Industrial Commission’s Refusal to Discontinue Workers’ Comp Benefits Not Reviewable by Local Court
2008-1946 and 2008-1949. Benton v. Hamilton Cty. Educational Serv. Ctr., Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-4969.
Hamilton App. No. C-070223, 2008-Ohio-4272. Certified question is answered in the negative, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is dismissed.
Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.
O'Donnell and Cupp, JJ., concur in judgment only.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-Ohio-4969.pdf

View oral argument video of this case.
Requires the free Adobe Flash Player.
(Sept. 29, 2009) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that a decision of the Industrial Commission refusing to discontinue a previously approved claim for workers’ compensation benefits does not involve the claimant’s right to participate in the workers’ compensation fund under R.C. 4123.512, and therefore is not a decision subject to review by a court of common pleas. The Court’s lead opinion was authored by Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger.
Diazonia Benton was injured in a car crash in March 2003 while she was employed by the Hamilton County Educational Service Center (Hamilton ESC). Benton later applied for and in March 2005 was granted state workers’ compensation benefits for medical conditions arising from the 2003 accident. Hamilton ESC did not appeal the allowance of Benton’s claim within the 60-day time limit provided under state workers’ compensation statutes.
In February 2006, Hamilton ESC filed a motion requesting that the Industrial Commission exercise continuing jurisdiction in Benton’s case (i.e., re-open her claim) and order that her benefits be terminated based on allegations of fraud in her original application. Following a hearing on that motion, a district hearing officer found no evidence of fraud and refused to re-open the case. A staff hearing officer affirmed the district officer’s denial of continuing jurisdiction, and the Industrial Commission declined to review the case further. Hamilton ESC then attempted to appeal the commission’s decision in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. Pursuant to a motion filed by Benton, the court dismissed the appeal, ruling that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider Hamilton ESC’s complaint because state workers’ compensation statutes did not authorize a common pleas court to review the Industrial Commission’s ruling declining to re-open a previously approved claim.
Hamilton ESC appealed the trial court’s dismissal order. The 1st District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the common pleas court for further proceedings. The appellate panel held that the common pleas court had subject matter jurisdiction to review the Industrial Commission’s ruling in this case because the commission’s refusal to exercise continuing jurisdiction to make a finding of fraud is “an issue involving the right to participate in the fund” under R.C. 4123.512. The 1st District then certified that its holding with regard to the appealability of the Industrial Commission’s ruling was in conflict with decisions of two other appellate districts addressing the same legal issue. The Supreme Court agreed to review the case to resolve the conflict among districts.
Writing for the Court in today’s decision, Justice Lanzinger noted that the state’s common pleas courts do not have inherent jurisdiction in workers’ compensation cases, but only have such jurisdiction as is conferred on them by the workers’ compensation statutes. Citing the Court’s decision in State ex rel. Liposchak v. Industrial Commission (2000), Justice Lanzinger wrote: “We have explained that appeals are limited to cases involving ‘whether an employee’s injury, disease, or death occurred in the course of and arising out of his or her employment.’ ... The issue to be determined is whether the appeal involves the claimant’s right to participate or continue to participate in the fund. ... Here, the commission found no evidence of fraud and thus declined to exercise continuing jurisdiction to reconsider the allowance of Benton’s claim. Therefore, we must determine whether that determination is itself an issue involving the right to participate under R.C. 4123.512.”
Justice Lanzinger pointed to prior court decisions holding that unless the statutory grounds for court review of workers’ compensation rulings are interpreted narrowly “almost every decision of the commission, major or minor, could eventually find its way to common pleas court.” In this case, she wrote, a narrow reading of the statute at issue supported a finding that refusal by the Industrial Commission to discontinue a claimant’s benefits does not involve the right to participate in the fund, and therefore is not appealable in common pleas court.
“First, the Industrial Commission’s decision on a claimant’s right to participate is a threshold determination,” wrote Justice Lanzinger. “Benton’s initial claim was allowed, and Hamilton ESC did not appeal her right to participate. If it had, the court of common pleas would have fully reviewed the initial right-to-participate determination, including any allegations of fraud. ... Hamilton ESC may not stand in the position it would have if it had alleged fraud on appeal of the allowance of the claim. Second, district and staff hearing officers did review Hamilton ESC’s claim and found no evidence of fraud. The denial of Hamilton ESC’s motion for a finding of fraud does not disturb the effect of the initial order that granted Benton’s right to participate. If evidence of fraud had been found and Benton’s right to participate had been terminated, Benton would have had a right to appeal. ... The commission’s refusal to find fraud, however, does not change the effect of the initial order. Additionally, appeal under R.C. 4123.512(D) involves a de novo review in which the claimant has the burden of proof ... Allowing the employer to appeal the continuance of the claim would require a successful claimant like Benton to prove again in common pleas court that her claim should be allowed, even when she had already prevailed administratively.”
“Because Hamilton ESC did not appeal the initial determination that Benton’s claim should be allowed and because the Industrial Commission did not make a finding of fraud so as to terminate Benton’s participation in the workers’ compensation fund, the initial determination on her right to participate remains unchanged,” Justice Lanzinger concluded. “The commission’s refusal to exercise continuing jurisdiction to reconsider the allowance of Benton’s claim is not a right-to-participate issue. We decline to extend the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas to review decisions of the Industrial Commission in cases like this.”
Justice Lanzinger’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Evelyn Lundberg Stratton and Maureen O’Connor.
Justice Robert R. Cupp entered a separate opinion, joined by Justice Terrence O’Donnell, in which he concurred only in the majority judgment that the Industrial Commission’s refusal to reopen Benton’s case was not subject to review in common pleas court. Justice Cupp indicated, however, that his concurrence was predicated on the specific facts of this case, and in particular on the facts that Hamilton ESC did not contend that it was unable to discover evidence of the alleged fraud prior to the time Benton’s claim was originally approved, or that the evidence of fraud on which it based its motion to re-open the case was not discovered until after the initial hearing.
Contacts
Benjamin C. Mizer, 614.466.8980, for the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.
Gregory W. Bellman, 513.621.2260, for Diazonia Benton.
David J. Lampe, 513.421.2540, for the Hamilton County Educational Service Center.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
