance; meeting of the minds; motion for relief from judgment; Civ.R. 60(B); grounds for relief; meritorious claim; abuse of discretion. Affirmed probate court’s decision granting summary judgment to defendants-appellees on plaintiffs-appellants’ claims for “declaration of validity of agreement to sell” and specific performance where there was a lack of admissible evidence to support appellants’ claims, and even if a purported letter were admissible, there was no valid contract. The alleged contract was not signed by a co-owner of the property and arguably violated the statute of frauds, acceptance was not made in a reasonable time, and there was no meeting of the minds. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants’ motion for relief from final judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5044 |
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JTC Solutions, L.L.C. v. New Age Consulting Serv., Inc.
| 114799 | Motion to compel; statutory interpretation; de novo standard of review; R.C. 1335.11(F)(3); mootness; failure to address presented issue; reversal. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it found R.C. 1335.11(F)(3) rendered a contract’s arbitration provision void and denied defendant-appellant’s motion to compel on that basis. Pursuant to this court’s finding that R.C. 1335.11(F)(3) did not void the arbitration provision, the trial court’s alleged failure to state whether the presented facts and parties met the statutory definitions was moot. Where the trial court’s denial of the defendant-appellant’s motion to compel was in error and not based on the merits of the case, the trial court’s order was reversed and the case remanded for further inquiry on the additional arguments raised in the motion to compel. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5045 |
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State v. Smith
| 114814 | Guilty plea; ineffective assistance of counsel; preindictment delay. Judgment affirmed. The defendant failed to establish that his trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to dismiss the indictment based on preindictment delay resulted in actual prejudice to him. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5046 |
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In re K.C.
| 114958 | Kinship Caregiver Act; legal custody; best interests; placement in temporary custody; intensive efforts; foster parents; foster placement; R.C. 2151.353(A)(3); R.C. 2151.011(B)(21); R.C. 2151.4119; R.C. 2151.4115; R.C. 5180.50; R.C. 2151.4118; R.C. 2151.4119; R.C. 2151.412(F)(2); R.C. 2151.417(A). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Order awarding legal custody to foster parents is reversed and remanded for a determination of why legal custody to foster parents rather than maternal great grandmother was in the best interests of the child. Juvenile court did not err when it determined that foster parents have a kin relationship with the child pursuant to the Kinship Caregiver Act and that determination is affirmed. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5047 |
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Monroe v. Petition for Relief From Firearms Disability
| 115011 | R.C. 2923.14(A), “law-abiding life,” application for relief from firearm disability. Denial of application for relief from firearm disability affirmed. Appellant failed to file a hearing transcript, firearm disability arose from appellant’s commission of multiple offenses of violence, and multiple arrest warrants had been issued since appellant’s conviction regarding his failure to appear in court. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5048 |
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Davis v. JLW Constr. Group, L.L.C.
| 115033 | Failure to file transcript; App.R. 9(C); App.R. 9(D); presumption of regularity. The court found in favor of the defendant after a trial. The plaintiff appealed but failed to file the trial transcript. This court must presume regularity and affirm. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5049 |
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In re T.F.
