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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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State v. Zeigler
| C-160428 | ALLIED OFFENSES - R.C.2941.25: The trial court did not commit plain error by failing to merge as allied offenses of similar import defendant's convictions for aggravated burglary, two counts of rape, and felonious assault where the aggravated-burglary conviction required proof of physical harm, and the state produced evidence of physical harm to support the aggravated-burglary conviction that was separate from the physical harm supporting the two counts of rape and the serious physical harm supporting the felonious assault. | Deters | Hamilton |
9/20/2017
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9/20/2017
| 2017-Ohio-7673 |
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Parker v. L.T.
| C-160642 | APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL - NEGLIGENCE: Where plaintiff elderly church guest, who was knocked down in the parking lot by a minor church guest playing football, brought a negligence claim against the father of the minor, alleging that he had violated his duty as a parent and as a church deacon to supervise his son and the other boys playing football in the parking lot, and where plaintiff subsequently withdrew her claim against the father in his parental capacity and settled her negligence claim against the church, and then challenged on appeal the grant of summary judgment to the father, but neglected to provide any argument, citation to legal authority, or reference to the record relating to the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the father, the appellate court will not address the challenge. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant minor, who was playing football in the church parking lot with a group of boys and collided with plaintiff, who was walking through the parking lot, on the basis that he owed her no duty of care, because it was reasonably foreseeable that the minor, by running and playing football in a crowded parking lot, would create a risk of harm to other individuals who were walking through the parking lot, and the minor recognized the risk of harm to others. Defendant minor was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff, who was walking through a crowded parking lot between church services, had proceeded into the "field of football" at her own risk where she was neither a participant in nor a spectator of a football game being played by children in the church parking lot. Defendant minor was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis that a football game being played in a church parking lot was an "open and obvious" hazard, because the open-and-obvious doctrine is limited to persons with a property interest in the premises. | Deters | Hamilton |
9/20/2017
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9/20/2017
| 2017-Ohio-7674 |
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In re J.F.
| C-160719, C-160720, C-160721, C-160722, C-160723 | JURISDICTION ? DELINQUENCY ? COMPETENCY: The state's appeal from the juvenile court's dismissal of the complaint alleging that the juvenile was unruly must be dismissed, because the state did not have an appeal of right under R.C. 2945.67(A): the statute only provides an appeal of right from the juvenile court's dismissal of a delinquency complaint. The time for a juvenile to attain competency under R.C. 2152.59 is not tolled for periods of time that the juvenile fails to participate in competency-attainment services; rather, R.C. 2152.59 provides mechanisms to address a juvenile's failure to participate in such services, such as placing the juvenile in a more restrictive setting to receive services. | Myers | Hamilton |
9/20/2017
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9/20/2017
| 2017-Ohio-7675 |
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State v. Gibert
| C-160857 | THEFT/RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY - EVIDENCE - SUFFICIENCY - VERDICT FORM - DEGREE OF OFFENSE: Defendant's conviction for receiving stolen property was supported by sufficient evidence where she continued to retain possession of a rental car for several weeks after the car rental agency had unequivocally and expressly withdrawn its consent for her to use the car and had notified her that she was no longer entitled to use it. Where the jury's verdict form included neither the degree of the offense for which defendant was convicted, nor a statement that the aggravating element-that the property involved was a motor vehicle-was found, defendant could only be convicted of a misdemeanor of the first degree, which is the least degree under R.C. 2913.51 of the offense of receiving stolen property. | Myers | Hamilton |
9/20/2017
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9/20/2017
| 2017-Ohio-7676 |
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Millard v. Ohio Accountancy Bd.
| C-160858 | ADMINISTRATIVE MISCELLANEOUS: The trial court did not err by affirming the accountancy board's revocation of a certified public accountant certificate where evidence that the accountant had been convicted of two unauthorized-use-of-property offenses was sufficient to support the board's disciplinary action under R.C. 4701.16(A)(6), because the offenses involved elements of dishonesty or fraud. | Myers | Hamilton |
9/20/2017
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9/20/2017
| 2017-Ohio-7677 |
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State v. Pitts
| C-150766 | APPELLATE REVIEW: Appellant's appeal from the overruling of his postconviction motion to correct the postrelease-control portion of his sentences is subject to dismissal as moot, because the court of appeals cannot provide appellant with any meaningful relief after the common pleas court entered judgment correcting postrelease control and that judgment was affirmed on appeal. | Miller | Hamilton |
9/15/2017
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9/15/2017
| 2017-Ohio-7623 |
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In re A.M.
