| Case No. | Case Caption | Case Status | Date
Accepted | Case Issue |
|
2019-1355
|
A.J.R., et al.
v.
Board of Education of Toledo City School District, et al.
|
OPEN
|
11/26/2019
| A. Proposition of Law:
There can be no finding of reckless conduct or perverse disregard of a known risk where the record establishes that in response to reports of student teasing, educators promptly speak with the students about the teasing, frequently ask the students how they are doing, and regularly monitor the students in the lunchroom and classroom. Under these circumstances, if a student with no history of violence later pokes another student with a pencil, R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) shields these educators from liability. |
|
2019-1309
|
Harmon Lingle and Mark Grosser
v.
State of Ohio, et al.
|
OPEN
|
11/27/2019
| Does R.C. 2950.09(F) provide out-of-state offenders
challenging their R.C. 2950.09(A) automatic sexual predator
classification with a right to an evidentiary hearing whereby the
offender must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he
or she is not likely to commit a sexually-oriented offense in the
future? |
|
2019-1274
|
Ohioans For Concealed Carry et al.
v.
City of Columbus, Ohio c/o City Attorney Zach M. Klein et al.
|
OPEN
|
11/26/2019
| Proposition of Law No. I: A non-profit firearms-rights association has standing
to challenge as unconstitutional municipal ordinances that violate R.C. §9.68 by
maintaining an action for declaratory and injunctive relief under R.C. §9.68,
R.C. §733.59, and/or Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2721. |
|
2019-1250
|
State of Ohio
v.
Ricardo Lozada
|
OPEN
(Held)
|
11/26/2019
| State’s Proposition of Law: A reviewing court applies a substantial
compliance standard in determining whether criminal defendants
understand they are waiving their constitutional trial rights when
entering a plea in a felony case. |
|
2019-1247
|
Harmon Lingle and Mark Grosser
v.
State of Ohio, et al.
|
OPEN
|
11/27/2019
| A person with an out-of-state sex offense conviction cannot be required to register in Ohio as a “sexual predator” if they can show that their home-state registration requirement is not substantially similar to Ohio law because the person is not likely to reoffend, and therefore does not fit the statutory definition of “sexual predator” in R.C. 2950.01(E). |
|
2019-1232
|
Richard Binder, et al. and Gerald Butterfield, et al.
v.
Cuyahoga County
|
OPEN
|
11/26/2019
| PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. 1:
O.R.C. 124.34 does not provide classified civil servants with an independent cause of action in the
court of common pleas. As such, Ohio courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to certify a class
action under Civ.R. 23 when the cause of action is based upon O.R.C. 124.34.
Anderson v. Minter, 32 Ohio St.2d 207 (1972), applied. |
|
2019-1232
|
Richard Binder, et al. and Gerald Butterfield, et al.
v.
Cuyahoga County
|
OPEN
|
11/26/2019
| PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. 2:
O.R.C. 124.34 establishes specialized statutory proceedings through the State Personnel Board of
Review or civil service commission for classified civil service employees to challenge a claimed
“reduction in pay.” Ohio courts lack jurisdiction over declaratory judgment proceedings that
attempt to bypass the specialized statutory proceeding established under O.R.C. 124.34.
State ex rel. Albright v. Court of Common Pleas, 60 Ohio St.3d 40 (1991), applied. |
|
2019-1232
|
Richard Binder, et al. and Gerald Butterfield, et al.
v.
Cuyahoga County
|
OPEN
|
11/26/2019
| PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. 3:
Class action plaintiffs who fail to exhaust available administrative appeals designated to hear
their claims lack standing and are barred from pursuing those claims in judicial forums. |
|
2019-1232
|
Richard Binder, et al. and Gerald Butterfield, et al.
v.
Cuyahoga County
|
OPEN
|
11/26/2019
| PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. 4
In conducting the required “rigorous analysis” under Civ. R. 23, a court may not disregard
the proposed class definition and, sua sponte, certify the ultimate issue for class treatment. |
|
2019-1221
|
State of Ohio
v.
David Castner II
|
OPEN
|
10/29/2019
| Proposition No. 3: This Court’s 1993 definition of “technical violation” controls the meaning
of that term as used in the General Assembly’s 2017 amendment to R.C. 2929.15 |
|