| 115224 | Manifest weight; sufficiency; best interest; clear and convincing; reasonable time; failure to remedy; lack of commitment; abandonment; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e); R.C. 2151.414(E)(1); R.C. 2151.414(E)(4); R.C. 2151.414(E)(10); R.C. 2151.415(D); R.C. 2151.415(A); R.C. 2151.353(G); R.C. 2151.412(H)(2); R.C. 2151.412(F)(2). Judgment affirmed. Permanent custody to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Mother continuously failed to remedy substance abuse, mental-health, housing, and anger-management issues. She had inconsistent visitation with the children, which did not progress beyond supervised visits. Mother missed 39 drug screens and had no prospective sobriety date. Her visits with the children often included 30- to 45-minute phone distractions. One child became inconsolable when mother no-showed. Evidence also supported the juvenile court’s finding that the children’s father had abandoned them. These findings supported the conclusion that the children could not or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. The statutory best-interest factors supported custody to CCDCFS, including, but not limited to, the guardian ad litem’s recommendation, the children’s custodial history since December 2023, and their need for a legally secure placement. Mother’s manifest-weight and sufficiency challenges failed because competent, credible evidence established each statutory element. A finding that a judgment is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a finding that sufficient evidence supports the judgment. We reject mother’s argument that CCDCFS moved too quickly or was required to secure placement with a relative. The agency’s filing of its motion for permanent custody complied with R.C. 2151.415(A) because the R.C. 2151.353(G) one-year temporary custody deadline neared. Temporary custody continued through disposition, and the juvenile court concluded that further extension would have been improper under R.C. 2151.415(D). No relatives filed a motion for legal-custody, CCDCFS was not required to rehabilitate nonparty relatives, and there was no requirement to favor relatives under R.C. 2151.414. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5051 |
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In re E.W.
| 115323 | Parental rights; permanent custody; R.C. 2151.419; reasonable-efforts findings; reasonable efforts by the agency; manifest weight of the evidence; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); child could not or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time; R.C. 2151.414(E)(11); R.C. 2151.414(D); best interests of the child. This court has consistently declined to require findings that reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal or return of a child safely home pursuant to R.C. 2151.419, and we continue to do so. This court found no error when the juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence to support its finding that at least one of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applied and that it was in the best interests of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
11/6/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5052 |
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In re N.A.-S.
| 115191 | Permanent custody; manifest weight of the evidence; clear and convincing evidence; plain error. The trial court’s decision to grant permanent custody to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) was supported by clear and convincing evidence and was also not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mother’s other assignments of error are overruled because she did not raise them at the trial-court level nor argue plain error on appeal. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
10/31/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5050 |
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State ex rel. Eldridge v. Kilbane
| 115338 | Mandamus; prohibition; jurisdiction; priority of jurisdiction rule; forcible entry and detainer action; quiet title claim; fraud; amendment of pleadings; and unprofessional behavior. This court dismissed a complaint for mandamus and prohibition. The priority of jurisdiction rule did not apply; a forcible entry and detainer action in municipal court does not deprive the common pleas court of jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of quiet title and fraud between the same parties and the same parcel of property. Unprofessional behavior by a judge, even if true, does not deprive the judge of jurisdiction. The relator did not properly seek to amend her complaint. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
10/31/2025
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11/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5053 |
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S. Shore Lake Erie Assets & Operations, L.L.C. v. Johnson
| 114726 | Motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; moot; voluntary dismissal with prejudice; breach of contract; App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16(A)(7); App.R. 16(A); failure to cite any authorities or statutes; failure to separately argue assigned error; failure to construct an argument on appeal. The plaintiff-appellee’s fraud claim became moot when the trial court granted the party’s motion to dismiss the claim with prejudice and, accordingly any challenge to the fraud claim is moot. Where defendant-appellant failed to cite any authorities or statutes and failed to separately argue the second and third assignments of error, those assignments of error are overruled. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
10/30/2025
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10/30/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4950 |
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State v. Lee-Robinson
| 114783 | Forgery; receiving stolen property; sufficiency of the evidence; identity. Affirmed. The defendant’s convictions relating to an altered check were not based on insufficient evidence. Based on the evidence presented, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes based on circumstantial evidence, which included the check clearing in the defendant’s business bank account, the check’s endorsement matching the defendant’s name, the funds being immediately transferred to a CashApp account that bore a username similar to the defendant’s name, and signature comparisons that matched defendant’s signatures on official documents. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
10/30/2025
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10/30/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4951 |
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Cleveland v. Sopjack
| 114807 | Community-control sanction; exterior inspection; abuse of discretion; excessive; overbroad; violation. The trial court abused its discretion when it ordered an exterior inspection of appellant’s uncited residential property as an expanded community-control sanction related to violations on a separate property. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
10/30/2025
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10/30/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4952 |
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State v. Martin
| 114834 | Motion for new trial; Crim.R. 33; newly discovered evidence; recanted testimony; independent review; abuse of discretion; credibility. There was no evidence that trial court failed to independently review the record when ruling on a motion for new trial even though the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law tracked the language in the State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions because the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law accurately reflected the facts and the law and there was no evidence that the court rubber-stamped the State’s proposed findings and conclusions. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that recanting witnesses’ testimony was not credible where the testimony required the court to believe that three law enforcement agencies and the witnesses’ defense lawyer engaged in conspiracy and the witnesses’ original trial testimony was consistent with the testimony of another eyewitness and with other corroborating evidence. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/30/2025
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10/30/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4953 |
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Grand v. Cleveland Clinic Found.