| C-160532, C-160533 | DELINQUENCY - SENTENCING - CONFINEMENT CREDIT: The juvenile court erred by denying the juvenile defendant's motions to include as confinement credit under R.C. 2152.18(B) time served at the Abraxas Ohio Residential Treatment Center without taking any evidence or making any findings regarding the nature of the Abraxas facility or the juvenile's time at Abraxas under the guidelines set forth in In re D.P., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-140518, 2014-Ohio-5414. | Deters | Hamilton |
9/15/2017
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9/15/2017
| 2017-Ohio-7624 |
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State v. Summerlin
| C-160539 | COUNSEL - EVIDENCE - JURY INSTRUCTIONS - FLIGHT - HEARSAY - IMPEACHMENT - WITNESS: The decision whether to appoint substitute counsel rests within the sound discretion of the trial court; in the exercise of its discretion the trial court is required to make an inquiry into defendant's request, including whether the motion was timely and whether there had been a complete breakdown in communication between defendant and his counsel. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's ill-timed, successive request for substitute counsel on the grounds that counsel had failed to share all discovery with defendant when, well before the request, the court had entertained an identical oral motion, had carefully explained the limitation placed on counsel by Crim.R. 16(C), and had appointed new counsel to represent defendant, and when the motion was renewed held an inquiry at which current appointed counsel explained that he had provided defendant with all discovery material that had not been designated "counsel only" under Crim.R. 16(C), had met with defendant 15 times before trial and had explained to him the limitations placed on them by the discovery rules, had discussed at length their trial strategy and the plea negotiation, and had concluded that the attorney-client relationship had not broken down. Evid.R. 806(A) provides that when a hearsay statement has been admitted into evidence, "the credibility of the declarant may be attacked * * * by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness," and Evid.R. 806(C) permits the use of Evid.R. 609 prior-conviction records to impeach a hearsay declarant even if that declarant does not testify. Evidence of flight is admissible to show consciousness of guilt, and a jury instruction on flight is proper if the record contains sufficient evidence to support the charge as long as the instruction does not raise a presumption of guilt or shift the burden of proof to defendant to explain his flight. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by instructing the jury on flight as consciousness of guilt where the state's evidence showed that defendant, knowing that the police would soon arrive, had immediately left the scene of shootings even though his victims lay seriously wounded, that he had removed himself from the city following the shootings, that he had made statements that he knew that he was "hot," acknowledging that the police were looking for him, and that he or his associates had offered one shooting victim money not to testify at trial. The trial court did not abuse its sound discretion over the admission or exclusion of relevant evidence when it admitted into evidence two prejudicial photographs taken from defendant's Facebook profile page, one photo showing defendant with a gun in his waistband, and the other photo showing defendant with another perpetrator of a shooting, each with a gun. | Cunningham | Hamilton |
9/15/2017
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9/15/2017
| 2017-Ohio-7625 |
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State v. Schwarm
| C-160677 | SENTENCING ? RULE OF LENITY - COMPETENCY: Under the rule of lenity, where the indictment alleged that defendant had committed offenses during a range of time that encompassed pre-Senate Bill 2 and post-Senate Bill 2 time periods, defendant was entitled to be sentenced under the law in effect post-Senate Bill 2, where the maximum sentence that could have been imposed for each rape offense was ten years, as opposed to the 11 years that could have been imposed if the offenses had been committed prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 2. Where the trial court was required to make findings in support of consecutive sentences at the sentencing hearing, and where the appellate court cannot discern from the record that the trial court engaged in the required analysis, the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences was erroneous. Where the record does not contain evidence to create a sufficient doubt that defendant was incompetent, the trial court did not err in failing to sua sponte order that defendant undergo a competency evaluation. | Myers | Hamilton |
9/15/2017
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9/15/2017
| 2017-Ohio-7626 |
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LV Reis, Inc. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision
| C-160732 | PROCEDURE/RULES - CIV.R. 53 - CORPORATIONS - STANDING: The trial court did not err in granting a motion to strike the plaintiff's objections to the magistrate's decision where they were not filed within 14 days from the date the magistrate issued his decision as required by Civ.R. 53 even though the local rule provides for a 17-day time period based on an overruled appellate court opinion. The trial court did not err in determining that the plaintiff had no standing to appeal an administrative decision to the court of common pleas because it was a foreign corporation that was not licensed in Ohio prior to initiating the action. | Deters | Hamilton |
9/15/2017
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9/15/2017
| 2017-Ohio-7627 |
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