| 114851 | Medical claim, R.C. 2305.113(E)(3); affidavit of merit, Civ.R. 10(D)(2)(a); dismissal without prejudice; Civ.R. 10(D)(2)(d); final appealable order, R.C. 2505.02; motion to dismiss, Civ.R. 12(B)(6); Civ.R. 12(C); motion for judgment on the pleadings. Appellant’s complaint set forth a medical claim as defined by statute. Appellant’s failure to submit an affidavit of merit in support of the claim was properly dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 10(D)(2). Civ.R. 12(C) was not an improper procedural avenue for challenging appellant’s failure to file the affidavit of merit. The judgment did not constitute a final appealable order. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
10/30/2025
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10/30/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4954 |
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In re C.H.
| 114941 | Delinquent; rape; abduction; R.C. 2907.02(A)(2); R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b); R.C. 2905.02(B); sufficiency; manifest weight; consecutive; commitment; R.C. 2152.17(F); R.C. 2929.14(C); juvenile offender; confinement; discretion. Affirmed the juvenile court’s decision adjudicating appellant delinquent of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and of abduction in violation of R.C. 2905.02(B). The decision was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The findings required under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) are not required under R.C. 2152.17(F), which vests the juvenile court with discretion to impose consecutive commitments to the department of youth services. Juvenile offenders are treated differently from adult offenders for purposes of confinement. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/30/2025
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10/30/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4955 |
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State v. D.L.L.
| 115025 | Expungement; eligibility; R.C. 2953.32; statutory construction; de novo; plain language. Judgment vacated and remanded. The statutory language of the applicable version of R.C. 2953.32(A)(1) conveys a clear and definite list of exceptions and plainly and unambiguously enumerates the convictions that are ineligible for expungement. Accordingly, the trial court was required to apply the statute as written and any further interpretation of legislative intent was unwarranted. Based on the statute’s plain language, the two fourth-degree-felony convictions that the defendant sought to expunge are clearly not excluded; the statute does not prohibit the sealing or expunging of fourth-degree-felony convictions in relation to third-degree-felony convictions when the fourth-degree felony convictions are nonviolent and otherwise eligible for expungement. Consequently, the trial court erred in finding that the defendant’s two fourth-degree-felony convictions were not eligible for expungement. Since the trial court incorrectly determined the defendant was an ineligible offender based on its interpretation of excluded convictions alone and did not determine whether he was otherwise ineligible under other statutory requirements and considerations, we remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
10/30/2025
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10/30/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4956 |
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Peiffer Wolf Carr Kane Conway & Wise, APLC v. Washington
| 114319 | Directed verdict; Civ.R. 50(A)(4); quantum meruit; moot; alternate theory of liability; manifest weight of the evidence; jury verdict; remand; new trial on compensatory damages. The trial court did not err when it granted a directed verdict finding the corporate defendants-appellants liable under quantum meruit when, construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the defendants-appellants, demonstrated the only conclusion that could have been reached was that the plaintiff-appellee was entitled to recover its contingency fee under quantum meruit from the corporate defendants. A review of the evidence submitted at trial demonstrated the jury clearly lost its way when it entered its verdict of $8,500,000 in favor of the plaintiff-appellee and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that judgment must be reversed and a new trial on compensatory damages ordered to determine the value of plaintiff-appellee’s legal services rendered to the defendants-appellants. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4839 |
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Rodriguez v. Catholic Charities Corp.
| 114437 | Expert witness testimony; admissibility; causation; speculation; directed verdict; vicarious liability; respondeat superior; apportionment of damages; consent judgment entry; negligent hiring, training, and supervision; wrongful death; survival action; failure to report child abuse or neglect. The Estate of a deceased boy sought damages for claims, including wrongful death, a survival action, failure to report child abuse or neglect and negligent hiring, training and supervision, against Catholic Charities, a community service provider hired by the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services to provide services to the boy’s mother and her family. The boy’s mother and her boyfriend pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter of the boy after law enforcement discovered his body buried in the backyard of his home. Evidence in the record tends to show that the boy died of starvation. The Catholic Charities employee who was assigned to this case pled guilty to food stamp fraud for purchasing the boy’s mother’s food stamps for a reduced price. The Catholic Charities employee and the Estate entered into a consent judgment entry in which the employee admitted liability for the boy’s death. After a jury trial, the court granted a directed verdict on all claims other than Catholic Charities’ negligent hiring, training and supervision of its employee who admitted liability. The court found, as a matter of law, that Catholic Charities was not vicariously liable for the negligence of its employee. The jury found in favor of the Estate and against Catholic Charities and awarded the Estate $12 million. After the court applied the statutory cap on non-economic damages, as well as apportionment under the empty-chair defense, the damage award was reduced to $740,000. The Estate appealed. We find that the trial court erred by refusing to acknowledge the consent judgment entry; ruling that the consent judgment entry was inadmissible at trial; ruling that, as a matter of law, Catholic Charities was not vicariously liable for its employee’s negligence; granting Catholic Charities’ motion for directed verdict; ruling that expert testimony regarding causation was speculative and inadmissible at trial; and apportioning damages. Judgment reversed and case remanded for a new trial. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4840 |
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State v. Kenney
| 114553 | R.C. 2953.21; R.C. 2953.23; successive; untimely; petition for postconviction relief; res judicata; burden of proof; unavoidably prevented; newly discovered evidence; witness recantation; affidavits; Brady claim; suppression. Judgment affirmed. The defendant failed to withstand his burden of proving that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence upon which his untimely and successive petition for postconviction relief was based within the statutory deadline or that the State suppressed evidence. Thus, the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction to entertain his petition, did not err in denying the defendant’s R.C. 2953.23 petition, and had no duty to hold a hearing or issue findings of fact and conclusions of law under R.C. 2953.21. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4841 |
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State v. Carter-El
| 114603 | Sufficiency; Crim.R. 29; manifest weight; aggravated murder; R.C. 2903.01(B); murder; R.C. 2903.02(A); R.C. 2903.02(B); aggravated robbery; R.C. 2911.01(A)(1); R.C. 2911.01(A)(3); felonious assault; R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); R.C. 2903.11(A)(2); accomplice testimony instruction; DNA evidence; surveillance-video identification; sentencing; R.C. 2929.03; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b); R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); juvenile bindover; mandatory transfer; Juv.R. 30; R.C. 2152.10; R.C. 2152.12; probable cause. Judgment affirmed. The State presented sufficient evidence through surveillance footage, eyewitness identification by an accomplice, and corroborating DNA linking appellant to the vehicle involved in the crime to support convictions for aggravated murder and firearm specifications. The trial court therefore properly denied appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motions. In addition, the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The jury heard an accomplice’s identification and robbery narrative, the jury could independently evaluate surveillance video and stills depicting the perpetrator the accomplice identified as appellant, and the jury received a cautionary accomplice instruction before crediting that testimony. In sentencing appellant, the trial court did not fail to consider youth as mitigation. The sentencing record expressly reflected consideration of R.C. 2929.11, 2929.12, and the youth-specific factors in R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b). Constitutional challenges were forfeited by failure to object. The aggregate term of 36 years to life, including consecutive three-year firearm specifications, was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Finally, the juvenile court did not err in its mandatory bindover determination. Because appellant was 16 at the time and charged with category one and category two offenses, transfer under R.C. 2152.10 and 2152.12 was proper upon a showing of probable cause. Testimony and exhibits, including surveillance stills, DNA from the vehicle involved in the incident, and a Faygo bottle, as well as ballistic links tying a common firearm to incidents with common suspects, established more than a mere suspicion. Any credibility disputes were for trial, not the probable-cause phase governed by Juv.R. 30. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4842 |
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CommuteAir, L.L.C. v. Bremer
| 114665 | Manifest weight of the evidence; Federal Railway Labor Act; motion for new trial. The trial court’s judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellant’s claims are not covered by the Federal Railway Labor Act. The trial court did not err when it denied the appellant’s motion for a new trial. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4843 |
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Ellis v. Setjo, L.L.C.
| 114735 | Motion to stay pending arbitration; contract; meeting of the minds; retail installment sales contract; arbitration agreement; Civ.R. 6; abuse of discretion. Trial court did not err in denying Kia’s motion to stay pending arbitration. There was no meeting of the minds as the formation of the contract. Appellee was an elderly woman with vision, hearing, and mobility limitations and who was obviously ill when she purportedly signed two arbitration provisions for the purchase of a car. She told the salesperson she could not read the contract nor hear what he was saying but the dealership proceeded with the sales contract anyway. In addition, the arbitration provisions contained conflicting terms. The trial court also did not err in striking Kia’s reply brief. The court expressly told the parties no reply briefs would be accepted but Kia ignored the court’s order and filed a reply brief. It is well-settled that a trial court has discretion to manage its docket. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4844 |
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Pope v. Abdullah
| 114756 | Replevin; R.C. 2737.03; failure to move for evidence to be admitted; manifest weight of the evidence; certificate of title; R.C. 4505.04; R.C. 4505.10. The trial court did not prevent appellant from presenting sufficient evidence of his claim when trial counsel had neglected to move to have the evidence admitted; the court had previously reviewed the exhibits and had heard testimony about them. The judgment denying appellant’s claim for replevin and award of permanent possession of the vehicle to appellee was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4845 |
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In re J.T.
| 114764 | Juvenile sex offender; register; R.C. 2152.83(D); nature of the offense; remorse; abuse of discretion. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in classifying the juvenile offender as a Tier I juvenile sex offender pursuant to R.C. 2152.83(B) given the victim’s young age, the offender’s relationship to the victim, the offender’s apparent inability to take accountability for what occurred, the serious nature of the offense, and the fact that the offense occurred while the victim was asleep. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4846 |
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Cerreta Interiors, L.L.C. v. New Moon, L.L.C.
| 114815 | Civ.R. 56; summary judgment; evidence; disputed issues of material fact. Vacated and remanded. The trial court erred by granting judgment in favor of both defendants because the first defendant’s motion for summary judgment did not address all claims and the second defendant failed to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4847 |
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Issa v. Cleveland Metro. School Dist.
| 114830 | Motion to dismiss; failure to prosecute; motion for relief from judgment; Civ.R. 60(B); bootstrapping. Appeal dismissed. By appealing from the January 15, 2025 journal entry denying appellant’s motion for relief from judgment, appellant is attempting to bootstrap arguments that are time-barred. Appellant is attempting to utilize the instant appeal (denial of her Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment) to improperly seek review of alleged errors that she failed to timely appeal (the dismissal of her refiled case for the failure to prosecute). As a result, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4848 |
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State v. Singleton
| 114841 | No-contact order; prison sentence; hybrid sentence; invited error; plain error; discretion. Vacated and remanded. The imposition of the no-contact order attendant to the prison sentence on the same felony offense is not authorized by statute and constitutes plain error irrespective of the defendant’s agreement to a no-contact order as part of the accepted plea deal under State v. Nelson, 2020-Ohio-6993, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4849 |
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A.L.W.A.Y., L.L.C. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.
| 114845 | R.C. Ch. 119; R.C. 119.01; R.C. 119.12; R.C. 5515.02; Administrative Procedure Act; agency; adjudication; subject-matter jurisdiction; Civ.R. 12(B)(1). The trial court’s judgment dismissing appellants’ appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was affirmed. R.C. 119.12 permits an appeal by a party adversely affected by an order of a state agency issued pursuant to an adjudication. But here, the Ohio Department of Transportation is not an “agency” as defined in R.C. 119.01(A) nor was there an “adjudication” as defined in R.C. 119.01(D). | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4850 |
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In re Z.L.
| 114976 | Permanent custody; domestic violence; manifest weight of the evidence; clear and convincing; best interest; case plan; legal custody; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e); R.C. 2151.414(D); R.C. 2151.414(E); R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)(d); R.C. 2151.353(A)(3). Affirmed. Juvenile court did not err when it granted permanent custody of three children to the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services. The juvenile court’s finding that although Father completed most of the objectives of his case plan, he failed to benefit from those services, which was supported by the record. Permanent custody; domestic violence; manifest weight of the evidence; clear and convincing; best interest; case plan; legal custody; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e); R.C. 2151.414(D); R.C. 2151.414(E); R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)(d); R.C. 2151.353(A)(3). Affirmed. Juvenile court did not err when it granted permanent custody of three children to the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services. The juvenile court’s finding that although Father completed most of the objectives of his case plan, he failed to benefit from those services, which was supported by the record. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4851 |
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In re Z.L.
| 114984, 114986, 114987 | Parental rights; permanent custody; clear and convincing evidence; R.C. 2151.414(D)(2); best interests of the child; manifest weight of the evidence; sufficiency of the evidence; reasonable efforts. It was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the juvenile court granted permanent custody of the children to the agency. The juvenile court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) were supported by competent and credible evidence. Mother was unable substantially remedy the conditions that caused the child to be placed outside the child’s home, which included domestic-violence, mental-health, substance-abuse, and parenting concerns. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4852 |
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In re G.J.
| 114991 | Manifest weight of the evidence; R.C. 2151.414; permanent custody; best interest; clear and convincing evidence. Judgment affirmed. The juvenile court’s decision granting permanent custody to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record demonstrates that the juvenile court properly applied the two-prong statutory analysis required under R.C. 2151.414 and that clear and convincing evidence supports its decision to grant permanent custody of the children to CCDCFS. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4854 |
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In re J.C.
| 115103 | Child support; establishment of support; abuse of discretion; App.R. 9; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; nunc pro tunc; clerical error. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering appellant-father to pay child support. Where the appellant-father failed to comply with the appellate rules and separately argue his assignments of error or provide legal support for his arguments, the assignments of error are disregarded. The trial court’s clerical error, stating in its journal entry that paternity was established in 2019 when the record reflects it was established in 2009, is properly corrected by a nunc pro tunc. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
10/23/2025
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10/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4855 |
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Manning v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth.
| 114429 | New arguments on appeal; identification of error in the record; pro se litigant; App.R. 16(A)(7); App.R. 12(A)(2). Affirmed. Appellant’s assignments of error are disregarded because they either assert new arguments that were not before the trial court or fail to identify the error in the record and argue the assignment separately in the brief. Appellant’s status as a pro se litigant does not excuse the deficiencies in the appeal. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
10/16/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4751 |
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Nemec v. Morledge
| 114664 & 114744 | Arbitration; motion to vacate; timely; filed; electronic filing; clerk of courts; authority to reject filing. Trial court erred in refusing to direct clerk of courts to accept for filing appellant’s motion to vacate an arbitration award and to place the motion on active docket. There was no court rule or law authorizing the clerk of courts to reject a timely filed motion to vacate on the grounds that the wrong defendant was named in the case caption. Consequently, the trial court also erred in granting appellees’ application to confirm the arbitration award where there is a timely filed motion to vacate the award pending before the court. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
10/16/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4752 |
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In re J.C.
| 114694 & 114711 | Child support; cash medical support; abuse of discretion; bootstrapping; res judicata; nunc pro tunc; parenting time; clarification of court order; disqualification of trial judge. Appellant cannot use this appeal to challenge previous court orders that appellant did not appeal. The trial court has the authority to clarify its previous orders. The court of appeals is not the proper forum to try and have a trial judge disqualified from a case; that jurisdiction lies with the Ohio Supreme Court. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
10/16/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4753 |
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AMG Peterbilt Group, L.L.C. v. Apple Growth Partners, Inc.
| 114704 | Motion for sanctions; R.C. 2323.51; sanctions award; hearing; frivolous conduct; abuse of discretion; reasonable attorney; real party in interest. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct was frivolous under R.C. 2323.51 and awarded one defendant attorney fees and costs. Because the trial judge had the benefit of viewing the entire course of the proceedings and was the most familiar with the parties and their attorneys, the court’s finding of frivolous conduct is subject to substantial deference by a reviewing court. Here, plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct adversely affected the defendants because no reasonable attorney would continue to pursue plaintiff’s claims after knowing that plaintiff was not the real party in interest by virtue of its sale to another corporation prior to filing the underlying lawsuit. Additionally, plaintiff’s counsel’s post-summary judgment conduct continued to provide no justification for pursuing plaintiff’s claims. Because the trial court must hold a hearing prior to a sanctions award in accordance with R.C. 2323.51(B)(2)(c), we reverse the portion of the award regarding one defendant’s motion and remand the matter solely for a hearing on that defendant’s motion for sanctions. The sanctions award with regard to the other defendant shall remain undisturbed. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
10/16/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4754 |
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State v. Bethel
| 114722 | Prosecutorial misconduct; ineffective assistance of counsel; trial strategy; manifest weight. Appellant’s convictions for felonious assault are upheld. Prosecutor’s statements during closing argument did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct since the statements did not prejudice appellant. Furthermore, defense counsel was not ineffective for deciding not to delay the trial to recall a witness during appellant’s case-in-chief that was subject to cross-examination during the State’s case-in-chief since the decision amounted to trial strategy. Counsel was also not ineffective for not objecting during the prosecutor’s close because there was no misconduct for the defense counsel to object to. Last, the appellant’s convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the jury did not clearly lose its way and create a manifest injustice. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/16/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4755 |
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State v. Schumacher
| 114773 | Driver’s license suspension; bootstrapping; Civ.R. 60; App.R. 4; App.R. 5; Crim.R. 57; bootstrapping. Appellant did not file a direct appeal of his conviction. After filing an untimely appeal as of right, this court dismissed his appeal. The appellant then filed a motion to terminate his driver’s license suspension, arguing that it was contrary to law, an argument he could have made on direct appeal. Appellant attempted to bootstrap a claim that is now time-barred. Therefore, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider his appeal. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
10/16/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4756 |
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Berea v. Blackshear
| 114819 | Domestic violence; R.C. 2919.25; attempt to cause physical harm; no evidence of physical harm needed; manifest weight of the evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel; bench trial; failure to object. Defendant’s conviction for domestic violence is affirmed. The conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The victim testified that the defendant kicked her in the face and attempted to kick her in the body when she was lying on the floor. Defendant failed to show that his counsel’s failure to object to certain testimony was prejudicial to him in this bench trial. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/16/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4757 |
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State v. Molina
| 114849 | Guilty plea; prejudice; completely fail; effect of guilty plea. Guilty pleas vacated where trial court completely failed to explain the effect of a guilty and the fact that a guilty plea is an admission of guilt was not obvious from the plea colloquy. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/16/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4758 |
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FAM 13375, Inc. v. Brook Park
| 114490 | Declaratory judgment; facial constitutional challenge to municipal ordinance; home rule amendment; dismissal of claims. Plaintiff was denied an occupancy permit for a retail store based on a municipal zoning ordinance. In addition to filing an administrative appeal, plaintiff filed this declaratory-judgment action alleging that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because it conflicted with a state statute. Plaintiff also requested that the court use the declaratory-judgment action to declare that plaintiff succeeded on the merits of the case. The court declared the ordinance constitutional in that it did not conflict with the statute and, at the same time, dismissed the entire case. We affirm the declaration that the ordinance is constitutional in this regard. We also affirm the dismissal of all other claims because the merits of the zoning issue were subject to the Administrative Appeal. The portion of the journal entry ruling on the merits of the zoning issue are vacated. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/9/2025
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10/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4667 |
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FAM 13375, Inc. v. Brook Park Bd. of Zoning Appeals
| 114498 | Notice of appeal; administrative appeal; zoning decision. Judgment reversed; case remanded. The trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s administrative appeal from a decision of the zoning board. The plaintiff perfected a timely appeal under R.C. 2505.03 and 2505.04 and, therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider its appeal. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
10/9/2025
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10/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4668 |
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Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections v. Bardwell
| 114579 | Declaratory judgment; public-records request; compliance; disposal; Board of Elections; jurisdiction; dismiss; Court of Claims; mandamus; R.C. 149.43; justiciable controversy; moot. - Trial court erred in failing to dismiss the Board of the Elections’ complaint for declaratory judgment in total because the court lacked jurisdiction over the action. Once the court determined that the Board’s first declaration concerned R.C. 149.43 and thus under the jurisdiction of either the Court of Claims or mandamus, the justiciable controversy between the Board and the defendant ceased. The second declaration request did not present any conflict or controversy with the defendant, but merely requested permission to dispose of public records. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
10/9/2025
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10/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4669 |
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State v. Glass
| 114607 | Manifest weight of the evidence; felonious assault; aggravated assault; reckless assault; simple assault; jury instructions; plain error; ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant punched victim’s head multiple times, resulting in facial fractures. The manifest weight of the evidence supported appellant’s conviction for felonious assault. By punching victim in the face, appellant acted knowing that serious physical harm was likely to result, even though victim was fighting back and both fighters were women. Under these circumstances, the court did not err by not instructing the jury on certain lesser assault offenses and trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by not requesting them. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
10/9/2025
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10/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4670 |
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Terrell v. Ford Motor Co.
| 114613 | Subject-matter jurisdiction; jurisdiction; asbestos; wrongful death; Bureau of Workers’ Compensation ("BWC"); lung cancer; estate; next of kin; R.C. 2307.92; R.C. Ch. 2125; R.C. 4123.59; Industrial Commission; exclusive jurisdiction; administrative appeal; constitutionality; declaratory-judgment action; workplace injury; Article II, Section 35 of the Ohio Constitution; right to a remedy. The trial court’s administrative dismissal of the Estate’s wrongful-death and personal-injury claims against Ford Motor Company is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court to enter a dismissal based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Estate’s claims against Ford Motor Company are based on an alleged workplace injury that resulted in the decedent’s death. Accordingly, the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and the Industrial Commission have exclusive jurisdiction over the claims asserted, including the claim asserting an as-applied constitutional challenge to R.C. 4123.59. The trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the constitutional challenge as an administrative appeal from the agency’s decision. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
10/9/2025
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10/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4671 |
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